Problems of Communism

MARCH-JUNE 1989

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USSR & Central America—A Note
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Book Reviews
John A. Armstrong
Robert W. Janes

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MARCH-JUNE 1989 VOL XXXVIII

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COVER: China's Deng Xiaoping and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev confer in Beijing on May 16, 1989, during the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years. Photo by Wide World.

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IN THIS ISSUE OF

Problems of Communism

Articles

New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security

Rajan Menon

In line with his "new thinking" in foreign policy, Mikhail Gorbachev has attempted to effect substantial change in Soviet relationships with the Northeast Asian states. Thus, the USSR has offered proposals on military bases, arms control, and economic cooperation in Northeast Asia to allay the concerns in China, Japan, and, to a lesser extent, South Korea that stemmed from the Brezhnev-era's military buildup in the Far East. Attempts to explore common ground with China and Japan in promoting trade and other kinds of ties have also marked bilateral Soviet relations with these countries. To enhance the credibility of the new approach, Gorbachev has appointed new officials to be responsible for the overall direction of foreign policy as well as different specialists and diplomats to deal with the Northeast Asian countries. However, these countries are not convinced of Soviet good intentions, and many problems between them and Moscow remain unresolved.

China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation

Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine

Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988 represents a culmination of recent attempts by China and India to close the book on 30 years of hostility and to promote a better atmosphere for the resolution of long-standing contentious issues. Although summit diplomacy is unlikely to bring about dramatic changes in Sino-Indian relations in the near term, it will contribute to building support in both countries for expanded relations; and it has created a regular mechanism for working toward the settlement of the border dispute. The general relaxation of international tension also is likely to assure that Sino-Indian disputes will be resolved peacefully. However, the divergent interests and possibly incompatible regional ambitions of China and India will continue to shape interstate relations in South Asia. Thus, the normalization of Sino-Indian relations can only ameliorate, not eliminate, the long-standing rivalry between these two major powers.

The USSR and the Third World in the 1980's

David E. Albright

In the last decade, the number of distinct Soviet schools of thought concerning what policy the USSR should pursue toward the Third World has multiplied significantly. To those who would support "revolutionary-democratic" and/or radical military regimes have been added those who advocate some acceptance of the attraction that capitalism has for emergent Third World governments or who see the Soviet Union's interests to lie in dealing with the Third World as part of an economically interdependent world economy. The top Soviet leadership, in contrast with earlier periods, has not endorsed a single school of thought exclusively, but rather has combined elements of the policy prescriptions of all of the contending schools, the mix varying substantially from region to region.

The Soviet Union and Southern African Security

S. Neil MacFarlane

In recent months, the Soviet Union's outlook on regional security in Southern Africa has shifted from a posture of fostering conflict over Angola and Namibia and endorsing violent change in South Africa proper to contributing to conflict settlement on the Angola-Namibia front and even some moderation of views on social change within South Africa itself. This shift both reflects and informs a broader general trend in Soviet Third World policy, a new receptivity to regional conflict settlement that is rooted in adverse concrete local experience rather than in ideological prescriptions.

(Abstracts continued on reverse side)

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Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic

Vladimir Tismaneanu

The opposition movement of the 1980's in the German Democratic Republic began as pacifism supported by the Evangelical Church. Since the mid-1980's, it has not only become increasingly concerned with the militarization of public life internally and the threat of nuclear annihilation but has also insisted that true peace both domestically and internationally requires the observance of human rights, including political rights, on the part of the East German regime. Together, the various pacifist, ecological, and other groups represent a nascent civil society.

Note

Change and Continuity in Soviet Central American Policy

Jan S. Adams

Gorbachev's new thinking has introduced perceptible changes in Soviet policy toward Central America and the Caribbean: notably, a new Soviet reluctance to continue providing military and economic support to clients in the region at previous levels, signs of pressure from Moscow on client states and movements to settle regional conflicts by political rather than military means, and some efforts by the USSR to play down ideology in relations with states and parties of the region. While this new posture may offer a window of opportunity for regional states to resolve their differences less burdened by East-West issues, the Soviet Union continues to seek power and influence in the region, not least of all by pursuing traditional lines of behavior, including support for groups pursuing social revolution by violent means, provision of considerable amounts of military, economic, and political assistance to major client states, and the mounting of virulent ideological attacks and disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States.

Essay-Reviews

The Future of Eastern Europe

John A. Armstrong

The books by Zbigniew Brzezinski, Roman Szporluk, and Ivan Berend indicate a turning point in assessing contemporary developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By using multidimensional interpretations solidly grounded in historical analysis, the three authors provide a coherent picture of the prospects of communism in this century and give their perspectives on the current manifestations in the communist world of nationalism, a phenomenon that had been written off as transient not only by Marxists but by many Western liberal analysts as well.

Moscow and the Military Buildup in Northern Europe

Robert W. Janes

Recent works on the Nordic security arrangements draw attention to their role in the military competition between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The key question the works under review attempt to answer is whether the postwar stability that has obtained in Northern Europe can be maintained in the face of the region's increased importance for both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Several of the works under review also analyze the role of Finland in Soviet policy toward Northern Europe, the impact of domestic politics on defense policy formulation in the Nordic states, and the issue of natural-resource exploitation as it affects the region's security environment. The authors agree that Moscow will continue to take an active interest in Scandinavia; they disagree over whether this interest will enhance or diminish Nordic stability.

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New Thinking and Northeast Asian Security

Rajan Menon

Since Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in March 1985, he has, at regular intervals, proposed initiatives relating to security and arms control in East Asia. Gorbachev's proposals began with his July 1986 address in Vladivostok. The process continued in November 1986 with the signing in New Delhi of "The Declaration of Principles for a Nuclear-Weapon–Free and Non-Violent World" and Gorbachev's speech to the Indian Parliament, which was studded with suggestions for promoting stability and reducing armaments in the Asia-Pacific region. Then, almost exactly a year after the Vladivostok initiative, Gorbachev elaborated upon his existing proposals and offered others in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper *Merdeka*. And, to maintain the momentum, he outlined seven specific proposals—not all of them new—on East Asian security at a speech given at Krasnoyarsk in September 1988.[1]

Although Gorbachev has taken a direct, personal role in this dynamic and unprecedented effort to reshape the Far Eastern security environment, he has been bolstered by a well-organized public relations campaign in which the Soviet media, senior party leaders, state officials, and leading academic specialists have all participated. The prolonged and intense effort leaves little doubt that the Soviets are involved in a serious, long-term drive to win support for their ideas on economic cooperation, military stability, and arms reduction in East Asia.

The specifics of the Soviet program as presented by Gorbachev and disseminated by his associates involve a range of issues: incorporating Siberia into the "international division of labor" by opening it up to foreign investment; instituting confidence-building measures to reduce the threat of accidental war; limiting specific forms of naval activity in the northwest Pacific; establishing multilateral cooperation to resolve regional conflicts; enhancing the security of sea lanes vital to commerce; initiating reciprocal US and Soviet withdrawal from existing naval bases; and calling for a new and comprehensive security regime in Asia which would ultimately merge with a similar arrangement in Europe to establish a universal system of collective security to replace the existing system based on precarious arms competitions and contending alliances.

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[1]For a translation of the Vladivostok speech of July 1986, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), July 29, 1986, pp. R/1–20 (the speech is cited hereafter as VS). Gorbachev's address to the Indian Parliament on Nov. 27, 1986, is translated in ibid., Nov. 28, 1986, pp. D/6–12. For the text of the Delhi Declaration, see *Pravda* (Moscow), Nov. 28, 1986, trans. in ibid., Dec. 3, 1986, pp. D/14–16. The text of the *Merdeka* interview is in *Pravda*, July 23, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 23, 1987, pp. CC/1–10 (the interview is hereafter cited as MI). The foreign policy portion of the Sept. 16, 1988, Krasnoyarsk speech appears in "News and Views from the USSR," Soviet Embassy Information Department (Washington, DC), Sept. 19, 1988, pp. 1–11 (the speech is cited hereafter as KS).

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The Context: New Thinking

According to Gorbachev and his colleagues, these diverse and sweeping proposals for East Asian security flow from the "new political thinking" that guides Soviet foreign policy.[2] The already extensive Western debate about this new political thinking focuses on two issues: first, just how "new" is the new thinking; second, is it essentially a public relations offensive, devoid of any concrete Soviet *actions,* aimed at identifying the USSR with the forces of peace and progress and the United States and its allies with a dangerous, unstable, and wasteful status quo founded on the acquisition and expansion of arms?[3]

The debate over the "newness" of the new thinking is not particularly meaningful. Any body of thought—and new thinking is no exception—has ancestry, pedigree, and intellectual roots. Thus Gorbachev's insistence that survival in the nuclear age requires that the superpowers find means to coexist has, by his own admission, roots in Lenin's ideas of the 1920's on peaceful coexistence. Gorbachev's belief that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons invalidates Clausewitzian conceptions of war and renders the notion of victory meaningless resembles views expressed after Stalin's death by Georgiy Malenkov and, indeed, parallels the direction in which Soviet military doctrine was evolving in the last years of the Brezhnev regime. Other components of "new thinking," such as banning nuclear tests or creating favorable conditions for domestic economic growth through curbing expenditures on armaments, evoke memories of Nikita Khrushchev.

The second point of debate—whether new thinking is rhetoric aimed at putting the US and its allies on the defensive or a set of serious proposals that will guide Soviet behavior—is much more important. As with most good questions, it admits no categorical answer. For one thing, the question presupposes a mutually exclusive distinction in the minds of Soviet leaders on the propagandistic value of new thinking on the one hand, and its potential operational contribution to Soviet security on the other. To be sure, the dominance of public relations as a motive is evident in some Soviet initiatives, such as the support for North Korea's calls for an end to US–South Korean military exercises, the withdrawal of US conventional and nuclear forces from the Korean peninsula, and the reunification of the Korean peninsula on a confederal basis.[4] Such a Soviet posture is clearly meant to maintain the USSR's position in North Korea—a state that has long adroitly manipulated Sino-Soviet rivalry—as well as to appeal to that segment of the South Korean public that views the US military presence as intrusive, demeaning, and a key obstacle to national unity. The USSR understands full well the strategic significance attached by Washington to its deployments in South Korea, and that a major, unilateral disengagement by the US would, in the eyes of American leaders, contribute to instability on the Korean peninsula and weaken Japan's confidence in the reliability of American security commitments.

Similar motivation could be ascribed to Gorbachev's proposal made in the September 1988 Krasnoyarsk speech for coupling a US withdrawal from its bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay in the Philippines with a Soviet disengagement from the naval facilities at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam. In making this offer Gorbachev was undoubtedly aware that it would be rejected—as indeed it promptly was—by the US, given not only the centrality of the Philippine installations to the US Seventh Fleet's ability to operate in the western Pacific, but also the asymmetry between the Soviet air and naval presence in Vietnam and the significantly larger American deployments in the Philippines.[5]

[2]This point is made in VS, p. R/11. See also MI, p. CC/2; KS, p. 2; *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), June 9, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 11, 1987, pp. C/1–2; Mikhail Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* (Washington, DC), Spring 1988, pp. 55, 64.

[3]For surveys of the content of the "new thinking," see Charles Glickham (pseud.), "New Directions for Soviet Foreign Policy," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL Supplement 2/86, Sept. 6, 1986; Jeffrey Checkel, "Gorbachev's 'New Political Thinking' and the Formation of Soviet Foreign Policy," ibid., RL 429/88, Sept. 23, 1988; Paul Marantz, "From Lenin to Gorbachev: Changing Soviet Perspectives on East-West Relations," *Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, Occasional Papers* (Ottawa), May 1988, pp. 59–91; Stephen Meyer, "The Sources and Prospects of Gorbachev's New Political Thinking on Security," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1988, pp. 124–63; and David Holloway, "Gorbachev's New Thinking," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), America and the World 1988/89, 1989, pp. 66–81. For assessments of the significance of new thinking for Soviet foreign policy behavior that differ sharply from those above, see Gerhard Wettig, "'New Thinking' on Security and East-West Relations," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), March–April 1988, pp. 1–14; and Matthew Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach to Security," *World Policy Journal* (New York), Fall 1986, pp. 561–99. Wettig sees the new thinking as largely a public relations offensive unlikely to have a major effect on Soviet force structure and foreign policy conduct.

[4]E.g., the message sent by the Soviet leadership on the 40th anniversary of the formation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in *Pravda,* Sept. 9, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Sept. 9, 1988, p. 18. The Soviet delegation attending the celebration of the anniversary was led by then-KGB chairman Viktor Chebrikov, who likewise supported the North Korean proposals. See ibid., pp. 20–21. For other examples of Soviet support for the North Korean position, see the report on Gorbachev's speech during Kim Il-song's October 1986 visit to Moscow in *Pravda,* Oct. 26, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Oct. 28, 1986, pp. C/3–5; Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 30, 1986, in ibid., Jan. 5, 1987, p. C/2; *Izvestiya* (Moscow), July 18, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 20, 1987, p. C/1; Ivan Glebov, "For New International Relations in Asia and the Pacific," *International Affairs* (Moscow), October 1987, p. 30.

[5]KS, p. 7; Milan Hauner, "Gorbachev in Krasnoyarsk: New Soviet Disarmament Proposals for Asia," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 426/88,

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Soviet party General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev attends an aquatic festival on July 27, 1986, during his visit to Vladivostok.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

At the same time, it is a mistake on the basis of these and other such examples to label the new thinking as pure propaganda. New thinking has entailed some major, and in some cases unprecedented, changes in actual Soviet *behavior*. Thus, from August 1985 through February 1987, the Soviet Union adhered to a unilateral moratorium on nuclear weapons testing, although it quickly became apparent that the Reagan Administration would not follow suit. Moreover, to counter US assertions that such bans could not be verified, the Soviets allowed American scientists to install monitoring devices near Soviet test sites. In making proposals for conventional and nuclear arms control, Gorbachev has incorporated provisions for on-site verification, an arrangement that the USSR had been traditionally unwilling to allow.[6] The verification provisions of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty show that the shift in the Soviet position was not simply verbal. And, in proposing verification arrangements for reductions on sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM's), Moscow has proposed on-site procedures that are far more intrusive than what the US is prepared to allow.[7]

The INF accord itself was possible only because the Soviets were willing to make major changes in their original positions. The Soviets ultimately returned to the bargaining table after having walked out of the negotiations when the US deployments of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe commenced. They then abandoned the demand that any INF agreement count British and French nuclear missiles when calculating the number of theater nuclear missiles arrayed against the USSR. Finally, the Soviets did what many had believed impossible when President Reagan suggested a global "zero option" in 1982. In the *Merdeka* interview, Gorbachev agreed to dismantle Soviet INF's from Asia and Europe, dropping in the process the Soviet demand that, for this dismantling to occur, the US would have to withdraw its nuclear weapons platforms and delivery vehicles from South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, and pull its aircraft carriers behind lines to be mutually negotiated. The USSR thus agreed to the removal of all Soviet INF's from Asia and Europe in exchange for the dismantling of similar US systems in Western Europe.[8]

Sept. 17, 1988, pp. 2–3. As Hauner points out, "Gorbachev has made no mention of giving up Da Nang air base in Vietnam or any of the other installations said to be under Soviet control" (p. 2). For early official criticisms from the US, see *The Washington Post*, Sept. 17, 1988.

[6]Evangelista, "The New Soviet Approach," loc. cit., pp. 563–67, 581–83.

[7]See the interview with Viktor Karpov in *The Guardian* (London), Mar. 31, 1988; and the interview with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov in *La Stampa* (Turin), May 29, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 8, 1988, pp. 11–12.

[8]For Gorbachev's speech in which he originally linked the zero option on

(fn. continues on p. 4)

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Under the rubric of new thinking, the Soviets have taken other steps that respond to the security concerns of northeast Asian states. These efforts include Gorbachev's offer, in the Vladivostok speech, to pursue force reductions along the Sino-Soviet frontier and to accept the main channel of the Amur and Ussuri rivers—rather than, as the USSR had hitherto insisted, the Chinese bank—as the demarcation line for the border, the withdrawal of a motorized rifle division "and several separate units" from Mongolia during the spring and summer of 1987; and the signing of the April 1988 Geneva accords, which provided for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.[9] Soviet spokesmen depict these steps as products of the new thinking.[10] Although this characterization need not be accepted at face value, the concrete initiatives described above show that Gorbachev's pronouncements in the areas of foreign policy and national security are not merely rhetorical flourishes with scant practical significance.

The substance of new thinking consists of broad propositions about contemporary international relations and the implications they pose for foreign policy. The principal propositions are as follows:

- The capacity of nuclear weapons to destroy civilization nullifies Clausewitzian conceptions of war as a means to political ends and requires that states, regardless of differences in social systems, coexist. This argument was contained in the statement on military doctrine adopted at the May 1987 session of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee and appears routinely in Soviet analyses of international security.[11] As Aleksandr Bovin, commentator for *Izvestiya* and adviser to Gorbachev, has put it: "Either peaceful coexistence or nonexistence. There is no third way."[12]
- The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, when seen alongside the unprecedented destructive capabilities of conventional forces, demands *political* efforts, rather than traditional policies based on deterrence, to bolster national security. Such political efforts include arms control, confidence-building measures, and the strengthening of international law and the United Nations.[13]
- The cost of modern conventional weapons, the need to divert funds toward economic development, and the escalatory potential of conventional war in the nuclear age call for new military doctrines and force postures based on "reasonable sufficiency." Specifically, "reasonable sufficiency" entails significantly lower force levels with weapons and doctrines oriented toward *defensive* warfare.[14] Although the concept of reasonable sufficiency remains ill-defined and ambiguous in many respects, it has been discussed in several Soviet writings on military doctrine. Efforts have been made to legitimate this idea by locating it in the evolution of Soviet military thought, to demonstrate its practicality by combing the history of warfare to highlight instances where it was used with success or ignored to bad effect, and to explore how it might be implemented in practice.[15]
- In a world that modern technology has made militarily and economically interdependent, definitions of interests based on criteria of class or nation must be transcended in favor of a cooperative approach to common security and global problems. "The interests of mankind as a whole," notes Aleksandr Yakovlev, "are not an abstract notion . . . . In our day, when the whole planet seems to have been compressed to an unprecedentedly small size . . . the interests of mankind as a whole have acquired flesh and blood."[16] Moreover, Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze

INF's to the removal of US forward-based nuclear systems from East Asia, see *Pravda*, May 20, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 21, 1987, p. E/8. For examples of the reiteration of this view by Soviet spokesmen, see Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, May 26, 1987, trans. in ibid., May 28, 1987, pp. AA/1–2; and the remarks of Radomir Bogdanov and Sergey Plekhanov (both of the Institute of the USA and Canada) on the program "Top Priority," Radio Moscow in English to North America, May 22, 1987, in ibid., May 27, 1987, pp. AA/1–3.

[9]The completion of the withdrawal from Mongolia was announced in *Pravda*, June 8, 1987. On the Sino-Soviet river boundary proposal, see VS, p. R/14.

[10]Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security," loc. cit.; idem, "The Soviet Strategy of Peace: The Asian-Pacific Region," *Kommunist* (Moscow), January 1987, pp. 97–98.

[11]Major General Yuriy Lebedev and Aleksey Podberezkin, "Military Doctrines and International Security," ibid., September 1988, pp. 111–12.

[12]Aleksandr Bovin, "New Thinking–New Policy," ibid., June 1988, pp. 115–18; Major General Yuriy Lebedev and Aleksey Podberezkin, "The Contemporary World: Tendencies and Contradictions," ibid., September 1988, pp. 112–13, 115. See also, Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroyka i novoye myshleniye dlya nashey strany i dlya vsego mira* (*Perestroyka* and New Thinking for Our Country and for the Whole World), Moscow, Politizdat, 1988, pp. 140–45.

[13]These ideas are developed in Vladimir Petrovskiy, "Security Through Disarmament," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEiMO*), January 1987, pp. 3–13, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1987, pp. 1–12; Yevgeniy Primakov's article in *Pravda*, July 9, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 14, 1987, pp. CC/5–10; idem, "Soviet Policy in Regional Conflicts," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow), May 1988 p. 8; Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security," loc. cit., pp. 67–69.

[14]Petrovskiy, "Security Through Disarmament," loc. cit., pp. 2–3; *Pravda*, July 9, 1987, loc. cit., pp. CC/6–7.

[15]See Lebedev and Podberezkin, "Military Doctrines," loc. cit., pp. 117–18; Andrey Kokoshin and Major General Valentin Larionov, "The Kursk Battle in Light of Contemporary Defense Doctrine," *MEiMO*, August 1987, pp. 32–40, esp. 39–40; Kokoshin and Larionov, "The Confrontation of Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic Stability," ibid., June 1988, pp. 23–31, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 21, 1988, pp. 8–14; Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs and Reduction of Armed Forces and Conventional Arms," ibid., January 1988, pp. 20–32, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 12, 1988, pp. 1–9.

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has gone so far as to state that "[t]he struggle between two opposing systems is no longer the determining tendency of the world."[17]

• The Soviet Union's preoccupation with the military dimension of security and its secretiveness on military matters diverted it from badly-needed economic reform and generated worst-case thinking and suspicion in the West. Soviet overemphasis on the military aspects of security also led the USSR to engage in a costly arms race with the West and placed additional burdens on an already inefficient economy by limiting economic ties with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan. The lack of Soviet involvement in the world economy resulted in a gap between the USSR and the West in the economic-technological realm that not only impairs socialism's emergence as a viable alternative to capitalism, but also threatens the Soviet Union's status as a world power. Against this background, the principal task of Soviet foreign policy now is to fashion an external environment conducive to *perestroyka*.[18]

Reassessment of Past Policies

In making its various proposals on East Asian security, the Gorbachev leadership has reassessed many of the policies of its predecessors. The reasons for departure from the policies of the Brezhnev era are clear. The reliance, particularly in the 1970's, on military instruments of policy ultimately proved counterproductive. Confronted by a major Soviet buildup in the Far East—which by the late 1970's amounted to 54 divisions supported by the latest Soviet aircraft, armor, and nuclear missiles—China transformed its relationship with the US, moving from hostility to rapprochement, and ultimately, toward strategic cooperation. The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty, which was prompted by concern about burgeoning Soviet power, indicated to the Soviets the potential for collusion between the two principal states of northeast Asia. The Reagan Administration justified the following key elements of its policy in northeast Asia by citing the need to balance Soviet deployments: the commitment to maintain forces in South Korea, a posture which had been reconsidered under President Jimmy Carter; the willingness to sell defensive military technology to China; and the buildup of the Seventh Fleet so as to equip it to execute the "maritime strategy." In a broader context, Soviet military intervention in the Third World contributed to the atrophy of détente, provided the rationale for hard-line Reagan policies toward the USSR, and short-circuited the potential for East-West trade and technology transfer.

These negative consequences are now candidly recognized by Soviet spokesmen. Speaking of Soviet involvement in the Third World in the 1970's, Vyacheslav Dashichev of the Institute for the Economy of the World Socialist System argued in a May 1988 article that: "We were wrong in assessing the global situation . . . . Though we were politically, militarily (via weapons supplies and advisors), and diplomatically involved in regional conflicts, we disregarded their influence on the relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West . . . ." He added that "chasing petty and essentially formal gains associated with leadership coups in certain developing countries" led the Soviet leadership to ignore the "genuine interest" of fostering favorable international circumstances for profound transformations in the Soviet Union's economy and socio-political system. In an obvious criticism of the past salience of military power as an instrument of Soviet policy, Dashichev called on the USSR to "influence social progress exclusively via its economic, political, scientific, and cultural successes."[19] In an interview with *Der Spiegel* two months later, Dashichev described Soviet policy in the Third World in the latter part of the

[16]Aleksandr Yakovlev's speech at a party meeting in Lithuania, Moscow Television Service, Aug. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 16, 1988, pp. 51–52. For a more elaborate, but less enthusiastic, official exposition of the significance of global problems, see Vadim Zagladin, "Socialism and the Global Problems of the Contemporary Period," *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), September 1986, pp. 13–22, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 25, 1986, pp. 1–11.

[17]Speech at a conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, *Pravda*, July 26, 1988, trans. in ibid., July 26, 1988, pp. 29–31.

[18]For these themes, see Vitaliy Zhurkin, Sergey Karaganov, and Andrey Kortunov, "Challenges of Security—Old and New," *Kommunist*, January 1988, pp. 47–49; Vladimir Lukin and Aleksandr Nagornyy, "The Concept of the USSR-USA-PRC 'Triangle' and the New Realities of World Politics," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* (Moscow), June 1988, p. 6; the comments of Lukin (an East Asian specialist at the Institute of the USA and Canada, now serving as deputy chief of the Foreign Ministry's Pacific and Southeast Asia Department) at a conference on Soviet policy in the Far East attended by scholars and Foreign Ministry officials, *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'*, July 1988, pp. 140–55, trans. in Joint Publications Research Service (hereafter—JPRS), *Soviet Union: International Affairs*, UIA-88-015, Sept. 15, 1988, pp. 12–13 (Lukin comments); interview with Mikhail Nosov (chief of the Far Eastern Department, Institute of the USA and Canada) in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Sept. 3, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 22, 1988, p. 25; Aleksandr Bovin's article in *Izvestiya*, July 11, 1987, trans. in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH—hereafter, *CDSP*), Aug. 12, 1987, pp. 5–6; and S. Blagovolin's article in *Izvestiya*, Nov. 18, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 25, 1988, pp. 1–3. As an example of this facet of new thinking, consider Blagovolin's assertion (p. 2) that the preoccupation with military power "is one of the main reasons for the plight of the Soviet economy and the slow growth of the people's living standards."

[19]Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West: Quest for New Relations. On the Priorities of the Soviet State's Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 18, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 20, 1988, pp. 7–8. For a similar although less pointed argument, see L. Lyubimov, "New Thinking and Soviet-American Relations," *MEiMO*, March 1988, pp. 9–10.

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1970's as a resurrection of "Stalinist hegemonism" and judged it as "probably Brezhnev's greatest mistake."[20]

The pursuit of military power and advantage has been attacked not only by prominent Soviet scholars, but also by those directly involved with the formulation of foreign policy. For example, speaking at a July 1988 conference at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Shevardnadze spoke of the economic costs incurred by the USSR's preoccupation with military competition, concluding that: "The idea, which gained a firm hold in the minds and deeds of certain strategists, that the Soviet Union could be as strong as any possible coalition of states is absolutely groundless."[21]

To be sure, the new thinking, Soviet security proposals on northeast Asia that new thinking has inspired, and the withdrawal of a number of Soviet military forces from that region certainly have a public relations aspect. But they must also be seen as products of a critical assessment of Soviet policy in the previous decade—a policy that served the interests neither of Soviet security nor of Soviet economic development.

New Agents of Policy

Gorbachev has realized that both effectiveness and credibility demand that officials not associated abroad with the Brezhnev era be entrusted with the formulation and execution of his initiatives in foreign policy. The advent of new officials to oversee Soviet foreign policy is striking. Gorbachev has effected changes both among policy-makers responsible for the overall direction of foreign policy and among specialists and practitioners responsible for the Asian-Pacific region.

Policy-makers. The most important personnel change involves the replacement in 1985 of long-time Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko with Shevardnadze, who had no prior experience in foreign policy and had spent all of his professional life in the Georgian republic working in the Komsomol, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the party organization.[22] Initially, because of his lack of experience in foreign policy, Western observers doubted Shevardnadze's influence. Nevertheless, he has played an active, visible, and effective role in the dynamic and flexible foreign policy of the Gorbachev years. As a leading ally of Gorbachev in the Politburo and an enthusiastic proponent of *glasnost', perestroyka,* and new thinking, he has emerged as one of the most powerful members of the Soviet leadership. Shevardnadze's statements on the limits of military power as a tool of statecraft and his flexible, outgoing demeanor mark a sharp contrast with the Brezhnev era in general and with Gromyko in particular.[23]

Shevardnadze has taken a number of actions that symbolize Gorbachev's new approach to East Asia. His 1986 trip to Japan was the first by a Soviet foreign minister in more than 10 years and, in conjunction with the follow-up visit in 1988, represented an effort to recast Soviet-Japanese relations in a friendlier mold. These initiatives also served notice that the USSR would cease to treat its policy toward Japan as a function of the state of US-Soviet relations. Shevardnadze's visits to Thailand and Indonesia in 1987 marked a reassessment of the Soviet attitude toward influential regional states that under Gromyko had been regarded as being of marginal significance, or, in Thailand's case, as simply a Western appendage. Finally, Shevardnadze's meetings with China's foreign minister during UN sessions and his visit to China in February 1989 set the stage for Gorbachev's May 1989 meeting with Deng Xiaoping in Beijing—the first Sino-Soviet summit in three decades.

Other personnel changes also point to the new approach in foreign policy. In 1986, Vadim Medvedev became secretary of the Central Committee's Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. He is thus directly linked to the major improvement in Sino-Soviet relations that has occurred in the latter half of the 1980's. At the September 1988 Central Committee meeting, Medvedev was promoted to full membership in the Politburo and given responsibility over ideology—a sphere traditionally overseen by the party leader second in standing to the general secretary—in the reorganized Secretariat.[24] Medvedev's new position and responsibilities ensure that he will be a major factor in foreign policy.

Another official to emerge with greater authority from the September 1988 Central Committee plenum was Yakovlev, a key ally of Gorbachev and major architect of the innovations in the style and substance of Soviet foreign policy. A strong critic of the United States,

[20]*Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), July 4, 1988, pp. 123–27, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 8, 1988, pp. 18–21.

[21]Loc. cit.

[22]Alexander Rahr, "A Biographic Directory of 100 Leading Soviet Officials," 3rd Ed., Munich, Radio Liberty Research, March 1986, pp. 186–88.

[23]A summary of Shevardnadze's thinking on foreign policy is contained in his December 13, 1988, speech at the Foreign Ministry on the implementation of the proposals contained in Gorbachev's address to the UN in the same month. See *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, SSSR* (Moscow), Dec. 23, 1988, pp. ii–viii. Abridged trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 28, 1989, pp. 1–8.

[24]On Medvedev, see Rahr, "A Biographic Directory," loc. cit., pp. 135–36; idem, "The Composition of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 433/88, Oct. 5, 1988, pp. 1–2, 5; *The Washington Post*, Oct. 1, 1988.

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Vadim Medvedev, secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Yakovlev is a force for change in Soviet foreign policy in two specific respects. First, he emphasizes the need to transcend ideological, class, and national categories in favor of a non–zero-sum, cooperative approach to security with an eye to settling global problems. The stress on the accumulation of military power and the definition of security in purely military terms—both hallmarks of the Brezhnev era—are notably absent from his analysis.[25] Second, Yakovlev has stressed that the changing economic balance of power among the leading capitalist states, characterized by the relative decline of the US and the ascendancy of Western Europe and Japan, intensifies discord within the Western alliance. He sees, as a result, growing independence on the part of US allies and the emergence of an incipient multipolar order.[26] The presumptive policy conclusion is that diplomacy toward Western Europe and Japan ought not to be a function of US-USSR relations but should be based on an appreciation of the increasing independence of these countries vis-à-vis the US.[27]

Specialists and practitioners. In the northeast Asian context it would make little sense to entrust the improvement of relations with China and Japan to officials who represent to these countries aspects of policy that Gorbachev is seeking to repudiate. Important personnel changes signify the earnestness of the new approach to China and Japan.

Two Asian specialists who symbolized the inflexible, swaggering policies of the past have been removed from the Central Committee's principal foreign policy departments. One change involves Oleg Rakhmanin, who long served in the Department for Liaison with Socialist Countries. Rakhmanin is a China specialist, whose past writings—appearing under the pseudonym O. Borisov—identify him as a hard-liner on Sino-Soviet relations. He came to the department following service in the foreign ministry and the Soviet embassy in Beijing and rose in this hierarchy to become its first deputy chief in 1968. His tenure was marked by Sino-Soviet tensions, border clashes, and a massive increase in Soviet military strength in the Far East.[28]

Japan specialist Ivan Kovalenko, who symbolized the intractable and heavy-handed policies of the Brezhnev era, is the second. Thought by the Japanese to be central to Soviet policy toward their country, Kovalenko served as the chief Japan specialist in the Central Committee's International Department. According to Japanese sources, he was placed in charge of Japanese prisoners after World War II. Following a posting in Tokyo as a TASS correspondent from 1949 to 1952, Kovalenko joined the International Department, becoming head of its Japan section in 1963, and a deputy chief in 1983. Although Kovalenko spoke approvingly of new thinking, his publications—appearing under the pen name I. Ivkov—mark him as a hard-liner. Moreover, during his years in the International Department, Soviet-Japanese relations acquired the adversarial and unproductive character that Gorbachev now wants to alter. Kovalenko's association with the policies of the Brezhnev era and the tendency of influential Japanese to regard him as a symbol of Soviet arrogance and inflexibility have apparently led to his retirement. Al-

[25]These views are represented in Yakovlev's speech to a Lithuanian party meeting on August 12, 1988, loc. cit., pp. 51–53.

[26]For this facet of Yakovlev's thinking, see his article, "Inter-Imperialist Contradictions—The Contemporary Context," *Kommunist,* November 1986, pp. 4–17, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Dec. 12, 1986, pp. 1–16.

[27]See Jerry F. Hough's article in *The New York Times,* Nov. 4, 1988. On Yakovlev's career and outlook, see Bill Keller, "Moscow's Other Mastermind," *The New York Times Magazine,* Feb. 19, 1989, pp. 30–33, 40–42.

[28]On the background and career of Rakhmanin, see Rahr, "A Biographic Directory," loc. cit., pp. 161–62. In April 1989, Rakhmanin was among those dropped from the Central Committee.

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though he visited Japan as late as July 1988 and met with key Japanese visitors in Moscow as late as October, according to Japanese sources Kovalenko has left the International Department for the Institute of Oriental Studies.[29]

On the operational level of Soviet diplomacy as well, important personnel changes have occurred. Igor' Rogachev has become a deputy foreign minister—replacing Mikhail Kapitsa, who has been relegated to the directorship of the Institute for Oriental Studies—and has assumed key responsibilities for relations with China and Japan. Rogachev also replaced the aged Leonid Il'ichev as chief Soviet negotiator with China on overall political relations and the boundary dispute. The replacement of Kapitsa, viewed by the Chinese as a hard-liner, with Rogachev is intended to convey Moscow's seriousness about promoting Sino-Soviet détente. Apart from the symbolism involved in the replacement of Kapitsa, the appointment of Rogachev is important because he combines relative youth (he is 57) with considerable experience. He has spent 15 years in China (six as a child and the rest in two tours of duty at the Soviet embassy in Beijing), served as head of both the Southeast Asian and Far Eastern departments of the Foreign Ministry, and speaks fluent Chinese.[30]

Gorbachev's desire to break with past patterns in Soviet relations with Japan and China is also indicated by his ambassadorial appointments to these countries. The new envoy to Tokyo, Nikolay Solov'yev, speaks fluent Japanese, spent eight years (1958–61 and 1966–71) in the Soviet embassy in Japan, and also directed the foreign ministry's Second Far East Department. In interviews with the Japanese press soon after his appointment in May 1986, he sought to smooth over bilateral differences and stressed the potential for cooperation in the economic and cultural spheres.[31] In assessing the importance of Solov'yev's appointment, a Japanese newspaper judged him "the most pro-Japanese in the whole Soviet Foreign Ministry."[32] The new ambassador to China, Oleg Troyanovskiy, arrived in Beijing in May 1986 and is one of the Soviet Union's most senior and experienced diplomats, having served as Soviet ambassador in Japan (1967–76) and at the United Nations.[33]

Having surveyed the new thinking and the personnel changes that have taken place among those officials who are charged with formulating and implementing policy toward Northeast Asia, we will now turn to a consideration of current Soviet policy toward the Northeast Asian states, particularly China and Japan. In addition, because the USSR has begun to make overtures to South Korea, thus potentially changing its relationship to North Korea, this article will briefly examine Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula.

Sino-Soviet Relations

The break with the recent past is perhaps nowhere more visible than in Sino-Soviet relations. By the late 1970's, relations between China and the Soviet Union seemed fated to move from bad to worse, a welcome trend to those in the United States who viewed China as a potential partner for containing burgeoning Soviet power in the Far East.

The hallmark of Sino-Soviet relations in the 1980's, especially in the latter half of the decade, has, however, been slow, unspectacular, but steady détente. Over the course of this decade, several meetings have taken place between leading officials on each side. This upsurge of contacts fundamentally altered each country's stereotypes of the other that had emerged, among other reasons, as a result of the Cultural Revolution's frenzied anti-Soviet polemics, the 1969 border clashes, and the Soviet military buildup. Neither China nor the USSR now regards the other as an immediate security threat. On the economic front as well, a strengthening of ties between Moscow and Beijing has occurred that has implications for their security relationship.

Economic relations. To be sure, the USSR does not, and may never, play the central role in China's foreign

[29]On Kovalenko's career, recent activities, and reported retirement, see Tokyo, Kyodo in English, July 14, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 15, 1988, p. 14; Tokyo, JPS in English, Apr. 20, 1988, in ibid., Apr. 29, 1988, p. 9; *Sankei Shimbun* (Tokyo), Nov. 8, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 7, 1988, p. 3; and *Nihon Keizai Shimbun* (Tokyo), Mar. 4, 1989, trans. in ibid., Mar. 9, 1989, p. 4. For Japanese perceptions of Kovalenko, see Hiroshi Kimura, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking' and the Asian-Pacific Region," in Peter Juviler and Hiroshi Kimura, Eds., *Gorbachev's Reforms: US and Japanese Assessments*, New York, Aldine de Gruyter, 1988, pp. 159–60. On p. 159, Kimura refers to Kovalenko as the "notorious anti-Japanese Japanologist." Also, Myles L. C. Robertson, *Soviet Policy Towards Japan: An Analysis of Trends in the 1970s and 1980s*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 156. Kovalenko's position reportedly has been filled by Yuriy Zuyev, a deputy chief of the International Department, who dealt with Western Europe. See *Yomiuri Shimbun* (Tokyo), Mar. 21, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 3, 1989, p. 15.

[30]On Rogachev's background and career, see *Vjesnik* (Zagreb), Mar. 8, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 14, 1988, p. 25.

[31]On Solov'yev's background and early interviews in Japan, see Moscow, TASS in English, May 17, 1986, in ibid., May 19, 1986, p. C/1; the interview with Solov'yev on Tokyo NHK television, May 22, 1986, trans. in ibid., May 23, 1986, pp. C/1–2; Tokyo, Kyodo in English, May 22, 1986, in ibid., May 23, 1986, p. C/2; the interview with *Mainichi Shimbun* (Tokyo), Aug. 10, 1986, trans. in ibid., Aug. 14, 1986, pp. 2–6.

[32]*Mainichi Shimbun*, Aug. 10, 1986, trans. in ibid., Aug. 14, 1986, pp. 2–6.

[33]On Troyanovskiy's background, see *The New York Times*, Sept. 30, 1988.

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Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese President Yang Shangkun review troops upon the Soviet leader's arrival in Beijing on May 15, 1989, for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years.

—Wide World.

economic relations that it did in the 1950's. Although the Soviet Union is now China's fifth largest trade partner—after Hong Kong, Japan, the US, and West Germany—trade with the West is deemed by the Chinese to be far more vital to the task of economic modernization. Nevertheless, the value of Sino-Soviet trade grew from 177 million rubles in 1981 to 1.8 billion rubles in 1987.[34] By contrast, the total value of Sino-Soviet trade during 1976–80 was a mere 1.5 billion rubles. This growth in trade between China and the Soviet Union helps to create a context wherein the leaders of both countries can visualize and plan for cooperative, as opposed to purely conflictual, interactions.

Likewise, the resumption of the Soviet foreign aid program, with assistance promised for the construction of seven new Chinese projects and the modernization of 17 projects built earlier with Soviet aid, has important implications for the security relationship.[35] China now views the USSR as willing to contribute to Chinese well-being. And a changed Soviet image of China is suggested by Moscow's willingness to have this resumed aid program cover projects such as metallurgy and power generation, which are central elements of any country's strength.[36]

Economic developments along the 7,520-kilometer border, long viewed by China, the USSR, and outside observers solely as a zone of potential conflict, have similar implications. Of particular importance are the resumption of barter trade in the eastern sector and in the western sector, in 1983 and in 1986, respectively; the 1986 agreement to resume trade along the Amur river, involving the Soviet ports of Nizhneleninskoye, Khabarovsk, and Blagoveshchensk and the Chinese port of Tongjiang; and the agreement in 1986 on Soviet assistance in constructing a railroad in China connec-

[34]Y. Bavrin, "USSR-PRC: Prospects for Business Relations," *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta* (Moscow), Feb. 7, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 20, 1987, p. B/3; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, May 21, 1988, trans. in ibid., May 27, 1988, p. 19; *The Washington Post*, Jan. 31, 1989.

[35]Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Nov. 11, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 17, 1988, pp. B/1–2; *Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1986, trans. in ibid., Sept. 29, 1986, p. B2.

[36]On these facets of Soviet aid to China, see Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Aug. 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 20, 1988, pp. 11–12; and Moscow Television Service, Sept. 8, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 8, 1988, p. 16.

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ing the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region with Kazakhstan.[37] These initiatives have been supplemented by others: negotiations on the use of Chinese labor in Siberian construction projects; the opening of additional Chinese river ports—including Harbin—to Soviet shipping; the establishment of joint-venture restaurants in Khabarovsk and Harbin, and the signing of economic agreements directly between cooperatives and between towns in the two countries.[38]

Security issues. The political and economic developments discussed so far, although having no direct, immediate significance for the Sino-Soviet balance of military power, have undoubtedly altered the Sino-Soviet security relationship. China's listing of military tasks as the last of its "Four Modernizations" and its decision to effect a 25 percent cut in the size of the People's Liberation Army by 1988 are directly related to its focus on economic development. Both steps suggest a reduction in the perceived threat from Moscow.[39] The Soviets have sought to reinforce this Chinese assessment by pointing out that both countries have a stake in a tranquil, secure environment, given their preoccupation with economic reforms and modernization.[40]

Soviet views of China's foreign and security policies have undergone significant change. In the latter half of the 1970's, Soviet analyses were replete with references to an incipient anti-Soviet alliance between China and the US.[41] Today, it is not Sino-American concord that receives Soviet attention, but discord between the two states over Taiwan, technology exports, trade, and human rights. Soviet assessments maintain that such frictions, China's fear of dependence and ideological contamination, and differences with the US on regional conflicts, led to the decision at the 12th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1982 to pursue an independent foreign policy devoid of alliances. Since then, in the Soviet view, China has "stopped following American strategic suggestions. . . eased to identify with Washington in matters of . . . international security . . . ."[42] Soviet commentary on military affairs in China also reflects this new assessment. Reporting on Chinese military reforms, meetings between US and Chinese military officials, and US sales of military technology has assumed a calm, objective tone.[43] Soviet coverage of such events in Japan and South Korea, by contrast, has a hostile, alarmist tone.

In the late 1970's, Soviet writings exhibited a preoccupation as well with the possibility of an alliance between China and Japan. The 1978 Sino-Japanese treaty—a document that included a criticism of hegemony, then the Chinese label for Soviet policy—was taken in Moscow to represent a step toward such a dénouement. Since 1985, a different Soviet attitude toward this issue has emerged. Thus, as the Sino-Japanese treaty neared its 10th anniversary, a Soviet report discussed its likely renewal without critical comment and, instead, focused on the issues that strain the relationship between China and Japan: Japan's trade surpluses with China, Chinese concerns about the growth in Japanese defense spending, and the comments of Japanese officials seeking to put Japan's role in World War II in a favorable light.[44] The Soviets are now convinced that the Chinese no longer have a self-evident interest in encouraging the expansion of Japanese military power and are beginning to share Moscow's long-standing concern over the prospect of a greater Japanese role in the Pacific military balance.

Soviet writings and radio broadcasts now stress areas of common ground between the USSR and China in security matters. In this vein, the Soviets highlight a shared approach to Taiwan, support for the principle of

[37]On these developments, see Bavrin, "USSR-PRC," loc. cit., pp. B/3, B/5; *Pravda*, Sept. 23, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 29, 1986, p. B/2; Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, June 7, 1986, trans. in ibid., June 10, 1986, p. B/1; Moscow Television Service, Aug. 6, 1986, trans. in ibid., Aug. 6, 1986, p. B/7; Moscow Domestic Service, Aug. 15, 1986, trans. in ibid., Aug. 15, 1986, p. B/1.

[38]*Pravda*, Aug. 14, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 17, 1988, p. 13; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, June 16, 1988, trans. in ibid., June 20, 1988, p. 16; Moscow, TASS in English Aug. 29, 1988, in ibid., Aug. 30, 1988; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Aug. 21, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 23, 1988, pp. 7–8.

[39]Gerald Segal, "As China Grows Strong," *International Affairs* (London), Spring 1988, pp. 218, 224–25. On p. 224, Segal notes: "China's partial disarmament is undoubtedly the single largest reduction in military power since Khrushchev trimmed one million men from the Soviet army in the early 1960's. Since the majority of Chinese troops had been oriented towards meeting a perceived Soviet threat, it now appears that some 100,000 Chinese troops have been removed from the order of battle facing the Soviet Union."

[40]Moscow International Service in Mandarin, May 21, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 27, 1988, p. 19.

[41]E.g., I. Aleksandrov's (a pseudonym used until 1983 for official statements) article in *Pravda*, May 26, 1981; idem, *Pravda*, June 27, 1981, both trans. in CDSP, *Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, 2nd Ed., Columbus, OH, CDSP, 1985, pp. 172–75. For a review of Soviet concerns regarding the growth of military and security content in agreements between China and the US in the 1970's and early 1980's, see USSR Academy of Sciences, Institute of the USA and Canada, *Mesto Kitaya v global'noy politike SShA* (The Place of China in the Global Policy of the USA), Moscow, Nauka, 1987, pp. 150–63.

[42]Evgeny Bazhanov, "Shifts of Emphases. Evolution of Chinese Foreign Policy in the Eighties," *New Times* (Moscow), Apr. 1, 1988, p. 26.

[43]E.g., Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Apr. 26, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 28, 1987, p. B/2; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, July 31, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 31, 1987, pp. B/1–3. On the barriers to the expansion of Sino-American military ties, ranging from China's financial inability to import large stocks of weapons and its fear of dependence to bilateral disputes such as the one over Taiwan, see *Mesto Kitaya*, pp. 159, 161, 165, 166–67.

[44]Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Aug. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 17, 1988, pp. 15–16.

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"no first use" of nuclear weapons, condemnation of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), and support for the Rarotonga Treaty aimed at prohibiting the basing and testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific. The USSR underscores differences between Washington and Beijing on each of these and other issues. Thus, Moscow cites Taiwan's role as "a link in the Pentagon's strategic military chain" to explain continued US military sales to the island and blames the US for the Kuomintang's intransigence on the question of reunification.[45] In addition, Moscow argues that US military deployments in the Pacific, although "primarily directed" at the Soviet Union, are, given the American opposition to socialism, also "directed at China to a considerable extent," notwithstanding improved Sino-US relations. Finally, Soviet commentators stress the common commitment of China and the USSR to socialism and reform (Chinese economic reforms receive frequent and favorable treatment in the Soviet press), and they label the notion of a Soviet military threat to China as a tired American scare tactic.[46]

The Three Obstacles

Although security perceptions in Moscow and Beijing have changed significantly in the 1980's, the practical problems have not faded as quickly. The Chinese have long maintained that three obstacles prevent full normalization of relations with the Soviet Union: Soviet military forces deployed in the Far East (including those in Mongolia), the Soviet war in Afghanistan, and Vietnam's Soviet-supported occupation of Cambodia. The Soviet Union has attempted to address China's concerns through its actions, proposals, or shifts from entrenched positions.

Force levels in the Far East. The Soviet military presence in Mongolia is meant to secure the latter's status as the USSR's sole buffer along a vast and thinly populated frontier with China. The Chinese, however, see Soviet troops as menacing the approaches to Beijing and fear they would serve as the spearhead of any assault on their capital, which is only about 500 kilometers from the Mongolian border. A matter of particular concern to the Chinese is the fact that the two tank and two motorized rifle divisions in Mongolia have been maintained in the highest category of readiness.[47] By contrast, only a quarter or so of the 55 tank and motorized rifle divisions in the Far Eastern military theater command (headquartered at Irkutsk and encompassing the military districts of Central Asia, Siberia, Transbaykal, and the Far East) are in such a status.

In the spring and summer of 1987, the Soviet Union withdrew one motorized rifle division and some additional forces from Mongolia. Soviet press reports explicitly tied the move to "the new thinking" and depicted it as a step toward addressing the three obstacles to rapprochement with China.[48] The reduction affected some 12,000 of the 65,000 Soviet troops stationed in that country.[49]

Although the Soviet withdrawal did not completely remove the threat from a military standpoint, it was viewed by the Chinese as a gesture of good faith. Following this action, however, the removal of additional forces from Mongolia was by no means assured.[50] Nevertheless, official Soviet announcements proclaiming the limited 1987 pullout of the Soviet forces based in Mongolia suggested the possibility of eventually removing all Soviet troops.

Circumstantial evidence indicates that Mongolia objected to the Soviet force reductions. Opposition to the prospects of a Soviet withdrawal is quite plausible, given Mongolia's tendency to view Moscow as the guarantor of its territorial integrity against China. Indeed, after Gorbachev first broached the possiblity of a withdrawal in his Vladivostok address, Mongolia's foreign minister indicated his opposition by saying at a press conference in Zimbabwe that "there would be no complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from Mongolia." This statement not only contradicted the official Soviet announcements mentioned above but also a Japanese newspaper report that a "high-ranking" Soviet diplomat at the UN had told a Chinese official that all Soviet troops would ultimately be brought back home.[51]

The Soviet Union evidently has not been swayed by

[45]Radio Moscow in Mandarin, Jan. 23, 1987, trans. in ibid., Feb. 4, 1987, pp. B/1–2; Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Apr. 7, 1987, trans. in ibid., Apr. 10, 1987, p. B/2.

[46]For the emphasis on these points, see V. Vorontsov, "Facing the Responsibility: China and Nuclear Disarmament," *New Times*, Sept. 29, 1986, pp. 20–21; Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in Mandarin, Oct. 30, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 30, 1986, p. B/2; *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1987, trans. in ibid., Jan. 12, 1987, pp. B/1–3; *Izvestiya*, Jan. 17, 1987, trans. in ibid., Jan. 29, 1987, pp. B/1–6; *Izvestiya*, Jan. 18, 1987, trans. in ibid., Jan. 30, 1987, pp. B/1–5; Moscow, Radio TASS, Mar. 1, 1987, trans. in ibid., Mar. 4, 1987, p. B/3; Radio Moscow in Mandarin, Jan. 23, 1987, trans. in ibid., Feb. 4, 1987, pp. B/1–2.

[47]International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), *The Military Balance 1988–1989*, London, IISS, 1988, p. 43.

[48]Moscow, TASS, Jan. 16, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1987, p. C/1; *Pravda*, Jan. 18, 1987, trans. in ibid., Jan. 20, 1987, pp. C/1–2.

[49]Kimura, "Gorbachev's 'New Thinking'," loc. cit., p. 157.

[50]Cf. *Pravda*, Apr. 11, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 13, 1987, p. C/1; and the Mongolian foreign minister's statement quoted in *Mainichi Shimbun*, Sept. 5, 1986, trans. in ibid., Sept. 16, 1986, p. 12.

[51]*Yomiuri Shimbun*, Sept. 3, 1986, trans. in ibid., Sept. 3, 1986, p. 2.

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Mongolian objections. Following Gorbachev's December 1988 address to the UN announcing the proposed reduction of Soviet troop levels by 500,000 men, Soviet spokesmen noted that 40 percent of the scheduled decrease in military manpower would come from deployments in units east of the Urals. That the latter figure would encompass further cutbacks of the forces in Mongolia was clarified in February 1989 when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze stated while in Beijing that three-quarters of the remaining Soviet troops in that country would be removed over a period of two years. Foreign ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov formally confirmed Shevardnadze's announcement the following month in Moscow.[52] When this reduction is completed, Soviet forces in Mongolia will have been reduced to the equivalent of about one division. In addition to shrinking the size of their military presence in Mongolia, the Soviets have either announced, or discussed with the Chinese during Shevardnadze's visit to Beijing, the removal of some of the components of their Mongolian deployments that most threaten the Chinese, e.g., airborne units and conventional missiles.[53]

The USSR has also made several proposals to allay China's concerns about its military forces in Siberia. At Vladivostok, Gorbachev raised the possibility of "a proportionate reduction in the level of ground forces" on the part of the Soviet Union and China.[54] He also stated that Soviet SS–20 missiles removed from Europe would not be transferred to Asia. In addition, Gorbachev's agreement in the *Merdeka* interview to accept the so-called "global zero" position of the Reagan Administration removed the INF issue per se as a sticking point in the Sino-Soviet relationship.[55]

The Soviet leadership has also proposed initiatives that are referred to in the jargon of security studies as "confidence-building measures." (These efforts involve not the reduction of forces, but steps to reduce the possibility of inadvertent war arising from misperception spawned by a state of tension between military adversaries.[56]) Thus, during his visit to Beijing in February 1989, Shevardnadze brought up the possibility that China and the Soviet Union might reduce the frequency and scale of military exercises along their common border, and provide each other with advance notice of scheduled troop movements and training maneuvers.[57] Such agreements, along with others on force reductions and the border dispute were doubtless the subject of discussions and documents signed during the May 1989 summit between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping.

But the problem of Soviet conventional and nuclear superiority in the Far East remains unsolved. It is a long-standing, complex issue not amenable to a quick and easy solution. Gorbachev made a promising start with his proposal for "proportionate reductions in the level of ground forces." This proposal is of significant symbolic and psychological value because it promises to alter a relationship long molded by suspicion and the tendency to think in terms of worst-case scenarios. But, if implemented, proportionate reductions would only reestablish Chinese inferiority at lower numerical levels. If the reductions were to emphasize manpower, the Chinese disadvantage might well be aggravated, because China's strength lies in superior numbers, while the USSR's rests upon technological superiority in firepower, mobility, and logistics. It remains to be seen whether Gorbachev's explicit reference to "ground forces" in the Vladivostok speech (thus, by implication excluding air and naval forces) indicates an unwillingness to sacrifice Soviet superiority in interceptor and ground attack aircraft, *Backfire* bombers, amphibious vessels, and attack submarines.

As for the nuclear issue, the destruction of the Soviet SS–20's based in Siberia called for by the US-Soviet INF Treaty of 1987 has greater effect on the political context of Sino-Soviet relations and Beijing's threat perceptions than on operational problems related to Soviet nuclear superiority. In fact, by redirecting less than 10 percent of their *strategic* nuclear warheads, the Soviets could attack the targets that had been covered by their SS–20's.

Can the continuing reality of Soviet military superiority be changed so as to meet China's security concerns and to foster deeper Sino-Soviet détente? One possibility would be to apply the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" to the Pacific Fleet and to Soviet forces in the Siberian, Transbaykal, and Far Eastern military districts.[58] Although defensively oriented armaments would remain, reductions would focus on strike aircraft, bombers, assault helicopter units, tanks, amphibious vessels, and attack submarines. If possible such an arrangement would unquestionably reduce Chinese vulnerabilities.

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[52]*The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1989; *The Washington Post*, Mar. 8, 1989.

[53]*The Washington Post*, Feb. 1, 1989; ibid., Mar. 8, 1989.

[54]VS, p. R/18. Also, Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security," loc. cit., p. 63.

[55]MI, p. CC/4.

[56]For a discussion of this concept, see Barry M. Blechman, "Confidence-Building in the North Pacific: A Pragmatic Approach to Naval Arms Control," *Working Paper No. 29*, Canberra, Peace Research Center, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, February 1988, pp. 14–16.

[57]*The Washington Post*, Feb. 1, 1989; *The New York Times*, Feb. 5, 1989.

[58]In the Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev spoke of the applicability of "reasonable sufficiency" to the Far East. See VS, p. R/18.

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But the USSR would also benefit. The forces arrayed against China account for roughly 15–20 percent of Soviet defense spending. The reduced expenditures would facilitate the transfer of funds from the military to the civilian sector and thus bolster *perestroyka*. Indeed, the Soviets have already sought to reduce the burden of defense. According to CIA estimates, the rate of growth of military spending fell from 4 percent to 2 percent from 1976 to 1983.[59] Defense budget planning for 1986–95 has curtailed expenditures for maintenance and procurement in order to marshal funds for research and development on ultra-modern weaponry.[60] And, in a speech of January 6, 1989, given at the Central Committee to a group of Soviet academic and cultural figures and attended by Defense Minister Dmitriy Yazov, Gorbachev pointedly stated that the problems posed by the Soviet budget deficits and the poor performance of the economy were "so acute" that reductions in defense expenditures would have to be considered.[61] Following the speech, in a meeting with members of the Trilateral Commission, Gorbachev said the military budget of the Soviet Union would be decreased by 14.2 percent.[62]

Given the urgency of addressing the problems of the Soviet economy, major reductions in the military deployments along the border with China would be of great value. At the same time, the Soviet leadership will have to confront some difficult dilemmas before implementing any such decision. One is the difficulty of winning the armed forces' support for such a policy when Gorbachev is immersed in promoting wide-ranging reforms that have alienated conservative ideologues, state bureaucrats, and party *apparatchiks*. Major reductions in the forces based in the east cannot be based on purely economic calculations; they also must be judged by Gorbachev for their possible effect on the bureaucratic balance of power. The Brezhnev-era military buildup along the border with China meant that the military acquired additional resources, power, prestige, and positions of authority. Although the Brezhnev years are now derided as the period of stagnation, this period was hardly one of privation for the armed forces.

The Soviet military is not a monolith, of course. Each of the five services would view the effects of major force reductions on its institutional integrity somewhat differently. Any major decreases would, in general, affect the power and resource base of the military as a whole and would therefore be viewed with misgivings. However, support for the military's objections in the Central Committee was probably reduced with the removal of retired military officers Viktor Kulikov and Nikolay Ogarkov at the April 1989 plenum.

The remarks of some senior officers suggest military resistance to cutbacks in the Far East. Thus, in an interview with *Moscow News*, Army General Ivan Tret'yak, the commander of the Air Defense Forces and a former commander of the Far Eastern Military District, while supporting restructuring of the military, warned that "[t]he country's defense must be absolute" and criticized Khrushchev's economically motivated reductions in the size of the armed forces as having "dealt a colossal blow at our defense potential, the officer corps included." In a less direct vein, the commander of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, although supporting restructuring, noted that "[s]ome people understand it in a simplistic way: Everything that existed before is bad and everything that is being done now is good .... The essence of restructuring consists, in my opinion, not in rejecting the past. Certainly, there were miscalculations, major ones at times. But there were also successes."[63]

A group of senior officers based in Moscow have had recent command experience in the east and might constitute a lobby opposing major force reductions in the Far East as well. In addition to General Tret'yak, this group includes Defense Minister Yazov and the Chief of the General Staff, Colonel General Mikhail Moiseyev (both recent commanders of the Far Eastern Military District); Army General Vladimir Govorov; the head of the Civil Defense Forces (a former commander of the Far Eastern Theater); and the deputy commander-in-chief of the Navy in charge of Rear Services, Admiral Vladimir Sidorov (a former commander of the Pacific Fleet).[64]

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[59]Statement of Robert Gates (then the deputy director for intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency), in US Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on International Trade, Finance, and Security Economics, *The Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1984*, Nov. 21, 1984, mimeo., pp. 7, 11, 15–18.

[60]James T. Westwood, "Soviet Reactions to the US Maritime Strategy," *Naval War College Review* (Newport, RI), Summer 1988, pp. 62–63.

[61]*Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 9, 1989, pp. 52–64.

[62]*The Washington Post*, Jan. 19, 1989. The meeting, attended, among others, by Henry Kissinger, Yasuhiro Nakasone, and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, was held on January 18.

[63]Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Feb. 17, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 18, 1988, p. 89; *Komsomol'skaya Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 21, 1988, trans. in ibid., Feb. 25, 1988, p. 72.

[64]This group also includes two current first deputy commanders-in-chief of the Ground Forces who served previously as commanders of the Transbaykal military district: Army General S. I. Postnikov and Colonel General A. V. Betekhtin. Information on the careers of the officers in this group is from private discussions; *Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar'* (Military Encyclopedic Dictionary), Moscow, Voyennoye Izdatel'stvo, 1983, p. 752; Personnel Report: USSR Ministry of Defense (January 1989), (fn. continues on p. 14)

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Beyond the possible parochial concerns of this "group," senior defense ministry officials and representatives of the services could raise important, substantive considerations regarding force reductions in the Far East. For example, although the Soviet ground forces in the east essentially have missions related to China, bombers, tactical aircraft, warships, and submarines have important tasks—both for deterrence and warfighting—against the US, Japan, and South Korea. So long as the US military presence in the Pacific does not decline and strategic coordination among the US, Japan, and South Korea continues, the implementation of "reasonable sufficiency" through major cuts and reorganizations in force structure will be difficult. The bottom line is that Sino-Soviet arms reductions that blunt significantly the offensive components of Soviet air, ground, and naval forces can proceed only in a multilateral mode with the participation of the US and its allies in the north Pacific.

A second consideration involves the implications of a major reduction in the forces of the Far Eastern Military District for the defense of the Soviet homeland. The Far Eastern Military District contains the single most important concentration of Soviet forces east of the Urals, with 43 percent of all the motorized rifle, tank, and artillery divisions and 54 percent of all tactical aircraft.[65] For major changes in the Sino-Soviet military balance, significant cuts would be required in deployments of these forces. Soviet forces defend important stretches of the Baykal-Amur rail line as it heads towards Komsomol'sk, and of the Trans-Siberian railway after it leaves Chita, goes east toward Khabarovsk and turns south to Vladivostok. Both these vital supply lines are vulnerable to Chinese interdiction. The Far Eastern Military District is also distant from the centers of Soviet power in the west—about 5,000 kilometers from Moscow, for example—so that it cannot be reinforced quickly from other parts of the Soviet Union. Nor does the Far Eastern Military District's geographic configuration—it is just over 300 kilometers from Khabarovsk to the Pacific coast, and about 50 kilometers from the Chinese border to Vladivostok—facilitate a defensive strategy of trading space for time while reinforcements arrive from the west.[66] Finally, the district must secure locales of vital strategic consequence such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok, both cities with a population over 500,000 and the headquarters, respectively, of the Far Eastern Military District and the Soviet Pacific Fleet.

Thus major security dilemmas will arise if the Soviet leadership considers significant force reductions in the east. Yet the mere existence of dilemmas does not rule out changes in the Soviet military posture in this region, because Gorbachev has demonstrated repeatedly that the military has no veto over his domestic and foreign policies. Thus, he has set aside the criterion of seniority in selecting new individuals to fill important posts such as defense minister and chief of the General Staff; developed non-military sources of information on security matters through appointments to the International Department of the Central Committee and by tapping the expertise of civilian research institutes; and announced initiatives generally regarded by students of Soviet affairs as contrary to the interests and predispositions of the military, such as accepting on-site verification for arms control agreements and cutting the size and resources of the armed forces.[67]

Can the notion of "reasonable sufficiency" be applied to Soviet forces in the east? Beneath the appealing aura of "reasonable sufficiency" lie the complexities of making clear distinctions between defensive and offensive armaments acceptable to all parties involved in a given arms control agreement. The inherent difficulty in distinguishing offensive from defensive weapons is compounded by the absence in Soviet military doctrine of a clear-cut distinction between offensive and defensive strategies of warfare. At a heuristic level, "reasonable sufficiency" suggests these distinctions in weaponry can be made, but as an operational matter, they will prove a tricky and protracted problem. Moreover, Soviet writings on this issue have yet to tackle the operational challenges of imposing a clear-cut dichotomy on weaponry.[68]

JPRS, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, UMA-89-004, Feb. 10, 1989, pp. 3–4, 6, 23, 30, 55, 58, 71; Albert L. Weeks, Comp., *Soviet Nomenklatura: A Comprehensive Roster of Soviet Civilian and Military Officials*, Washington, DC, Washington Institute Press, 1987, pp. 4, 13, 25, 37, 115; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 15, 1988, trans. in JPRS, *Soviet Union: Military Affairs*, UMA-89-002, Jan. 26, 1989, p. 31.

[65]Calculated from IISS, *Military Balance 1988–1989*, p. 43.

[66]This important point was first made in Harry Gelman, *The Soviet Military Leadership and the Question of Soviet Deployment Retreats*, R-3664-AF, Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation, November 1988, pp. 32–33. For the configuration of the Far Eastern Military District, see the map in David C. Isby, *Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army*, London, Jane's, 1988, p. 31. Distances calculated from *Hammond Ambassador World Atlas*, Maplewood, NJ, 1988, p. 48.

[67]Additional evidence points to Gorbachev's control of the military: the replacement in February 1989 of Marshal Viktor Kulikov, a conservative, as commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact and first deputy defense minister with General Petr Lushev, first deputy defense minister; and the replacement since December 1988 of the commanders of half of the 16 military districts. *Sankei Shimbun*, Feb. 17, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 6, 1989, p. 1.

[68]Wettig, loc. cit., pp. 4–8. For Soviet efforts in this direction, see Kokoshin and Larionov, loc. cit. See also Kokoshin, loc. cit., which discusses the ideas of Professor A. A. Svechin, a military theorist of the 1920's, to show that the principles of defensive warfare have a rightful place in the history of Soviet military thought.

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Soviet Lt. Gen. B. Gromov is welcomed back to Soviet soil by his son on February 15, 1989, near Termez, Uzbekistan, as the last Soviet battalions complete their withdrawal from Afghanistan.

—Camera Press.

Afghanistan. The second obstacle—the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan—has now effectively been removed. In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev announced that six regiments, out of a total of some 120,000 Soviet troops in Afghanistan, would be withdrawn. Many in the West viewed this announcement as a ploy. Yet, two years later, in April 1988, the Geneva Accords were signed, providing, among other things, for the withdrawal of Soviet troops to begin on May 15, 1988, and to be fully completed by February 15, 1989. The withdrawal was completed on schedule. Although the USSR will continue to seek to influence events in Afghanistan, Beijing must view the end of the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan as a major improvement in its security environment.

The Vietnam-Cambodia conflict. The final obstacle is Vietnam's war in Cambodia and the Soviet Union's support for the Vietnamese invasion. The Chinese made a summit meeting between Deng Xiaoping and Gorbachev contingent on the Soviet ability to goad Vietnam into disengaging from Cambodia.[69] This issue, which has also been the principal hindrance to improved Soviet relations with the members of ASEAN, has thus far proved the most intractable.

In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev argued that Sino-Soviet détente could not come at the expense of the USSR's friendship with other countries. Sino-Soviet negotiations should, he intimated, focus on bilateral matters, and he asked China to deal directly with Vietnam on the Cambodian conflict.[70] During the biannual political negotiations that have been held since 1982, Soviet spokesmen continued to make this point in one form or the other and stressed their inability to determine Vietnamese policy.

Yet, the Soviets eventually did make the Cambodian war a subject of their negotiations with China. Just before the 10th round of Sino-Soviet talks, Troyanovskiy, although reiterating the ritualistic point about not prejudicing the interests of third countries, stated that Cambodia would be discussed.[71] In a much more significant development, in August 1988, negotiations explicitly dealing with Cambodia were held in Beijing between Rogachev and Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Tian Zengpei. On this issue, Chinese spokesmen referred to continuing differences but also to common ground between the USSR and China.[72]

In response to Soviet flexibility on this issue, the Chinese have also been conciliatory. Recognizing the importance of the matter to Vietnam and the USSR, Beijing now is apparently more willing to accept measures designed to prevent the Khmer Rouge (the largest and most powerful of the three Cambodian resistance groups and the recipient of Chinese arms) from returning to power after a Vietnamese withdrawal.[73] In addition, a month after the Sino-Soviet discussions on Cambodia, and following a meeting between the Chinese

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[69]See the report on Deng Xiaoping's Sept. 2, 1986, interview with CBS News in Tokyo, Kyodo in English, Oct. 15, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1986, p. 81.

[70]VS, pp. R/17, R/19; B. N. Slavinskiy, *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR na dal'nem vostoke 1945–1986* (The Foreign Policy of the USSR in the Far East, 1945–1986), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, 1988, p. 240.

[71]Tokyo, Kyodo, Apr. 7, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 10, 1987, p. B/1. On the Soviet agreement, at the ninth round of the Sino-Soviet political talks in October 1986, to expand future discussion to cover Afghanistan and Cambodia, see Hong Kong, AFP in English, Oct. 14, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 16, 1986, p. B/2.

[72]*The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Sept. 2, 1988; *The New York Times*, Sept. 2, 1988.

[73]*The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Sept. 2, 1988. For a Soviet recognition of this change in the Chinese position, see *Pravda*, Aug. 26, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 30, 1988, p. 11.

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and Soviet foreign ministers in New York, it was announced that Qian Qichen, China's foreign minister, would visit Moscow at the end of 1988. This announcement signified a narrowing of differences on the Cambodian issue, as did the announcement, following the Shevardnadze visit to Beijing, that a Deng-Gorbachev summit would be held in 1989.

The Cambodian obstacle has also been partially overcome by Vietnam's announcement in May 1988 that it would withdraw fully from Cambodia by 1990 and remove 50,000 troops by the end of 1988. The Chinese demanded a total withdrawal by mid-1989, however, and were skeptical about Hanoi's good faith. Because of the inability of the Cambodian armed forces to hold their own against Khmer Rouge attacks in areas from which Vietnamese troops have disengaged, Vietnam slowed the pace of its withdrawal. Yet, an interview given by the Thai foreign minister confirmed reports that the Soviets had been using their influence to urge Vietnam to end its war.[74] Perhaps as a result of Soviet goading, during the December 1988 visit to Moscow of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian, Vietnam announced that 12,000 of its troops would be withdrawn from Cambodia to reach the target of 50,000 set for the end of the year.[75] In April 1989, the Vietnamese went even further, announcing that they would withdraw fully by the end of September.[76]

Vietnam's moves to reduce its military presence, and the shifts in the positions of the USSR and China have made the Cambodian issue a less potent obstacle to the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. But important differences remain between Moscow and Beijing. In principle, each side accepts the desirability of a monitored Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia followed by elections. But China and the Soviet Union have not reached agreement on crucial matters such as the role to be assigned to the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government during the period between the Vietnamese withdrawal and the completion of the elections, and the linkage between the removal of all Vietnamese forces and the halt of all support in the form of weapons and foreign bases of operations to the three anti-Vietnamese Cambodian resistance groups.[77]

Territorial disputes. Although not listed by the Chinese as one of the three obstacles to normal relations, the Sino-Soviet border has also been the subject of renewed negotiations. Formal border talks—held in 1964 and from 1969 to 1978—resumed in February 1987 with the focus being on the eastern sector spanning the area from the trijunction with Mongolia eastward to the Pacific. Joint aerial photography to aid delimitation began in May 1988, and according to Soviet sources, an agreement in principle has been reached on the course of the boundary for most of the eastern sector.[78]

Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen at a press conference during his December 1988 visit to the Soviet Union.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

Yet, China and the Soviet Union continue to dispute the status of Heixiazi (Tarabarov/Bol'shoy Ussuriysk)—a 300-square kilometer island at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers. This dispute has an important bearing on Soviet security. The island is claimed by the Chinese but controlled by the USSR. Because Heixiazi overlooks Khabarovsk as well as the point where the Trans-Siberian railway crosses the Amur river, the Soviets are reluctant to see it pass from their control. The issue has yet to be settled, and it remains to be seen whether the change in Sino-Soviet relations and Moscow's altered perception of China's security policy allay Soviet concerns about the danger of any future use of the island for hostile purposes. Such apprehensions

[74]For details on the Cambodian situation and the positions of Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union, see *The Washington Post,* Aug. 27 and Oct. 1, 1988.

[75]*The New York Times,* Dec. 2, 1988.

[76]*The Washington Post,* Apr. 19, 1989.

[77]Radio Moscow in Cambodian to Cambodia, July 28, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Aug. 1, 1988, pp. 16–17; *Krasnaya Zvezda,* July 31, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 4, 1988, p. 19.

[78]*Izvestiya,* Nov. 1, 1988, trans. in ibid., Nov. 2, 1988, p. 19. This article, which appeared at the end of the third round on the boundary talks (October 20–31), noted that the two sides had "a common understanding on the majority of sections" of the eastern border. See also, *The New York Times,* Nov. 1, 1988.

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could well be addressed by measures such as partition, joint administration, or Chinese control with verifiable demilitarization provisions. The state of Sino-Soviet relations makes a political settlement more plausible than ever before.

Japan

The easing of Sino-Soviet tensions sharply contrasts with the state of Soviet-Japanese relations. Moscow's concerns about the growing strength of Japan's military and its ties with the United States, the long-standing and vast US military presence in Japan, and mutual rigidity on the territorial dispute all make for the persistence of an adversarial relationship between Moscow and Tokyo.

Japan's military buildup. In the 1980's, amidst an unprecedentedly candid discussion in Japan of the pros and cons of a major expansion of the country's military buildup, Soviet analyses have focused on what they perceive to be an American-inspired plan to increase the value of Japan as a military partner in the Pacific.[79]

In the Soviet view, one aspect of this plan was the approval by the Japanese government in December 1986 of a defense budget that exceeded the official ceiling of 1 percent of GNP for military expenditures established—as a temporary restriction—when the National Defense Program Outline was developed in 1976.[80] According to a TASS broadcast, this decision meant that "an important psychological barrier on the road to the non-nuclear rearmament of the country has been passed." For the Soviet Union, the event was particularly worrisome because it occurred when Tokyo was harping on the Soviet military threat and was allegedly making "revanchist" and "unlawful" claims upon the territory of the USSR while pressing its claims to the Northern Territories (the islands of Habomai, Shikotan, Etorofu, and Kunashiri, occupied by the USSR since the end of World War II and claimed by Japan).[81]

Soviet writings underscore Japan's increasing value to the US as an ally with references to other developments and trends indicating a significant growth in Japanese military power in the 1980's. Moscow argues, for example, that Japan has maintained a rate of growth in defense expenditures far surpassing that of America's NATO allies. This tempo, together with the rising value of the yen in the 1980's, has, Moscow stresses, made the Japanese defense budget the third largest in the world when calculated in US dollars.[82] Although Western analyses emphasize the continuing weaknesses of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF), Soviet reports note time and again that Japan now has twice the number of destroyers as the US Seventh Fleet, four times as many aircraft for anti-submarine warfare (ASW), and as many tactical aircraft as are deployed on the continental US.[83]

As for the future, Soviet analyses have paid particular attention to Japan's plans to acquire ships equipped with advanced ASW sonar and the AEGIS air defense system, additional P–3C *Orion* ASW patrol aircraft, new fighter aircraft, and over-the-horizon radar capable of tracking distant aircraft and ship movements. Discussions in Japan about strategies of defense involving preemptive attacks on opponents and the possibility of building aircraft carriers also receive considerable Soviet comment. To the Soviets, these discussions indicate a departure from Japan's defensive military posture.[84]

US-Japanese military relations. The USSR has maintained that the scope and intimacy of US-Japanese military relations threaten stability in the Far East. Thus, Moscow argues that despite Japan's commitment to the three non-nuclear principles (to refrain from the possession, manufacture, and introduction of nuclear weapons), it has, in fact, become central to the US ability to employ nuclear weapons in the Pacific. A specific example the Soviets use to substantiate this conclusion is the US-Japanese decision to station American F–16 fighter-bombers at the Misawa air base in northern Honshu.

The deployment began in the spring of 1986 and, according to Soviet reports, reached 54 aircraft by the summer of 1987. Soviet reports often cite the nuclear-

[79]See Mikhail Ivanov, *Rost militarizma v Yaponii* (The Growth of Militarism in Japan), Moscow, Voyenizdat, 1982, pp. 31–39, 54–76; Nadezhda Fedulova, *Evolyutsiya politiki SShA v Aziatsko-Tikhookeanskom region 70–80 gody* (The Evolution of US Policy in the Asian-Pacific Region in the 1970's and 1980's), Moscow, Nauka, 1987, pp. 126–42; N. Vladimirov, "The Policy of Japan in the Asian-Pacific Region: Alarm Signals," *MEiMO*, September 1985, pp. 23–26.

[80]Research Institute for International Peace and Security (RIIPS), *Asian Security 1987–88*, London, Brassey's, 1987, pp. 138–39, 156–58.

[81]Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Jan. 23, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 23, 1987, pp. C/1–2; Moscow Television Service, Jan. 22, 1987, trans. in ibid., Jan. 23, 1987, p. C/2.

[82]Moscow, TASS in English, Mar. 21, 1988, in ibid., Mar. 2, 1988, pp. 27–28; *Sovetskaya Rossiya* (Moscow), Mar. 22, 1988, trans. in ibid., Mar. 30, 1988, pp. 19–20.

[83]For this disagreement, contrast Sheldon Simon, *The Future of Asian-Pacific Security Collaboration*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1988, pp. 49, 53, 55, with Moscow, TASS in English, Apr. 11, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 15, 1988, pp. 16–17, and Radio Moscow in Japanese, Jan. 12, 1988, trans. in ibid., Jan. 14, 1988, pp. 18–19.

[84]Ibid.; *Pravda*, Jan. 4, 1988; *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, Mar. 22, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 30, 1988, pp. 19–20; Moscow, TASS in English, Mar. 21, 1988, in ibid., Mar. 22, 1988, pp. 27–28.

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capable character of the F–16's as an illustration of Japan's willingness to stray from its avowed opposition to nuclear weapons.[85] The threat to the USSR was emphasized by Radio Moscow, which noted that "the F–16's are for offensive operations against the USSR's Primorskiy Kray, Sakhalin, and the Kurile Islands . . . . Vladivostok is only 800 kilometers away from Misawa and within the F–16's range of 1,000 kilometers."[86]

Particularly since the US decision to equip vessels of the Seventh Fleet with *Tomahawk* SLCM's, the Soviets repeatedly have charged that Japan's opening of its ports to American warships is another deviation from the three non-nuclear principles. In the Soviet view, under the cover of a long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying the existence of nuclear weapons aboard its warships, the US has regularly brought such armaments into Japanese territory.[87] The Soviets cite the comments of former US military officers and officials, as well as documents allegedly found in US archives by Japanese researchers, to show that a secret 1960 US-Japanese agreement exists to facilitate access to Japanese ports by nuclear-armed ships of the US Navy.[88] Moscow dismisses Japan's argument that the absence of American requests to bring in nuclear weapons indicates that such weapons are unloaded before US vessels call at Japanese ports. Soviet sources reply by insisting that the US would not violate its policy of "neither confirm nor deny" by seeking such permission and that, in any event, the United States does not consider anchorages and port calls by its nuclear-armed ships as equivalent to the deployment of nuclear weapons into foreign countries.[89]

Aside from highlighting the alleged contrast between theory and practice in Japan's policy on nuclear weapons, Soviet analyses have followed other developments denoting an expansion in the US-Japanese military relationship. Since 1980, Japan's ships have participated along with the navies of the US, Canada, and Australia in the biennial RIMPAC naval exercises. The Soviet Union closely monitors this participation, as well as the pattern of the exercises. Bilateral exercises are also scrutinized, particularly those suggesting US-Japanese plans to launch amphibious operations and strikes from the air and sea against the Soviet Far East, and seek-and-destroy missions against the strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) of the Pacific Fleet.

In 1983, while on a visit to Washington, Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stated that Japan would serve as "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" for the US in the Pacific and also contribute to bottling up the Soviet Pacific Fleet by helping to blockade the straits that command its access to the high seas.[90] Since then, Soviet assessments of the East Asian security environment have emphasized that Japan adds to US military capabilities in the region in several respects: by allowing the US, in conjunction with NATO, to confront the USSR with positions of military strength on two widely-dispersed fronts; by assuming more of the financial burden of the US military presence in Japan; by providing increased levels of economic aid to the Philippines and South Korea, thus helping the US retain access to vital bases at reduced cost; and by increasing Japanese defense spending and force procurement, which provides the US with more flexible choices for deploying its Pacific forces, whether within the region or beyond.[91]

Another facet of US-Japanese security cooperation that evokes considerable Soviet apprehension is collaboration in the development of military technology. Soviet discussions of this issue betray Moscow's preoccupation with the Soviet Union's lag in technology, its awareness of the potential of advanced technologies to transform the character of weaponry, and its worries about being double-teamed by the world's two foremost technological powers in an area of particular weakness.

In 1983, the Japanese government approved the export of technology with military applications to the US and in July 1987, it formally agreed to participate in research and development for the SDI. The Soviets believed that the US was seeking to coopt the technological prowess of Japan for military purposes. Moscow interpreted the 1983 agreement as evidence of the American interest in gaining access to relevant tech-

[85]Radio Moscow in Japanese, June 12, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 1, 1987, p. C/1; Moscow, TASS in English, June 3, 1987, in ibid., June 5, 1987, p. C/1; and Viktor Krasnov, "US Military Buildup in the Asia and Pacific Region," *International Affairs*, May 1987, p. 97.

[86]Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 10, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1987, pp. C/1–2.

[87]*Pravda*, Nov. 26, 1986, trans. in ibid., Nov. 26, 1986, pp. C/3–4; "US Military Buildup," loc. cit., pp. 97–98; L. Tolkunov, "Japan: Plagued by Contradictions," *International Affairs*, April 1984, p. 95.

[88]Moscow, TASS in English, Apr. 6, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 7, 1987, p. C/1; Moscow, TASS in English, Apr. 7, 1987, in ibid., Apr. 10, 1987, pp. C/1–2.

[89]Moscow, TASS in English, Feb. 7, 1988, in ibid., Feb. 8, 1988, p. 24; *Pravda*, Apr. 13, 1988.

[90]USSR Academy of Sciences, The Far East Institute, *SSSR i Yaponiya* (The USSR and Japan), Moscow, Nauka, 1987, pp. 369–70.

[91]Mikhail Nosov, "Washington and Security: The Asian-Pacific Region," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya*, May 1987, pp. 26, 28, 31; I. Zvyagel'skaya, "The Evolution of US Approaches to Conflict Situations in Asia (From the End of the 1970's to the 1980's)," *MEiMO*, February 1987, pp. 70–71; V. Bunin, "Japan and Washington's Asian-Pacific Strategy," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* (Moscow), February 1987, pp. 42, 47; Radio Moscow in Japanese, Mar. 10, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 11, 1988, p. 11; Fedulova, "The Evolution of US Policy," loc. cit., pp. 127–32.

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nologies with military applications in which Japan has demonstrated great advancement, especially lasers, fiber optics, radar-resistant coatings, and arsenide gallium semiconductors.[92] The Kremlin criticized the accord on SDI as a scheme by the US to fortify itself with the resources of allies for new forms of military competition aimed at exhausting the Soviet Union and frustrating its efforts at economic restructuring.[93]

Soviet writings also portrayed the SDI agreement as *militarily* dangerous. Because SDI envisages the deployment of a nuclear-pumped x-ray laser and could impair strategic stability by undermining a Soviet assured second-strike capability, the Soviets viewed Japan's support for SDI as another departure from the country's non-nuclear principles and defensive military policy.[94] In conjunction with Japan's decision to supplement the US naval role in the north Pacific by expanding ASW operations, the collaboration on SDI is seen as especially harmful to nuclear equilibrium between the superpowers. As a Soviet commentary noted, "a buildup of . . . anti-submarine capability in combination with SDI is bound to destabilize the strategic situation."[95]

Implications of Japan's security policy. What is the strategic context for these changes in Japanese secu-

[92]"On New Fronts of 'Electronic War'," *MEiMO*, April 1985, pp. 12–15; Fedulova, "The Evolution of US Policy," loc. cit., pp. 130–31; Yu. Mel'nikov, "American-Japanese Relations in the Contemporary Era," *MEiMO*, August 1986, pp. 27–28; V. Bunin, "Japan and SDI (Political, Economic, Scientific-Technical, and Military Aspects)," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, January 1988, pp. 112–14.

[93]Bunin, "Japan and SDI," loc. cit., pp. 109, 118–19.

[94]On Soviet concerns regarding Japan's decisions to export military technology to the US and to participate in SDI research, see Radio Moscow in Japanese, Oct. 7, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 7, 1986, pp. C/1–2; Moscow Television Service, Apr. 21, 1987, trans. in ibid., Apr. 29, 1987, p. C/1; Radio Moscow in Japanese, July 22, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 24, 1987, p. C/2; Moscow, TASS in English, July 22, 1987, in ibid., July 23, 1987, p. A/l; Elena Kirichenko, "The USA and Japan: Rivalry and Cooperation," *International Affairs*, March 1987, pp. 54–55; and V. N. Bunin, "Japan and SDI," loc. cit., pp. 107–19.

[95]Moscow, TASS in English, June 30, 1987, in *FBIS-SOV*, July 10, 1987, p. C/3. Commenting on Japan's increasing role in ASW in the northern Pacific, a Soviet expert on East Asian security remarked that "one of the Soviet nuclear deterrent systems is under threat by the SDF [Japan's Self-Defense Forces]." See Vladimir Ivanov's interview with *Tokyo Shimbun*, Apr. 20, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 29, 1988, p. 8. On the US emphasis on penetrating Soviet SSBN bastions—in areas like the Sea of Okhotsk—see, for example, V. Vrevskiy and V. Ivanov, "The Asian-Pacific Region and the Realities of the Nuclear Age," *MEiMO*, August 1987, p. 22.

A Typhoon-class Soviet nuclear submarine, capable of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles.

—US Navy Department.

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rity policy, as perceived by Soviet analyses? And what do the Soviets believe the implications to be for their security? In the Soviet view, a shift in the economic balance of power is occurring in the capitalist system, highlighted by the ascendancy of Western Europe and especially Japan at the expense of the US. This shift is characterized by increased squabbling over tariffs, monetary exchange rates, and export subsidies. At the same time, the military dependence of Japan and Western Europe upon the US remains essentially unchanged. The result, in the US-Japanese context, is an increased American effort to shift the burdens of common defense onto its junior partner. For its part, Tokyo responds positively as a means to contain the economic disharmony between itself and Washington and to head off protectionist legislation in the US Congress.

Gorbachev's arms control proposals and Yakovlev's notions of polycentrism within the Western alliance have led American leaders to worry about a Soviet campaign aimed at dividing the US and its allies. But Soviet writings betray little confidence that rising economic discord will destroy US-Japanese strategic concord. Indeed, the Soviets argue that economic tensions may make Japan more predisposed to accommodate American demands for an expanded military effort in the Pacific so as to offset economic frictions. Thus commercial disputes with the US will not inevitably produce either Japanese neutralism or Gaullism. As for the US, Soviet analyses conclude that although Washington periodically complains about Japan's so-called free ride in defense, it will continue to bear this burden because of Japan's geostrategic significance to the American military presence in East Asia.[96]

American pressure—spurred largely by Congressional unhappiness about persistent US trade deficits with Japan—is seen by Soviet observers as an important factor in the expansion of Japan's security role. But they do not believe that Japan is being forced to take on larger military responsibilities. In the Soviet view, although opposition to an expansion of Japan's military might remains strong among the public, the intelligentsia, the Komeito Party, the Japanese Socialist Party, and the Japan Communist Party, elements in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the SDF, and big business regard a military buildup as a necessary complement to Japan's status as an economic great power.[97]

Soviet analyses note various strategic consequences of expanded Japanese military cooperation with the US. First, Moscow sees the possibility of a Far Eastern variant of NATO brought about by a stepped-up coordination in security policy among Japan, South Korea, and the US. Nakasone's 1983 visit to South Korea, which resulted in Tokyo's commitment of US$4 billion in aid, is presented by the Soviets in this light. Exchanges of visits between military officers from Japan and South Korea as well as US exercises with the armed forces of one of these countries in which representatives of the other participate as observers also are depicted as evidence of a "Washington-Tokyo-Seoul militarized triangle" in the making.[98]

A second consequence of greater US-Japanese military cooperation is, in the Soviet view, the US effort to implement a policy of "neoglobalism" by facilitating increasing contact between Japan and NATO on security matters. Thus, in commenting on the Japanese foreign minister's visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels, TASS stated in 1986 that "Japan is being increasingly drawn into NATO military-political consultations" and that it is "turning into a 'NATO far-Eastern member'."[99]

In Soviet assessments, a final strategic consequence of an expanded Japanese military role and the expanded security cooperation between Tokyo and Washington is the emergence of a Japanese role in the US "maritime strategy."[100] As articulated since 1980,

[96]See Kirichenko, "The USA and Japan," loc. cit., pp. 47–54; D. Petrov, "Japan and the USA: Their 'Special' Relations," *International Affairs*, May 1984, pp. 43–48; Mel'nikov, "American-Japanese Relations," loc. cit., pp. 20–21, 24–27; Nosov, "Washington and Security," loc. cit., pp. 31–32.

[97]Petrov, "Japan and the USA," loc. cit., pp. 46–48; *SSSR i Yaponiya*, p. 372. For an extreme view on pro-military forces within Japan, see Captain Second Rank V. Zimonin, "The Evolution of the Military-Doctrinal Views of Japan in the Postwar Period," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), August 1986, pp. 75–78. My reference to "the Soviet view" is for convenience and does not mean that Soviet specialists share a uniform view on the strength of pro-military sentiment in Japan and the likelihood of vast increases in Japanese military power. For the view that Japan's economic resurgence does not presage radical changes in its military status, see V. Rosin, "The Militarization of Japan: The View of an Economist," *MEiMO*, January 1988, pp. 75–87.

[98]Marshal V. Petrov, "Military-Political Lessons of the Defeat of Japanese Militarism," *International Affairs*, September 1985, p. 11; A. Markov, "Japan: and South Korea in the Plans of American Imperialism," *MEiMO*, October 1984, pp. 22–23; V. Bunin, "The Defeat of Japanese Militarism: Lessons for the Contemporary Period," *MEiMO*, October 1985, p. 23.

But, just as all Soviet specialists do not expect a major expansion in Japanese military power, a monolithic view on this question does not exist either. For the view that the deep-rooted animosities between Japan and South Korea complicate an alliance between them, and hence the supposed American design for a Far Eastern NATO, see N. Shaskol'skiy, "The Asian-Pacific Region in the Military Plans of the USA," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, April 1987, pp. 74–76.

[99]Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 14, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 15, 1986, p. C/1; *SSSR i Yaponiya*, p. 371; Nosov, "Washington and Security," loc. cit., p. 28.

[100]The key assumptions and operational elements of the maritime strategy are well summarized in David Alan Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible to Imagine Anything Worse: Soviet Thoughts on the Maritime Strategy," *Naval War College Review*, Summer 1988, pp. 70–73; and in Norman Friedman, *The US Maritime Strategy*, London, Jane's, 1988, Ch 7. For a critique of the maritime strategy, see Barry Posen, "US Maritime Strategy: A Dangerous Game," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* (Chicago), September 1987, pp. 24–33.

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the maritime strategy has several elements. It seeks to raise the Soviet costs of waging war in Europe by increasing the US capability to inflict damage to bases, ports, and other important installations on the Soviet periphery, including the Pacific coast. Simultaneously, the maritime strategy envisages attacking SSBN's in well-guarded ocean bastions, such as the Sea of Okhotsk. The strategy has two objectives. First, it seeks to prevent Soviet attack submarines from interdicting Pacific sea lines by diverting their attention to defending the SSBN's. Second, by destroying Soviet SSBN's, the maritime strategy hopes to tilt the nuclear balance against the USSR and thus provide Moscow with another inducement to end a war in Europe.

Although Soviet analyses rarely refer to the maritime strategy by its formal name, they do discuss it.[101] With regard to Japan, the Soviets interpret the F–16 deployment in Misawa, Nakasone's 1983 statement on Japan's likely wartime role, US-Japanese naval exercises in the northern Pacific in the 1980's, and Japan's agreement with the US to expand its anti-submarine warfare capabilities as evidence of Tokyo's willingness to help implement the maritime strategy. More ominous, Soviet security experts note that by allowing US vessels armed with *Tomahawk* SLCM's into its ports, Japan supports one of the more destabilizing aspects of the maritime strategy. According to Moscow, *Tomahawk* SLCM's are detrimental to stability because they increase the angles and points of possible attack, are difficult to detect and destroy, and, being dual-capable, multiply the maritime platforms that must be neutralized.[102] Soviet security experts also emphasize the threat posed to deterrence by the maritime strategy's plan for ASW in SSBN bastions. The Soviets regard submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM's) as a vital complement to land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. SLBM's ensure deterrence by providing a secure capacity to launch a retaliatory strike.

In the 1970's, the USSR met perceived threats to its security in the Far East chiefly by military deployments. Just prior to the opening of an October 1988 conference on cooperation in the Asian-Pacific region hosted by the Soviets in Vladivostok, Rogachev admitted that "the Asia-Pacific line of our policy was for a long time 'frozen'. We did not look our best in the . . . region, and we were seen as a country active only in the military context, that of defense."[103] The essence of the new thinking is the recognition that this strategy was counterproductive because it worsened the USSR's security environment. By contrast, Gorbachev's efforts have been directed at promoting proposals for political dialogue and economic cooperation. We have seen the record in Soviet policy toward China. What of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Japan?

The Soviet Union has recognized that Japan may well emerge as an independent center of power. Therefore, the USSR, in an apparent application of the ideas of Yakovlev, seems no longer willing to let its approach to Japan be guided by the tenor of US-USSR relations.[104] Shevardnadze's visits to Tokyo in 1986 and 1988 are one such indication of this policy. So is continued Soviet-Japanese discussion of a visit to Tokyo by Gorbachev, an event desired by both sides but complicated by ongoing differences over the territorial issue.

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[101]Thus according to an article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, Dec. 14, 1986, in US-Japanese military planning, Japan has been assigned the task of "backing up combat operations planned by the Pentagon in the Far East . . . . The Japanese Navy is made responsible for escorting American aircraft carriers and other large warships, sealing off international straits, and taking part in antisubmarine warfare operations in the Sea of Japan and the Sea of Okhotsk." The article identifies joint exercises held to practice such operations. See the translation in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 19, 1986, pp. C/2–3. A Moscow television report in discussing US-Japanese naval maneuvers noted an "increasingly marked interest in the two-front strategy, which envisages—in the case of armed conflict in Europe—a preemptive strike in the Far East region." Japan's involvement in the plan, tied it "even closer to the military chariot of Washington." See Moscow Television Service in Russian, trans. in ibid., Oct. 10, 1986, p. C/2. See also, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 22, 1987, trans. in ibid., June 5, 1987, pp. C/1–2. A Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress report in English (Oct. 13, 1988) quoted Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Rogachev as follows: "The American military doctrine, known as the Admiral [sic] Lehman doctrine sets forth the following task for the United States naval forces: to approach the territory of the USSR dealing strikes, including nuclear ones, on both coastal targets and targets deep in the country." See Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress in English, Oct. 13, 1988, in ibid., Oct. 14, 1988, p. 11. For a thorough analysis of Soviet assessments of the maritime strategy, see Rosenberg, "It is Hardly Possible," loc. cit., pp. 73–105.

[102]Kokoshin, "The Development of Military Affairs," loc. cit., pp. 8–9; Vladimir Ivanov's interview with *Tokyo Shimbun*, loc. cit., pp. 8–9; Bunin, "Japan and the Asian-Pacific Strategy," pp. 4, 14; Vrevskiy and Ivanov, "The Asian-Pacific Region," pp. 22–24. Also, Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 6, 1988, trans. in ibid., Feb. 12, 1988, pp. 24–25.

[103]Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Sept. 30, 1988, trans. in ibid., Oct. 5, 1988, p. 9. On the importance of altering the image of the USSR as "a belligerent undemocratic state," see also Primakov's article in *Pravda*, loc. cit., p. CC/9.

[104]In his Vladivostok speech, Gorbachev referred to Japan as a country that "has turned into a power of front-rank significance." See VS, p. R/12. After the Reykjavik summit between Reagan and Gorbachev, a Japanese newspaper asked Vadim Zagladin about the connection between Gorbachev's planned visit to the US and his prospective trip to Japan. Zagladin replied that the two issues were separate and that Japan, although an ally of the US, was viewed by the USSR as "a big independent country." See *Yomiuri Shimbun*, Oct. 18, 1986, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 24, 1986, p. 4. Yakovlev has argued that in the face of its relative economic decline and the economic ascendancy of Japan and Western Europe—due to which "[p]olycentrism is coming to replace the monocentrism in capitalist economics and politics"—the US retains its overall predominance by virtue of the military dependence of its allies. He strongly suggests that Soviet strategy ought in such circumstances to weaken this dependence by pursuing an independent economic and political détente with Japan and the states of Western Europe. See Yakovlev, "Inter-Imperialist Contradictions," loc. cit.

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The Northern Territories dispute. Soviet statements on the Northern Territories continue to criticize Japan's claims. Moscow denounces Tokyo's policy of linking progress in other spheres of Japanese-Soviet relations to a resolution of the territorial dispute.[105] Talks held during Shevardnadze's 1986 visit, comments in Gorbachev's speeches in Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk, and Gorbachev's *Merdeka* interview all failed to indicate Soviet flexibility on this issue. Indeed, in the spring of 1988, Shevardnadze told a Japanese newspaper that Gorbachev and he would be "sacked" if they ceded islands to Japan that belonged to the USSR and that symbolized the sacrifices made during World War II.[106]

Yet some evidence suggests that Moscow is trying to redefine its position so as to remove this important barrier to improved relations with Japan. On a practical level, Moscow has begun to allow Japanese citizens to visit ancestral graves at certain sites—the number of which has been increased—in the Northern Territories without requiring visas, in exchange for Japan's permitting Soviet citizens to visit the graves of relatives killed in the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese war.[107]

Other signs point to the possible exploration of solutions to the dispute among influential Soviet circles. Aleksandr Bovin has called for mutual flexibility and the need to recognize that a disagreement does exist on the disposition of the islands.[108] At a "closed-door" symposium in Japan, G. Kunadze of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations (Russian acronym—IMEMO) mentioned the possibility of joint administration of the islands but provided no further details.[109] Kunadze made his proposal in the presence of IMEMO Director Yevgeniy Primakov, who has emerged as Gorbachev's leading academic advisor on policy toward Japan. Primakov himself has suggested the possibility of a solution within the framework of the 1956 Soviet-Japanese statement—crafted on the occasion of the reestablishment of diplomatic relations after World War II—that called for the return of the Habomai and Shikotan islands following the signing of peace treaty between Moscow and Tokyo.[110]

This approach has also been proposed by Mikhail Titarenko, Director of the Institute of the Far East, and by leaders of the Japan Communist Party (who have suggested an "interim treaty" following the return of the two islands and pending a final peace treaty officially demarcating the border).[111] The strategic importance of using the 1956 statement as the basis of at least a first-stage solution is that the Habomai and Shikotan are the



Academician Yevgeniy Primakov, Director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations in Moscow, at a November 19, 1987, television bridge between Soviet and American legislators devoted to the issue of regional conflicts.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

[105]E.g., *Pravda*, Jan. 8, 1986; ibid., Jan. 20, 1986; *Izvestiya*, June 16, 1986, trans. in CDSP, *Soviet Foreign Policy Today*, p. 186; Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 1, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 2, 1986, pp. C/1–2; Moscow Television Service, Feb. 7, 1987, trans. in ibid., Feb. 9, 1987, p. C/1; Slavinskiy, *Vneshnyaya politika SSSR*, pp. 276–78, 295; *SSSR i Yaponiya*, pp. 405–06. The gist of the Soviet position as reflected in these sources is that Japan's territorial claims are "illegal," "unlawful," linked to the proponents of anti-Sovietism and militarism, and an effort to disturb the postwar territorial settlement. During the visits to Tokyo of Shevardnadze (January 1986) and to Moscow of then-Japanese Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe (May 1986), the Soviets held to their position and resisted Japanese efforts to insert mention of the dispute into the joint communiqué.

[106]*Asahi Shimbun* (Tokyo), May 10, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 11, 1988, p. 1.

[107]Agreement to allow such visits was reached during the Abe visit and later formalized. The first group of Japanese visited in August 1986. See *SSSR i Yaponiya*, p. 400; *Izvestiya*, Dec. 29, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 16, 1987, pp. C1–C2, and Radio Moscow in Japanese, July 9, 1988, trans. in ibid., July 15, 1988, pp. 16–17.

[108]Interview with *Mainichi Shimbun*, Jan. 3, 1989, trans. in ibid., Jan. 5, 1989, p. 2.

[109]*Yomiuri Shimbun*, July 27, 1988, trans. in ibid., July 28, 1988, p. 1. Kunadze also criticized Japan for linking a transformation in relations with the USSR to the settlement of the territorial dispute, noting that Tokyo had signed a peace treaty with China in 1978 without first resolving the discord over the Senkaku islands.

[110]Interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 26, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 7, 1988, p. 4.

[111]Titarenko's interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, Dec. 18, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 21, 1988, pp. 1–2; JCP discussions with Gorbachev, reported in Tokyo, JPS in English, May 7, 1988, in ibid., May 10, 1988, p. 4.

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smallest of the disputed islands and are located well to the east of the others. Thus, the integrity of the area that stretches from the Kurile Islands barrier (which stretches some 1,200 kilometers from Cape Lopatka at the tip of the Kamchatka peninsula to the coast of Hokkaido) to the Sea of Okhotsk SSBN bastion could be maintained, especially if Japan agreed to maintain the returned territory in demilitarized status.

A much more significant departure from the previous official Soviet position occurred during Shevardnadze's December 1988 visit to Tokyo. Japan and the Soviet Union agreed to set up working groups at the deputy foreign minister level to discuss various issues relevant to the conclusion of a peace treaty. Shevardnadze made it clear that among these issues were "geographical" questions.[112] Thus, the Soviet government, after having denied the existence of any territorial dispute, has returned to the terms of the 1973 joint statement with Japan. That document called for discussions on a peace treaty and, in an apparent reference to the territorial question, noted the need for the "settlement of outstanding questions" left over from World War II.[113]

Yet the agreement to discuss the territorial dispute does not guarantee that the USSR will be willing to part with some or all of the islands. Indeed, after Shevardnadze's 1988 visit to Japan, Soviet spokesmen, although conceding that the territorial dispute hindered improved Japanese-Soviet relations, have continued to maintain that Japan lacks any legally valid claim to the islands.[114]

Although several issues will be weighed by the Soviets in contemplating major concessions on the Northern Territories, the military significance of the islands, which guard the southern entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk and were fortified in 1978 with a motorized rifle division and MiG–23 fighters, will be foremost among them. And the maritime strategy, which includes in its tasks the penetration of the Sea of Okhotsk in order to track and destroy Soviet SSBN's stationed there, has increased the strategic value of this small archipelago. The real question is whether the Soviet leadership will countenance Japanese control of the disputed islands, given Japan's perceived role in the maritime strategy and the increase in Japan's military capabilities and its cooperation with the US.

Yet the complexities involved in settling the territorial question do not rule out a solution. For one thing, increased Soviet flexibility can be expected within the context of new thinking. Moreover, Moscow is keenly interested in trade and joint economic ventures with Japan, and Gorbachev cannot hope to make a productive visit to Japan without at least some significant movement toward a settlement of the Northern Territories question.

Efforts at Soviet-Japanese détente. Some recent Soviet initiatives suggest an effort to seek détente with Japan using a strategy similar to the one the USSR is pursuing toward China and Western Europe. In the security realm, Moscow has proposed "a joint formulation of confidence-building measures in the Far East and the signing of an agreement stipulating Soviet obligations not to use nuclear weapons against Japan on the condition that Japan strictly abides by its three nonnuclear principles."[115] Because the Soviets have maintained that port calls by nuclear-armed US vessels and Japan's participation in the SDI research program violate these principles, the proposals amount to a call for a major redefinition of Japan's security relations with the US. At the same time, as noted previously, little evidence suggests that the Soviet leadership seriously believes that it could split Japan from the US. Indeed, because a Japan bereft of the alliance with the US might be forced to reconsider the limitations observed on its military strength, it is far from clear that the USSR has an axiomatic interest in a severance of US-Japanese security ties. It is far more reasonable to interpret Soviet policy as seeking to provide Japan with inducements to eschew or limit those forms of security cooperation with the United States that Moscow finds particularly worrisome.

On the economic level as well, the USSR has tried to transform the relationship with Japan. Expansion of trade and investment ties with Japan would promote the modernization of Soviet technology and also reduce the salience of the perceived Soviet threat in Japanese eyes. In particular, Moscow wants to pull the economic relationship out of the doldrums into which it was cast when Japan, in response to the declaration of martial law in Poland and the invasion of Afghanistan, followed the United States in applying economic sanctions against the USSR in 1980–81.

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[112]*Pravda*, Dec. 22, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 22, 1988, p. 4. See also Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita's interview with *Izvestiya*, Mar. 2, 1989, trans. in ibid., Mar. 3, 1989, p. 20.

[113]Rajendra K. Jain, *The USSR and Japan 1945–1980*, Atlantic Highlands, NJ, Humanities Press, 1981, pp. 307–11.

[114]See the report on a Soviet television program featuring Major General Batenin, Aleksandr Bovin, Vladimir Lukin, and Ivan Ivanov carried by Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 9, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 13, 1989, pp. 22–23. For a detailed rejection of Japan's claims made at a higher level, see Deputy Foreign Minister Igor' Rogachev's article in *Izvestiya*, Apr. 24, 1989.

[115]Radio Moscow in Japanese, Oct. 2, 1985, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 4, 1985, p. C/2.

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The Soviets also argue that Soviet-Japanese economic cooperation promotes Japan's economic interests. One of the objectives of the new Soviet regulations on joint economic ventures is to open up Siberia to foreign investment, thus making it part of the "international division of labor." Moscow stresses the importance of this policy plus the Baykal-Amur railroad's contribution to improved transportation in Siberia in seeking to persuade Japan that it stands to gain by increasing economic cooperation with the USSR.[116]

Various measures, completed or under way, testify to the USSR's interest in expanding economic ties with the countries of the Pacific, especially Japan: the proposal to open Vladivostok and to establish Chinese-style Special Economic Zones in Siberia; indications that the existing legislation on joint ventures will be modified to make investment in the USSR more attractive; the Soviet application in 1986 for membership in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council; and the establishment in 1987 of the Committee for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, chaired by Primakov.[117]

Several factors will determine whether, in fact, the Soviets succeed in inaugurating a new phase in economic relations with Japan: the future of the Northern Territories dispute; the amendment of specific provisions of the 1987 Soviet legislation on joint ventures, particularly those covering the duration of the tax-free period and restrictions on the repatriation of profits in convertible currencies; and Tokyo's assessment of the degree to which, absent a parallel upswing in US-Soviet economic transactions, burgeoning Soviet-Japanese economic ties will be seen in Washington as a Japanese search for profits at the expense of security considerations. The last consideration may be especially salient for Japan in the aftermath of the controversy created in 1986–87 after the US government uncovered evidence that the Toshiba Machine Company had, together with a Norwegian firm, and in violation of Coordinating Committee for Export Controls regulations, shipped sensitive military technology that enabled the Soviets to develop quieter submarines.[118]

The Korean Peninsula

The Korean peninsula has long been a source of concern to Moscow because of the important role it plays in the security of the Soviet Far East. South Korea, like Japan, represents a platform for potential air strikes against the Soviet mainland and for bottling up Soviet naval vessels in the Sea of Okhotsk.[119] For this reason, the USSR needs a well-armed North Korea as a buffer between itself and the American strategic emplacement in South Korea.

South Korea. The desire to promote an American military disengagement from South Korea plus South Korea's rise as a center of economic power could prompt a new Soviet approach to Seoul. At least some developments point in this direction. The Soviets did not join North Korea in boycotting the 1988 Olympics. Indeed, according to a Japanese press report, then-KGB chief Viktor Chebrikov was sent as head of the Soviet delegation for the 40th anniversary of North Korea's founding in September 1988 to discourage Pyongyang from disrupting the Olympics.[120] The political significance of the Soviet participation in the Games was also manifested in other ways: an official accompanying the USSR's team was accorded consular status and met with South Korean president Roh Tae Woo, and the Soviets while in Seoul made efforts to appeal to South Korean public opinion.[121]

The decision of the two Koreas to continue their dialogue after the Olympics, Roh Tae Woo's quest for détente with Pyongyang (which has included an end to trade restrictions on civilian goods), signs of a thaw in US–North Korean relations, the emergence of substantial indirect trade ties between China and South Korea, and the February 1989 decision to establish full diplomatic relations between Hungary and South Korea may provide a favorable context for modification of Soviet policy.[122]

[116]These themes are reflected in Tokyo, Kyodo in English, Dec. 10, 1986, in ibid., Dec. 11, 1986, p. C/1; comments by Rogachev cited in Moscow, TASS in English, July 28, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 30, 1987, pp. B/1–2; *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* May 10, 1987, trans. in ibid., May 13, 1987, p. 4. On stimulating Siberia's development by increasing its ties to the "international division of labor," see comments of Anatoliy Dobrynin at a conference in Ulan Batar, Mongolia, Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, July 7, 1987, trans. in ibid., July 9, 1987, p. C/3; and Moscow, TASS International Service in Russian, Oct. 2, 1988, trans. in ibid, Oct. 4, 1988, p. 7. A similar point is made in Mikhail Kapitsa, "Paths to Peace and Security in the Asia and Pacific Region," *International Affairs,* August 1987, p. 36.

[117]Interview with Ivan Ivanov, Deputy Chairman, State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* July 14, 1988, trans. in ibid., July 22, 1988, p. 14; Tokyo, Kyodo in English, May 18, 1988, in ibid., May 20, 1988, p. 17; interview with Primakov, *Yomiuri Shimbun,* May 5, 1988, trans. in ibid., May 13, 1988, pp. 5–6; interview with Titarenko, *Asahi Shimbun,* Dec. 21, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 21, 1988, p. 2; interview with Vladimir Kamentsev (chairman of the USSR State Foreign Economic Commission), *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* May 1, 1988, trans. in ibid., May 13, 1988, p. 6.

[118]*Asian Security 1987–1988,* pp. 145, 163–64.

[119]A. Markov, "Japan and South Korea in the Plans of American Imperialism," *MEiMO,* October 1984, pp. 15–24.

[120]Tokyo, Kyodo in English, in *FBIS-SOV,* Sept. 12, 1988, p. 23.

[121]*The Washington Post,* Sept. 11, 1988; *The New York Times,* Sept. 14, 1988.

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The possibility of such a change was indicated by an interview given by *Izvestiya* commentator Aleksandr Bovin. Although stating that these were his "personal views," Bovin spoke approvingly of the idea of cross-recognition and the admission of both Koreas to the UN. During the same month, in reviewing the results of the October 1988 Vladivostok conference, Primakov noted that "we don't regard South Korea as our diplomatic or even our political partner. At the same time we must take account of reality. The reality is that South Korea is a fast-growing economic organism. All the world's other countries, including China, are also considering this."[123]

Although the two-Koreas formula has not been embraced by the Soviet government, Moscow has allowed its senior scholars and its trade officials to visit South Korea, and South Koreans have been allowed to attend functions in the USSR.[124] In addition, Gorbachev (in the Krasnoyarsk address) and Shevardnadze and other foreign ministry officials have specifically mentioned Moscow's intention to expand economic ties with South Korea.[125] Following the establishment of South Korean trade missions in Hungary and Yugoslavia in 1988, Moscow also decided to set up such organizations in the USSR in 1989.[126] Discussions on joint ventures have also been held with South Korean firms such as Daewoo.[127]

The Soviets have emphasized that developments on the economic front do not presage a Soviet move to recognize South Korea, and they have noted as a model China's policy of combining economic ties with non-recognition.[128] In the joint statement signed when Foreign Minister Shevardnadze visited North Korea following his December 1988 trip to Japan, the Soviets explicitly disavowed the idea of admitting the two Koreas to the UN following mutual recognition, although Shevardnadze pointedly commented on the impermissibility of terrorism and violence to achieve political goals and called for Korean reunification based on "existing realities."[129]

North Korea. The Soviet Union has, over the years, supported various North Korean proposals for arms control and security on the peninsula. In essence these proposals have called for a US–North Korean peace treaty, an agreement on nonaggression and mutual force reductions between the two Koreas, the termination of US–South Korean military exercises, the withdrawal of US troops from South Korea, and Korean reunification on a confederal basis.[130]

This policy is hardly surprising, given Soviet opposition to the American military presence in South Korea. As noted above, Moscow has also opposed the South Korean plan for "cross-recognition," that calls for mutual recognition by the two Koreas and recognition of the existence of two separate Korean states by the major powers. However, the combined influence of the new thinking and the Yakovlev strategy emphasizing the importance of a flexible and pragmatic policy in an incipient multipolar world order could eventually push Moscow away from this traditional stance and toward a "German formula" for the Korean peninsula.

North Korea is a buffer between the USSR and US forces in South Korea. North Korea is also strategically important to the USSR even though its border with the USSR is only about 25 kilometers long, because it is a mere 175 kilometers from the Pacific Fleet's principal base in Vladivostok. Moreover, North Korea's coast overlooks the routes taken by Soviet ships leaving Vladivostok and moving eastward or southward through the Sea of Japan en route to the Pacific Ocean.

Because of North Korea's strategic significance, and the competition for influence in Pyongyang between the USSR and China, Moscow continues to serve as North Korea's key source for aid, trade, and armaments. High-level Soviet officials frequently visit Pyongyang (former Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsa in November 1984, then-Deputy Prime Minister Geydar Aliyev in August 1985, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in January

[122]*The New York Times*, Sept. 14, 1988; *The Washington Post*, Aug. 27 and Oct. 21, 1988.

[123]For the comments of Bovin, see *Mainichi Shimbun*, Oct. 12, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 20, 1988, p. 1; *Asahi Shimbun*, Oct. 13, 1988, trans. in ibid., Oct. 21, 1988, p. 6; and *Mainichi Shimbun*, Jan. 3, 1989, trans. in ibid., Jan. 5, 1989, p. 4. Primakov's remarks appear in an interview with *Pravda*, Oct. 8, 1988, trans. in ibid., Oct. 12, 1988, p. 12.

[124]For South Korean comments on the visit of Mikhail Titarenko to Seoul, see Seoul, Yonhap in English, Sept. 12, 1988, in ibid., Sept. 14, 1988, pp. 11–12. See *Korea Times* (Seoul), Feb. 24, 1989, in ibid., Mar. 8, 1989, p. 22, for comments on the visit of an official from the USSR's Exporters Association.

[125]KS, p. 10; Moscow International Service in Mandarin, Dec. 22, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 29, 1988, p. 17; Tokyo, NHK Television in Japanese, Jan. 4, 1989, trans. in ibid., Jan. 5, 1989, p. 12.

[126]Dong Joon Hwang, "The Changing Security Equation on the Korean Peninsula," paper presented at the conference on Asian security sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute and the Institute of International Relations (Taipei), Taipei, Taiwan, Nov. 30–Dec. 1, 1988, p. 29.

[127]Tokyo, JIJI in English, Aug. 11, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 12, 1988, p. 1.

[128]Interview with V. Tikhomirov (Institute of Oriental Studies) in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Aug. 29, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 2, 1988, pp. 12–13.

[129]Shevardnadze's speech at a reception given in his honor by his North Korean hosts, Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 23, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 27, 1988, p. 12.

[130]E.g., Moscow, TASS in English, Dec. 30, 1986, in ibid., Jan. 5, 1987, pp. C/2–3; Gorbachev's speech during Kim Il-song's October 1986 visit, *Pravda*, Oct. 26, 1986, trans. in ibid., Oct. 28, 1986, pp. C/3–5; Soviet leadership's message on the 40th anniversary of the establishment of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1988.

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

Soviet SA–3 antiaircraft missile installations such as the one pictured here have been delivered to North Korea.

—Photoreporters.

1986 and December 1988, and the Chebrikov delegation to attend the 40th anniversary of North Korea's founding in September 1988). For his part, Kim Il-song visited Moscow after a 23-year hiatus—marked by a North Korean tilt toward China—in May 1984 and again in October 1986.

Following Kim's 1984 visit, the Soviets agreed to provide North Korea some 60 MiG–23 fighter bombers, with deliveries beginning in the summer of 1985. Moscow also provided approximately 30 SA–3 surface-to-air missiles.[131] After Kim's 1986 visit, the Soviets agreed to supply MiG–29 and Su–25 aircraft, SA–5 air defense missiles, and the *Tin Shield* advanced radar designed for early warning, target acquisition, and ground control.[132]

These deliveries should be placed in proper context. It is not unreasonable to see them as a Soviet response to the American sale of 36 F–16's to South Korea and the decision to station such aircraft at the Japanese base in Misawa. Furthermore, they do not upset the inter-Korean military balance. Neither the MiG–23 nor the MiG–29 is superior to the F–16. The SA–3 and SA–5 (which were both deployed in the USSR in the early 1960's, and complement each other, their functions being low-altitude and high-altitude defense, respectively) are defensive weapons.[133] Although the performance record of the SA–5 is largely unknown, the SA–3 proved extremely vulnerable to Israeli countermeasures when used by Syria in the 1982 Lebanese war and in other Arab-Israeli conflicts.

The transfer of these systems undoubtedly represents an increase in Soviet–North Korean military cooperation. But it does not mean that Moscow has abandoned its traditional risk-averse policy and become cavalier about the importance of maintaining equilibrium on the Korean peninsula. Given Kim Il-song's commitment to reunification, the existence of a Soviet–North Korean security treaty, and the vast American military presence in South Korea (widely assumed to include tactical nuclear weapons), the Soviets have understood that war between the Koreas could eventually lead to a clash of the superpowers.

Following Kim's 1984 visit to Moscow and the subsequent arms transfers, the Soviet Union may have gained access to North Korean ports.[134] In August 1985, the Soviet Navy made its first visit to a North Korean port when three of its ships called at the east coast

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[131]IISS, *Strategic Survey 1984–85*, London, IISS, 1985, p. 98; IISS, *Strategic Survey 1985–86*, London, IISS, 1986, p. 166; *The Economist* (London), Jan. 25, 1986, pp. 36–37; *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Mar. 20, 1986, p. 69; Daniel Abele, "Soviet–North Korean Relations on the Upswing," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 356/87, Aug. 24, 1987, pp. 2–4.

[132]The first six of a total of 30 MiG–29's were delivered in the summer of 1988, and deliveries were to be completed by the end of the year. The first deployments of the SA–5 also took place just north of the DMZ at the same time. North Korea is the first non–Warsaw Pact state to receive the *Tin Shield*. For information on these Soviet arms transfers to North Korea, I am grateful to Ian Curtis of *Defense and Foreign Affairs* and John Zindar of the Center for Defense Information.

[133]When news of the SA–5 deployments arrived, however, US officials expressed concern that civilian aircraft landing at Seoul for the Olympics could be threatened by the system.

[134]Details on the naval dimension of Soviet–North Korean relations are from Abele, "Soviet–North Korea Relations," loc. cit., pp. 3–4.

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port of Wonsan. In July 1986, units from the Pacific Fleet, led by its then-commander, Admiral Vladimir Sidorov, visited North Korea to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Soviet–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. In May 1987, the commander-in-chief of the Navy, Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, led a naval delegation to North Korea, and finally, in May 1988, Pacific Fleet commander, Admiral Gennadiy Khvatov, led a flotilla to Wonsan. The Soviet Navy has also been allowed access to Nampo port in the west.

The nature of this access to North Korean ports is unclear, and Wonsan and Nampo are not Soviet bases in any meaningful sense of the term.[135] In a related matter, Soviet aircraft bound for Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam are now allowed to use North Korean airspace, thus enabling them to bypass Japanese and South Korean surveillance systems along the Tsushima Strait.[136]

A New Asian-Pacific Security Regime?

In a variety of formats beginning in 1986, Gorbachev has proposed moving toward a new security regime for the Asian-Pacific region. The point of departure for Soviet suggestions on Asian-Pacific security is, it is emphasized, the recognition that the threat of nuclear war and the salience of global problems in an interdependent world require a reassessment of zero-sum conditions of security. Gorbachev and his advisers also have recognized that because the stability offered by competing alliances and arsenals is precarious and expensive, security must henceforth be pursued by political and economic means.

These thoughts are not mere products of abstract reasoning born of the stimulus of *glasnost'*; they constitute a repudiation of the Brezhnev-era's misplaced emphasis on military power as a means to bolster Soviet security. In northeast Asia the old approach provoked regional fears of Soviet expansion, strengthened the American military presence, and created an alignment of forces that heightened Soviet insecurity and made it difficult for the Soviet Union to harness foreign capital and technology to Siberian economic development. This militarized security environment also complicated the task of expanding the Soviet Union's economic ties with Japan, and of reducing military expenditures and winning the military's support for major force reductions—a necessity if resources are to be redirected to the civilian sector.

The Soviet conception of Asian-Pacific security under Gorbachev is nothing less than a rejection of the framework of Brezhnevian security policy and the quest for a new one. It seeks to use political means to neutralize perceived threats to Soviet security, to alter the Soviet image in the region, and to encourage foreign funds and expertise to promote economic growth in Siberia.

In proposing regional discussions on Asian-Pacific security, the Gorbachev leadership has taken care to emphasize the need for Chinese and American participation, realizing that the Asian collective security regime proposed by Brezhnev in 1969 failed, in part, because it was viewed as a means to isolate the US and to establish a coalition of states hostile to China.[137] In addition, although acknowledging that the Helsinki Accord in Europe inspires Soviet conceptions of an Asian-Pacific security system, Soviet spokesmen stress that the different circumstances (the absence of a bipolar bloc alignment, greater cultural diversity, etc.) rule out any simple transplanting of European arrangements to Asia.[138] Finally, the Soviet Union offers its proposals as points for discussion and welcomes bilateral and multilateral meetings to produce other possible measures to promote regional security.[139]

Based on Gorbachev's statements and Soviet analyses explicating his proposals, the chief elements of the security order envisaged by the Soviet Union can be specified. These elements include proposals on military bases, arms control, nuclear-free zones, and economic cooperation.[140]

Military bases. The Soviet conception of Asian-Pacific security clearly opposes foreign military bases and troops in the region. Gorbachev made this point in his

[135]Ibid.; *Asian Security 1987–88*, p. 91.

[136]*Sankei Shimbun*, May 13, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 20, 1987, p. 3.

[137]VS, pp. R/12–15; Vladimir Lukin, "The Pacific Orientation of International Politics," *MEiMO*, November 1986, pp. 70–71.

[138]Mikhail Kapitsa's comments (soon after leaving the post of deputy foreign minister to become director of the Institute of Oriental Studies) on a panel on Asian-Pacific Security, Moscow Television Service, Feb. 19, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 27, 1988, pp. CC/1–3; International Strategic Institute at Stanford, Stanford University, and Institute of Far Eastern Studies, USSR Academy of Sciences, *A Program for Strengthening Security and Reducing the Risk of War in the Asian-Pacific*, Stanford University, Center for International Security and Arms Control, March 1988, pp. 5–7. Mikhail Titarenko led the Soviet delegation to the Stanford conference.

[139]Comments of *Pravda* correspondent Vsevolod Ovchinnikov at Moscow Television Service panel of Feb. 19, 1987, loc. cit., p. CC/4.

[140]The listing by category of Soviet proposals on Asian security given below is based on VS; MI; KS; Ivan Kovalenko, "On a Complex Approach to the Problem of Asian Security," *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka*, January 1986, pp. 14–36, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, May 9, 1986, pp. 1–16; Kapitsa, "Paths to Peace," loc. cit.; Titarenko, "The Soviet Concept of Security," loc. cit.; idem, "The Soviet Strategy of Peace," loc. cit.; Institute of World Economics and International Relations, *Pacific Ocean Security*, Moscow, Nauka, 1987; *A Program for Strengthening Security*, pp. 4–5; Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev's article in *Pravda*, Sept. 5, 1988; V. Kalugin's article in ibid., Apr. 28, 1988; Lukin, "The Pacific Direction," pp. 72–73.

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Vladivostok address. In the *Merdeka* interview, he specifically mentioned the US military presence in South Korea and the Philippines. The Krasnoyarsk speech made an even sharper connection between regional security and foreign bases. In this speech, Gorbachev offered a Soviet evacuation of Cam Ranh Bay in exchange for a US willingness to give up its bases in the Philippines.

Arms control. The Soviets have suggested using the principle of reasonable sufficiency for reducing conventional forces in Asia. At Vladivostok, Gorbachev mentioned the Sino-Soviet border as the starting point. The Krasnoyarsk address proposed that the levels of naval and air forces in the northwest Pacific be frozen as a prelude to discussions. And, as mentioned above, Moscow now accepts on-site verification as an essential component of arms reduction.

A new element that recently has become clear in the Soviet position is the argument that conventional arms control should not focus on Soviet advantages in armor and artillery to the exclusion of NATO's superiority in key components of the naval balance. In February 1988, Defense Minister Yazov made this point in an article in *Pravda* as did Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy at the UN in October 1988. It was repeated in the same month by Rogachev, suggesting either that the Soviets would link European conventional arms reductions to naval arms control in Europe and elsewhere, or that in any future negotiations on arms control in the Asia-Pacific region, Moscow would insist on including naval forces.[141]

On nuclear arms, the Soviets have expressed willingness to freeze their nuclear-capable aircraft in the region if the US agrees not to increase deployments in East Asia of aircraft that are capable of striking the USSR. Moscow also proposed a US-Soviet freeze on all nuclear weapons in the region. More specifically, Moscow has maintained that without a US-Soviet agreement on limiting SLCM's, the 50 percent reduction in central strategic systems envisaged in the START negotiations will prove impossible. The Soviet Union interprets the American position that the complexities of verification prevent an accord on SLCM's as a ploy to weaken the Soviet defense posture. In Moscow's view, without an accord on SLCM's, major reductions in ICBM's—the mainstay of the Soviet triad—would create new sources of vulnerability for the USSR because the US would retain the freedom to deploy SLCM's at various locales near the Soviet periphery, including the northwest Pacific.

The superpowers have agreed in principle to limit long-range SLCM's. But the US position on the extent and nature of these limits is less well-defined than that of the Soviets. For its part, Moscow has proposed that each side limit itself to no more than 400 nuclear-armed SLCM's with a range in excess of 600 kilometers and that satellite reconnaissance plus on-site inspections of vessels can solve the verification problem posed by the dual-capable character of SLCM's.[142]

Nuclear-free zones. Opposition to nuclear weapons and the desirability of nuclear-free zones are key themes in Soviet conceptions of an East Asian security regime. Regional manifestations of anti-nuclear sentiment—the Rarotonga Treaty, Australia's and New Zealand's opposition to French nuclear tests in the South Pacific, New Zealand's banning of visits by nuclear-armed ships, and discussions within ASEAN on a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia—are singled out for praise. Soviet and Chinese adoption of the "no first use" principle and the Soviet Union's unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests are contrasted with the American reluctance to reduce the reliance on nuclear weapons for security.

Confidence-building measures. The following Soviet initiatives have sought to promote stability given existing deployments: a proposed US-Soviet agreement to keep warships armed with nuclear weapons beyond the range of the respective coasts; a proposal to limit ASW in agreed-upon zones and eliminate it in others; a proposal to limit major naval exercises to one or two per year; a proposal to prohibit large naval exercises in major sea routes; a proposal to provide advance notice of planned exercises or troop movements involving forces larger than an agreed-upon number; and a proposal for on-site inspections to ensure compliance. Some of these initiatives derive from the experience of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, while others, especially those involving safe havens for SSBN's and limiting the operating areas for nuclear-armed vessels, speak to more immediate concerns such as the maritime strategy and *Tomahawk* SLCM's.

[141] *Pravda*, Feb. 8, 1988; *The New York Times*, Oct. 19, 1988; Moscow, Radio Peace and Progress, Oct. 13, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Oct. 14, 1988, p. 11.

[142] For the Soviet position on SLCM's, see interviews with Colonel General Nikolay Chervov in *La Stampa*, loc. cit., pp. 11–12; with Viktor Karpov in *The Guardian*, Mar. 31, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 12, 1988, pp. 1–2; with Vladimir Ivanov in *Tokyo Shimbun*, Apr. 20, 1988, trans. in ibid., Apr. 29, 1988; Gorbachev's remarks to Japan Communist Party Central Committee Vice-Chairman, Tetsuzo Fuwa, as reported in Tokyo, JPS in English, May 7, 1988, in ibid., May 10, 1988, p. 2; comments of Novosti security expert Viktor Pavlov in *Rabotnichesko Delo* (Sofia), June 1, 1988, trans. in ibid., June 6, 1988, pp. 3–4.

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Economic cooperation. The Soviets view regional economic cooperation as a means both to promote Siberian economic development and to create a setting conducive to negotiating arms-control and confidence-building measures intended to bolster Asian-Pacific security. They stress that the role envisaged for foreign capital and technology in the development of Siberia —an area now heavily subsidized by the rest of the USSR—creates immense opportunities for profitable investments. Preferential tax rates and other incentives are discussed to entice foreign investors. And, in an effort to involve itself more deeply in the East Asian economy, the USSR has sought a role in the Asian Development Bank and the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, a 15-nation group established in 1980 to discuss regional economic issues.[143]

Conclusion

These broad proposals as well as various bilateral relationships in the region reflect a Soviet attempt to redefine the way that Northeast Asian countries view the USSR. Moscow now wishes to be seen as a constructive partner in the region rather than as a hegemon. Senior Soviet officials, such as Rogachev, have stressed the importance of recasting the Soviet image.

The Soviets also seek to limit the American military presence in the region. Thus, the call for dismantling foreign bases and the support of nuclear-free zones are aimed at American deployments in South Korea, Japan, and the Philippines, which represent to the USSR a threatening projection of power along its periphery. The confidence-building measures seek to limit anti-submarine warfare and confine nuclear-armed vessels to areas from which they could not strike targets ashore.

Overall, the Soviet conception of Asian-Pacific security responds politically to what Moscow views as the principal military threats to its security and attempts to create a regional environment suited to two important goals of *perestroyka:* reducing the burden of defense expenditure and using foreign investment to improve technology and raise the standard of living in the USSR.

Thus far, the Soviets have been disappointed by the responses to their proposals. First, the US and its Pacific allies view Soviet initiatives on regional security as efforts to undermine the American military presence and to create a situation in which the USSR emerges preponderant simply by virtue of geographical proximity. A 1988 Japanese Defense Agency report maintains that Soviet military power in the Far East has increased since Gorbachev became general secretary.[144] And William Safire has called Soviet proposals on Pacific security "a sucker play" and "the deliberate moves of a superpower switching from raw power to diplomatic trickery to further imperialist aims."[145] Second, the US and Japanese governments in particular do not regard Gorbachev's proposals as genuine efforts prompted by a willingness to reduce Soviet forces, but as a public relations offensive aimed at falsely presenting the USSR as the agent of peace and progress.

Neither of these views is totally without foundation. But, by the same token, they do not adequately appreciate the new domestic context of Soviet foreign policy, Gorbachev's efforts to design a security environment for the USSR supportive of *perestroyka* and the reallocation of investment resources from the military to the civilian sector.

The failure to give adequate weight to these considerations is not surprising—neither political leaders nor most Soviet specialists in the West anticipated the changes now taking place in Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Entrenched perceptions and assumptions are not easily reexamined. Yet, if Gorbachev's proposals are dismissed as pure public relations ploys, the opportunity may be lost to determine if they can lead to mutually-acceptable, mutually-beneficial, verifiable agreements that might reduce tensions, minimize the likelihood of accidental war, and decrease the defense burdens that neither superpower now can easily bear.

[143] *The Daily Yomiuri* (Tokyo), May 21, 1987, in ibid., May 26, 1987, p. 1, notes that the Soviets sent a representative to the 20th annual general meeting of the Asian Development Bank although since the founding of the Bank in 1966, Moscow had "not even bothered to reply to letters of invitation to the annual conference." On Soviet interest in the Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference, see *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), May 24, 1988, which notes that a Soviet delegation headed by Primakov attended a meeting of the conference in Osaka, Japan, and sought membership. Primakov reportedly stated that the Soviets had reassessed "some dogmatic judgments we had in the past" and sought foreign cooperation to develop the Soviet Far East.

[144] The report states that ground forces have increased by 20,000 or the equivalent of two divisions, that naval power has been strengthened by the addition to the Pacific Fleet of Sovremennyy- and Kirov-class ships, as well as Akula-class submarines marked by significant noise reduction, and that air power has grown by 190 aircraft with additional MiG–31's, Tu–22M's, and MiG–23's. *Nihon Keizai Shimbun,* Apr. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Apr. 15, 1988, pp. 2–3; *Sankei Shimbun,* Feb. 26, 1989, trans. in ibid., Mar. 6, 1989, p. 2. The Soviets have denied this claim. See Yazov's interview with Tokyo, Kyodo, July 4, 1988, in ibid., July 5, 1988, p. 11; Radio Moscow in Japanese, Feb. 16, 1989, trans. in ibid., Feb. 28, 1989, pp. 20–21.

[145] *The New York Times,* Sept. 9, 1988. The fear that Gorbachev's proposals, if implemented, would reduce the American presence and leave the USSR predominant in East Asia is reflected in Japanese reactions to Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk initiatives. See *Izvestiya,* Oct. 15, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Oct. 20, 1988, pp. 15–16, for a Soviet summation of some of the reactions.

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China and India: Moving Beyond Confrontation

Surjit Mansingh and Steven I. Levine

The visit of India's Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China, from December 19 to 23, 1988, marked an advance in the two countries' decade-long quest for a mutually acceptable mode of coexistence. This summit diplomacy represents an attempt by China and India to close the book on 30 years of hostility and to promote a better atmosphere in which long-standing contentious issues may be peacefully resolved.

Despite the goodwill generated by Gandhi's visit, resolving disputes and easing tensions will not be easy for the two countries. Beijing and New Delhi have been attempting to improve their relations for more than a dozen years, but the road to Sino-Indian normalization has been as full of switchbacks and rough spots as any of the strategic roads that now cross the Himalayan mountains between the two countries. Although China and India have managed—not without difficulty—to prevent sporadic tensions along their disputed border from escalating into serious armed conflict (most notably in 1986–87), they are still a long way from resolving the territorial dispute over their Himalayan border, which erupted into a shooting war in October 1962. The past decade has also found the two countries on opposite sides of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia, and both compete for influence in the Himalayan border kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan.

Their conflicting self-images also are divisive. New Delhi sees Beijing as an interloper in South Asia. China believes that as the leading power in Asia it is entitled to pursue active diplomacy in that region. Moreover, the smaller states of South Asia (including Pakistan) see the People's Republic of China (PRC) as a counterweight to India.

This article examines recent developments in Sino-Indian relations within their regional and global contexts. Its principal conclusion is that recent Sino-Indian summit diplomacy is unlikely to bring about any dramatic changes in the relations between Beijing and New Delhi in the near term but that the summit dialogue will contribute to building domestic support in both countries for expanded relations. The summit also has established a regular mechanism for working toward the resolution of the border conflict. But even normalization of Sino-Indian relations can only be expected to ameliorate, not eliminate, the long-standing rivalry between these two major powers, whose divergent interests and possibly incompatible regional ambitions will continue to shape inter-state relations in South Asia. Despite many changes in the domestic and international environments of China and India over the past four decades, certain unresolved issues remain at the core of relations between the two largest states in Asia, whose combined population of 1.9 billion people constitutes more than one third of the world's total.

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Relations in Historical Context

Despite more than 2,000 years of cultural and economic contact, India and China emerged historically as largely autonomous civilizations whose interactions—with the significant exception of Buddhism—were peripheral to their respective development. In the century preceding modern India's independence in 1947 and the establishment of the People's Republic of China in 1949, Indian and Chinese intellectual leaders occasionally took sympathetic note of each other. However, no close ties developed between the emerging elites of the two countries; moreover, the National Congress Party of India and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) each pursued their national objectives through very different means.

Since the 1940's, Sino-Indian relations have passed through four stages. Broadly speaking, the 1950's can be characterized as an era of friendship based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence; the 1960's as a time of conflict and hostility; the 1970's as a period in which tentative efforts were made to reestablish contact; and the 1980's as an era of regular but insubstantial governmental meetings.

The brief flowering of Sino-Indian friendship in the mid-1950's was due, in large part, to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who viewed Indian independence and the Chinese Revolution as parallel expressions of resurgent Asian nationalism, and envisioned India and China as cooperating leaders of post-colonial Asia.[1] India became one of the first noncommunist states to recognize the PRC (on April 1, 1950), and New Delhi vigorously upheld Beijing's right to representation in the United Nations. After some hesitation, the Indian government also recognized China's 1951 takeover of Tibet and concluded a trade agreement in April 1954 that liquidated the privileged position there that India had inherited from the British raj. This agreement was notable also for first enshrining the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (*Panch Shila*)[2]—respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, nonaggression, no interference in internal affairs, equality and mutuality, and peaceful coexistence. This Pan-Asian idealism, however, was rooted in the rather thin soil of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism. It looked toward a self-managed Asia free not only from the domination of the existing major powers but also from the politics of power itself. This turned out to be an illusion.

Border dispute. The undemarcated border of some 2,500 miles in mountainous terrain between territories administered and/or claimed by New Delhi and Beijing proved to be an insuperable barrier to Sino-Indian amity. Small border clashes began to occur in the middle and late 1950's, first at points in the middle sector of the Indo-Tibetan border, then in the northwestern reaches of Ladakh, a district of Kashmir, where the Chinese constructed a road linking Sinkiang to Tibet across the Aksai Chin plateau, and finally at the other extremity of the frontier where eastern Tibet met India's North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, now the state of Arunachal Pradesh) along the famous McMahon line. In a letter to Nehru dated September 8, 1959, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai laid claim to about 40,000 square miles of territory over which India's most recent maps showed it to have sovereignty. Zhou's explanation for the claim lay in his review of the history of British imperialist expansion into the Himalayas.[3] However, independent India, as the successor state to British India, accepted the legitimacy of the borders it inherited. Nehru defended this position tenaciously even though he expected to resolve controversy peacefully.

In addition, India's close links with the Himalayan kingdoms of Bhutan and Nepal, as well as the small princely protectorate of Sikkim, were strengthened by treaty in 1949–50, and Nehru subsequently made it clear to China that the security of their northern borders was of vital interest to India. India and China, then, were like two powerful magnets embedded in the Himalayan region, each exerting a field of force that overlapped with that of the other.

Tibet. Although China's assertion of control over Tibet was grudgingly accepted by India, the issue of Tibet—the geographical and cultural link between China and India—is entwined with the border question since most of the border runs along the southern frontier of Tibet. Conflicting claims to specific areas rest in part in the status of Tibet as a signatory to the controversial agreement establishing the McMahon line as the boundary in the eastern sector. This agreement was negotiated between the British and Tibetans in Delhi in

[1]Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, *Diplomatic History of Modern India*, New Delhi, Allied, 1971, pp. 184–201; Bhabani Sen Gupta, *The Fulcrum of Asia: Relations Among China, India, Pakistan, and the USSR*, New York, Pegasus, 1970, pp. 304–05. See also Surjit Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, New Delhi, Sage Publications, Ltd., 1984, pp. 192–96.

[2]For the text of the Sino-Indian agreement on Tibet, see R. K. Jain, Ed., *China–South Asian Relations 1947-1980*, Brighton, England, The Harvester Press, 1981, Vol. 1, pp. 61–64.

[3]This point of view is documented by British writers. See Neville Maxwell, *India's China War*, Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1972, pp. 5–55. See also Alastair Lamb, *The China-India Border: The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries*, London, Oxford University Press, 1964; and idem, *The McMahon Line: A Study in the Relations Between India, China, and Tibet, 1904–1914*, 2 vols. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1966.

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February and March 1914 after the Simla Conference of 1913–14 failed to secure the formal adherence of the Chinese government to a tripartite border agreement. Although India upholds the legality of the agreement, China has denied the binding force of the McMahon line—which pushed the Indian boundary northward about 60 miles—contending that Tibet had no treaty-making power.

The PRC's imposition of its own highly centralized state structure provoked a Tibetan national uprising in 1959 and the exodus of the Dalai Lama, Tibet's preeminent religious leader, and about 100,000 others to India, where they were given sanctuary and allowed to set up a government-in-exile.[4] Beijing responded with outrage and initiated a steady buildup of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in this sensitive and volatile border area. After China crushed the Tibetan uprising, relations with India deteriorated rapidly.

1962 war. Although the border was the subject of detailed official Sino-Indian talks in 1960, these talks did little but point up divergent Indian and Chinese interpretations of juridical principles, historical records, and even the methods of delimiting borders. By 1962, Nehru, spurred by growing Indian patriotic fervor, and convinced that the Chinese would never go to war over the barren frontier territory, abruptly adopted an assertive policy of forward patrolling along the disputed border. Local clashes between Indian and Chinese forces intensified. Reeling from the internal crises induced by the Great Leap Forward and fearing that China's external enemies, Taiwan and the United States, were taking the offensive against Beijing, Mao Zedong adopted a stiffer stand toward India and launched an ideological onslaught on Nehru.[5] Finally, on October 20, 1962, the PLA launched an attack down the Himalayan ridge lines against Indian forces that were inadequately prepared for such an eventuality.[6] After humiliating India and provoking international concern about a possible Chinese invasion of the North India plains, on November 21, the PLA declared a unilateral cease-fire and withdrew to the preexisting lines of control. Sino-Indian relations settled into a cold war pattern.

Several observations may be made concerning the breakdown of Sino-Indian relations in the late 1950's and early 1960's. First, with very few exceptions, Chinese and Indian leaders were woefully ignorant of each other's history and culture and lacked knowledge of each other's modern politics as well. The modernizing elites of China and India had many links abroad, but they had few links with each other as Asians.

The second point, a corollary of the first, is that the two countries shared very few concrete interests. The anti-imperialist rhetoric of Pan-Asian solidarity and the peaceful code of international conduct embodied in the *Panch Shila* were insubstantial commodities compared to the heavy weight of traditional military definitions of national security. In fact, anti-imperialism in China and India was expressed in various forms, including by assertiveness in international affairs. This national assertiveness, which invoked the glorious past of both countries, accelerated the drift toward territorial conflict.

Third, China's and India's defense of their sovereignty and territorial integrity focused on remote border areas of little economic, but considerable strategic significance to both states. Moreover, the ability to pacify and incorporate these areas into their respective political systems was perceived by both Chinese and Indian leaders as proof of their political efficacy and legitimacy.[7] This circumstance significantly reduced the flexibility on both sides and complicated the resolution of disputes.

Finally, underlying the specific conflicts between China and India were competing Chinese and Indian visions of their roles in Asia and the world, visions that touched upon questions of status, prestige, and position in the international hierarchy of nations. Maoist China saw itself as a revolutionary socialist great power providing symbolic leadership to all oppressed peoples against the dominant powers. Similarly, India's self-image in Nehru's time was that of a major power pioneering new principles of peaceful international relations through the concepts of nonalignment and evolutionary change. These Chinese and Indian self-images proved mutually incompatible. Thus, when concrete points of dispute arose between the two countries in the late 1950's, they were exacerbated by symbolic political issues, as well as by the personalities of the leaders on both sides.

Global context of Sino-Indian relations. Beginning in the 1960's, Beijing saw India as an adversary associated first with "Western imperialism" and then with "Soviet expansionism" in encircling the PRC. When, in the

[4]See John F. Avedon, *In Exile from the Land of the Snows*, New York, Vintage Books, 1986, pp. 65–133; Tom Grunfeld, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1987.

[5]See the articles on Nehru in *Renmin ribao* (Beijing), especially those of May 6, 1959, and Oct. 27, 1962.

[6]For Chinese calculations and warnings, see Allen S. Whiting, *China's Calculus of Deterrence*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1975.

[7]For a similar point, see Stephen P. Cohen, "Toward a Great State in Asia?" in Onkar Marwah and Jonathan D. Pollack, Eds., *Military Power and Policy in Asian States: China, India, Japan*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1980, p. 22.

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Chinese and Indian military officials on December 19, 1962, negotiate the return of Indian materiel seized by the Chinese during hostilities earlier in the autumn.

—China Photo Service from Eastfoto.

midst of the Bangladesh crisis of 1971, India modified its nonaligned policy and intensified its economic and security relationship with the Soviet Union, ultimately signing the Soviet-Indian Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation on August 9, 1971, the Chinese media sneered that "the Soviet Union has turned India into its dependency."[8] However, China was also motivated by security concerns and, using Pakistan as an intermediary, entered upon a strategic relationship with the United States. In this way, the Sino-Indian conflict became linked to both the Sino-Soviet conflict and the Sino-Soviet-American strategic triangle, ensuring that no substantial change would occur in Sino-Indian relations until a thaw began between Moscow and Beijing.

From New Delhi's perspective, it was China that was actively engaged in encircling India rather than the reverse. The consolidation of an informal alliance between China and Pakistan in the 1960's posed two threats to Indian national security. First, it opened the possibility of a two-front war, though this did not materialize either during the 1965 or the 1971 Indian wars with Pakistan, and second, it brought Chinese assistance to Pakistan's clandestine nuclear weapons program.[9] India has also regarded with suspicion China's diplomacy with respect to other South Asian states friendly to India, namely, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. It feared that China, as an outside power, was exploiting natural disagreements on a heterogeneous subcontinent for the purpose of extending its own influence at India's expense.

In the 1950's and 1960's, China's and India's divergent self-images were often discussed by outside observers, who posited the existence of competing Chinese and Indian "models" of development: peasant revolution and communism versus voluntarism and democracy.[10] Since then, the many zig-zags in China's domestic policies and the difficulties that India has experienced in its development have sharply reduced the salience of this original perspective. Nevertheless, the

[8]*Peking Review*, Nov. 30, 1973, cited in R. K. Jain, op. cit., p. 440.

[9]See Carnegie Task Force on Non-Proliferation and South Asian Security, *Nuclear Weapons and South Asian Security*, Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1988.

[10]See, for example, Barrington R. Moore, Jr., *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1966.

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sheer size of India and China, their roughly comparable stages of economic development, and the similar problems that they presently face continue to direct attention to their development strategies and their respective achievements and failures.[11] Although these factors also fuel the competition between the two countries, they hold the potential for collaboration and mutual learning as well.

Obstacles to Normalization

It is axiomatic that solutions of long-standing disputes in international relations require that both sides display an equal interest at the same time in reaching a mutually satisfactory solution. This is especially true when the adversaries have resorted to arms and lack both trust in and familiarity with each other.

The Sino-Indian border war of 1962, however, froze relations between India and China in a posture of mutual hostility and mistrust for nearly two decades. The Indian public's sense of outrage over the national humiliation in the war was compounded when in 1967, during the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards besieged the Indian Embassy and assaulted Indian diplomats, and Chinese media heaped abuse on Indira Gandhi's government. Relations were further complicated by China's support of tribal insurgency movements in NEFA as well as Marxist-Leninist and Maoist agitators in several Indian states.

Prime Minister Gandhi saw little opportunity for improving relations with China during her early years in power. When she was ready to explore the possibility of doing so in 1969–70, she elicited no response from the Chinese side.[12] Not only was the PRC deep in the throes of the Cultural Revolution but it was also preoccupied with a worsening conflict with the Soviet Union. The diplomatic turnabout of 1971 that produced Sino-American rapprochement and the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation further reduced the prospects for an early initiative to break the Sino-Indian logjam.

For New Delhi, close relations with Moscow acted as a constraint in at least two ways. First, for most of the Brezhnev period (1964–82), Soviet leaders were obsessed with the problem of China and viewed even tentative moves in the direction of Sino-Indian reconciliation as a threat to Soviet interests in Asia. This became particularly clear during the period of the Janata party government (1977–79), when suspicion that Prime Minister Morarji Desai wanted to improve relations with China was one of the factors that prompted reported Soviet efforts to unseat him,[13] and when both Leonid Brezhnev and Aleksey Kosygin voiced objections to Foreign Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee's visit to Beijing in February 1979.

Second, Soviet diplomatic support along with military and economic assistance over several decades had built a broad spectrum of support in India for close relations. Soviet embassy materials depicting Chinese foreign policy in the worst possible light easily fanned the flames of anti-Chinese sentiment among the many Indian opinion-makers who opposed rapprochement with the PRC on terms short of Chinese capitulation. In the context of continuing Sino-Soviet antagonisms, any move toward Beijing by an Indian government could be portrayed by the opposition as an unfriendly act toward Moscow rather than as a sensible step toward ameliorating bilateral relations with China. Thus, in the early 1980's Mrs. Gandhi's government was obliged to repeatedly assert that "normalization of relations with China will not be at the cost of our tested friendship with the Soviet Union."[14] In sum, Indian domestic and foreign policy considerations obstructed progress toward the normalization of Sino-Indian relations.

An analogous set of circumstances prevailed on the Chinese side. As Indo-Soviet relations grew better, Sino-Soviet relations grew worse. The Chinese looked askance at India's relations with the Soviet Union and viewed Moscow's neutrality in the Sino-Indian border war and its military assistance to India as integral parts of Soviet strategy to contain China's power. In the 1960's, China acted to counter Soviet strategy throughout Asia and Africa, as well as to demonstrate its own credibility as a major Asian power whose voice should command attention in South Asia.

In 1963, China and Pakistan signed a border agreement that accorded interim recognition to Pakistani claims on Kashmir. The following year, Zhou Enlai formally supported Pakistan's position that the future of Kashmir should be determined by plebiscite. An informal alliance between China and Pakistan took shape against the backdrop of subcontinental conflict.[15] Dur-

[11]See, for example, Robert F. Dernberger and Richard S. Eckaus, *Financing Asian Development No. 2: China and India*, Lanham, MD. University Press of America, 1988. See also Sanjay Kathuria, "China Can Learn from India's Problems," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (Hong Kong), Aug. 13, 1987, p. 85.

[12]Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, p. 204.

[13]See Arun Gandhi, *The Morarji Papers: Fall of the Janata Government*, New Delhi, Vision Books, 1983, pp. 28–29, 37–39. We are indebted to John W. Garver for bringing this source to our attention.

[14]Mansingh, *India's Search for Power*, p. 246.

[15]For a trenchant analysis, see J. D. Armstrong, *Revolutionary Diplomacy: Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1977, pp. 159–64; also, Yaacov Vertzberger, *China's Southwestern Strategy: Encirclement and Counterencirclement*, New York, Praeger, 1985, pp. 21–45.

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ing the Pakistan-India war of 1965, China demanded that India cease fire and desist from alleged incursions along the Sino-Indian border.[16] During the protracted Bangladesh crisis of 1971, Chinese leaders tried discreetly to moderate Yahya Khan's brutal policy toward East Bengal, but without success.[17] Liu Shaoqi's earlier pledge to support Pakistan's territorial integrity[18] was quietly interred and China remained on the sidelines during the war in December 1971, which resulted in the establishment of Bangladesh. However, the PRC, by then a member of the UN Security Council, supported Pakistan in the United Nations, and criticized India and the Soviet Union for their roles in dismembering a sovereign state.[19] China did not establish diplomatic relations with Bangladesh until 1975.

In this way China aligned itself with a weaker regional state locked in chronic conflict with its more powerful neighbor.[20] In the polarized politics of South Asia, China's support for Pakistan, limited though it proved to be in practice, constrained Chinese diplomacy toward India. Beijing was unwilling to abandon its junior partner for the sake of better relations with New Delhi. It was only some years after the Bangladesh crisis that Chinese leaders concluded that their interests on the subcontinent would be better served by promoting rapprochement between Pakistan and India.

In the meantime, however, China provoked Indian resentment by providing an alternate source of economic and technical aid to Nepal, a Himalayan kingdom where the Indian presence was highly visible.[21] The Sino-Indian struggle for political influence in the Himalayan border lands took a new turn in 1975 when India integrated the princely state of Sikkim into the Indian Union.[22] A torrent of Chinese criticism appeared in *Renmin ribao* denouncing the action as a "flagrant act of colonialist expansion," and further proof of India's desire to become a "sub-superpower." A Chinese government statement issued on April 29, 1975, condemned India's "illegal annexation," and offered to support Sikkimese resistance.[23] This was seen as an inflammatory gesture in New Delhi.

The United States also played a role in hardening the lines of confrontation in South Asia. Because of Pakistan's friendship with both the United States and the PRC, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger viewed President Yahya Khan as an indispensable intermediary during the delicate early stages of Sino-American rapprochement.[24] Kissinger's historic trip to Beijing in July 1971 coincided with the unfolding tragedy in Bangladesh. Enmeshed in the crisis, India assessed the strategic dimensions of the emerging Sino-American rapprochement as a potential threat to its interests.[25]

Thus, from the original bilateral confrontation in 1962, Sino-Indian relations gradually evolved into a secondary or dependent antagonism within the context of great-power relations in the 1970's. A pentagon of power relations took shape in South Asia within which three linked triangles could be discerned. The politics of the triangle of regional powers—India-Pakistan-China—became linked to both a Soviet-Indian-Chinese triangle of major Asian powers as well as to the international politics of the so-called strategic triangle of the great powers—US-USSR-PRC.[26] (Note China's unique position in this schema.) Beijing's calculation was that the American-Pakistani-Chinese coalition would outbalance the Soviet-Indian combination. This linkage suited Chinese as well as American inclinations to treat regional issues as manifestations of a global strategic contest.[27] However, this approach magnified Indian fears as well, so that this "globalizing" tendency made progress towards Sino-Indian normalization exceedingly difficult.

Toward Normalization

Faint signs of a thaw in Sino-Indian relations became discernible in the mid-1970's. An Indian initiative in

[16]See Anwar Syed, *China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an Entente Cordiale*, Amherst, MA, University of Massachusetts Press, 1974, pp. 109–25; also Armstrong, op. cit., pp. 166–69.

[17]Golam W. Choudhury, *China in World Affairs: The Foreign Policy of the PRC Since 1970*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1982, pp. 254–55. Choudhury was then a member of President Yahya Khan's inner circle.

[18]Cited in Armstrong, op. cit., p. 170.

[19]*Renmin ribao*, Editorial, Jan. 31, 1972, cited in Robert G. Sutter, *Chinese Foreign Policy After the Cultural Revolution, 1966-1977*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, p. 134. For China's position during the 1971 crisis, see Vertzberger, op. cit., pp. 47–59.

[20]The PRC has a proclivity for alignments with a weaker regional power against a more powerful state that was an enemy of China's partner, e.g., with Cambodia against Vietnam.

[21]See Hemen Ray, *China's Strategy in Nepal*, New Delhi, Radiant Publishers, 1983; T. R. Ghoble, *China-Nepal Relations and India*, New Delhi, Deep & Deep Publications, 1986.

[22]For an insider's account of this process, see B. S. Das, *The Sikkim Saga*, New Delhi, Vikas Publishing House, 1983.

[23]Sutter, op. cit., pp. 136–37.

[24]See Seymour M. Hersh, *The Price of Power: Kissinger in the Nixon White House*, New York, Summit Books, 1983, pp. 444–53.

[25]For an incisive account of the international diplomacy of the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, see Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1985, pp. 262–88.

[26]For a similar point, see Raju G. C. Thomas, "India: Balancing Great Power Intrusions and Regional Security Interests," in Raju G. C. Thomas, Ed., *The Great Power Triangle and Asian Security*, Lexington, MA, D. C. Heath, 1983, p. 65.

[27]See Steven Levine, "China in Asia: The PRC as a Regional Power," in Harry Harding, Ed., *China's Foreign Relations in the 1980s*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 107–45.

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1976 to resume diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level was the first step. Thereafter, the two countries reestablished trade, shipping, and banking links at modest levels.[28]

The Janata party victory in the Indian elections of 1977, coming just a few months after the death of Mao Zedong and on the eve of sweeping changes in China's domestic politics, seemed a propitious moment for new overtures in Sino-Indian relations. Morarji Desai desired better relations with China as a means of partially distancing India from the Soviet Union. Chinese leaders reciprocated for the same reason. After some preliminary exchanges, a visit by the Indian Foreign Minister A. B. Vajpayee took place in February 1979, during which the two sides set out their basic positions on the issues that divided them. Vajpayee identified the border problem as the key obstacle to normal Sino-Indian relations, and made it clear that India considered its resolution essential. Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping responded that the border problems could be resolved through consultations, but that meanwhile relations could move forward in other areas.

According to the Chinese news agency Xinhua, the meetings were highly successful. The five principles of peaceful coexistence were reaffirmed as the basis of bilateral relations and as the foundation for a settlement of the boundary question that, it was said, had been "left over from the past when the people of China and India were in a powerless position."[29] According to Vajpayee, the Chinese leaders "showed understanding of our policy toward Pakistan and our neighbors" and expressed "appreciation of our efforts." Furthermore, they assured him that China would stop assisting tribal insurgents in India's Nagaland, Manipur, and Mizoram.[30] As a consequence of Vajpayee's visit, the Chinese subsequently reopened Kailash and Mansarovar in Tibet to Indian pilgrims.

However, the positive momentum of Vajpayee's visit was halted by China's attack on Vietnam on February 19. Indian critics of Janata, including Mrs. Gandhi, interpreted the Chinese action as a deliberate insult to India reminiscent of China's behavior in 1962.[31] Yet, even if China had not moved against Vietnam, Vajpayee's visit, despite its successes, could have had only limited significance over the long term. Vajpayee himself looked on the visit as only an exploratory trip and carried with him no concrete proposals on how to settle the boundary question. Moreover, the Janata government was publicly committed to the resolution passed by the Indian Parliament on November 14, 1962, asserting "the firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor [China] from the sacred soil of India."[32] China policy was an explosive issue in domestic politics, and the Janata coalition was weak.

The Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 reinforced China's interest in mending fences with the outside world, including India, and Mrs. Gandhi's return to power in January 1980 was not seen as an impediment. (This was signalled, in part, by Foreign Minister Huang Hua's attendance at India's Republic Day celebrations at the Indian embassy, Beijing, on January 26, 1980, the first by a high ranking official in over 20 years.) Nevertheless, it must be noted that the contrast between China's and India's initial responses to the Soviet action was striking. Beijing, like Washington, quickly increased military aid to Pakistan while New Delhi refused to join in public condemnations of the Soviet Union. Both governments launched a series of high level diplomatic visits designed to accomplish different objectives. China hoped to elicit anti-Soviet commitments from all the South Asian states, while India hoped to prevent the formation of an anti-India bloc in the region. With respect to improving bilateral relations, China emphasized the need to set aside the border question and cooperate in other areas, while India insisted that its settlement was a precondition for overall improvement of relations.

In June 1980, Vice-Premier Deng attempted to address India's concerns through the medium of an interview with Krishan Kumar, the editor of *Vikrant,* an Indian defense journal. The interview took place during the visit to Beijing of Eric Gonsalves, Secretary of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Backpedaling from China's previous position, Deng called the Kashmir dispute a bilateral problem in Indo-Pakistani relations, thereby suggesting that China would no longer take Pakistan's side in the dispute. More significant, Deng revived Zhou Enlai's "package proposals" of 1960–62 by proposing that India and China settle their border dispute on the basis of the present line of actual control and abandon their respective claims in the eastern and western sectors.[33] From India's point of view this pro-

[28]See Shen Chun-ch'uan, "Peking-New Delhi Relations in Recent Years," *Issues and Studies* (Taipei), March 1986, pp. 142–43.

[29]Xinhua commentary, Feb. 19, 1979, in R. K. Jain, op. cit., p. 502.

[30]Vajpayee's statement in Parliament, Feb. 21, 1979, in ibid., pp. 508–10.

[31]The leader of the Congress Party (I) in the Lok Sabha charged that China's attack on Vietnam was designed to remind India of China's military superiority and predominance in Asia. Raju G. C. Thomas, *Indian Security Policy,* Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1986, p. 114.

[32]Resolution adopted by the Lok Sabha, Nov. 14, 1962. Text in ibid., p. 225.

[33]Jain, op. cit., pp. 542–44; also *Far Eastern Economic Review,* July 4, 1980, pp. 26–27.

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posal remained as unattractive as it had been 20 years earlier because it sought to legitimize Chinese occupation of territory in Ladakh between 1959 and 1962 without offering any territorial compensation to India. Nevertheless, Foreign Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao, in a statement to the Lok Sabha (India's lower house of Parliament) on July 2, 1980, welcomed the offer as a starting point for normalization and for opening negotiations on the border.[34]

India's recognition of the Heng Samrin government in Cambodia, which the Chinese denounced as a puppet regime, delayed the next step in the nascent Sino-Indian dialogue, but by June 1981, the Chinese were ready to pick up the thread. Huang Hua, at long last returning Vajpayee's visit of February 1979, journeyed to New Delhi for talks with Foreign Minister Rao on a broad range of subjects. Meanwhile, Premier Zhao Ziyang toured Pakistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh, assuring them of Chinese support even while calling India "a major South Asian power" and expressing enthusiasm over the prospects for South Asian regional cooperation.[35]

Following Huang Hua's visit, the two governments embarked on a series of border talks, the first being held in Beijing in December 1981, with Secretary Gonsalves and Vice Foreign Minister Han Nianlong heading the respective delegations. Eight such meetings have taken place since the agreement. The initial optimism about settling the border issue seemed justified because at the first session China agreed to discuss the border first, while India agreed to place other issues on the agenda, such as cultural and economic ties and access to Buddhist pilgrimage sites. At the second round of talks in New Delhi in May 1982, China repeated its package offer without giving precise details while India pressed for discussion of the border question on a sector-by-sector basis without making any overall counterproposal. In February 1983 in Beijing, the two sides discussed specific outstanding claims on the border by both sides.[36]

Some progress was apparently made during the course of the fourth round (October 1983, New Delhi), when China and India agreed to work toward defining principles that could be applied in working out a comprehensive settlement on the boundary question through a sector-by-sector approach. Under discussion, according to the Indian press, were concepts commonly found in international law such as that of the watershed and the highest crest of a mountain range. Judging by its border agreements with Burma, Nepal, and Pakistan in the 1960's, China found such principles acceptable. The utilization of these principles was also compatible with India's traditional definition of its borders. It seemed, at the least, that a semantic logjam had been broken and that further progress could be anticipated. However, the fifth round in Beijing in September 1984 disappointed such hopes, producing nothing more than an agreement to continue to meet.

In 1985, China adopted a distinctly harder line on the border dispute, perhaps to position itself for some real bargaining with Rajiv Gandhi who, after succeeding his assassinated mother, had won a resounding personal mandate in the December parliamentary elections and may have appeared to possess a position strong enough to enable him to make the concessions that previous Indian leaders had eschewed. When pressed by India to define its package proposal, China refused to be precise but explained that it meant "mutual concessions," in which China would expect India to make territorial concessions in the eastern sector in return for which China would make concessions in the Ladakh (western) sector.

Having already agreed to the sector-by-sector approach favored by India, China now gave priority to the eastern sector, claiming that the dispute there was most acute. It is difficult to say whether this was part of its bargaining tactic, or whether it reflected a new assessment of China's interests along the eastern sector of the boundary. Be that as it may, this articulated position dashed Indian expectations of a deal by which India would recognize China's control of the Aksai Chin in return for Chinese withdrawal from those areas in Ladakh occupied in the 1962 war, as well as for *explicit* Chinese recognition of the McMahon line in the eastern sector. With the Chinese reassertion of claims in the eastern sector, the gap between Chinese demands and Indian willingness to make concessions—a gap that had appeared to be narrowing—seemed to be widening once more.

Notwithstanding its demand for concessions in the eastern sector, China did appear to be hopeful of reaching an accommodation with Rajiv Gandhi. In June 1985, Beijing proposed reopening consulates to facilitate normal commercial and cultural exchanges. The sites initially proposed were Shanghai and Lhasa on the Chinese side and Bombay and Calcutta on the Indian. Subsequently, India has had second thoughts about allowing the Chinese to set up shop again in Calcutta, which is too close for comfort to the volatile northeast tribal region, and China has rethought its offer to allow the Indians a diplomatic listening post in the even

[34]Jain, op. cit., pp. 549–50.

[35]Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman was soliciting support for what became the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

[36]For an early assessment of the first three rounds, see Jerrold F. Elkin and Brian Fredericks, "Sino-Indian Border Talks: The View from New Delhi," *Asian Survey* (Berkeley, CA), October 1983, pp. 1128–39.

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more volatile atmosphere of Lhasa. Thus, nothing has yet materialized.

In October 1985, Prime Ministers Zhao and Gandhi met at the United Nations and agreed on the need to upgrade Sino-Indian talks to the highest political level. The Indian leader accepted in principle an invitation to visit Beijing, but no follow-up occurred. By the end of 1985, the bright promise of Rajiv's first year in office had been tarnished by successive failures at home, and Chinese leaders may well have decided to await proof of his capacity for continued leadership before making any further overtures.

The seventh round of talks—in Beijing in July 1986—was tense because of a flare-up of border problems. In the summer of 1986, Beijing and New Delhi traded bitter charges over military activities in the Tawang tract area (eastern sector), each side alleging that the other had intruded into its territory.[37] In the following year, as discussed below, charges and counter charges were exchanged at an even higher pitch. Only after those tensions subsided was it possible to hold the eighth round of talks in New Delhi in November 1987. These talks merely confirmed what appeared to have been decided by Gandhi and Zhao two years earlier, namely, to shift the problem to the level of top political leaders in both states.

Meanwhile, a curious sideshow illustrated some of the continuing obstacles in the path of Sino-Indian normalization. India's grant of statehood to the Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (NEFA prior to 1972) in December 1986 evoked a formal protest from China on grounds that this was a unilateral Indian attempt to impose the "illegal" McMahon line upon China. India rejected China's protest as "clear interference in the internal affairs of India."[38] New Delhi had promised statehood at an appropriate time to Arunachal in the Shillong agreement of 1975, which resolved a number of problems between the northeastern state of Assam and adjacent tribal peoples. The same agreement had also promised statehood to Mizoram, which was conferred in August 1986 after Rajiv Gandhi signed a widely acclaimed accord with Laldenga, leader of the erstwhile separatist Mizo insurrection that China had previously supported. Once this constitutional arrangement was made with Mizoram, it seemed appropriate to New Delhi to make the same arrangement with Arunachal even though there was no insurgency there.

Bearing in mind the likelihood of a negative reaction from China, Foreign Secretary A. P. Venkateshwaran warned that it might be prudent to delay implementing any change in the status of Arunachal Pradesh. In overruling this advice, Prime Minister Gandhi and his domestic political advisers perhaps displayed an element of complacency in their thinking. China's Foreign Ministry spokesman announced that conferring statehood on that "Indian occupied" area had "seriously violated China's territorial integrity and sovereignty and deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people." He warned that the consequences might be "serious."[39] Obviously, once Arunachal Pradesh became part of the Indian Union, Beijing was deprived of the ability to make a "concession" in the eastern sector to gain Indian recognition of PRC claims in Ladakh.[40]

What is one to make of these 10 years in Sino-Indian relations, a period when the steps toward détente were so timid and faltering. Writing in 1987, Venketeshwaran said "we were very near to a solution of the border question in 1983 and again in 1985."[41] It was his view that China, at these times, was prepared to confirm the McMahon line in the eastern sector, renounce claims to Arunachal Pradesh, and make a few concessions in the west as a gesture toward recognizing and accommodating New Delhi's constraints arising from the 1962 parliamentary resolution mentioned above, which prohibited any territorial concession by India. In his opinion, this could have given India a recognized and defensible border. Venketeshwaran blamed Indian "hesitation and vacillation" for not grasping the opportunities then offered, and for appearing to treat China with less seriousness than it deserved. His harsh conclusion was that New Delhi gave higher priority to the short-term calculus of forthcoming domestic elections than to important long-term matters of foreign and defense policy.[42]

Other Indian officials view the matter quite differently. They suggest that China's willingness to settle the boundary issue on terms that any Indian government, even Mrs. Gandhi's with its massive majority, could sell to Parliament was not at all clear in the early 1980's. By refusing to spell out its package proposal and to admit its encroachments in Ladakh west of the 1959 line of actual control, and by reasserting claims in the eastern sector, China provided ammunition for those old guard advisers who first cautioned Mrs. Gandhi, and then Rajiv, against making any concessions.

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[37]See *India Today* (New Delhi), Aug. 31, 1986; and *Beijing Review*, Sept. 1, 1986, pp. 14–15.

[38]*India News* (Embassy of India, Washington, DC), Mar. 16, 1987, p. 2.

[39]*China Daily* (Beijing), Dec. 12, 1986, and Feb. 23, 1987.

[40]See Liu Chu, "What Is the Illegal 'Arunachal Pradesh' All About?" *Shijie zhishi* (Beijing), Mar. 16, 1987, pp. 77–78, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: China* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-CHI*), Apr. 3, 1987, pp. F/1–2.

[41]A. P. Venketeshwaran, "Just Neighbors, or Friends?" *Indian Express Magazine* (New Delhi), July 5, 1987.

[42]Interview, New Delhi, June 1988.

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In any case, the longer New Delhi hesitated about moving towards improving relations with China, the less eagerness there was in Beijing to do so. Hesitation characterized Mrs. Gandhi's handling of many serious problems in the early 1980's. If one goes outside the field of bilateral Indian-Chinese relations, one finds two linked explanations for this. First, the government in India had become overly centralized and personalized. Too much business was left to the discretion of the Prime Minister and her personal advisers. With regard to China, expertise in the foreign ministry and in the army was barely used, and coordination between different departments of government was minimal. Second, Mrs. Gandhi was shaken by the devastating loss of her younger son in June 1980, and though she appeared outwardly calm and authoritative, she often refrained from making decisions that were likely to provoke opposition. Thus, she did not attempt to educate the public on the need for a realistic new look at the border problem or to challenge the prevailing assumption that engaging in "mutual concessions" might endanger India's vital frontier defenses. By the mid-1980's, Chinese leaders had decided to press forward with the more important task of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union and relegated Sino-Indian relations to the back burner.

In sum, between 1976 and 1985, despite sporadic efforts on both sides, movement toward Sino-Indian normalization had failed to develop enough momentum to push it over the rough spots along the road. Yet, it seems, the two countries made enough progress in reducing the level of tension that they felt no particular urgency to press forward. The tug of existing relationships and the inertia of familiar patterns of policy and behavior inhibited greater movement toward détente.

This complacency was rudely challenged by the events of 1986 and 1987 out of which emerged a new determination to achieve some Sino-Indian understanding. But before examining the 1986–87 crisis, let us take a further look at the changes that were taking place in the international environment in the second half of the 1980's that enabled leaders on both sides to overcome a legacy of mistakes and cut through the thicket of obstacles that had previously prevented the two sides from improving relations.

Changing International Environment

In the broadest sense, China's program of economic and political reform has provided the rationale for Beijing's interest in better relations with New Delhi.[43] Deng Xiaoping and his associates have concluded that the Sino-Indian confrontation was one among many dysfunctional antagonisms and conflicts inherited from the Maoist period that inhibited the rational pursuit of China's national interest. They recognized that nothing China has thus far achieved in South Asia—its alliance with Pakistan, its inroads in Nepal and Bhutan, its links with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—is capable of counterbalancing a hostile relationship with India, the major power on the South Asian subcontinent. Indeed, rather than weakening India, Chinese hostility has helped to spur India's transformation into a major conventional military power whose forces deployed along the Himalayan border are likely to be a match for Chinese forces in Tibet.[44]

In the past, Beijing has tended to approach conflict situations (e.g., US-USSR, Indo-Pakistani, Arab-Israeli, etc.) as if its sole policy option was a stark choice between one side or the other. Such dichotomous thinking is now falling out of favor as Chinese diplomacy becomes more sophisticated and nuanced. In South Asia as elsewhere, Chinese leaders are learning to manage the ambiguous complexities of international relations without making unduly restrictive choices or becoming overly identified with one or another side.

In concrete terms, China is now able to recognize India's dominant power position in South Asia and explore avenues for better relations with New Delhi without diminishing Beijing's commitment to Pakistan or its connections with the other South Asian states. Recognizing that a reduction of tension between India and Pakistan as well as movement toward regional cooperation within South Asia would reduce the conflicting tugs on China's policy, Beijing has hailed the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), founded in 1985 on the initiative of Bangladesh, as a major achievement in regional cooperation. Indeed, if anything, China exaggerates its potential to promote peace and development.[45]

By the mid-1980's, it also became evident that the Sino-Soviet conflict, which had constrained both Beijing and New Delhi from pursuing opportunities for conciliation, was winding down. China had successfully re-positioned itself between the superpowers, making credible the concept of an independent Chinese foreign policy first enunciated in 1982. Beijing no longer views the Soviet Union as an imminent threat to Chinese security, but rather as an important partner in the mod-

[43]See Harry Harding, *China's Second Revolution: Reform after Mao*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1987.

[44]See Thomas, *Indian Security Policy*, pp. 141–42, 163, 171.

[45]For a recent Chinese survey of international relations in South Asia, see Zheng Ruixiang, "Current Problems of Peace and Security in South Asia," *Guoji wenti yanjiu* (Beijing), No. 4, 1987.

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ernization of China's economy.[46] The commencement of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and Sino-Soviet discussions on Cambodia in the summer of 1988 set the stage for the final acts of normalization—Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's visit to Moscow (December 1–3, 1988) and the summit between Deng and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Beijing in May 1989.

In short, Sino-Indian relations are now no longer hostage to Sino-Soviet hostility as they were in the last years of the Brezhnev era. The normalization of relations between Moscow and Beijing not only removes the major external obstacle to Sino-Indian conflict resolution, but actually pushes New Delhi in that direction. While Gorbachev has taken pains to reassure Gandhi that the Soviet Union remains a reliable friend of India—and there is no reason to doubt that this assurance has been backed up in concrete terms[47]—he has also openly encouraged New Delhi to improve its relations with Beijing. During his November 1988 trip to India, for example, the Soviet leader referred explicitly to the common interests of the three states.[48] Some Indian leaders, perhaps wary of the drift of Soviet policy toward a focus on East Asia, may find such talk unsettling, but to the Chinese it is another encouraging sign that the time is ripe for seeking better relations with India.

Renewed anxiety about Tibet reinforces China's desire to promote Sino-Indian relations. So far, Beijing has been satisfied with New Delhi's distance from the resurgent Tibetan nationalism of the past two years.[49] During his visit to the PRC, Rajiv Gandhi reiterated India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet as well as India's policy of not interfering in China's internal affairs.[50] But these pronouncements have not removed Chinese worries. Although Beijing has more or

[46]John W. Garver, "Peking's Soviet-American Policies: Toward Equidistance," *Issues and Studies*, October 1988, pp. 55–77.

[47]See Dilip Mukerjee, "India and the Soviet Union," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Spring 1986, pp. 109–22. For a euphoric Indian view of contemporary Soviet-Indian relations, see S. Viswam, "Gorbachev Visit," *Indian and Foreign Review* (New Delhi), Dec. 31, 1986, pp. 4–13.

[48]*Far Eastern Economic Review*, Dec. 1, 1988, p. 38.

[49]See, for example, ibid., Oct. 22, 1987, p. 13.

[50]*China Daily*, Dec. 26, 1988.

Tibetans in Dharamsala, India, stage a token hunger strike in October 1987 in solidarity with the Tibetan Youth Congress in Delhi, protesting Chinese repressions in Tibet and demanding freedom for their homeland.

—Magnum.

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less managed to keep the lid on in Lhasa, the possibility of a more powerful manifestation of Tibetan national sentiment cannot be ruled out.[51] The Chinese fear such an upsurge could generate a wave of popular sympathy in India, particularly if Beijing feels compelled to use force on a wide scale to maintain its control. China realizes this would create a dilemma for the Indian government, which has already been criticized by Tibetan groups in India, as well as by opposition parties, for exhibiting a callous indifference to the principles of freedom and human rights in its pursuit of the power game with China.[52] Chinese leaders hope to build up a network of Indian-Chinese connections and a reservoir of goodwill in India to buffer the adverse fallout from another Tibetan crisis.

Other recent developments in Asian politics also facilitate accommodation between China and India. In particular, progress toward resolution of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Cambodia has, at a minimum, opened the prospect for tacit mutual recognition of Beijing' and New Delhi's roles in Asia. Neither China's role in South Asia nor India's in Southeast Asia intrinsically threatens the legitimate interests of the other so long as regional tensions do not develop into actual conflicts. Under the big top of an emerging Sino-Indian détente, room may be found to accommodate both China's South Asia and India's Southeast Asia acts. Statesmanship and diplomacy rather than some abstract geopolitical imperatives will determine whether this possibility will be realized.

The 1986–87 Border Crisis

In deference to the official denials by India and China that their forces engaged in any actual military clashes in 1986–87, the heightened tension of this period may perhaps be dubbed the war that was not. Yet the level of tension did not escalate without some reason. Several questions inevitably arise. What troop movements or other events on the ground prompted the questions raised in the Indian Parliament concerning the possibility of a Chinese attack? What lay behind Chinese allegations that Indian troops were "nibbling" at Chinese territory? How did these events differ from the events that preceded the border war of 1962? If there was an actual crisis in the making, how did India and China defuse it? Larger questions also remain. How far have the two governments advanced toward resolving the boundary question? How far can they progress toward a meaningful détente without resolving this question?

Without the benefit of reliable maps of difficult topography, open archives, or eyewitness accounts, any reconstruction of events along the Sino-Indian border in 1986–87 is bound to contain a large measure of conjecture. Nevertheless, it is virtually certain that increased border patrolling by Chinese and Indian troops took place, during the summer months of 1986, in the areas immediately east of Bhutan. This intensified patrolling brought regular troops from both sides into closer proximity and created a tense situation that the two sides interpreted differently. The government of India lodged a formal protest on June 26, 1986, against "intrusions" that it said occurred on June 16 by groups of uniformed and non-uniformed Chinese personnel six or seven kilometers into Indian territory south of the McMahon line, in the Sumdorung Chu, a valley in the Tawang district of Arunachal Pradesh. This protest was announced on All-India Radio on July 15. Some Indian administrators from this area also asserted privately that New Delhi had ignored their reports of earlier Chinese forays.[53] Questioned later in Parliament, Indian Foreign Minister Shiv Shankar declined to describe the Sumdorung episode as an "attack," preferring to stand by the term "intrusion."[54]

During this same period, China not only rejected the Indian protest but complained that Indian troops had penetrated north of the line of actual control (previously acknowledged by China to be more or less coterminous with the McMahon line) into Chinese territory, namely Wangdung (Sumdorung Chu). On August 22, 1986, the New China News Agency charged that Indian ground troops and aircraft were constantly crossing the "actual line of control" in the eastern sector in attempts to "nibble further at Chinese territory and to create more disputed territory."[55] In short, China and India traded mirror-image charges over the same piece of land.

It is worth noting that the Chinese chose to reinforce their warnings to India through US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, who discussed the security situation on the Indian subcontinent while on a visit to China in October 1986. Proceeding to New Delhi, Weinberger reportedly told his Indian hosts that Deng Xiaoping had been "vehement in criticizing India" and said that China would have to "teach India a lesson" if it did not stop

[51]For the Tibetan nationalist view of the situation within Tibet, see *News Tibet* (New York), September-December 1988, pp. 1–16.

[52]*Indian Express*, Dec. 22, 1988, reporting the resentment expressed by the Tibetan parliament-in-exile over Rajiv Gandhi's statements in Beijing; also *The New York Times*, Jan. 3, 1989.

[53]Interviews, New Delhi, July 1986.

[54]*Frontline* (Madras), Sept. 5, 1986; *India News*, Aug. 11, 1986, p. 3.

[55]*Keesings Contemporary Archives* (Harlow, England), February 1987, p. 34946f.

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"nibbling" at Chinese territory. (US Secretary of State George Shultz conveyed similar sentiments to New Delhi in March 1987.[56])

In early 1987, China's public rhetoric about India rose in a crescendo of criticism, even hostility. Privately, some Chinese officials expressed bafflement, if not contempt, at India's governmental process, as judged from its apparently uncoordinated and dangerous decisions on Arunachal. More ominously, China augmented its military presence in eastern Tibet. It brought in some 20,000 regular troops from the 53rd Army Corps in Chengdu and the 13th Army in Lanzhou, moved in American-made high-altitude helicopters, and upgraded roads, air strips, and helicopter pads throughout the border region.[57] By this time, China had completed the phase of military modernization and reconstruction that had reduced the number of military regions and combat troops, and was focusing on the acquisition of advanced military technology and equipment from the West, and the planning of combined air-land operations, including the conduct of local or limited wars and possible border conflicts.[58]

India, too, was reinforcing routine administrative and police patrols in the northeast with military posts set in defensive hedgehog-type patterns. In spring 1987, India strengthened its air power in the border region and redeployed mountain divisions to the northeast. A command air-land exercise followed in the east and northeast. It focused on coordination and long-term defense of the China front, perhaps to correct what some Indian commanders regarded as excessive preoccupation with the Pakistan front.

Against this background, mutual Chinese and Indian accusations triggered alarm in the world press that conflict was imminent. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, while denying that tension along the border was as great as some press reports suggested, called for the immediate withdrawal of "intruding Indian troops" in order to ease tension and to "avoid the possible occurrence of an unpleasant event."[59] Voices in the Indian press and in Parliament drew parallels between China wanting to "teach a lesson to India" in 1987 with its language prior to attacking Vietnam in February 1979 and India in October 1962. Other Indians believed they saw evidence of a "Washington-Beijing-Islamabad axis" against India. This was the interpretation put upon the May visit to Washington of General Yang Shangkun, permanent vice-chairman of the CCP Central Committee's Military Commission, and upon the news that US officials were concerned that troop movements on the border might lead to hostilities.

British journalist Neville Maxwell, reiterating his thesis of India's sole responsibility for the 1962 war, claimed that Rajiv Gandhi was deliberately provoking China so as to "recall Indians to unity of national purpose" and to justify the "declaration of a state of emergency."[60] An editorial in the Hong Kong Chinese newspaper *Wen wei po* played the same theme.[61] A Finnish newspaper reported Sino-Indian border clashes and wounded troops being treated in Lhasa hospitals.[62] A real crisis seemed to be brewing.

However, no conflict took place, because leaders on both sides acted in time. Rajiv Gandhi told the Indian Parliament: "China is not planning to attack India . . . . I do not think there is a China-Pakistan-US axis against this country . . . . We must overcome the phobia about Sino-Pakistani collusion."[63] And Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing, who was visiting Calcutta, denied rumors that China was massing troops on the border: "I can say that there have been no clashes on the Sino-Indian border, nor do we expect any unpleasant incidents."[64]

New Delhi sent messages to Beijing that disclaimed any intent of provocation and avoided making official accusations. Indian Foreign Minister N. D. Tiwari made a point of stopping in Beijing on his way back to New Delhi from a nonaligned nations meeting in Pyongyang, and joined Vice Foreign Minister Liu Shuqing in calling for the avoidance of conflict along the border while working towards a complete settlement.[65] Former Foreign Minister Huang Hua, along with other important Chinese officials, attended a banquet given by Indian Ambassador C. V. Ranganathan celebrating the 40th anniversary of Indian independence, and said that China wanted to improve relations with India and that the boundary issue could be resolved through negotiations.[66]

At least equally important, mechanisms were introduced in the field to reduce the risk of skirmishes or

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[56]Robert G. Sutter and Richard P. Cronin, "China-India Border Friction," CRS Report, 87-514 F, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 19, 1987.

[57]Nayan Chanda, "Heading for a Conflict," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1987, p. 42; see also Finnish journalist Jari Lindholm's report from Tibet, "The Dragon's Teeth," in *India Today*, Aug. 15, 1987, pp. 82–84.

[58]Paul Godwin, "Changing Concepts of Doctrine, Strategy and Operations in the Chinese People's Liberation Army 1978-1987," *The China Quarterly* (London), December 1987, pp. 572–90.

[59]*China Daily*, May 7, 1987.

[60]Neville Maxwell, "Towards India's Second China War," *South* (London), May 1987, pp. 80–83.

[61]*FBIS-CHI*, May 15, 1987, pp. F/2–5.

[62]Ibid., p. F/1.

[63]*Times of India* (New Delhi), June 18, 1987.

[64]*Indian Express*, June 19, 1987.

[65]*China Daily*, June 17, 1987.

[66]*FBIS-CHI*, Aug. 18, 1987, p. F/1.

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escalation. According to an Indian commander, when his troops returned to the Sumdorong Chu in spring 1987, they found a new Chinese military post there, and the Indians established positions overlooking this post without either side firing a shot.[67] Field commanders met and, by August, had moved their men away from each other. Finally, in November 1987, Indian and Chinese officials met in New Delhi to talk in what official spokesmen described as a "positive, cordial and friendly atmosphere." They stressed that "pending a negotiated settlement on the boundary question, peace and tranquility should continue to be maintained all along the border," and they expressed the belief that there was "considerable scope for strengthening and diversifying cooperation in several fields."[68] Though no dramatic breakthrough was expected from these talks and none was achieved, they were important in two respects. These talks opened the way to elevating a dialogue among officials to the level of a summit meeting between heads of state—Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China was the result. And, they marked the end of tensions, which did not reoccur when Chinese and Indian patrols returned to their outposts in the spring 1988.

Some observers professed to be witnessing a reenactment of the 1962 crisis as events unfolded in 1986–87.[69] In fact, the differences between the two crises were greater than the similarities, although at first glance the latter seemed much more apparent. In both cases, the two sides disagreed on where the boundary line between Chinese and Indian territory lay and what principles should guide the delimitation and demarcation of the border. India invoked legal-historical-administrative records and well-recognized geographical features that necessitated research followed by joint confirmation, while China asserted the primacy of strategic necessity, actual possession, and political expediency that required bilateral negotiation. In both cases, unrest in Tibet exacerbated tensions between Beijing and New Delhi. The sequence of events was also similar: imprecise Chinese offers to make a political exchange of respective claims in the eastern and western sectors; Indian rejection of the offers—abruptly in 1960, and with a more careful insistence on detail in the 1980's; Indian assertions of proprietary rights coupled with forward patrolling; Chinese escalation of rhetoric and strengthening of troop levels, shows of force in the border areas, and attempts to isolate India diplomatically; and, finally, the establishment of overlapping Chinese and Indian border posts and/or the conduct of forward patrols resulting in skirmishes.

Yet the different outcomes require an examination of the dissimilarities. The first factor to note is the international situation. In 1962, Beijing felt beleaguered by a combination of internal and external enemies, and lashed out at India in part as a warning to the United States and its putative client—the Chiang Kai-shek government in Taiwan—which threatened to take advantage of China's internal disarray.[70] In addition, acute tension among the major powers (the US, the USSR, and the PRC) exacerbated Sino-Indian tensions. In the 1980's, China did not feel threatened from without, and the major powers were actually improving relations with each other, a circumstance that tends to mitigate Sino-Indian tensions. In addition, in 1987 both Moscow and Washington made known their preference for a peaceful resolution of the border flare-up.

Second, the greater degree of stability in the domestic political situations of both countries and the enhanced degree of administrative authority and central military control that Beijing and New Delhi now exercise over the border regions is different from what existed in the 1960's. There have been no significant changes of disposition along the border since March 1963, and both sides have consolidated their positions along what China terms the line of actual control.

In addition, over the past decade Deng Xiaoping's realism has neutralized the Maoist ideological venom that had charged Nehru with representing the big bourgeoisie and big landlords as well as being a cat's-paw of imperialism. Rajiv Gandhi, and Mrs. Gandhi before him, have been acknowledged as the legitimate leaders of a powerful state. Gone, too, is Chinese support for all manner of Indian revolutionaries and tribal insurgents. In the early 1960's, China faulted India for supporting the Tibetan uprising, but in the past two years Beijing has carefully refrained from imputing to India any responsibility for the demonstrations against Chinese rule in Lhasa and elsewhere in Tibet. In an atmosphere virtually free of mutual recriminations concerning interference in each other's domestic affairs, Chinese and Indian leaders have been able to deal with each other more rationally and calmly.

Contemporary Indian leaders have no illusions or misconceptions about China of the sort harbored by Prime Minister Nehru in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Nehru's misconceptions fed his sense of betrayal by the Chinese and gave rise to the injured self-righteousness that suffused his communications on the boundary question in 1959–62. Today, Indian leaders

[67]Interview, June 1988.
[68]*Times of India*, Dec. 10, 1987.
[69]See Maxwell, loc. cit., pp. 80–83.
[70]See Whiting, op. cit.

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are well aware that high-flown unilateral declarations will not settle the boundary question.[71] Notwithstanding the traces of Nehruvian idealism in the language and phrasing of Indian foreign policy, pragmatism and expediency reign.

Finally, there are the differences on the military side of things. Prior to the 1962 war, India's defense build-up, begun belatedly in 1960, fell well short of New Delhi's verbal diplomacy and failed to catch up with the accelerating deterioration of events on the frontier. Inadequate preparations were compounded by lack of coordination within the Indian government as well as by intelligence failures.[72] The Indian army emerged from the debacle of 1962 determined to prevent a repetition of such an event, and by the 1980's India's mountain warfare divisions were generally judged to be a match for the PLA in Tibet. During his tenure as India's chief of army staff (February 1986–May 1989), General Krishnaswami Sundarji, an innovative thinker on matters of strategy and mobile warfare, left an impact on Indian defense policy and practice that is likely to endure.[73] He also impressed India's political leaders with the need for strategic rather than map-depicted legal-historical frontiers, frontiers that could be properly controlled and defended.

In sum, in 1962, the totality of international and domestic political, ideological, and military factors tilted the Sino-Indian balance toward war. In 1986–87, these same factors pointed China and India away from a military confrontation. Acutely conscious of the potential for conflict that lurked on the border, Indian and Chinese officials made conciliatory statements and took appropriate measures to reduce tensions. They also determined to accelerate the hitherto sluggish progress toward genuine détente.

Economic and Cultural Diplomacy

Less dramatic developments also were gradually ameliorating the atmosphere of Sino-Indian relations. During the Sino-Indian cold war of 1962 to 1976, people-to-people contacts between the two countries were cut off and trade came to a halt. The restoration of diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level in 1976 opened the way for resuming economic and cultural contacts in 1977.

Generally speaking, the figures on direct Sino-Indian trade have been quite unimpressive. Prior to 1988, the peak year for trade was 1982 when a turnover of US$145 million was registered, but the volume subsequently declined.[74] Most-favored-nation status, reciprocally conferred in the official trade protocol of 1984—the first such protocol in 30 years—failed to increase trade, which stood at $138 million in 1986–87, with China enjoying a lopsided ratio of exports over imports.[75] At a time when China's foreign trade has been increasing dramatically, trade with India has stagnated.

Nevertheless, both sides still profess to see a great potential for various forms of economic interaction. At the opening of the India-China Chamber of Commerce branch in Calcutta in March 1988, PRC Commercial Counselor He Wei called for the use of barter, countertrade, and counter-investment in order to expand trade.[76] With the Chinese expressing a willingness to strive for more balanced trade, Indian exporters are seeking to add a range of new products to the metal ores, leather products, tobacco, and shellac they already ship to China.[77] Under the terms of the Sino-Indian trade protocol for 1988, India will export oil field equipment, chemicals and pesticides, electronics, and software to China while importing spices, raw silk, industrial chemicals, yarn, and nonferrous metals.[78] Unlike earlier agreements, the 1988 trade protocol sets no upper limit on trade, and in the first three quarters of the year, the value of trade reached $172 million, thereby exceeding the previous one-year mark.[79]

A PRC delegation from the Foreign Investment Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade visited India in June 1988, trying to drum up Indian investment in Chinese industrial development and touting the prospects for economic and technological cooperation.[80] Around the same time, a delegation from the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce visited China to explore opportunities for trade.[81] Although China and India may never become major trading partners, considerable scope for expansion in their economic relations still exists, given the present low level of trade and the continued growth in the export sectors of both economies.

[71]Even India scholars have raised questions about the accuracy and wisdom of India's claims in Ladakh along the Kuen Lun rather than the Karakoram range of mountains. See John Lall, *Aksaichin and Sino-Soviet Conflict*, New Delhi, Allied Publishers, 1988; also, Karanahur Gupta, "Doubtful Documents," *Frontline*, Aug. 23–Sept. 5, 1986.

[72]See S. Gopal, *Nehru: A Biography*, Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1979, p. 131, and Vertzberger, op. cit., Ch. 8.

[73]See "Disputed Legacy" in *India Today*, May 15, 1988, pp. 35–43.

[74]*China Daily*, June 11, 1988.

[75]*The Economic Times* (Delhi), June 8, 1988.

[76]*FBIS-CHI*, Mar. 9, 1988, p. 9.

[77]*The Economic Times*, June 8, 1988.

[78]*China Daily*, June 11, 1988.

[79]Ibid., Oct. 22, 1988.

[80]*The Economic Times*, June 8, 1988.

[81]*FBIS-CHI*, May 26, 1988, p. 8.

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A marked increase in political contacts and people-to-people diplomacy has been a notable feature of Sino-Indian relations over the past few years. In 1983, the CCP reestablished ties with the long-divided Indian communist movement, beginning with the independent-minded Communist Party of India (Marxist). By the spring of 1988, the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India (CPI), which had long been wary of Chinese intentions, sent a delegation to Beijing headed by General Secretary Rajeswara Rao. CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang joined Rao in endorsing the reestablishment of party-to-party ties between the CCP and the CPI on the basis of the four principles of independence, equality, mutual respect, and mutual noninterference in each other's internal affairs.[82]

Close on the heels of the CPI visit, an official delegation from the Congress Party (I), headed by former Foreign Minister Bali Ram Bhagat, visited China for the first time and met with Vice-Premier Wu Xueqian and Politburo member Hu Qili.[83] Addressing the Lok Sabha on March 7, 1988, Minister of State for External Affairs K. Natwar Singh noted that 27 Chinese delegations had visited India and 26 Indian groups had traveled to China since January 1987.[84] Although the total number of persons involved in these exchanges is still very small, these visits and others like them, all of which endorsed the further expansion of economic and cultural relations between China and India, helped prepare the ground for Rajiv Gandhi's visit. In June 1988, China and India signed their first cultural exchange agreement to promote closer ties in culture, art, education, the social sciences, sports, public health, and the media.[85] Four months later, a draft protocol of exchanges in the areas of science and technology was discussed; it envisioned cooperation in agriculture, irrigation, and rural development.[86] This network of economic, political, cultural, and scientific and technological connections may gradually be shifting the center of gravity of the Sino-Indian relationship away from conflict toward cooperation. In both countries, constituencies may be emerging that support an eventual compromise solution to the border question.

The Chinese, who habitually justify current policy by invoking historical precedent, have recently dusted off the slogans of Chinese-Indian friendship from the 1950's and earlier. Commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the medical mission dispatched to China by the Indian National Congress in 1938 as a gesture of solidarity during the Sino-Japanese war is a case in point. In May 1988, the ashes of Dr. B. K. Basu, who worked in the communist wartime capital of Yan'an until 1943, were interred in the newly constructed Memorial Hall of the Indian Mission to China at the Cemetery of Revolutionary Martyrs in Shijiazhuang.[87] In this manner, the dead confer benefits on the living.

The Summit and Beyond

The state visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in December 1988 was a definite step toward overcoming the Sino-Indian confrontation of the past three decades. Undertaken within a year of the next general elections in India, Gandhi's journey indicated his confidence that some domestic political advantage could be wrested from the visit. With the Congress (I) commanding a massive majority in Parliament, it is significant that the All-India Congress Committee passed a resolution in November 1988 that approved Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China "even if the settlement of the complex problem of the boundary takes time," and urged the government "to renew its effort for such a settlement acceptable to the peoples of both the countries . . . through peaceful negotiations."[88] The Prime Minister's personal commitment to enhancing India's diplomatic maneuverability, partly through improving relations with the Chinese, also stiffened his determination to set aside numerous doubts and ignore the vocal opposition that had surfaced in and out of the Indian government since the invitation to a summit meeting was first extended in 1985.

Chinese leaders from two different generations received Rajiv Gandhi in a manner that bespoke their parallel commitment to ending hostility toward India. Deng, the 84-year-old patron of post-Mao reform, warmly greeted his "young friend" Rajiv Gandhi—40 years his junior—and urged that China and India "forget the unpleasant past."[89] Premier Li Peng, still winning his spurs in the foreign policy arena, was Gandhi's major interlocutor during the visit, and their discussions focused on the substantive issues of the border, Tibet, bilateral relations, and the international situation. Li accepted Gandhi's invitation to pay a return visit to India. CCP General Secretary Zhao Ziyang underlined China's

[82] Ibid., Apr. 1, 1988, p. 7, and Apr., 26, 1988, p. 17.
[83] Ibid., May 16, 1988, p. 13, and May 24, 1988, p. 11.
[84] Ibid., Mar. 8, 1988, p. 11.
[85] Ibid., June 2, 1988, p. 23.
[86] Ibid., Oct. 11, 1988, p. 10.
[87] Ibid., May 26, 1988, p. 9; see also Dwijendra Nandi, "50th Anniversary of Indian Medical Mission to China," *China Reconstructs* (Beijing), December 1988, pp. 26–31.
[88] *Indian Express*, Nov. 6, 1988.
[89] *China Daily*, Dec. 22, 1988; *The New York Times* (National edition), Dec. 22, 1988.

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Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi meets with China's senior leader Deng Xiaoping in Beijing on December 20, 1988.

—Gamma-Liaison.

and India's shared commitment to peace and development, the formula that has joined the five principles of peaceful coexistence as the tent poles of the new Sino-Indian relationship.

The joint press communiqué issued by China and India at the conclusion of Gandhi's visit enumerates areas of agreement without ignoring subjects on which agreement has yet to be reached. Implicit in the text is a significant change—each side has discarded old formulas and agreed to the other's main demand. India has accepted China's proposition that friendly bilateral relations can be expanded through a range of exchanges without waiting for a resolution of the border problem. China has agreed to a time frame of two to three years for reaching a "fair and reasonable settlement" of the boundary question "through peaceful and friendly consultations" by means of mechanisms conducive to a "mutually acceptable solution."[90] A joint working group on the boundary question headed by the Indian Foreign Secretary and the Chinese Vice Foreign Minister is to be established. This group will almost certainly include technical personnel such as military commanders and surveyors from both sides.

A hopeful precedent for this joint working group, and perhaps a useful model as well, is provided by the Sino-Soviet boundary talks that resumed in February 1987.

[90]Text of the Sino-Indian joint press communiqué in *China Daily*, Dec. 26, 1988. For reference to the time frame see *Indian Express*, Dec. 23, 1988.

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Away from the glare of publicity, these talks had progressed significantly by the summer of 1988. In the Sino-Indian case, regular meetings of the joint group can provide time for the metamorphosis of what has been an emotional political issue into a technical one capable of resolution by experts within certain prescribed parameters. However, even if the problem is not resolved soon, and even though frontier defenses can never be totally dismantled, it is clear that the tensions of the recent past have diminished.

As mentioned above, before China's negotiating position hardened in 1985, Deng's verbal offers were generally interpreted to mean a regularization of the territorial status quo with relatively minor adjustments, perhaps including some areas taken by China in Ladakh in 1962. Now that the joint working group has been established, it will be interesting to see whether the Chinese continue to press their claims to Arunachal Pradesh or whether they will drop this matter, in effect reinstating Deng's package proposal.[91] Although some sort of bartered solution would be sure to arouse controversy in India, increasing numbers of Indian opinion-makers are likely to find a solution of this sort acceptable, provided that it confirms the geostrategic principles and local custom and usage on which India's claims are based.

Although it seems quite unlikely that in the near future either country will simply agree to relinquish significant parcels of territory that it now holds, especially since China has defined the Aksai Chin in the western sector and India the McMahon line (or the highest crest principle) in the eastern sector as strategically vital, it appears equally unlikely that either country will resort to war in order to gain what it does not yet hold.

Achievements of the summit. In the course of Rajiv Gandhi's visit, specific agreements were signed on cooperation in the field of science and technology, in civil aviation, and in bilateral cultural exchanges. For the first time, Beijing and New Delhi will be directly linked by air. Also, direct-dial telephone facilities between major Indian and Chinese cities are being established. However, the scale of initial exchanges specified in the accords is small, and subject to control by joint committees of bureaucrats. Though the joint communiqué optimistically referred to the vast scope for mutual learning, it requires considerable imagination to envision waves of Indian and Chinese tourists, students, intellectuals, and business people traveling back and forth between the two countries in the immediate future.

The summit communiqué made no mention of the expected reopening of consulates. Apparently the two sides have still been unable to agree on which two of the four suggested cities—Bombay, Calcutta, Lhasa, and Shanghai—would be most appropriate. Each potential site has its problems. Few Indians are in Shanghai; Tibet is virtually closed to foreigners; Calcutta is under the rule of a Marxist government to which New Delhi does not grant favors; and Bombay is on the opposite coast of India from the main sea route to China.

The question of Tibet deserves more extended commentary. The two sides held extensive discussions on the subject at the summit, apparently without reaching agreement on anything other than the five principles of peaceful coexistence first articulated in 1954. According to the December 1988 joint communiqué, "the Chinese side expressed concern over anti-China activities by some Tibetan elements in India. The Indian side reiterated the long-standing and consistent policy of the government of India that Tibet is an autonomous region of China and that anti-China political activities by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil."[92] This bland formulation cannot entirely hide the fact that the situation in Tibet, closely monitored by the Dalai Lama and his followers in exile, is complex, unpredictable, and potentially explosive both in itself and in terms of Sino-Indian relations.

In the past few years, China has reacted sharply toward any country that offers public (even if unofficial) sympathy to the plight of the Tibetan people or that provides a platform to the Dalai Lama. During this same period, the resurgence of ethno-nationalist consciousness inside Tibet has animated and, to a degree, radicalized the exile community. Vocal groups among the Dalai Lama's younger followers do not echo the conciliatory tone of his proposals. They call for an independent status for Tibet, arguing that the *Cho-yon* (priest-patron) relationship between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese emperors that determined Tibet's status from the 13th century onward terminated with the end of imperial China in 1911.[93] (Neither the Kuomintang nor the communist government of China has accepted this argument—both claim legitimate succession to the maximal territorial extent of the Qing empire.)

Demonstrations in Tibet against Chinese control mounted in 1988, and in March 1989 on the 30th anniversary of the events that led to the Dalai Lama's departure. In response, Beijing imposed martial law on Tibet. Meanwhile, overseas Tibetan groups have sought to

[91] It should be noted that in recent years China has vociferously and, on occasion, forcefully upheld its territorial claims to the South China Sea islands that are also claimed by Vietnam.

[92] *China Daily*, Dec. 26, 1988.

[93] For a detailed exposition of this case, see Michael C. van Praag, *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1988.

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Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto and India's Rajiv Gandhi after bilateral talks in late December 1988 on the occasion of a summit meeting of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation in Islamabad.

—Gamma-Liaison.

muster international support for their cause of protecting human rights in Tibet, and Tibetans in New Delhi have demonstrated in the streets. Both publicly and privately, Chinese officials insist that Tibet will not be given independence, or even the degree of autonomy the Dalai Lama presently demands, though Beijing is ready to talk with him in order to restore peace.[94] They make clear that Chinese control will be maintained by whatever means are necessary, and that foreign support for Tibet's cause is unwelcome and will continue to be regarded as unfriendly.

Well aware of China's views, Rajiv Gandhi's government has reaffirmed the position taken by its predecessors of recognizing China's sovereignty over "the autonomous region of Tibet" and refraining from recognition of a Tibetan government-in-exile. Yet it also continues to provide sanctuary and humanitarian assistance to the Dalai Lama and his followers (and their progeny), who fled the military occupation of Tibet by the Chinese in 1959. This assistance has enabled Tibetan culture and national identity not only to survive but to flourish and become "an active part of the modern world," at a time when the Chinese were trying to extirpate it within Tibet.[95] Thus, New Delhi continues to face dilemmas similar to those it faced when PLA forces first took over Tibet in 1950. How can it build friendly relations with Beijing and acknowledge the reality of its presence in Tibet without totally sacrificing the principles of human rights, religious freedom, and cultural autonomy that India itself proclaims, and without surrendering all control over India's borders with Tibet.

Recent developments within Tibet and among the Tibetan community in India make the issue of Tibet more acute for Chinese-Indian relations. Chinese control in Tibet is heavily dependent upon a more or less permanent display of force. Whatever they may presently think about India's recognition of Chinese control over Tibet in 1954, Indian officials know that any alteration in official Indian policy respecting Tibet would be highly provocative to China. On the other hand, such is the prestige and veneration that the Dalai Lama now commands in India that no Indian government could force upon him an unwelcome accommodation, as Nehru did in the early 1950's.

This situation is complicated by a recent development—the political, as distinct from the religious, au-

[94] *Indian Express*, Mar. 14, 1989.

[95] Franz Michael, "Survival of a Culture: Tibetan Refugees in India," *Asian Survey*, July 1985, pp. 737–44; also Avedon, op. cit. In recent years, the Chinese, whose historical memory can be very selective, have been urging the Tibetans to overlook and forget this attempt to wipe out their culture. At the same time, Beijing has permitted a limited and circumscribed revival of Tibetan culture in order to earn tourist dollars and to "pacify the natives."

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thority of the Dalai Lama is being questioned by some Tibetans in India. The Tibetan Youth Congress, for example, demands complete Tibetan independence from China, stages frequent demonstrations in New Delhi, and even before Rajiv Gandhi returned from Beijing, denounced his statements there as capitulating to his Chinese hosts.[96] Links between vociferous Tibetan groups and some right-wing Hindu political parties opposing Rajiv Gandhi are yet another volatile element. Under the circumstances, China will undoubtedly remain hypersensitive to even the slightest signs of Indian support for Tibetan nationalist agitation and continue to demand that New Delhi adhere scrupulously to its pledge of noninvolvement.

Prospects for Sino-Indian détente. The view beyond the Sino-Indian summit, therefore, is not a clear one. Not only is the border dispute unresolved, but India has not received formal Chinese recognition of its integration of Sikkim in 1975, and the Kashmir dispute is still capable of stirring the pot even though Deng Xiaoping informally acknowledged, as long ago as 1980, that it was an Indo-Pakistani issue.

Yet some optimism concerning the future of Sino-Indian relations is justified, in part because of the brightening prospects for overall relaxation of conflicts within Asia. Hard on the heels of the Sino-Indian summit, during a SAARC summit meeting in Islamabad, Rajiv Gandhi and Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan's newly elected leader, pledged to seek better relations between their two countries. In May 1989, Soviet President Gorbachev visited Beijing for the first Sino-Soviet summit in 30 years, bringing to fruition the process of Sino-Soviet normalization.

Three pairs of long-time Asian adversaries—China and India, India and Pakistan, and China and the Soviet Union—appear ready to approach their deep-seated differences in a constructive way. In the past, hostile relations among each of these pairs of adversaries exacerbated relations among the other two as well. Now the regional linkages can work the other way. The gradual diminution of hostility within each of the pairs may exert a positive, reinforcing effect on the other two. Provided no unexpected disruptions occur, a steady if not necessarily speedy process of normalization can be expected. Measured against the inflated hopes of the 1950's, when an era of Sino-Indian friendship was proclaimed, this may not seem like much. Measured against the record of hostility and conflict in the intervening decades, it is a great deal.

[96] *Indian Express*, Dec. 22, 1988.

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The USSR and the Third World in the 1980's

David E. Albright

Virtually all Western analysts today agree that Soviet policy toward the Third World has changed during the 1980's, but they differ widely in their assessments of the extent and meaning of the policy shifts. One group argues that although Moscow's policy has undergone some modification, the Soviet approach to the Third World remains fundamentally the same as before. However, members of this group disagree as to which factors explain this perceived continuity. Some trace it back to tsarist policies that have been reinforced in the Soviet era.[1] Others view it as the product of lingering ideological commitments on the part of the Soviet elite.[2] Still others see it in terms of recurrent patterns of Soviet behavior toward developing areas.[3]

A second group asserts that the alterations in Soviet policy reflect a basic change in the Soviet approach to the Third World, yet there is also no unanimity within this group about the reasons for the shift. Some maintain that it has resulted from the declining impact of ideology on Soviet perceptions of the Third World.[4] Others contend that it has stemmed essentially from domestic considerations—particularly the need to improve the performance of the USSR's economy.[5]

In addressing these issues, however, analysts tend to ignore some major new developments. In the last decade, the number of distinct Soviet schools of thought about what policy the USSR should pursue toward the Third World has multiplied significantly. The top Soviet leadership, in contrast with earlier periods, has not endorsed a single school of thought exclusively. Finally, the USSR's behavior in the Third World has combined elements of the policy prescriptions of all of the contending schools of persuasion, and the mix has varied substantially from region to region. Each of these developments, it should be stressed, antedates Mikhail Gorbachev's advent to power.

These changes have important implications. Moreover, these implications relate not just to the nature of policy but to the nature of policy formulation as well. The present article will examine these changes and their likely bearing on future Soviet Third World policy.

Contending Policy Viewpoints

Controversy in the USSR over policy toward the Third World is nothing new. It has prevailed almost constantly within the Soviet hierarchy since the early 1960's, as a result of differing assessments of circumstances in the

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[1]See, for example, Alvin Z. Rubinstein, *Moscow's Third World Strategy*, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1988.

[2]A typical illustration is Daniel S. Papp, *Soviet Perceptions of the Developing World in the 1980's: The Ideological Basis*, Lexington, MA, Lexington Books, 1985.

[3]See, for instance, the writings of Francis Fukuyama—especially, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, R-3337-USDP, Santa Monica, CA, RAND Corporation, February 1986; "Gorbachev and the Third World," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Spring 1986, pp. 715–31; "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1987, pp. 1–13.

[4]Both Jerry Hough and Elizabeth Valkenier fall into this category. See Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World: Soviet Debates and American Options*, Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1986; Valkenier, *The Soviet Union and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger,

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Third World. However, prior to the early 1980's, the debate had never involved more than two perspectives on the issue at any given juncture. From about 1962 through the mid-1960's, for example, arguments over policy had focused on the merits of two alternative approaches to trying to expand the USSR's presence and role in the Third World.[6]

Proponents of the first approach held that at least some "bourgeois-nationalist" leaders in the Third World were undergoing radicalization. Not only did these leaders exhibit increased interest in Marxism-Leninism, according to the assessment, but they were also carrying out significant "progressive" reforms in their countries. Therefore, the USSR should enter into close alliances with the states under the rule of such leaders and serve as these leaders' revolutionary mentor. That is, it should help them deepen their understanding of "true" socialism and the measures required to achieve it.

Supporters of the second approach maintained that these leaders, despite their "progressive" attributes, would probably never preside over "real" socialist transformations of their countries. Consequently, the USSR should, while taking advantage of the openings that such leaders offered for enhancing its position in the Third World, pursue a policy of both "alliance" and "struggle" with them and their governments. Specifically, it should cooperate with the leaders to the extent possible in foreign affairs, but it should encourage leftist elements in the countries under the control of these leaders to try to increase their own influence in state affairs and bring about further radicalization of local situations.

By the early 1980's, however, the number of contending Soviet visions of what policy the USSR should follow with respect to the Third World had expanded to four, and the ensuing years have witnessed no reduction in that total. These visions have entailed often conflicting judgments about what entities should be the USSR's primary targets of interest, what sort of relationships Moscow should attempt to establish with these entities, what means it should employ to forge such links, and what posture it should strike toward the West in the Third World. As in the preceding years, the views have flowed from contrasting perceptions of conditions in the Third World.

To refer to these policy outlooks, it is useful to have short-hand designations. Thus, the analysis here will label them the "revolutionary-democratic" school, the "pro-military" school, the "national-capitalism" school, and the "economic-interdependence" school.

The "revolutionary-democratic" school. Adherents of this perspective insist that a gradual process of radicalization is taking place in Third World areas: these areas, despite some zigs and zags, are bypassing capitalism and advancing directly toward socialism. In the eyes of these individuals, not only have the ranks of Third World "socialist-oriented" states—and particularly the most radical of them, the "revolutionary democracies"—grown over time, but in some "revolutionary democracies" such as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, ruling parties of a "new" or "vanguard" type have emerged. As the revolutionary process in the Third World deepens, the estimate goes, the number of "revolutionary democracies" will continue to increase, the circle of "vanguard" parties will expand, and at least some of these parties will transform themselves into full-fledged communist parties.

Partisans of this line do admit that even existing "revolutionary-democratic" regimes with "vanguard" parties have severe faults, and they acknowledge that it is impossible to rule out a reversal of course in all cases. Nonetheless, they still maintain that the Third World is marching inexorably toward socialism and will avoid capitalism. Therefore, they hold that "socialist-oriented," and especially "revolutionary-democratic," governments—however deficient—are the wave of the future and the best available allies for the USSR in the Third World at present.

In keeping with the stress on ties with "revolutionary-democratic" regimes, this school of persuasion urges that the USSR try to build long-term structural relationships with the states that these regimes run. Here proponents of the outlook have in mind joint collaboration in constructing institutions that will enable these regimes to entrench themselves in power. This includes cooperation in building a party apparatus, in establishing or strengthening intelligence and security services, in training military personnel, and the like.

As for instruments, advocates of this viewpoint lean toward reliance on nonmilitary tools. They do not, to be sure, reject military means. Indeed, they have ap-

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1983; idem, "Revolutionary Change in the Third World: Recent Soviet Assessments," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1986, pp. 415–34; and idem, "New Soviet Thinking About the Third World," *World Policy Journal* (New York), Fall 1987, pp. 651–74.

[5]Jack Snyder, "The Gorbachev Revolution: A Waning of Soviet Expansionism?" *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Winter 1987–88, pp. 93–131, affords a typical example.

[6]For detailed discussion of this particular controversy, see especially Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow and the Third World," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1965, pp. 22–31. A systematic treatment of all Soviet policy debates since the early 1960's may be found in David E. Albright, *Vanguard Parties and Revolutionary Change in the Third World: The Soviet Perspective and Its Implications*, forthcoming.

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proved Soviet use of military force to ensure the survival of "revolutionary-democratic" governments run by "vanguard" parties, and they have recognized the role of military assistance in the development of close Soviet ties with such regimes. Yet their specific vision of a long-term structural relationship with these governments implicitly pushes them toward stress on nonmilitary instruments, especially political ones.

With respect to posture toward the West in the Third World, backers of this perspective have on occasion evinced readiness to risk confrontation with the West where ruling "revolutionary-democratic" parties of a "vanguard" type have been concerned, but that willingness has declined noticeably over the course of the 1980's. Furthermore, adherents of the school have always discouraged military confrontation with the West in the Third World. Nevertheless, the group has appeared to foresee that Soviet relations with the West in the Third World will inevitably be contentious in nature.

Among those who have publicly subscribed to this policy line since it originated in the 1970's have been several eminent political figures, although the influence of many of them has diminished in the latter half of the 1980's. Grigoriy Romanov, a member of the Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and Mikhail Gorbachev's chief rival to succeed Konstantin Chernenko as party general secretary, associated himself with the outlook before his ouster in July 1985. So did Boris Ponomarev, until February 1986 director of the CPSU International Department and an alternate member of the Politburo.[7] Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy vocally endorsed the approach prior to his retirement as a deputy head of the International Department in late 1986, and he has persisted in doing so since then as a consultant to the African Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Anatoliy Gromyko, director of that institute and son of Andrey Gromyko (formerly a CPSU Politburo member, USSR foreign minister, and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet), has strongly supported such policy prescriptions since the 1970's.[8]

The "pro-military" school. Exponents of this viewpoint emphasize the high percentage of Third World states under military rule, or at least dominated by military elements, and they contend that a substantial number of these military governments evince a resolve to effect major social transformations in the countries that they run and a willingness to enter into close relations with the USSR. In light of such factors, the group concludes that the USSR should devote its energies principally to military-controlled states—especially those with "progressive" regimes.

These Soviet observers do concede that, in the abstract, a "vanguard" party might constitute a more satisfactory vehicle for carrying out social change and a more reliable ally for the USSR than military leaderships do, but they point out that "vanguard" parties have not yet taken shape in most Third World countries under military domination. Nor does this situation appear to them likely to change in the years immediately ahead, for many militaries in power in the Third World see "vanguard" parties as potential competitors for political authority. Even where militaries have tolerated the formation of "vanguard" parties, the champions of this perspective assert, the armed forces remain the key institutions shaping the destinies of their countries. If they decide to act in opposition to local "vanguard" parties or to do away with such parties altogether, these parties do not have the mass base and the access to instruments of violence required to meet such challenges effectively. Hence, those committed to this outlook submit that ties with Third World militaries, and particularly radical militaries, afford the USSR the best openings available to advance the revolutionary process in the Third World and improve the Soviet position there.

Support for creating long-term structural relations with states in which militaries, and especially radical militaries, are preeminent flows naturally from these Soviet observers' rationale for focusing on such countries, but the structural links that the group advocates differ from those that the "revolutionary-democratic" enthusi-

[7]See, for example, Romanov's speech of September 7, 1984, at the founding congress of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, as published in *Pravda* (Moscow), Sept. 9, 1984; and Ponomarev's "Real Socialism: The Liberated Countries," *Slovo Lektora* (Moscow), March 1984, pp. 13–19.

[8]Regarding Ul'yanovskiy, see his *Sovremennyye problemy Azii i Afriki* (The Contemporary Problems of Asia and Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1978; "On the Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 11, July 1979, pp. 114–23; "The Twentieth Century and the National Liberation Movement," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 2, 1980, pp. 2–9; "Robbery under the Guise of 'Interdependence'," *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1981, pp. 76–87; "On National and Revolutionary Democracy: Paths of Evolution," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1984, pp. 9–18; *Pobedy i trudnosti natsional'no-osvoboditel'noy bor'by* (The Triumphs and Difficulties of the National Liberation Struggle), Moscow, Politizdat, 1985; "Pressing Problems of the National Liberation Movement and of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1986, pp. 3–13; and "Toward a Characterization of Contemporary Neo-Colonialism," ibid., No. 4, 1987, pp. 83–92.

With respect to Gromyko, see his "Pressing Problems of the Most Recent History of the Developing Countries," *Kommunist*, No. 4, March 1979, pp. 117–24; "Socialist Orientation in Africa," *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1979, pp. 95–104; "Pressing Problems of Contemporary Africa," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1980; "The Imperialist Threat to Africa," *International Affairs*, July 1981, pp. 47–53; "The Experience and Prospects in Research on Africa's Problems," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 1, 1985, pp. 1–12; "The Revolution That Awakened Africa," *International Affairs*, December 1987, pp. 31–37; and "Africa: The Awakening," *The October Revolution and the World*, Special Supplement to *New Times* (Moscow), 1987, pp. 24–27.

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

The last two battalions of Soviet troops in Afghanistan cross the Amu Darya into the USSR near Termez, Uzbekistan on February 15, 1989.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

asts favor. The "pro-military school" presses for cooperation that will render the countries at issue dependent on the USSR in a military sense.

Proposals to woo military-based regimes and to make these regimes highly dependent on the USSR militarily imply an inclination on the part of endorsers of this policy perspective to rely heavily on military means. They also tend to indicate that the group is willing to see the USSR engaged in the Third World in ways that could lead to military clashes with the West; however, since the mid-1980's, backers of the perspective have explicitly sought to expunge any impression that they advocate Soviet involvement in the Third World's military conflicts.

Public articulation of this school of thought has stemmed essentially from military quarters in the 1980's. The school came into being in the mid-1970's, and although it received open endorsement from at least some lower-level civilians at that time, it enjoyed support largely in military circles even then. During the late 1970's, moreover, all overt civilian backing disappeared. In fact, the outlook itself appeared to vanish entirely from the Soviet scene for a few years.[9] When it resurfaced in 1982, it failed to regain any public civilian endorsement. Among defenders of this viewpoint in the 1980's have been Colonel Ye. Rybkin, long a prominent figure in the shaping of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, and Major General Ye. Dolgopolov.[10]

The "national-capitalism" school. According to adherents of this school, the vast majority of Third World states have now chosen the path of development that they intend to pursue, and the bulk of them have opted for a capitalist, or at least a nonsocialist, path. Thus, the analysis goes, most Third World countries will probably

[9]For more detailed discussion of the emergence and fate of this vision of policy in the 1970's, see Mark Katz, *The Third World in Soviet Military Thought*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982, pp. 81–83, 104–05.

[10]On Rybkin, see, for instance, his "The Army in the Political System of Developed Socialism," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), August 1982, pp. 3–12, and "Fundamentals of the Study of War and the Army," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow), No. 5, March 1983, pp. 88–91.

With respect to Dolgopolov, see his "On Principles of Equality," *Soviet Military Review* (Moscow), January 1984, pp. 49–50; *Sotsial'no-politicheskaya rol' armiy osvobodivshikhsya stran* (The Socio-Political Role of the Armies of the Liberated Countries), Moscow, Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1986; and "Working for Independence," *Soviet Military Review*, July 1987, pp. 50–51.

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pass through a capitalist or non-socialist phase of development before embarking on a socialist course. This prospect means that "socialist-oriented" countries will in all likelihood remain in the minority in the Third World for the indefinite future.

Furthermore, the group argues, the states that have adopted a "socialist orientation" have disturbing faults. Even the most "progressive" of these states—the "revolutionary democracies" with "vanguard" parties—have displayed a less than steadfast desire to implement far-reaching social transformations internally and have vacillated in their foreign policies. As a result, they have substantial deficiencies as Soviet allies.

Under such circumstances, proponents of this outlook assert, the USSR needs to diversify its relationships in the Third World. Diversification of ties is not only imperative but also possible, they suggest. The objective bases for it lie in "contradictions" between Third World "capitalist-oriented" states and the West that the USSR can exploit. Perhaps the most important of these "contradictions" have economic roots. In the opinion of subscribers to this viewpoint, the rulers of many "capitalist-oriented" Third World countries want to develop a "nationalist" type of capitalism in their domains, while the "imperialist" Western powers strive to foster a "dependent" form of capitalism there. But "contradictions" of a strictly political and ideological nature exist as well. For example, from the standpoint of the group, commitment to Islam coupled with resistance to Westernization can produce tensions between a "capitalist-oriented" Third World state and the Western powers.

Advocates of this perspective believe that the USSR has little chance of constructing long-term structural links with the great bulk of the states that they consider the prime targets for courtship. And these Soviet analysts accept the probability that over time there will be divergences of interests between the USSR and many of the countries that they pinpoint for attention. Nevertheless, as they see things, eclecticism in defining potential allies will tend to offset this difficulty, for profitable relations with a large and varied circle of states will reduce the impact that a setback in any one of these states can have on overall Soviet fortunes in the Third World. The sheer volume of ties, in short, will help to insulate Moscow's Third World position.

Although expounders of this vision of policy give no sign of eschewing military tools in forging links with the diverse states upon which they concentrate, the type of opportunities that they discern for building these ties prompts them to emphasize other instruments. Economic means play a prominent role in their calculations. Yet, because the economic capabilities of the USSR are limited at present, the group places greatest stress on political tools.

Besides downplaying military instruments, this school of persuasion appears to want to avoid confrontation with the West in the Third World. Nevertheless, it still seems to favor a highly conflictual approach toward the West there. The bases upon which it intends to construct relations with a wide range of Third World countries are varied types of anti-Western sentiment, and it anticipates fashioning and/or strengthening ties by fanning such sentiments.

The front ranks of the formulaters and champions of this policy outlook have long included Karen Brutents, formerly a deputy director and now a first deputy director of the CPSU International Department, and Yevgeniy Primakov, until the mid-1980's the director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences and since then head of the Academy's Institute of World Economics and International Relations.[11] In recent years, the perspective has acquired other supporters of consequence within the Soviet elite as well. Perhaps the outstanding illustration is Aleksandr Yakovlev, a full member of the CPSU Politburo, a key secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and the supervisor of the Central Committee's new International Policy Commission.[12]

The "economic-interdependence" school. Partisans of this viewpoint note that most countries in the Third World, whether they be "capitalist-oriented" or "socialist-oriented," have to date chalked up poor records of economic performance. Not only have they been slipping farther and farther behind the advanced industrial powers, but they have also failed to achieve significant economic growth in absolute terms. Even those states that have done reasonably well economically have en-

[11]For representative commentaries by Brutents, see his *Osvobodivshiyesiya strany v 70-e gody* (The Liberated Countries in the 1970's), Moscow, Politicheskaya literatura, 1979; article in *Pravda*, Feb. 2, 1982; "The Liberated Countries at the Beginning of the 1980's," *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1984, pp. 102–13; article in *Pravda*, Jan. 1, 1985; observations on a "Studio 9" program, Moscow Television Service in Russian, Feb. 27, 1988, as translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Feb. 29, 1988, pp. 6–16.

With respect to Primakov, see his "Some Problems of the Developing Countries," *Kommunist*, No. 11, July 1978, pp. 81–91; "The Liberated Countries: Community Problems," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1980, pp. 15–28; "The Law of the Unevenness of Development and the Historical Fates of the Liberated Countries," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEiMO*), pp. 28–47; *Vostok posle krakha kolonial'noy sistemy* (The East After the Collapse of the Colonial System), Moscow, Nauka, 1982; "Leninist Analysis of Imperialism and the Current Scene," *Kommunist*, No. 9, June 1986, pp. 103–13.

[12]See Yakovlev's "Inter-Imperialist Contradictions—The Current Context," *Kommunist*, No. 17, November 1986, esp. p. 9.

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countered difficulties of one sort or another—soaring debts, depressed demand for exports, and so on. Thus, according to this group's assessment, leaders of these diverse countries are seeking ways to improve their local economic situations.

This search, backers of the perspective contend, opens up new opportunities for the USSR to broaden its relations in the Third World, for even the top economic performers among "capitalist-oriented" states are prepared to intensify their dealings with the USSR substantially to further economic development. Moreover, endorsers of the line insist, the USSR has the wherewithal to take advantage of these opportunities. To be sure, the USSR has economic troubles of its own, and it does not possess the resources to solve the economic problems of Third World countries. But these deficiencies do not really matter. The only way of overcoming Third World economic woes anyway is through the working out of a coherent world system of economic interdependence. Within such a system, these Soviet observers maintain, the USSR could play a key part that would enable it to build up ties with a broad spectrum of states.

The system that the proponents of this outlook foresee has several features. First, the industrialized countries of the West would turn out goods of high technological sophistication for sale to the USSR and other members of the Soviet bloc. The USSR and its allies, for their part, would manufacture items of a lower level of technological sophistication for export to Third World states. This last category of countries would devote its energies, at least at the outset, to producing minerals and raw materials for sale to both the Western powers and the Soviet bloc. By specializing in such output, they would develop the necessary skills and surpluses to diversify their economies, beginning with labor-intensive food and processing industries. This projected system, it should be emphasized, entails no meaningful distinctions between "capitalist-oriented" and "socialist-oriented" states in the Third World.

Promoters of this policy outlook urge the creation of a long-term structural relationship with Third World countries that they deem to be worthwhile objects for wooing, but their vision of the relationship differs considerably from those put forth by other schools of thought. Advocates of this particular viewpoint focus on the fashioning of enduring economic links with Third World countries within a multilateral framework. That is, they anticipate that economic ties will flourish in a broader setting in which other actors also have major roles to perform.

Analysts of this persuasion do not dismiss out of hand the use of military instruments, but the character of the opportunities that they discern in the Third World dictates a heavy stress on economic tools. Even political means become decidedly secondary in such a light.

As for the stance toward the West in the Third World, exponents of this policy approach favor a less conflictual posture than do adherents of any of the other schools of thought. The group appears to assume that competition between the USSR and the Western powers will continue in the Third World, but it does not foresee that this competition will inevitably result in military clashes or even political strife. On the contrary, it entertains the possibility of Soviet-Western cooperation in certain situations. For instance, it sanctions close Soviet trade relations with the West, and it contemplates that both the West and the USSR will purchase the minerals and raw materials that Third World states will have to sell as these states attempt to develop economically.

Although no eminent political figures appear to have had a key hand in shaping this basic outlook, several have openly associated themselves with it. Among these have been Vadim Zagladin, until 1986 the sole first deputy chief of the CPSU International Department, then one of the two first deputy heads of the department, and since October 1988 a personal adviser to Gorbachev in his new capacity as president of the USSR Supreme Soviet; N. N. Inozemtsev, until his death in 1982 the director of the Institute of the World Economy and International Relations as well as a member of the CPSU Central Committee; Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States and Canada of the USSR Academy of Sciences and also a member of the Central Committee; and, most recently, Eduard Shevardnadze, a full member of the CPSU Politburo and USSR foreign minister since 1985.[13]

Stance of the Top Leadership

Up to the early 1980's, the top Soviet leadership had invariably singled out for broad official endorsement one of the positions articulated during periods of controversy over the USSR's Third World policy. During the last half of the 1970's, for instance, the leadership unequivocally lent the weight of its authority to the prescriptions of the "revolutionary-democratic" school, which had emerged in the mid-1970's. Speaking to the 25th CPSU Congress in February 1976, CPSU General

[13]On Zagladin, see his joint volume with I. T. Frolov, *Global'nyye problemy sovremennosti: nauchnyye i sotsial'nyye aspekty* (Contemporary Global Problems: Scientific and Social Aspects), Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1981; his joint article with I. Frolov, "Global (fn. continued on p. 56)

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Secretary Leonid Brezhnev contended that "the class struggle is building up" in "many liberated countries." As a result, he said, "Arab, African, and Asian states having a socialist orientation" were undergoing "new progressive changes" in their "economic and political life." These "important changes," he asserted, "facilitated" the "strengthening" of the USSR's cooperation with such countries. Moreover, in discussing Soviet relations with specific Third World states, he dwelt almost exclusively on those which Soviet commentators classified as "revolutionary democracies."[14]

The following year, Brezhnev dispatched Andrey Kirilenko, a full member of the CPSU Politburo and a key secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, to Angola as the Soviet representative to the congress of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) that proclaimed that party to be Marxist-Leninist. Kirilenko made clear that he viewed the emergence of this new "vanguard" party as a sign that the African revolutionary process was deepening, and as a harbinger of things to come in other "socialist-oriented" countries on the continent.[15]

Although Premier Alexey Kosygin's economic report to the 25th CPSU Congress mentioned the USSR's general desire to have "its cooperation with the developing countries take the form of a stable and mutually advantageous division of labor," Brezhnev's political report left no doubt that the General Secretary envisioned long-term structural ties that went well beyond economic relations in the cases of "revolutionary democracies" like Angola. He attested that the world's "progressive forces" had aided "Angola's struggle to defend its independence" in 1975–76, and he declared that "our party supports and will continue to support peoples who are fighting for their freedom."[16] At the 1977 MPLA Congress, Kirilenko highlighted the persisting internal and external opposition that the new Angolan regime faced and restated Brezhnev's pledge to help that regime survive.[17]

But by the early 1980's, the top Soviet leadership had ceased to uphold any single school of persuasion as official Third World policy. General Secretary Brezhnev's political report to the 26th CPSU Congress in February 1981 was indicative. It contained features that reflected aspects of at least three of the perspectives detailed above.[18]

In keeping with the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint, Brezhnev pointed out that the number of countries with a "socialist orientation" had risen in recent years, and he referred briefly to Soviet cooperation with seven "revolutionary democracies"—Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), Syria, Algeria, and Guinea—and somewhat more extensively to Soviet collaboration with "revolutionary-democratic" Afghanistan. He also affirmed that the USSR was helping "to strengthen the defense capability of liberated states if they ask that we do so." As illustrations, Brezhnev cited aid to Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan.

Other parts of the report, however, mirrored the perceptions and preferences of the "national-capitalism" and "economic-interdependence" schools of thought. For example, Brezhnev observed that "for all practical purposes," the 1970's had seen "the liquidation of the colonial empires," but he acknowledged that the countries "that have been liberated from colonial oppression" differed widely among themselves. Some had "taken a revolutionary-democratic path," while others had not merely opted for "capitalist orientation" but had "established capitalist relations."

Furthermore, the General Secretary paid far more attention to states that were not "socialist-oriented" than to those that were. He talked at some length about Iran. In the course of this discussion, he depicted the revolution there—despite "its complex and contradictory nature" and despite the attempts of "domestic and foreign reaction" to alter its character—as "basically an anti-imperialist revolution," and he indicated that the USSR was "prepared to develop good relations" with Iran. He underscored this willingness by failing to take "revolutionary-democratic" Iraq's side in the war that had broken out between Iran and Iraq five months earlier. On this issue, he merely urged the two battling countries to "draw the proper conclusions" from the "highly advantageous" situation that the war had created for "imperialism." Brezhnev also noted the "impor-

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Problems and the Fate of Civilization," *Oktyabr'* (Moscow), No. 5, 1984; his "Socialism and Contemporary Global Problems," *Politicheskoye Samoobrazovaniye* (Moscow), September 1986, pp. 13–22; "The Present and the Future: Two Strategies for the 21st Century," *MEiMO*, September 1986, pp. 3–14; and "An Arduous but Necessary Path," *International Affairs*, September 1988, pp. 28–37.

With regard to the other three, see Inozemtsev's edited volume, *Global'nyye problemy sovremennosti* (Contemporary Global Problems), Moscow, Mysl', 1981; Arbatov's address to the 26th annual convention of the International Studies Association in Washington, DC, on March 6, 1985, as published in *International Studies Newsletter* (Columbia, SC), May 1985, pp. 1–5; Shevardnadze's report of July 25, 1988, to a conference of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *International Affairs*, October 1988, particularly pp. 14–15 and 23, and his closing speech of July 27, 1988, to the same gathering, ibid., especially pp. 61–62.

[14] *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976.

[15] Ibid., Dec. 6, 1977.

[16] Cf. the reports of Kosygin (ibid., Mar. 2, 1976) and Brezhnev (loc. cit.).

[17] Ibid., Dec. 6, 1977.

[18] Ibid., Feb. 24, 1981.

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tant place" that India occupied in the USSR's "relations with liberated countries," and he promised that "interaction with peace-loving, independent India" would remain "an important area of Soviet foreign policy." In addition, he maintained that "no obstacles" existed to "good cooperation with Indonesia" or with other members of the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN). He even stressed that in the preceding five years, 10 states in Africa, the Caribbean, and Oceania had gained independence, and the USSR had recognized all of them "at once."

Last but not least, Brezhnev emphasized that the USSR was developing with the "liberated" countries "wide-ranging economic and scientific-technical cooperation" that was advantageous "to both sides."

In the short periods that Yuriy Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko served as CPSU general secretary, they said little in public about the Third World, and failed to associate themselves with any particular school of thought on the subject in the comments that they did make. Indeed, Andropov gave strong indications that he rejected some of the fundamental premises of the "revolutionary-democratic" outlook. Addressing a CPSU Central Committee plenum on June 15, 1983, he did depict states of "socialist orientation" as "the most close to us," yet he underscored their deficiencies as well. "It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one's aim," he argued, "and quite another to build it." Moreover, even though he pledged Soviet assistance to such countries "in the sphere of politics and culture" and in "the strengthening of their defense," Andropov insisted that "on the whole" their economic development could "only be the result of the work of their peoples and of a correct policy of their leadership."[19]

Gorbachev's elevation to CPSU general secretary has brought proliferating evidence that no school of thought about Third World policy can claim exclusive top-level support. Gorbachev's discussion of the Third World in his book *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*—comments that represent his most extensive and personal public statement about the Third World to date—is especially revealing in this regard.[20]

In this discussion, the General Secretary shied away from broad references to "socialist-oriented" states, to "revolutionary democracies," and to "revolutionary-democratic" parties of a "vanguard" sort, but he wrote at fair length about a number of the entities that normally show up on the lists set forth by partisans of the "revolutionary-democratic" line. For instance, he declared that "we fully appreciate the formidable tasks facing progressive regimes in Africa." Through "economic and financial means" and even "by resorting to arms," imperialism "is out to retain" the positions that it acquired in African countries during the colonial era. However, he stated, the "progressive" regimes there "are determined to pursue a course toward consolidating gains." For "these efforts and these policies" he expressed firm Soviet backing, and he went on to underscore that "our country has always acted, and will continue to act, in support of the national liberation struggle of African nations."

With regard to Nicaragua, he charged the United States with pursuing "an undeclared war against a small country whose only 'fault' is that it wants to live its own way, without interference from the outside." In addition, he contended that the Nicaraguan revolution had come about in the first place because of "unbearable conditions" there that the United States had created by treating all of Central America as its "backyard." The USSR, he concluded, "sympathized" with "the liberation movements of peoples fighting for social justice," and it believed that "if the United States left Nicaragua in peace, this would be better for the US itself, for the Latin Americans, and for the rest of the world."

Consistent with the "economic-interdependence" perspective, Gorbachev pointed to "the growing tendency towards interdependence of the states of the world community." This tendency, he asserted, produces "global issues" which "become vital to the destinies of civilization" and require solutions "in the framework of the world community." Among the specific issues that he cited was the economic development of Third World states.

Such development, the General Secretary emphasized, did not threaten "traditional links between the United States and Western Europe, on the one hand, and developing countries on the other." He acknowledged "how important the Middle East, Asia, Latin America, other Third World regions, and also South Africa are for American and West European economies, in particular as raw material sources," and stated that "to cut these links is the last thing we want to do, and we have no desire to provoke ruptures in historically formed, mutual economic interests."

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[19]Ibid. June 16, 1983.

[20]See specifically Chs. 3 ("How We See the World of Today") and 5 ("The Third World in the International Community") in Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987. Other key items providing insight into Gorbachev's position include the new CPSU Program published in draft in October 1985 and approved in slightly revised form at the 27th CPSU Congress in early 1986, and the General Secretary's political report to the 27th CPSU Congress. The draft of the former may be found in *Pravda*, Oct. 26, 1985, while the final version appeared in *Moscow News*, No. 12, Mar. 30–Apr. 6, 1986, Supplement. Gorbachev's report to the 27th CPSU Congress was carried in *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1986.

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In consonance with the "national-capitalism" viewpoint, Gorbachev sought to portray the USSR as a champion of Third World "capitalist-oriented" states trying to shake off the vestiges of Western domination. He began by holding that "economic, political, and ideological competition between capitalist and socialist countries is inevitable," although, "it can and must be kept within a framework of peaceful competition." Then he proceeded to demonstrate his commitment to such competition by arguing that every Third World state "is entitled to choose its own way of development, to dispose of its fate, its territory, and its human and natural resources." Significantly, he did not confine his defense of this right simply to countries that opted for "socialist orientation," but extended it to states on their way to becoming modern industrialized countries of a capitalist type. According to him, even those in this category that were "growing into great powers" confronted "uneven and painful" economic growth, for the "rich Western states" continued "to collect neo-colonialist 'tribute'." He wound up, therefore, calling upon Western leaders to "set aside the psychology and notions of colonial times" and stop treating "capitalist-oriented" as well as other kinds of Third World countries as the West's "sphere of influence."

The General Secretary's ensuing remarks about specific Third World states testified to the importance that he assigned to "capitalist-oriented" ones. He indicated that the USSR was "ready to develop [its] relations with each of the ASEAN nations individually and with ASEAN as a whole." He depicted the USSR's relations with India as "an example for others to emulate," and he saw in these relations "a budding world order in which peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation based on goodwill will be universal norms." He avowed Soviet sympathy "with the Latin American countries in their efforts to consolidate their independence in every sphere and to cast off all neo-colonialist fetters," and praised the "energetic foreign policies" and the "responsible stances on disarmament and international security" of Mexico and Argentina, the "peace-making efforts of the Contadora Group . . . ."

Indirect yet striking confirmation of the absence of top-level endorsement of a sole school of persuasion about Third World policy emerged at a major conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in late July 1988. It came from Karen Brutents, at the time a deputy director of the CPSU International Department and a key expounder of the "national-capitalism" viewpoint. He told the gathering: "It is . . . only fair to say that the problems of developing countries have yet to be worked out in accordance with the concept of new thinking."[21]

Soviet Behavior

Before the early 1980's, Soviet conduct in the Third World at any given juncture had traditionally followed the recommendation of whichever policy outlook enjoyed official blessing. During the latter half of the 1970's, for instance, it conformed to the prescriptions of the "revolutionary-democratic" line. The USSR directed toward "revolutionary democracies" most of the energy and resources that it devoted to the Third World in these years. Moscow signed new treaties of friendship and cooperation with five Third World states, and from the Soviet standpoint, all of these fell into the category of "revolutionary democracies." The CPSU also developed strong ties with six ruling "revolutionary-democratic" parties of a "vanguard" kind (in Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Congo, the PDRY, and Afghanistan) and with one commission established to create such a party (in Ethiopia).

Between 1975 and 1979, the USSR delivered an estimated US$23.2 billion of weapons and equipment to 30 Third World countries, and of this total, $19 billion went to 17 "revolutionary democracies."[22] In 1976, of the 9,080 Soviet and East European military technicians posted in Third World states, 5,975 were in eight "revolutionary democracies"; by 1979, 11 "revolutionary democracies" accounted for 14,800 of the 15,865 such technicians assigned to the Third World.[23]

During 1975–79, Moscow offered economic credits to 33 countries of the developing world, of which 17 met Soviet criteria for "revolutionary democracies." These 17 states, to be sure, received only an estimated $3.1 billion of the $10.8 billion that the USSR extended to the developing world over the period, but large commitments to three non–"socialist-oriented" countries introduced substantial distortions into the picture—Moscow proffered $2 billion to Morocco, $1.85 billion to Turkey, and $1.2 billion to Nigeria.[24] In 1977, Soviet and East European economic technicians in the Third World

[21]"Cooperation and Dialogue with Political Parties and Movernents," *International Affairs*, November 1988, pp. 38–39.

[22]This analysis is based on data in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970–1979*, Washington, DC, 1982.

[23]US Central Intelligence Agency (hereafter, CIA), *Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1976* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1976*), ER 77-10296, Washington, DC, August 1977, p. 4; and idem, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1954–79* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1954–79*), ER 80-10318U, Washington, DC, October 1980, p. 15.

[24]These figures were arrived at by the author from information in *Communist Aid, 1976*; CIA, *Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the Free World, 1977* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1977*), ER 78-10478U,

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numbered 58,730, of which 36,540 were located in 12 "revolutionary democracies." By 1979, 63,275 of the 80,820 such economic technicians were to be found in 14 "revolutionary democracies."[25]

Throughout the second half of the 1970's, Moscow labored mightily to help Third World "revolutionary-democratic" regimes, particularly those with "vanguard" parties, to create and/or strengthen their instruments of control. Although it employed a variety of means to this end, it relied heavily on political tools.

As noted above, the CPSU fashioned close ties with the ruling "vanguard" parties in Angola, Mozambique, Benin, Congo, the PDRY, and Afghanistan and with the commission formed to set up such a party in Ethiopia. These links included providing advice on ideological and organizational matters.[26]

The USSR also assumed key military roles in five of the seven states. To Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia, it provided military advisers to assist with the development and training of local armed forces, and it became the principal supplier of weapons and equipment for the three countries. In the cases of Angola and Ethiopia, it even furnished the logistical support for large contingents of Cuban troops that stayed in these countries after, respectively, the 1975–76 Angolan civil war and the 1977–78 war between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Ogaden. As for the PDRY and Afghanistan, Moscow had served as the chief source of weapons and equipment for the two and had furnished military technicians to both prior to the mid-1970's, but it greatly expanded the amount of arms and number of military technicians that it sent to them after they established "vanguard" parties in 1978.[27] In all instances, the aid that Moscow gave was designed to improve the performance of local militaries against rebellious domestic elements and threatening neighboring countries.

Only in Afghanistan did the USSR involve itself directly in assisting a "revolutionary-democratic" regime to shape or reshape its intelligence and security services. However, the USSR's staunchest East European ally, the German Democratic Republic (GDR), played a prominent part in setting up the intelligence and security services of the governments of Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and the PDRY.[28]

Finally, the USSR adopted a fairly provocative stance toward the West in the Third World. Not only did Moscow insist that there was no linkage between détente with the West and Soviet actions in the Third World,[29] but it even risked confrontation with the United States by indirect involvement in military conflicts in Angola and the Horn of Africa and direct intervention in Afghanistan. All of these undertakings were in behalf of "revolutionary-democratic" regimes.

In the early 1980's, however, a new diversity crept into Soviet activities in the Third World, and this diversity has persisted throughout the remainder of the decade. The USSR's behavior has reflected a mix of elements drawn from all four of the existing schools of thought about desirable policy toward the Third World, although it has had a dominant thrust along "national-capitalism" lines. Moreover, the precise amalgamation of elements has varied on a regional basis.[30]

Targets of interest. The USSR has continued, as the "revolutionary-democratic" enthusiasts have preferred, to channel toward the "revolutionary democracies" the bulk of the actual resources that it has allocated to the Third World. During 1982–86, Moscow shipped an estimated $59.7 billion worth of arms to 32 Third World states, and 17 "revolutionary democracies" received

Washington, DC, November 1978; idem, *Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978* (hereafter, *Communist Aid, 1978*), ER 79-10412U, Washington, DC, September 1979; and *Communist Aid, 1954–79*; plus Carol Fogarty and Kevin Tritle, "Moscow's Economic Aid Programs in Less-Developed Countries: A Perspective on the 1980's," in *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, Study Papers Submitted to the Joint Economic Committee, US Congress, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, Vol. 2, pp. 537–38.

[25] *Communist Aid, 1977*, p. 7, and *Communist Aid, 1954–79*, p. 21.

[26] See, for example, Brutents, *Osvobodivshiyesya strany v 70-e gody*, pp. 142–43; C. P. Nemanov, "Parties of the Vanguard Type in African Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1979, p. 27; B. Ponomarev, "The Joint Struggle of the Workers' and National Liberation Movements Against Imperialism, for Social Progress," *Kommunist*, No. 16, November 1980, pp. 42–43; William F. Robinson, "Eastern Europe's Presence in Black Africa," in Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich), Background Report No. 142, June 21, 1979, p. 4; Henry S. Bradsher, *Afghanistan and the Soviet Union*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1983, pp. 96, 102–04; Norman Cigar, "South Yemen and the USSR: Prospects for the Relationship," *The Middle East Journal* (Washington, DC), Autumn 1985, pp. 780–81.

[27] On these various activities, see, for instance, Morris Rothenberg, *The USSR and Africa: New Dimensions of Soviet Global Power*, Washington, DC, Advanced International Studies Institute, 1980, pp. 137–47; William M. LeoGrande, *Cuba's Policy in Africa, 1959–1980*, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1980, pp. 37–45; J. B. Kelly, "The Kremlin and the Gulf," *Encounter* (London), April 1980, pp. 87–88; Bradsher, op. cit., Chs. 5–6; *Communist Aid, 1977*, p. 3; *Communist Aid, 1954–79*, pp. 15, 35, and 40; *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970–1979*, p. 127.

[28] Melvin Croan, "A New Afrika Korps?" *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Winter 1980, pp. 30–31; Mark Katz, *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Arabian Peninsula*, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 85; Bradsher, op. cit., p. 123; Kelly, loc. cit., p. 87.

[29] See, for example, General Secretary Brezhnev's report to the 25th CPSU Congress, loc. cit.

[30] To explore in depth the regional differences in the nature of Soviet undertakings, compare the analyses in two works by the present author: *Soviet Policy toward Africa Revisited*, Significant Issues Series, Vol. IX, No. 6, Washington, DC, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1987; and "Latin America in Soviet Third World Strategy: The Political Dimension," in Eusebio Mujal-Leon, Ed., *The USSR and Latin America: A Developing Relationship*, Winchester, MA, Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 3–64.

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about $46.3 billion of that sum.[31] Of the 18,205 Soviet and East European military technicians in the Third World in 1981, 13,225 were assigned to 11 "revolutionary democracies." By 1984, 18,775 of 21,335 such technicians were posted in 14 "revolutionary democracies"; in 1986, 16,375 of 17,995 were active in the same 14 countries.[32]

During 1982–86, the USSR also extended an estimated $13.6 billion in economic credits to 43 Third World states, and $8.3 billion of this amount went to 16 "revolutionary democracies."[33] Of 95,685 Soviet and East European economic technicians in the Third World in 1981, 74,650 were assigned to 15 "revolutionary democracies." By 1984, 101,195 of the 125,960 such technicians in the Third World were to be found in 13 "revolutionary democracies." As of the end of 1986, 17 "revolutionary democracies" had 73,695 of the 96,455 such technicians in the Third World.[34]

A similar distribution of resources has prevailed in all of the major regions where "revolutionary democracies" exist—North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Central America and the Caribbean. For example, the Middle East's three "revolutionary democracies" (Iraq, the PDRY, and Syria) got more than $3.5 billion of the nearly $4 billion in economic commitments and $26.7 billion of the roughly $29.6 billion in arms deliveries that Middle Eastern countries obtained from the USSR during 1982–86.[35] In 1981, they accounted for 19,100 of the 27,150 Soviet and East European economic technicians and 4,900 of the 5,929 Soviet and East European military technicians in the Middle East. These figures stood at 23,025 of 33,100 and 7,700 of 8,310, respectively, in 1984; they were 21,485 of 30,005 and 5,100 of 5,700 in 1986.[36]

Since Gorbachev's advent to power in early 1985, to be sure, the percentage of Soviet resources going to "revolutionary democracies" has declined somewhat. For instance, the economic credits that Moscow offerred to 16 "revolutionary democracies" during the period 1982–86 amounted to only a little more than half of the total that it extended to the whole of the Third World in these years, while the same number of "revolutionary democracies" had received a substantially larger share of Soviet commitments to the Third World during 1980–84 ($7.6 billion of $9.7 billion).[37] Still, the basic pattern of investment of Soviet resources has not altered under Gorbachev.

In accordance with the recommendations of advocates of the "pro-military" perspective, the USSR has assiduously courted "progressive" military regimes in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. To a considerable degree, of course, Moscow has ensured major Soviet attention to states with military governments in these three regions by devoting to "revolutionary democracies" the bulk of the concrete resources that it has expended there, for most of the "revolutionary democracies" in these regions have either been headed by or dominated by the military. There has, however, been less ambiguous evidence as well that Moscow has singled out at least some of the military-controlled countries in the three regions for special wooing.

For example, the USSR has gone to unusual lengths to cultivate Ghana and the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR). Neither of these states claims to be even "socialist-oriented." Yet the government of Ghana under Flight Lieutenant Jerry Rawlings has demonstrated populist tendencies, and the YAR has toyed with the notion of uniting with the PDRY, although its enthusiasm about the idea has risen and fallen over the years.

Since Rawlings took power for the second time in Ghana in March 1982, the USSR has greatly stepped up its interaction with that African country. Delegation traffic between the two states has reached levels not attained since Kwame Nkrumah's downfall in 1966, collaboration between them has blossomed in various spheres, and Moscow has agreed to furnish technical assistance and funding for a number of economic construction and repair projects in Ghana.[38] In accordance with the last commitment, the USSR had by the close of 1986 extended more than $15 million in economic credits to Ghana.[39] Moscow has even resumed delivery of arms to Accra for the first time since Nkru-

[31]These statistics were put together by the author from data in US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, Washington, DC, March 1988.

[32]This analysis derives from information in three publications of the US Department of State: *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, Washington, DC, February 1983, p. 14; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's, 1984*, Washington, DC, May 1986, p. 20; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, Washington, DC, August 1988, p. 16.

[33]Calculated from data in *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8–9.

[34]Based on *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, pp. 20–21; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's, 1984*, p. 16; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 12.

[35]These figures were arrived at by the author from information in *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8–9; *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*.

[36]See the references cited in fns. 32 and 34.

[37]For the data upon which the 1980–84 analysis is based, see Fogarty and Tritle, loc. cit., pp. 537–38.

[38]For more detailed discussion, see Albright, *Soviet Policy toward Africa Revisited*, pp. 38–40.

[39]*Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 8.

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mah's political demise, and by the end of 1986, the cumulative value of these arms had climbed to an estimated $20 million.[40]

Although the USSR had had fairly close relations with the YAR in the 1960's, these ties had deteriorated by the early 1970's and remained at low ebb for most of the 1970's.[41] Only in late 1979 did they begin to revive, when Moscow reversed a long-standing policy and consented to supply arms to the Sanaa government to help it combat opposition forces backed by the PDRY. Ensuing years brought a burgeoning of ties. In 1981, the USSR proffered economic credits of $55 million to the YAR, the largest single offer that Moscow had ever made to a government in Sanaa since North Yemen became a republic.[42] An increase in Soviet and East European economic technicians assigned to the country followed this commitment, with the number mounting from 175 in 1981 to 565 in 1986.[43] In addition, the USSR has sent major quantities of arms to the YAR in the 1980's. During 1982–86 alone, Soviet arms deliveries amounted to an estimated $1.3 billion.[44] Although the total of Soviet and East European military advisers in the state peaked at 700 in 1981, it still stood at 350 in 1986.[45]

As proponents of the "national-capitalism" viewpoint have urged, the USSR has vastly increased the heed that it pays to "capitalist-oriented" countries. This shift has had two distinct dimensions.

First, Moscow has greatly expanded its contacts with two major regions that lack "revolutionary democracies" and have virtually no "socialist-oriented" states—South America and Southeast Asia. The heightened political interaction has been particularly striking. Soviet activity in Southeast Asia is illustrative.[46] During the first half of the 1980's, there was a modest rise in the number of delegations exchanged between the USSR and ASEAN countries, although most of the individuals involved were relatively low-ranking officials. Then the flow swelled dramatically and came to include many high-level figures. In March 1987, USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze toured Southeast Asia and stopped in both Thailand and Indonesia. His visit to Indonesia was the first by a major Soviet leader since Sukarno's ouster in 1965. Soon after Shevardnadze's trip, Soviet officials in Moscow welcomed the foreign ministers of Thailand and Malaysia for talks. Then in July 1987, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad spent several days in Moscow at Soviet invitation. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja journeyed to the USSR for conversations with Soviet leaders in February 1988. Later in the year, the Soviet hierarchy entertained Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanon of Thailand in Moscow, and Shevardnadze went to the Philippines for discussions with leaders there.

Second, even in regions where there are "revolutionary democracies," the USSR has wooed many "capitalist-oriented" states with which it had had few links at the outset of the 1980's. These have included some with especially revealing attributes.

Thus, Moscow has determinedly courted countries which, in its eyes, are guilty of having abandoned a "socialist orientation" in the recent past. Egypt is a good example. In the wake of President Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in October 1981, the USSR strove to reconstruct the economic, cultural, scientific, and trade union ties with Egypt that he had broken during the final years of his rule. In July 1984, the USSR and Egypt finally agreed to resume full diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors, and exchanges of delegations between the two states increased rapidly thereafter. Soviet officials in March 1987 addressed the last remaining source of friction between the USSR and Egypt by working out a rescheduling of Egypt's outstanding debt to Moscow on terms favorable to Cairo.[47]

The USSR has also resolutely cultivated states that it has long regarded as important "capitalist-oriented" countries but that had, at best, displayed coolness toward it in the last half of the 1970's. Examples are Zaire, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.

Some details of the USSR's efforts with respect to Saudi Arabia should suffice to indicate the intensity of Soviet undertakings in these cases.[48] Soviet leaders had their first talks in Moscow with a Saudi foreign minister in December 1982, when they received Prince Saud al-Faysal as a member of an Arab League delegation. There followed some lower-level contacts over the next few years, and then in early 1987, Soviet officials welcomed Saudi oil minister Hisham Nazir to Moscow for conversations about cooperation between the USSR and members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries (OPEC). In January 1988, the Soviet hierarchy played host to Foreign Minister Saud

[40] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, p. 127.

[41] See, for instance, Katz, op. cit., Ch. 1.

[42] Fogarty and Tritle, loc. cit., p. 538; *Communist Aid, 1976*, p. 13; *Communist Aid, 1978*, p. 10; and Katz, op. cit., Ch. 1.

[43] *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, p. 21; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 12.

[44] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, p. 130.

[45] *Communist Aid, 1954–79*, p. 15; *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, p. 14; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8–9.

[46] Details with respect to South America may be found in Albright, "Latin America in Soviet Third World Strategy: The Political Dimension," loc. cit.

[47] For more extended treatment of these various developments, see Albright, *Soviet Policy Toward Africa Revisited*, pp. 29–30.

[48] On Zaire and Jordan, see ibid., pp. 31–32; and Melvin A. Goodman and Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, "Gorbachev's 'New Directions' in the Middle East," *The Middle East Journal*, Autumn 1988, pp. 571–86.

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Prince Saud al-Faysal, Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia, arrives in Moscow on January 28, 1988, for a working visit. He is greeted by Yu. Vorontsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

again, who ostensibly headed a group representing the Gulf Cooperation Council but brought only Saudi officials with him. The following month, Gorbachev dispatched a special envoy, Vladimir Polyakov, to Saudi Arabia. Polyakov was the first Soviet representative to pay an official call there in more than 50 years.

Consistent with the wishes of the champions of the "economic-interdependence" outlook, the USSR has expanded its economic relations with Third World states without regard to political orientation. This approach has meant that its economic links with "capitalist-oriented" countries have multiplied significantly. The USSR's trade turnover with Third World states rose from roughly $4.8 billion a year on the average in 1975–79 to an annual average of more than $10.8 billion in 1982–86, and most of the increase came with "capitalist-oriented" countries. A major share of the growth, for instance, came in trade with South America and Southeast Asia, where, as already mentioned, there are virtually no "socialist-oriented" states. Soviet trade turnover with South America climbed from an average annual figure of only a little more than $800 million in 1975–79 to more than $2.1 billion a year on the average during 1982–86. Similarly, the USSR's annual trade turnover with non-communist countries in Southeast Asia averaged nearly $1.1 billion in 1982–86 as compared with an average yearly figure of about $460 million in 1975–79.[49]

Moscow has striven especially to enhance its economic ties with the best economic performers among developing countries, and these have been almost exclusively "capitalist-oriented" states. Examples are India, Brazil, Singapore, Thailand, Turkey, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, and Malaysia. In 1982–86, the USSR's trade turnover with India reached an average of $2.9 billion a year, whereas in 1975–79 it had amounted only to an average of $1.2 billion a year. The total for Brazil rose from about $320 million in 1975–79 to more than $630 million in 1982–86; for Singapore, from a little in excess of $115 billion to almost $290 million; for Thailand, from roughly $22 million to more than $115 million; for Turkey, from $170 million to nearly $375 million; for Tunisia, from $17 million to $34 million; for Sri Lanka, from $30 million to more than $46 million; for Malaysia, from about $170 million to more than $250 million.[50]

Relationships sought. In the cases of "revolutionary democracies" and especially those with "vanguard" parties, the USSR has persisted in pursuing the sort of ties that adherents of the "revolutionary-democratic" perspective have touted. That is, it has tried to fashion long-term, structural links with these states by assisting the existing regimes in their efforts to solidify their rule.

For instance, Moscow has encouraged "revolutionary-democratic" regimes still without "vanguard" parties to form such parties, and it has endeavored to help strengthen existing "vanguard" parties. The leading example of Soviet efforts of the former type has to do with Ethiopia. For example, Soviet officials prodded Ethiopia's Mengistu Haile-Mariam to carry out his avowed intention to set up a "vanguard" party, and when he was preparing for the official launching of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia in September 1984, the USSR played a major part in the undertakings. This role included educating Ethiopians about the operations of a Marxist-Leninist party. No less than 12 important Ethiopian delegations visited the Soviet Union in 1983 alone to observe CPSU activities, and some of these groups comprised 30 or more persons.

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[49]The statistics on trade turnover here were calculated by the author in light of information in International Monetary Fund, *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for 1981, pp. 387–88, and ibid. for 1988, pp. 399–400.

[50]Data on the economic performances of Third World states, as measured by the growth of gross national product (GNP) per capita during 1975–85, appear in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*. The figures on commercial exchanges were arrived at by the author on the basis of information in *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for 1981, pp. 387–88, and ibid. for 1988, pp. 399–400.

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The founding congress of the Workers' Party of Ethiopia in September 1984; wearing the garland, WPE leader Mengistu Haile-Mariam.

—ADN-ZB from Eastfoto.

As for Soviet bolstering of "vanguard" parties already in existence, the PDRY offers a good illustration. In January 1986, a coup there ousted President Ali Nasir Muhammad and resulted in the death of a large segment of the state's political elite. Subsequently, the USSR assumed a key role in reconstituting a government and rebuilding a viable party in the country.[51]

The USSR and its allies have also retained or taken over major functions with respect to the intelligence and security services of a number of "revolutionary democracies." Principal among these countries have been Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, the PDRY, Nicaragua, and (at least until early 1989) Afghanistan.[52]

Finally, the USSR has worked closely with several "revolutionary democracies" to enhance their capacity to deal with domestic and/or foreign military challenges. For example, it has furnished military advisers to Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, the PDRY, Nicaragua, and Afghanistan (until early 1989) to assist in the training of local military forces and to offer counsel on military strategy. In addition, it has constituted the primary source of the large amounts of arms that all six states have acquired during the decade. It even de-

[51]See the chapters by David E. Albright on the USSR and Africa in the annual volumes of Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record,* London, Holmes and Meier, for 1981–85; and David Pollock, "Moscow and Aden: Coping with a Coup," *Problems of Communism,* May-June 1986, pp. 50–70.

[52]See the entries for Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique in the yearly editions for the 1980's of *The Military Balance,* published in London by the International Institute for Strategic Studies; on the PDRY, see Pollock, loc. cit., p. 52; on Nicaragua, US Department of State and Department of Defense, *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean,* Washington, DC, March 1985, pp. 25–27; and on Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, "Moscow's Afghan War," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1986, pp. 7–8.

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ployed a large contingent of its own troops in Afghanistan until early 1989, and it has furnished logistical support for the stationing of substantial numbers of Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia.[53]

It should be acknowledged, however, that the late 1980's have witnessed a growing Soviet leeriness about involvement in attempts to bolster "revolutionary democracies" militarily when these undertakings entail high costs for the USSR or antagonize the Western powers. Not only did Soviet troops leave Afghanistan in February 1989 in line with a decision that Gorbachev had announced in 1988, but Moscow also actively promoted the accords that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa concluded in December 1988. These call for the departure of all Cuban forces from Angola by July 1991 in return for South Africa's acceptance of Namibia's independence, although they do not affect the status of Soviet military advisers in Angola.[54]

In approaching military-ruled countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, the USSR appears to have sought to create the kind of long-term structural relations of a military nature favored by the expounders of the "pro-military" school. For instance, it shipped arms to 16 military-controlled states in the three regions during 1982–86; furthermore, it served as the sole or primary source of arms for 11 of these states.[55]

As proponents of the "national-capitalism" viewpoint have counseled, the USSR seems to have eschewed attempts to establish lasting structural links with *most* "capitalist-oriented" countries—at least over the short term. Indeed, the great diversity of such states that Moscow has been wooing in the 1980's suggests that it has been hedging against possible setbacks here and there in its relations with them.

Moscow has been courting not only the more important "capitalist-oriented" countries but many fairly minor ones as well. For example, in 1984 alone, each of the African mini-states of Gambia, Togo, Niger, Mauritania, and Rwanda received at least one significant Soviet overture.[56] After extensive diplomatic preparations, the USSR opened up official ties with both Oman and the United Arab Emirates in October 1985. In February 1987, Moscow sent its ambassador in Costa Rica to Guatemala to explore the chances for a resumption of Soviet-Guatemalan diplomatic relations.[57] No formal links had existed between the two countries since the unseating of the left-wing Arbenz government in Guatemala in the mid-1950's.

In keeping with the prescriptions of the "economic-interdependence" school, however, the USSR has tried to foster long-term, structural ties in a multilateral framework with *some* "capitalist-oriented" states and particularly with the best economic performers in the Third World. It has done this basically by pressing for increased purchases of Soviet goods, especially machinery. But the items that Moscow has been promoting have gone well beyond those that would improve the capabilities of these Third World countries to produce for the Soviet market; they have included any type of machine goods that would ensure "mutually advantageous" exchanges. Thus, the trade flows that the USSR has encouraged are intended to create linkages whose ultimate importance will derive from their connection to the global economic system instead of in a purely bilateral context.[58]

Instruments. The USSR has employed all of the diverse means at its disposal in its handling of the Third World as a whole, but it has emphasized different tools in addressing different targets there. In dealing with "revolutionary democracies" with "vanguard" parties, Moscow has heeded the recommendations of adherents of the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint. It has resorted primarily to a mix of political and military instruments, with a stress on the former. The means whereby the USSR has sought to help the existing regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and the PDRY put down firm roots afford excellent illustrations. As already noted, Moscow has assisted these regimes with arms and training for local military forces to try to strengthen the capacities of the regimes to meet internal and foreign military threats; however, it has relied principally on undertakings designed to improve the control capabilities of these regimes' nonmilitary institutions.

In the cases of military-run states in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as of many "revolutionary democracies" lacking "vanguard" parties, the USSR has followed the desires of the exponents of the "pro-military" school. That is, it has used chiefly military tools. Political instruments, it is true,

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[53]On these various activities, see *The Military Balance, 1987–1988,* pp. 120, 123, 126, 129, and 133; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986,* p. 16; *The Soviet-Cuban Connection in Central America and the Caribbean,* p. 25; Khalilzad, loc. cit., p. 2; and *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987.*

[54]See the texts of the agreements in *The New York Times,* Dec. 23, 1988.

[55]This analysis is based on information in *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987,* pp. 127–30.

[56]For details, see David E. Albright, "The USSR and Africa in 1984: Trials of an Aspiring Global Power," in Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1984–85,* pp. 253–57.

[57]Guatemala City Radio-Television in Spanish, Feb. 27, 1987, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Latin America* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-LAT*), Mar. 2, 1987, pp. P/2–3.

[58]For more extensive treatment of this subject in a specific regional setting, see Elizabeth Valkenier, "Soviet Economic Strategy in Latin America," in Mujal-Leon, op. cit., pp. 65–89.

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have played a not inconsequential role in Soviet wooing of these countries, particularly the "revolutionary democracies." Yet the absence of "vanguard" parties in all of these states has imposed limits on the effectiveness with which the USSR can employ political means. Of the other types of tools available, Moscow has clearly judged military ones to be of greater value and viability than economic ones. During 1982–86, for instance, 18 military-ruled countries in the Middle East, North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa received arms deliveries and/or economic credits from the USSR, and 15 of these states got more supplies of arms than economic commitments—usually by a large margin.[59]

As for most "capitalist-oriented" countries, the USSR has carried out its courtship largely through political means, as partisans of the "national-capitalism" outlook have counseled. For the most part, Moscow has found the economic and military "contradictions" between these states and the West too costly to try to exploit, given Soviet resource constraints. Political "contradictions" are not as problematic. Thus, Soviet efforts to make common political cause with these states have proliferated and have covered a broad range of topics. For example, the USSR has supported the endeavors of the "capitalist-oriented" states of the South Pacific to declare their region a nuclear-free zone—a step opposed especially by the United States and France—and it has endorsed the calls by the "capitalist-oriented" countries of Latin America for the West to adopt a more flexible attitude toward their debts.

With respect to a few "capitalist-oriented" states, however, the USSR has followed the exhortations of those of an "economic-interdependence" persuasion by concentrating on economic means. The best illustrations are countries with which it has managed to establish a "mutually advantageous" economic relationship. Morocco, Turkey, and Egypt fall into this group. During 1981–86, Soviet exports to Morocco averaged about $151 million a year, while Soviet imports amounted to an annual average of almost $74 million. The figures for Turkey were, respectively, $211 million and roughly $161 million; for Egypt, more than $211 million and nearly $189 million.[60] All of these states, it should be underscored, qualify for listing among the developing world's better economic performers.[61]

Posture toward the West. To a large extent, the USSR has adopted the stance toward the West endorsed by proponents of the "national-capitalism" perspective—that is, competition without confrontation. A few diverse examples will suffice for purposes of illustration. When Thailand and the Dominican Republic in the early 1980's found themselves deprived of quotas for sale of rice and sugar respectively in the US market, Moscow agreed to purchase substantial amounts of these commodities from them. Thus, Soviet trade turnover with Thailand jumped from $22.2 million a year on the average in 1975–79 to an annual average of $115.6 million in 1982–86; that with the Dominican Republic rose from nothing in 1975–79 to an average yearly figure of $36.4 million in 1982–86.[62]

In the early 1980's, the USSR contracted to supply weapons and equipment to Jordan for the first time after King Hussein had failed to get what he wanted from the United States or other Western powers. Over the 1982–86 period alone, Soviet arms deliveries to this Middle Eastern state totaled an estimated $1.1 billion.[63]

Although Moscow has throughout the 1980's encouraged Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi's antipathy toward the West and has attempted to exploit it to forge strong links with Libya, the USSR has carefully dissociated itself from Qadhafi's more provocative actions toward the West. For instance, Soviet media studiously avoided mention of Libya's likely role in the mining of the Red Sea in the summer of 1984, and the USSR quietly helped with the mine-clearing operations in the Bab el-Mandeb area.[64] Furthermore, Moscow did not respond in a direct military way to the US bombing of Libya in April 1986, which Washington characterized as retaliation for Qadhafi's fostering of international terrorism. The USSR merely offered Qadhafi some new, more sophisticated military hardware—especially SA-5 missiles.[65]

In line with the inclinations of the backers of both the "revolutionary-democratic" and "pro-military" schools of thought, however, the USSR maintained a limited confrontational attitude toward the West by supporting some "revolutionary democracies" until the mid-1980's. Among these were three states in which it had taken on fairly heavy military responsibilities in the latter part of the 1970's—namely, Angola, Ethiopia, and Afghanistan—but the group also included other countries such as Nicaragua. To the governments of these states, all of which faced serious domestic and/or

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[59] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, pp. 127–30; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, pp. 8–9.

[60] These statistics were derived by the author from information in *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1988*, pp. 399–400.

[61] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, pp. 57, 70, and 80.

[62] Derived from data in *Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook* for 1981, p. 388, and ibid. for 1988, pp. 399–400.

[63] *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, p. 129.

[64] Middle East News Agency (Cairo) in Arabic, Aug. 23, 1984, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Middle East and Africa* (Washington, DC), Aug. 24, 1984, p. D/1.

[65] *Al-Ittihad* (Abu Dhabi), May 31, 1986, pp. 1, 9.

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external military challenges, Moscow provided large quantities of arms and, often in conjunction with its allies, significant numbers of military advisers.[66] Moreover, it did so despite the fact that the Western powers, and particularly the United States, were either seeking to end the conflicts or aiding the opponents of the existing regimes in the countries concerned.

But since early 1986, the USSR has gradually abandoned most of the confrontational aspects of its posture even in these cases. In March 1986, for instance, Gorbachev indicated explicitly that the USSR was prepared to help find political solutions to the conflicts engulfing Angola.[67] Although for nearly two years Moscow played a fairly minimal part in diplomatic efforts to such an end, in late 1987 it did begin to push actively for the agreements that Angola, Cuba, and South Africa signed in December 1988.[68] In October 1986, the USSR consented to normalize its relations with Somalia, one of the Ethiopian government's main antagonists.[69] Thereafter, Moscow pressed for a rapprochement between Ethiopia and Somalia. And finally, there is Afghanistan, where in May 1986, the USSR engineered a change in the leadership of the ruling party in Afghanistan that brought to power Najibullah, a man who appeared to be more amenable to some sort of "national reconciliation" in the country than his predecessor had been. Two months later, in a major speech in Vladivostok, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal of a number of Soviet regiments from Afghanistan.[70] By early 1988, Moscow had decided to pull all of its troops out, and it concluded a formal accord to this effect in April 1988.[71] In keeping with that document, the last Soviet troops left the country in February 1989.

Only with respect to Nicaragua have some elements of confrontation remained. To be sure, the USSR has endorsed peace initiatives such as the "Arias plan," set forth by the presidents of Central America in August 1987, and it has applauded conciliatory gestures by the Sandinist regime to its internal opposition. Yet Moscow has declined to involve itself in the Central American peace process. Moreover, it has promised to increase its military aid to the Managua government, although Gorbachev did indicate in early April 1989 that he was prepared to cut off this flow of arms if the United States ceased all of its shipments of arms to Central America.[72]

Since the mid-1980's, the USSR also has occasionally assumed the selectively cooperative stance toward the West that the champions of the "economic-interdependence" outlook favor. The manifestations of such a posture have come largely, though not exclusively, in connection with Third World conflict situations. The outstanding example is the negotiations that resulted in the pledge by Angola and Cuba to remove Cuban troops from Angolan soil in return for South Africa's acceptance of Namibian independence. Soviet and American officials worked closely together to facilitate this settlement.[73] The United States and Soviet Union also collaborated during the severe famine that hit Ethiopia in 1985. The USSR had little in the way of food to offer Addis Ababa, but Moscow furnished many of the trucks and airplanes required to get the relief supplies —provided by the West, especially the US—to affected areas of the country.[74]

Implications

What, then, do these shifts suggest about the USSR's policy toward the Third World? Two points stand out. First, from a substantive viewpoint, increased complexity has become the key feature of Soviet policy. Specifically, the policy now reflects several different, often clashing visions of what the Soviet approach to the Third World ought to be. It is true that, as the evidence laid out in the preceding pages attests, a good case can be made that today change outweighs continuity in the content of Soviet policy. Yet elements of continuity persist. More critical, even if these elements of continuity were to disappear, the heightened complexity of policy would still prevail as long as multiple schools of persuasion about desirable policy existed and the USSR's top leadership embraced no one of them exclusively.

The significance of this new complexity in Soviet policy toward the Third World arises from its impact on the

[66]See, for example, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987*, pp. 127–30; *Soviet and East European Aid to the Third World, 1981*, p. 14; *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid to Non-Communist LDC's, 1984*, p. 20; and *Warsaw Pact Economic Aid Programs in Non-Communist LDC's: Holding Their Own in 1986*, p. 16.

[67]Speech at a dinner in Moscow for President Samora Machel of Mozambique, as reported by TASS over Radio Moscow in English, Mar. 31, 1986, in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 1, 1986, pp. J/3–6.

[68]On the USSR's role in the undertakings after late 1987, see, for instance, *The New York Times*, June 6, 1988.

[69]This step took place at a meeting of a Somali official and USSR Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in the Yemen Arab Republic. See *Indian Ocean Newsletter* (Paris), Oct. 18, 1986.

[70]The text is in *Pravda*, July 29, 1986.

[71]For the agreement, see *The New York Times*, Apr. 15, 1988.

[72] See the press conference of the newly arrived Soviet ambassador to Nicaragua, as reported by Radio Belgrade, TANJUG in English, Nov. 5, 1988, in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1988, p. 35; Gorbachev's speech to the National Assembly in Havana, Cuba, on Apr. 4, 1989, as carried by Havana Domestic Radio and Television Services on Apr. 4, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-LAT*, Apr. 6, 1989, pp. 7–13, esp. p. 12.

[73]For typical discussion of this cooperation, see *The New York Times*, June 6, 1988, and Jan. 28, 1989.

[74]A revealing account of Soviet activities may be found in Z. Kadymbekov's dispatch in *Izvestiya* (Moscow), Sept. 6, 1985.

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Soviet Aeroflot helicopters deliver wheat shipments provided by the European Economic Community to remote villages in the northern and eastern parts of Ethiopia during the famine of 1984–85.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

predictability of that policy. In any concrete set of circumstances, it is hard to anticipate precisely what mix of the various policy perspectives will shape Soviet behavior. Thus, foreseeing the USSR's response to these circumstances is highly problematic.

From Moscow's standpoint, of course, this development is not necessarily a drawback. Nor is the greater flexibility that the added complexity permits in Soviet handling of the Third World. The absence of a firm official line, for example, gives Moscow more room to adjust its conduct in light of the conditions it may see as relevant in each individual situation.

Second, in terms of process, the formulation of the USSR's policy toward the Third World has also turned into a highly complicated affair. Policy now emerges from competition among a number of groups with diverse policy outlooks in the Soviet hierarchy.

Many signs do point to an evolution in the nature of this competition during the 1980's. In the final years of the Brezhnev era, during the brief tenures of Andropov and Chernenko as CPSU general secretary, and even in the initial stage of Gorbachev's rule, the competition resembled a free-for-all wrestling match. Advocates of the various policy lines picked concrete circumstances in which they believed that they could influence the USSR's behavior, and then they sought to exert this leverage.

Several factors contributed to this situation. Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko were elderly and suffered from serious illnesses and/or infirmities during much or all of the periods that they were in office; thus, they did not function in an activist fashion. Moreover, they faced so many pressing problems that the Third World did not rank high on their lists of priorities. As a consequence, even though they refused to lend the weight of their authority to the "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint that had enjoyed official sanction in the late 1970's, neither did they set forth a coherent alternative to it.

Gorbachev's rise to power brought a young, dynamic individual to the top leadership post, but he lacked experience in foreign affairs and had virtually no experience in dealing with the Third World. Perhaps more important, his immediate concerns were domestic in nature, and his need to solidify his political control reinforced this preoccupation. Hence, he devoted little attention to the Third World at the outset.[75]

(fn. 75 on p. 68)

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In addition, until roughly 1987, officials with diverse prescriptions for the USSR's Third World policy were entrenched in those Soviet institutions that had a major hand in shaping the Soviet approach toward the Third World. The CPSU International Department, for example, included among its directing elements representatives of three of the four Soviet schools of thought about Third World policy.[76] Without firm policy guidelines from above, these and other strategically-placed individuals were in a position to affect Soviet conduct at least within their own spheres of responsibility.

Since about 1987, however, the competition has taken on a more structured form, as advocates of each policy line battle to influence the content of the "new thinking." An item published in a leading Soviet academic journal in mid-1988 affords a graphic illustration. Under the headline "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking," two prominent specialists on the Third World with long-standing, conflicting outlooks on Soviet Third World policy engaged in a dialogue on "socialist orientation." One expounded a "revolutionary-democratic" viewpoint; the other, a "national-capitalism" viewpoint. Yet both claimed that their arguments accorded with "new political thinking."[77]

The previously cited observation by Brutents at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs conference in July 1988 offers equally revealing evidence. In saying that "the problems of developing countries have yet to be worked out" in light of "the concept of new thinking," he implied that "new thinking" required further refinement. Given his long-term commitment to a "national-capitalism" perspective, there can be little doubt what sort of refinement he had in mind.

This shift in the nature of the competition has come about for a combination of reasons. Over the years, Gorbachev has greatly enhanced his power by engineering a variety of personnel and institutional changes in the USSR, although he still appears to confront strong opposition in some quarters.

The General Secretary has also begun to evince a fair degree of interest in the Third World, and he has even set forth some general principles for Soviet policy toward it. These flow essentially out of his larger political and foreign policy concerns. That is particularly true of the two primary principles. As Gorbachev sees things, Soviet involvements in the Third World must not impede the restructuring of the Soviet economy, and the USSR's behavior there must not undermine Soviet attempts to improve relations with the West in general and the United States in particular.[78]

Aside from insisting on adherence to a few governing principles, however, Gorbachev has shown a willingness to listen to expert advice on how to deal with the Third World. This willingness has legitimized efforts by representatives of all policy persuasions to make inputs on the subject, and despite Gorbachev's shakeup of the personnel and institutions handling Third World matters, diversity of outlook persists among the well-placed experts. Indeed, even Gorbachev's two top-ranking lieutenants in the realm of foreign policy—Yakovlev and Shevardnadze—seem to hold clashing views on desirable Soviet Third World policy.

Prospects

None of the developments highlighted in this article, it should be recognized, is necessarily permanent. Therefore, an assessment of their likely future relevance requires answers to two basic questions. First, will debate continue over what the Soviet Union's policy toward the Third World should be, and especially will there be several schools of thought on the subject? Second, will the top Soviet leadership persist in avoiding an embrace of any single school of thought as an official line? Let us address each of these issues in turn.

Although the visions of desirable Soviet policy toward the Third World advanced by Soviet observers have totaled four since the early 1980's, there is nothing magical about that number, and it could alter in the years immediately ahead. The underpinnings of the "revolutionary-democratic" and "pro-military" outlooks, for example, have eroded substantially. Indeed, criticism of even the most radical forces in power in the

[75]For more extended treatment of these points, see Roderic Lyne, "Making Waves: Gorbachev's Public Diplomacy, 1985–86," in Robbin F. Laird Ed., *Soviet Foreign Policy*, New York, Academy of Political Science, 1987, pp. 235–53.

[76]As already noted, Ponomarev, the head of the department, and Ul'yanovskiy, a deputy chief, subscribed to the "revolutionary-democratic" outlook; Brutents, a deputy director, to the "national-capitalism" viewpoint; and Zagladin, the first deputy chief, to the "economic-interdependence" perspective. For elaboration, see David E. Albright, "The CPSU International Department and the Third World in the Gorbachev Era," in Donald Graves, Ed., *The CPSU International Department and Soviet Foreign Policy*, Washington, DC, Center for Foreign Policy Development, forthcoming.

[77]Vladimir Lee and Georgy Mirsky, "Socialist Orientation and New Political Thinking," *Asia and Africa Today* (Moscow), July-August 1988, pp. 64–70.

[78]See his speech to the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in *Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannykh Del, SSSR* (Moscow), Aug. 5, 1987, and his *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, pp. 139–40, 174, 177–78, 188–89.

[79]As pointed out previously, Yakovlev, Politburo member and head of the CPSU International Policy Commission, adheres to the "national-capitalism" school, while Shevardnadze, a Politburo member and minister of foreign affairs, identifies with the "economic-interdependence" school.

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Third World has come from supporters of the "revolutionary-democratic" and "pro-military" perspectives, as well as from partisans of other viewpoints.[80] Unhappiness with these forces could reach the point where the "revolutionary-democratic" and/or the "pro-military" schools of thought would disappear entirely.

By the same token, indications have cropped up since mid-1988 that a fifth vision of policy may be emerging, although these hints still remain scanty enough to leave questions about whether it has enough backing to qualify as a full-fledged school of thought. This perspective accepts a basic premise of the "national-capitalism" outlook—that at least most Third World states will pass through a capitalist or nonsocialist phase of development before arriving at socialism. Yet it sees far less possibility of advance toward socialism under present circumstances than even the "national-capitalism" line does. Not only is this viewpoint skeptical that "capitalist-oriented" countries in the Third World will try to assert their independence vis-à-vis the Western "imperialist" powers in economic and other spheres by expanding their contacts with the USSR, but it is pessimistic about even modest steps toward socialism on the part of "socialist-oriented" states. Worst of all from its standpoint, even the most consistent of the USSR's Third World allies are seeking to broaden their political and economic ties with the West, and the USSR lacks the resources to reverse this situation. In fact, Moscow is even having troubles increasing these resources, for it bears heavy military burdens in the Third World and other areas. As a result, the socialist path of development is losing its appeal in the Third World.

Thus, according to advocates of this possible new school of thought, the USSR must reduce its involvements in the Third World so as to focus on restructuring its own economy and making the socialist path more attractive. In doing so, it should not use political orientation as a basis for retaining close relations; rather, it should adopt pragmatic criteria based on its political interests and goals in each region. Nor should it attempt to maintain or develop links with Third World countries that entail heavy commitments of resources, especially those of an economic character. In addition, it should rely chiefly on political means, instead of more costly military and economic instruments, in pursuing its ends. Finally, it should adopt a nonprovocative posture toward the West; otherwise, it might find itself embroiled in Third World conflicts that would drain off its resources.

So far, we have not been able to identify any high-level individual who has publicly associated himself with this line of argument.[81] Nevertheless, some (unnamed) senior members of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, including ambassadors and high-ranking staff members of the ministry, did openly call at the ministry's July 1988 conference for a hard-headed reassessment of Soviet undertakings in the Third World. They urged that the USSR develop relations with Third World states "on realistic lines, with due regard to the peculiarities of each particular country and, first and foremost, to our actual possibilities."[82]

What appears beyond doubt is that controversy over Third World policy will continue in the USSR for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it seems highly probable that multiple schools of persuasion on the subject will remain in existence as well. The "revolutionary-democratic" perspective in particular has roots too deep in Soviet policy-making for one to anticipate that it will soon vanish completely.

Were the number of visions of policy to drop to two, of course, the complexity of current policy would inevitably diminish—especially if the two happened to be the "national-capitalism" and "economic-interdependence" viewpoints, which have elements of commonality in their prescriptions. Yet complexity would not vanish entirely if the top Soviet leadership still failed to extend its official sanction to one or the other. This point brings us to the second issue.

The top Soviet leadership's position on the merits of embracing as an official line one of the extant schools of thought about policy could undergo change in two ways. Someone amenable to the notion of sanctioning one of the schools could replace Gorbachev as general secretary, or Gorbachev himself could alter his attitude on the issue.

With regard to the possibility of Gorbachev's replacement, his hold on power will ultimately depend on how well his programs work, and that question remains unresolved. For the moment, however, he seems not

[80]The writings of Ul'yanovskiy, one of the prime architects of the "revolutionary-democratic"viewpoint, are indicative. Before the appearance of his article "On National and Revolutionary Democracy: Paths of Evolution" in 1984, he had never attacked "revolutionary democrats" in any severe fashion, but in this article he took them to task for a variety of failings, even though he continued to insist that the Third World was going through a protracted process of by-passing capitalism. All of his subsequent publications have been in the same vein.

[81]The most expansive statement to date of this vision of policy may be found in Alexey Izyumov and Andrey Kortunov, "The Soviet Union in the Changing World," *International Affairs*, August 1988, esp. pp. 51–56.

[82]See the account by Deputy Foreign Minister Leonid Il'ichev of the deliberations of a section on "Policy Toward Developing Countries and Regional Conflicts" at this conference, in ibid., October 1988, pp. 49–50.

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only to have enhanced his dominance of the political system but to have prevented a coalescence of different groups of malcontents, as well as to have denied them a prominent figure around whom to rally. Consequently, no succession appears to loom on the near horizon. Even were one to take place, there is no guarantee that a new general secretary would abandon Gorbachev's stance on the matter at issue here.

As for the potential for a shift in Gorbachev's attitude, such a development seems most unlikely, although not utterly impossible. Gorbachev appears to welcome the flexibility that his decision not to endorse exclusively any school of thought about policy toward the Third World has afforded the USSR. Moreover, this increased ability to adjust policy to local conditions has to date served the USSR fairly well in its dealings with the Third World. Thus, it would probably take a major setback for the USSR in the Third World to persuade Gorbachev to reverse himself.

All in all, then, both Soviet policy toward the Third World and the process whereby that policy is formulated will probably continue to evince a high degree of complexity in the years immediately ahead. This judgment, it should be stressed, does not preclude change, but it does mean that change is likely to be at the margins.

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The Soviet Union and Southern African Security

S. Neil MacFarlane

A major step toward resolution of regional conflict in Southern Africa was taken in New York on December 22, 1988, when Cuba, Angola, and the Union of South Africa signed a treaty at the United Nations agreeing on the transition to independence of Namibia and a timetable for withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola.[1] While many factors contributed to this outcome—rising South African casualties, growing concern in Luanda about the sorry state of the Angolan economy after 12 years of civil war, and the active mediation of the United States, to mention a few—it is difficult to conceive of such progress in negotiations on Angolan-Namibian issues without the acquiescence, if not support, of the Soviet Union. In fact, Moscow—long a major supporter of Cuba, Angola, the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), and the African National Congress (ANC)—participated as an observer in the series of US-mediated talks leading up to the signing of the treaty.[2]

To some extent, this development in Southern Africa reflects a broader shift in Soviet attitudes regarding regional conflicts. The signing of the treaty on Angola and Namibia came in a period when the USSR was implementing its military withdrawal from Afghanistan, when Soviet client Vietnam was mooting the possibility of complete withdrawal from Cambodia by the end of the decade, and when one detected that—despite a shaky ceasefire—the Soviet-backed Sandinista government was showing increased interest in exploring a peaceful resolution of Nicaragua's civil war. At the same time, one can also trace an important evolution in Soviet perspectives on conflict and regional security in Southern Africa per se. It is this evolution that I wish to discuss in this article.

The subject is an important one, foremost because recent changes in Soviet perspectives on Southern Africa could have a wide-reaching impact on the region and its security. The area has suffered from continual war, dating back to the beginning of insurgency in Angola in 1961. Will a changing Soviet perspective improve prospects for ending this seemingly interminable conflict? During the 1970's, conflict in the region became an important impediment to constructive developments in East-West relations. Will changing Soviet policies reduce such impediments in the future? Resolution of the issue of apartheid in South Africa has long been clouded by the specter of possible Soviet exploitation of upheaval in that society. Might a changing

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[1]See Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC—hereafter *FBIS-AFR*), Dec. 23, 1988, p. 1. This treaty culminated a series of talks mediated by the United States, which began in Lusaka in early 1988, continued in March in Cairo, in London and Brazzaville in May, in New York in July, and subsequently in Cabo Verde, Geneva, and finally Brazzaville in early December. A key stage in these negotiations was the emergence in New York of a 14-point agreement in principle committing the three negotiating parties to implementation of United Nations Resolution 435/78 on Namibian independence and to withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola (see *The New York Times*, July 21, 1988). In August, there was agreement on a ceasefire and the beginning of a South African withdrawal from Angola. In the autumn, there was considerable wrangling over the timetable for Cuban withdrawal, but these issues were resolved in Brazzaville, paving the way for the New York signing.

[2]*The New York Times* of August 3, 1988, reported that Anatoliy Adamishin, the Soviet deputy foreign minister responsible for Southern African affairs and the Soviet observer at some of the negotiations, had "implied" that the USSR was pressing Angola and Cuba toward a compromise. Soviet observers played a critical role during the Cairo round in preventing a walkout by Cuba and Angola.

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

At the signing of the treaty on Angola and Namibia at the United Nations in New York on December 22, 1988: at center, US diplomat Chester A. Crocker looks on as UN Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and US Secretary of State George P. Shultz shake hands; at the left are two representatives of South Africa, and at right, two representatives each from Angola and Cuba.

—US Department of State.

Soviet policy make possible a more productive solution to the deep indigenous socio-economic and political problems in South Africa and elsewhere in the region? In a broader context, detailed attention to specific regional cases can greatly enhance the examination of the broader issue of the current directions of Soviet Third World policy.

In broaching the subject, I will make a few general observations concerning changing Soviet attitudes toward the Third World as a whole and pursuit of Soviet interests there. Then I will explore shifts in Soviet attitudes regarding Sub-Saharan Africa before turning to a more detailed examination of the evolution of Moscow's perceptions of the conflict in Angola and the revolutionary process in South Africa itself. I will conclude with a discussion of the significance of this evolution in Soviet policy for the regional security of Southern Africa. It is not my intention to deal at any length with Soviet relations with other regional actors (e.g., Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Zambia); these topics are important, but they are not mine.

The analysis here is based on a reading of the Soviet literature on the Third World in general—and on Africa specifically—from 1976 through early 1989, on numerous interviews with Soviet regional specialists, on a field research trip to South Africa at the beginning of 1988, and on extensive discussions with participants in Soviet-American exchanges of Africanists.

General Trends in Soviet Policy

The USSR has pursued an array of objectives in the Third World. These have included competitive goals relating to strategic position, political influence, and expansion of the realm in which socialist ideology holds sway. This last reflects not only genuine commitment on the part of Soviet leaders to this ideology, but also their

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need to legitimize their rule by acting as purveyors of a universalistic ideology, the victory of which over international imperialism is alleged to be historically determined. The competition may have been pursued positively (through the acquisition of new assets) or negatively (through efforts to weaken the position of or deny gains to the adversary).[3]

The Soviet Union has also pursued economic objectives and sought to attain status in the international community as a superpower. This latter, essentially nationalist, objective may again have reflected either the genuine commitment of decision-makers to the "glory" of their state, or an attempt to appeal to Russian nationalism as part of a strategy of legitimation. These goals could have been pursued without seriously impinging on the position or assets of other powers.

Finally, the USSR has sought to avoid direct confrontation with the United States in seeking advantage in the Third World. More generally, the Soviet leadership has sought at various times to avoid or limit damage to its agenda in relations with other major powers that might arise from its démarches on the periphery.

The intensity with which the USSR has pursued these objectives and the priority accorded one or another of them have varied over time, in what some see as a cyclical alternation between activism and quiescence.[4] Observers generally agree that the current period is one of Soviet caution and moderation in the Third World.[5] Indeed, there is considerable evidence that Soviet analysts and policy-makers have concluded that a continuation of past policy in the Third World is a recipe for prolonged and increasingly costly entanglement in regional conflicts; that such entanglements are damaging to Moscow's relations with the West,[6] and, often, to Soviet prestige; that given the balance of forces in most regions, Soviet objectives must be scaled down to more modest levels; and that Moscow can attain these more modest goals by diplomatic means rather than by force.

The focus of Soviet attention seems to be shifting from the socialist states (Vietnam and Cuba) and "states of socialist orientation" (e.g., Angola, Ethiopia, and South Yemen) to major developing states such as India, Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and Nigeria. The objectives are now to construct relations of economic benefit to the USSR and to provide a solid footing for the Soviet claim to status as a player in various regions of the Third World. To the extent that links to the USSR encourage and sustain a degree of independence from the United States on the part of Third World states, so much the better in Moscow's view. There is little evidence of significant Soviet willingness to take advantage of new opportunities for involvement in Third World revolutions. The Soviet Union is seeking, meanwhile, to reduce its exposure in conflicts where it is already involved, through a diplomacy of political settlement.

Where the costs of regional involvement are sufficiently high and prospects for preserving Soviet interest unpromising, as in Afghanistan, Moscow is willing to cut its losses and pull out. The Soviet Union also appears to be pressing its clients to improve their economic performance through internal reform and to diversify their external economic relations, so as to be less dependent on the USSR.

Forgoing new opportunities and seeking to utilize a diplomacy of "political settlement" to reduce Soviet exposure relate in some measure to a turnover in key persons supervising Soviet policy toward the Third World. First, ideologues such as Boris Ponomarev and Rostislav Ul'yanovskiy were replaced in the Central Committee's International Department (ID) by professional diplomats Anatoliy Dobrynin and Georgiy Korniyenko—

[3]I owe the distinction between acquisition goals and denial goals to George Breslauer.

[4]For a discussion of the ups and downs of Soviet policy in the Third World, see S. Neil MacFarlane, *Superpower Rivalry and Third World Radicalism: The Idea of National Liberation*, Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 132–41. Many scholars have pointed to the cyclical pattern of activism and quiescence in Soviet policy in the Third World, among them E. H. Carr, Roger Kanet, Robert Legvold, and, most recently, Francis Fukuyama.

The danger, of course, with an excessive predisposition toward cyclical interpretation is that it may underemphasize or miss altogether longer-term secular trends in Soviet international behavior.

[5]The present Soviet leadership appears to be placing a lower priority on Third World issues than did its predecessors. For example, compare the attention given to Third World issues in the reports of Leonid Brezhnev to the 26th (1981) Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and of Mikhail Gorbachev to the 27th (1986) CPSU Congress. *Pravda* (Moscow), Feb. 24, 1981, and ibid., Feb. 26, 1986.

On the recent period, see Francis Fukuyama, *Moscow's Post-Brezhnev Reassessment of the Third World*, Santa Monica, CA, RAND, 1988, pp. 1–91; and idem, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October, 1987, pp. 1–13. See also Elizabeth K. Valkenier, *The USSR and the Third World: An Economic Bind*, New York, Praeger, 1983; and Jerry F. Hough, *The Struggle for the Third World*, Washington, DC, Brookings, 1986.

[6]Growing Soviet sensitivity to the relationship between behavior in the Third World and the state of the central relationship between the superpowers is evident in recent Soviet examinations of what went wrong in the 1970's. Thus, one analyst has written: "Was it possible to avoid such a strong worsening of tension in Soviet-Western relations in the late 1970's and early 1980's? Without a doubt, yes. In our view, the crisis was provoked mainly by the miscalculations and incompetent approach of the Brezhnev leadership in the solution of foreign policy tasks . . . . In our political, military, and diplomatic involvement in regional conflicts, we ignored their influence on détente between the USSR and the West and on the entire system of their relations." See Vyacheslav Dashichev, "East-West—The Search for New Relations," *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (Moscow), May 18, 1988, p. 14. For a similar assessment, see A. Kolosovskiy, "Regional Conflicts and Global Security," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow—hereafter, *MEiMO*), No. 6, 1988, pp. 32–33.

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individuals whose career experience suggests considerable sensitivity to the effects of Soviet Third World policy on Moscow's relations with the United States. Second, the authority of the ID in formulating foreign policy was considerably reduced in September 1988, when the department was subordinated to the new International Policy Commission, headed by Aleksandr Yakovlev, a man not known for radicalism on Third World issues.[7]

A number of additional factors have contributed to the current shift in Soviet Third World policy. Domestically, the Soviet leadership faces slow economic growth and the consequent difficulty of maintaining even essential investment, such as that needed for modernization of the Soviet industrial base and military establishment, let alone sustaining comparatively expensive luxuries, such as the support of Cuba, Vietnam, and—to a lesser extent—Angola and Ethiopia. Externally, the reassertion of American power on the periphery—both in the direct use of force, as in the Persian Gulf, Libya, Lebanon, and Grenada, and in covert and not so covert support of insurgencies directed against Soviet clients, as in Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua—altered the relative weights of risk, cost, and benefit faced by Soviet policy-makers in pursuing activism in the Third World and their assumptions about the durability of gains there.

Moreover, Moscow's concrete experiences in the Third World have increasingly called into question the more optimistic ideological formulations that have motivated Soviet policy. From the radical nationalists such as Ahmed Ben Bella, Gamel abdul-Nasser, Abdul Karim Kassem, and Kwame Nkrumah, who were courted by Nikita Khrushchev (with few long-term benefits), the USSR shifted its focus to ideologically orthodox communist regimes (e.g., Cuba and Vietnam) and vanguard party regimes leading states of so-called socialist orientation (e.g., Laos, Cambodia, South Yemen, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique, and with some qualification, Nicaragua and Grenada). However, many such regimes have proven to be chronically unstable and incapable of resolving internal security problems. Others, such as Cuba and Vietnam, have mired themselves in foreign military adventures with little prospect of success. Their economies, meanwhile, are generally in disastrous shape, partly as a result of mismanagement and partly owing to disproportionate security costs. The costs of empire are growing while, as noted above, the capacity of the USSR to bear them is not. And the USSR appears to be gaining little from paying these costs.

By contrast, it is in the areas of limiting Western influence, establishing the Soviet right to a role in Third World politics, and securing concrete material benefits through the manipulation of traditional levers of foreign policy (arms transfers, trade, aid, and diplomacy) that the most obvious and possibly durable Soviet successes have been attained. Soviet influence over India may be limited, and Soviet control negligible, but cooperation with that country has made the USSR a recognized and important regional player in South Asia and has facilitated the expression of Soviet policy in such fora as the Nonaligned Movement. It has also arguably reduced the level of Western—particularly, American—influence in the region. This is perhaps not much of a return on a 30-year Soviet investment. But the balance sheet is arguably more positive than is that of Soviet relations with radical movements and regimes over the same period. The Soviets, at least, appear to judge matters this way. Since Gorbachev's accession to power, they have tripled the total credits extended to India and have cited Soviet relations with India as a model for Soviet policy in the Third World as a whole.[8]

Focus on Africa

It is somewhat artifical to talk about *the* Soviet perspective on regional issues in the Third World. The specialist literature, authoritative pronouncements by party and foreign ministry officials, party publications, and official statements of the Soviet telegraph agency, TASS, reflect a reasonably broad diversity of opinion, and to ignore this is to distort reality.[9] Nonetheless, it is possible to identify dominant tendencies at any point in time.[10] Developments in Africa figured strongly in the former Soviet enthusiasm for an activist Third World policy founded upon support of vanguard parties, states of socialist orientation, non-capitalist development, and proletarian internationalism.

At the height of Soviet activism, in 1975–78, the prevailing Soviet perspective on Africa was that trends there favored expansion of socialism at the expense of imperialism. Witnessing the Ethiopian revolution, the

[7]For a characterization of Yakovlev's views on the Third World, see Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," loc. cit., p. 6.

[8]These developments are covered more fully in S. Neil MacFarlane, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Policy in the Third World under Gorbachev," Harriman Institute Forum, No. 3, 1988. See also Fukuyama, "Patterns of Soviet Third World Policy," loc. cit.

[9]For a comprehensive discussion if this diversity see the article by David Albright, "The USSR and the Third World in the 1980's," in this same issue.

[10]See Franklyn Griffiths, "The Sources of American Conduct," *International Security* (Cambridge, MA), Fall 1984, pp. 3–50.

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collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Southern Africa, the growing difficulties of the Smith regime in Rhodesia, the rising violence (e.g., the Soweto Uprising) in South Africa, and growth in the number of states of socialist orientation headed by vanguard parties (the Congo, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Madagascar, Sao Tome e Principe, and Benin)—most Soviet observers "were carried away on a wave of optimism."[11]

Soviet observers judged that in many cases, local petit bourgeois intellectuals would be capable—relying on the support of a growing and increasingly class-conscious proletariat and a sympathetic peasantry internally and on the socialist camp externally—of taking states of socialist orientation along the path of non-capitalist development.[12] In areas where these forces were not yet sufficiently strong to take the reins of power, the same role could be played by the military, whose progressive integrative and patriotic role in African polities was underlined.[13] Obstacles to the vanguard party model such as ethnicity, religious traditions, and the role of kinship groupings in traditional African politics and society were seen, not as serious problems, but as survivals of a past already well on the way to oblivion.

In the prevailing Soviet view, "scientific socialism"—with its focus on the role of the public sector in agricultural and industrial development, on heavy industry as a motor of the development process, and on nationalization of private property—provided a theoretical and practical basis for political, social, and economic development in Africa.[14] By contrast, capitalist orientation and reliance on aid from and trade with the imperialist states was a recipe for neo-colonial dependence and stagnation. According to this view, the USSR and the socialist camp could fill the role hitherto played by international capital in the external economic relations and internal economic development of the African states.[15]

Beyond an economic role, the USSR showed itself willing to assume substantial military responsibilities in the region as well. Commentaries from the mid-1970's frequently refer to Soviet military assistance to new socialist-oriented states and to national liberation movements that were continuing the struggle against colonialism and neo-colonialism in Southern Africa. Some even suggested a willingness to assume a direct military role in the defense of such states against external aggression.[16] Similar commitments were implicit in the various treaties of friendship and cooperation signed with states of socialist orientation (e.g., Angola and Ethiopia), which included clauses providing for consultation and coordinated response in the event of a threat to the security of either party.[17]

This munificence was related to the Soviet assessments of the sources of conflict in Africa and of how conflict in Africa affected the central relationship between the USSR and the US. With regard to the first, the Soviets tended to see local conflict in Africa as a product not of deep, sustained contradictions within African societies, but of interference on the part of international imperialism.[18] Given its assumption that the position of imperialism in Africa was inexorably deteriorating, this assessment led to an underestimation of the complexity and hence protracted nature of civil and interstate conflict in the African region.

With regard to US-Soviet relations, the dominant Soviet view was that although conflict in Africa was both a product and a manifestation of the global struggle between capitalism and socialism, there was no linkage between this peripheral competition and the conduct of the central relationship between the superpowers. Whatever was going on in Africa or elsewhere in the Third World, both sides had a concrete interest in arms

[11]From a personal conversation with a Soviet scholar. An example is Ye. Tarabrin, "Africa at a New Stage in the Liberation Struggle," *MEiMO*, No. 2, 1979, pp. 37, 38, and passim.

[12]The path of socialist orientation refers to the broad array of policies in the political, economic, social, and cultural areas designed to prepare for the transition to socialism. The non-capitalist path of development generally refers more narrowly to policy in the economic sphere. Some authors, however, (e.g., R. Ul'yanovskiy) have used the terms synonymously.

[13]See, for example, V. S. Yag'ya, "Revolutionary Changes in Ethiopia," *Narody Azii i Afriki* (Moscow), No. 6, 1975, pp. 17–18; V. Ya. Katsman and V. V. Pavlova, "Tendencies in the Development of Countries of Socialist Orientation in Africa," ibid., No. 4, 1975, p. 216; Yu. Irkhin, "Ethiopia on the Path of Socialist Orientation," *Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil* (Moscow—hereafter, *KVS*), No. 2, 1979, pp. 81–85. This enthusiasm was not, however, universal. See V. Yordanskiy's criticism of Z. Gafurov's positive treatment of the Third World's military in *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1976, p. 161.

[14]See V. Solodovnikov, "Africa—A New Stage in the Struggle," *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn'* (Moscow—hereafter, *MZ*), No. 4, 1976, p. 133; V. Korovikov, "What's New in Ancient Ethiopia," *MZ*, No. 2, 1977, p. 127; Ye. Tarabrin, "Africa: The Liberation Struggle and the Intrigues of Imperialism," *MEiMO*, No. 6, 1980, p. 69; A. A. Gromyko, "Africa in World Development and Problems of Soviet Africanists," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 3, 1980, pp. 7–9.

[15]See V. V. Vinnik, "Neo-colonialism in the Agriculture of the Ivory Coast," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 4, 1975, pp. 142–43; S. Balashov, "Tendencies in the Development of Kenya's Economy," *MEiMO*, No. 3, 1978, pp. 121–22; Tarabrin "Africa at a New Stage in the Liberation Struggle," loc. cit., pp. 44–45; N. Gavrilov, "The Face of Africa Is Changing," *MZ*, No. 6, 1980, p. 40.

The Soviets pointed to the experience in development of peripheral regions of the USSR as a model for development in Africa. See, for example, A. A. Gromyko, "The Imperialist Threat to the Countries of Africa," *MZ*, No. 6, 1981, p. 43.

[16]See A. Orlov, "The Armed Struggle of the Peoples of Africa," *Voyenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal* (Moscow), No. 12, 1975, pp. 110–11.

[17]For a text of the Soviet-Angolan Treaty, see *Pravda*, Oct. 9, 1976, pp. 1–2. The treaty is translated in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Oct. 12, 1976, pp. H/1–4. See, in particular, Article 7.

[18]A. Koshelev, "A Country of a Young Revolution," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 6, 1978, pp. 112–13; Tarabrin, "Africa at a New Stage in the Liberation Struggle," loc. cit., p. 74; Yu. Gavrilov, "Angola: Standing Up for Independence," *MZ*, No. 2, 1976, pp. 129–31; S. Borisov, "Africa in the Strategic Schemes of Imperialism," *KVS*, No. 13, 1980, p. 79.

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control, economic exchange, and the stabilization of the European theater. As such, questions of détente between states could be dissociated from questions of class struggle (of which Soviet support for the revolutionary process in Africa was a part).[19] This implied that the potential costs of forward military policies in Africa were lower than they might otherwise be or, in fact, actually were.

Since the mid-1970's, much has changed in Soviet perspectives on African politics. In part, this evolution has been a manifestation of the broader trends in Soviet Third World policy noted above. However, it has also reflected the Soviet Union's accumulated experience of maintaining relations with specific states of socialist orientation and with "Marxist" national liberation movements on the African continent. Indeed, this experience may have itself contributed to the overall evolution of Soviet thinking on relations with the Third World.

For one thing, the Soviets have learned from their experience in Africa that the vanguard party model of political organization is not particularly appropriate in African states facing serious ethnic division, regional disparities, and low levels of politicization of the very groups that the party purportedly depends on. Efforts at controlled political mobilization have largely failed owing not to only to a lack of political expertise, but also to high levels of apathy, if not hostility, toward party workers who challenge traditional political and social structures. Ethnic and regional insurgencies that have plagued the revolutionary regimes of Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique show little sign of dissipating. Although external assistance has unquestionably played a role in sustaining insurgencies against Soviet friends in these countries, the conflicts in at least Angola and Ethiopia seem to stem from deep indigenous roots and hence to belie the orthodox Soviet interpretation of them as the product of imperialist meddling.

Moreover, the supposedly democratic centralist vanguard parties have been riven with factional disputes—the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) being the most notable example. In effect, there is a very broad gap between the theory and practice of political organization in the African socialist states, which has led many to question the applicability of scientific socialism to Africa.[20]

The economic performance of states attempting to implement the non-capitalist agenda through large-scale nationalization and central planning has hardly matched the rosy predictions of their Soviet and East European advisers. And although chronic internal insecurity has played a role, even Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos acknowledged last August—in a speech announcing widespread economic reform—that the poor results also stem from mismanagement and bureaucratization.[21] Meanwhile, several "national democratic states" (e.g., Guinea, Zambia, and to some degree, Tanzania) have begun to pull back from the more extreme of their experiments with socialism and to expand the roles of the private sector and of foreign enterprise in their national economies.

The "international socialist division of labor" has proven no substitute for the international capitalist economy. Soviet and East European policy-makers have realized that they do not have the resources to subsidize the economic development of their African allies (hence the refusal of the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance to admit Mozambique in 1981). Disillusioned with the quantity and quality of Soviet developmental assistance, Mozambique and other states have turned to the West for assistance. In 1985, Ethiopia had to rely on Western donors for famine relief because the USSR was either unable or unwilling to provide substantial food assistance. Moreover, Soviet trade relations with its African allies have often been exploitative, fishing agreements being the most notable example,[22] and both Cuba and the Soviet Union drained the Angolan treasury of foreign exchange to pay for military operations there.[23]

[19]See L. Brezhnev, "Report to the Central Committee and the Party's Immediate Tasks in the Fields of Domestic and Foreign Policy," *Pravda*, Feb. 25, 1976, as translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (Columbus, OH), Mar. 24, 1976, p. 14; Yu. Alimov, "Recidivists of Colonialism," *Kommunist*, No. 9, 1978, p. 109; S. Madzoyevskiy, "The South African Junction of World Politics," *MEiMO*, No. 7, 1977, p. 20.

More generally, see S. N. MacFarlane, "The Soviet Conception of Regional Security," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), April 1985, pp.302–04; and S. N. MacFarlane, *The USSR and Arms Control: The Soviet View of Linkage*, Ottawa, Canadian Centre for Arms Control and Disarmament, 1987, passim.

[20]For an early commentary along these lines, see Kenneth Jowitt, "Scientific Socialist Regimes in Africa: Political Differentiation, Avoidance, and Unawareness," in Carl Rosberg and Thomas Callaghy, Eds., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa*, Berkeley, CA, Institute of International Studies, 1979, p. 133. Jowitt begins his discussion with this comment: "Currently there are a number of self-designated 'scientific socialist' and 'Marxist-Leninist' regimes in Africa. Their most striking feature is the absence of ideological commitments, developmental strategies, and institutional developments consistent with their formal identity." Although this statement is somewhat exaggerated, it is perhaps significant that it meets with wide agreement in Moscow today.

[21]Luanda Domestic Service in Portuguese, *FBIS-AFR*, Aug. 19, 1987, p. D/1.

[22]On the fishing question in Soviet-Angolan relations, see John Marcum, "Angola: A Quarter Century of War," *CSIS Africa Notes* (Washington, DC), Dec. 21, 1984, p. 2.

[23]By 1987, the war absorbed over half the Angolan budget. *Strategic Survey 1986–87*, London, IISS, 1987, p. 190. See also, Colin Legum, Ed., *Africa Contemporary Record 1982–83*, New York, Holmes and Meier, 1984, pp. 593–94, 605–06.

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A Soviet-type Mi–25 helicopter gunship prepares for take-off near Cuito Cuanavale in 1988.

—Camera Press.

In the meantime, the Angolans in particular have learned that the only significant producers of capital resources in their country are the much vilified Western multinational corporations. It has been oil revenue generated by the likes of Gulf and, subsequently, Chevron that has allowed the Angolans to prosecute their civil conflict for a decade without incurring substantial debt to the USSR and Cuba for security assistance.

In contrast to the sorry record in the socialist-oriented states, real growth did appear to be occurring, if haltingly and in a somewhat distorted fashion, in states such as Kenya, the Ivory Coast, and, with some qualifications, Nigeria, which had eschewed socialist or quasi-socialist strategies of development, preferring instead close involvement with the international capitalist economy and the stimulation of an indigenous private sector.

Hence, the socialist orientation as originally conceived by the Soviets and their African interlocutors has proven to be a recipe, not for political stability, civil peace, and rapid, balanced, independent growth, but for poverty, civil strife, and continuing neo-colonial dependency. And this has occurred at considerable and growing cost to the USSR, in a setting where Moscow's local clients have little of value that could be hauled away.

The Soviets have also learned from their African experience that the imperialist states were still capable of reasonably effective defense of allied regimes in Africa. Since the late 1970's, the French, in particular, have repeatedly demonstrated (in Shaba, in the Central African Republic, and, increasingly, in Chad) a willingness to defend their own (and, by extension, Western) interests in Francophone Africa. In both the Shaban and Chadian cases, the United States provided considerable and crucial logistical support, suggesting that earlier assessments of American impotence were premature. The capacity of the French and the United States to involve sympathetic African states (e.g., Morocco, Zaire, and Senegal) in operations of this type has indicated to Moscow that undifferentiated appraisals of the anti-imperialist character of the African community as a whole[24] were questionable.

Even where further advances have been registered in the process of liberation in Southern Africa, as in Zimbabwe, the results have not been to Soviet liking. In the Zimbabwean case, the British engineered a negotiated settlement that resulted in the victory of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) in free elections and consigned the USSR's favored candidate—the Zimba-

[24]Ye. Tarabrin, "The Developing World in the International Arena," *MZ*, No. 9, 1975, p. 137; V. Vinogradov, "Africa: The Eradication of Racism—The Most Important Task," *MZ*, No. 8, 1976, p. 130; Tarabrin, "Africa: The Liberation Struggle and the Intrigues of Imperialism," loc. cit., pp. 37, 38, 40.

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bwe African People's Union (ZAPU)—to a secondary role in Zimbabwean politics.

Finally, the Soviets have learned that the gains made through Moscow's military support of revolutionary movements and regimes have carried substantial costs in the central relationship between the USSR and the US. The historical record suggests that Soviet "expansionism" in the Third World affected the American leadership's perceptions of the desirability of détente and influenced American domestic politics in such a way as to make the advocacy of détente costly to its proponents.

In light of ample evidence from the region to suggest that the rigid ideological perspective of the USSR on Africa characteristic of the mid-1970's was inadequate as a guide to action in the region, Soviet Africanists have begun a thorough critical reevaluation of most if not all of those earlier postulates.[25] Optimistic assessments gave way to statements of concern about the resurgence of imperialism and the substantial and growing Western military presence in the region. Although such expressions of alarm were already heard during the Shaba interventions of 1977–78,[26] these grew in urgency in the early 1980's with the growth and success of French and South African military activity against what the Soviets construed to be progressive forces in Africa and with the expansion of the American military presence on the Indian Ocean littoral associated with the Rapid Deployment Force. By the mid-1980's, Soviet literature on Africa gave little impression of confidence that trends in the region were moving in the Soviet direction.

Not only was the path of socialist orientation judged by the Soviets to be considerably more rocky than anticipated, but it was even found to be reversible. The vanguard parties were criticized for the unscientific, subjective, and idealistic character of their approach to the task, and for a potentially fatal inability to mobilize the masses in their support. The factionalism that plagued their internal politics was also criticized.[27] Soviet commentators also took more heed of the obstacles to the transition to socialist development represented by traditional modalities of social and economic organization in African states, and their ideological reflection in religion and tribalism.[28] Creation of a monopoly of political power in the hands of a centralized single party came to be viewed as an ideal for the distant future, and the stress turned to advocacy of more cautious efforts to win over the less enthusiastic parts of African societies through policies of ethnic reconciliation, regional autonomy, and the construction of broad national fronts.[29]

Some authors even concluded that the trend in African politics was toward expansion of capitalist rather than of non-capitalist structures and relations of production. Local governments were advised to be cautious about or even, in certain cases, to reverse policies of nationalization. The national bourgeoisie and private sector were rediscovered as sources of national economic development, and even foreign direct investment and participation in world trade—if properly controlled—was seen as providing a potential boost to the development process. In a word, dissociation from the Western-dominated international capitalist economy was not a viable course for Africans.[30] The USSR itself was in no position to fully fund the development of its Third World allies.[31]

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[25]This reformulation has been accompanied by trenchant critiques of Soviet African studies for ignorance of the region, for a tendency to apply concepts developed for the analysis of European society to the much different conditions of Africa, and for uncritical and simplistic optimism regarding prospects for political, social, and economic development in the region. See, inter alia, Boris Asoyan "Africa: It's Really Not That Distant," *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, Nov. 7, 1987, p. 14; and idem, "Half-Truth? Half-Lie!" ibid., July 6, 1988, p. 14.

Asoyan is a high foreign ministry official with responsibilities for Southern Africa. He recently served as chargé d'affaires in Lesotho, a position of considerable importance in the context of Soviet attempts to improve intelligence from and communication with South Africa (see below).

[26]See Alimov, loc. cit., pp. 109, 114; Borisov, loc. cit., p. 79; V. Smirnov, "A Movement of Solidarity: Forum in Addis Ababa," *MZ*, No. 9, 1978, p. 124.

[27]A. A. Gromyko and G. Starushenko, "Urgent Questions in the Development of Africa," *Kommunist*, No. 2, 1980, p. 119; Irkhin, loc. cit., p. 83; Yu. Sumbantyan, "Thresholds of Struggle and Creation," *KVS*, No. 16, 1984, p. 84; Yu. Gavrilov, "Problems in the Formation of a Vanguard Party in Countries of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 6, 1980, pp. 12–13, and passim; Yu. Osipov and Yu. Cherkasov, "Socio-economic Problems and Prospects for the Development of Africa," *MEiMO*, No. 8, 1985, pp. 56, 69–70. These last authors criticize previous Soviet uncritical optimism vis-à-vis socialist orientation and non-capitalist development in Africa, a point also often made privately by Soviet Africanists. For more general analyses, see V. Vasiliyev, "Some Questions of Socialist Orientation," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 5, 1986, pp. 16–17, 20; and A. Vasiliyev, "The Liberated Countries: The Realities and Paradoxes of Development," *Kommunist*, No. 6, 1988, pp. 117–18, 119–20.

[28]V. Yordanskiy, "Tropical Africa: The Dynamics of National Self-Consciousness," *MEiMO*, No. 1, 1980, pp. 111–21; V. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., p. 17; A. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., pp. 121–22.

The Soviet approach to the Third World has generally suffered from an underestimation of the significance of traditional, non-class factors in developing societies. On this point, see G. Mirskiy, "On the Question of the Developing Countries' Selection of Their Path and Orientation," *MEiMO*, No. 5, 1987, p. 71. See also S. Tikhvinskiy's critique of Soviet historiography, and in particular its inattention to religion as a social force, in "Some Questions About the Work of Soviet Historians," *Voprosy Istorii* (Moscow), No. 12, 1986, p. 6.

[29]For example, V. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., p. 19.

[30]G. Smirnov, "Peculiarities of the Processes of Reproduction in the Liberated Countries of Africa," *MEiMO*, No. 7, 1986, p. 129; A. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., pp. 119–21; Mirskiy, loc. cit., pp. 72, 76, 80; Yu. Fedorov, "The Ivory Coast," *MZ*, No. 8, 1986, pp. 151–12. These findings with regard to Africa confirm Elizabeth Valkenier's more general discussion of Soviet attitudes on economic development (op. cit.).

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Today, it appears that Moscow is redefining its role in the Third World in the field of national security as well. Soviet scholars now emphasize that the principal responsibility for defending a revolution lies with the revolution itself.[32] This new approach suggests some reassessment by Moscow of the difficulties of consolidating and defending African revolutions, and of the potential costs of getting involved in such a process.[33] This is combined with a reasonably clear reassessment of the costs that Soviet military actions in the Third World have for relations with the United States and its allies at a time when these relations have become particularly significant for Soviet policy-makers.[34]

Armed with a more realistic appraisal of what is possible in Africa and of the costs of pursuing one or another goal, Moscow has arguably drawn back from the activism that characterized its relations with in the continent in the second half of the 1970's.

Moscow and Southern African Security in the 1970's

The evolution of the Soviet discussion of Southern African security in the 1970's parallels rather closely the general trends noted above, but it was also strongly influenced by events specific to the sub-region. In analyzing this evolution, I shall focus on three areas of Soviet discussion: the prospects for liberation struggles in Southern Africa; the role of the West in the politics of the area; and the Soviet approach to conflict resolution.

Regarding liberation struggles, Soviet authors of the 1970's found considerable grounds for optimism in the collapse of the Portuguese Empire and the incapacity of the United States and its alleged local proxy, South Africa, to prevent the establishment of states of socialist orientation in its place in Angola and Mozambique. These developments were seen by the authors as symptomatic of a dramatic deterioration in the position of imperialism, and as auguring well for the future resolution on terms favorable to the Soviet Union of the area's continuing security problems—notably the fate of the revolutionary process in Namibia and South Africa itself.[35] The heating up of the war in Zimbabwe, in which a movement—ZAPU—closely associated with the USSR was playing a significant part, seemed to confirm the prospect of a decline in Western influence in Southern Africa.

Evidence of South African interest in stabilizing its position in the region through a process of dialogue with its neighbors was interpreted by Soviet authors as a sign of weakness. Pretoria's temporary cooperation with the United Nations in the attempt to resolve the Namibian question in 1977–78 was also perceived to be evidence of a lack of staying power on the part of the only remaining significant outpost of imperialism and reaction in Southern Africa.[36]

The internal security of Angola was not initially a focus of discussion for the Soviets, because in the early years after independence, there was not a great deal of activity on the part of the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the remnants of the National Liberation Front of Angola (FNLA). Nor did Moscow's collaborators Cuba and Angola show much concern about the possibility of renewed South African military activity, judging from the alacrity with which the Angolans—presumably with Soviet approval—established ANC training camps within Angola and granted sanctuaries in Southern Angola to SWAPO guerrillas operating into Namibia.[37] Presumably, Soviet optimism concerning states of socialist orientation extended to Angola and Mozambique, although there was little specific comment in Soviet journals about pursuit of this path by these two Southern African states.[38]

The Soweto Uprising and associated disorders within South Africa were seen as a product of the success of liberation movements elsewhere in the region and suggested to Soviet observers that the apartheid re-

[31]This position, first enunciated by the late General Secretary Yuriy Andropov, is enshrined in the "The CPSU Party Program." See *Pravda*, Mar. 7, 1986, as translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Mar. 10, 1986, p. O/3; also, V. Vasiliyev, loc. cit., p. 21.

[32]This line of argument began to appear after the successful Western intervention in Shaba. See, for example, Alimov, loc. cit., p. 115. As shall be seen below, in specific instances (e.g., Angola in 1986–87) where client regimes are clearly threatened by a hostile power, Soviet statements of support have continued to be rather explicit.

[33]In this reassessment of prospects in Africa, some Soviet analysts have questioned the applicability of the Soviet model, or in some cases, even Marxism-Leninism itself to the problems of political and economic development. See Mirskiy, loc. cit., p. 71.

[34]See fn. 6 above.

[35]I. Neklessa, "Liquidating the Remnants of the Colonial System," *MZ*, No. 3, 1975, p. 44; A. Tamarin, "Calculations and Miscalculations of Imperialists in Africa," *Kommunist*, No. 18, 1976, pp. 96–97.

[36]B. Fetisov, "Namibia: The Colonizers Are Stubborn," *MZ*, No. 7, 1975, p. 131; A. Boretskiy, "Namibia," *MZ*, No. 6, 1978, pp. 127–28.

[37]See John Marcum, "Angola," *Survival* (London), No. 1, 1988, pp. 5–6.

[38]This may relate to the fact that Soviet links to FRELIMO in Mozambique had been strained in the pre-liberation period by the close ties of that liberation movement to China. In the Angolan case, it may suggest the continuing effects of problems in the Soviet relationship with the MPLA dating to the early 1970's—when the USSR ceased its support to Agostinho Neto's faction—and the movement's continuing problem of disunity typified by the Nito Alves coup in 1977. Reported Soviet acquiescence in or support of the coup—if true—presumably reflected Soviet reservations about the reliability and effectiveness of Neto.

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Sam Nujoma, President of the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) during an October 25, 1984, press conference at the USSR Foreign Ministry in Moscow.

—TASS from Sovfoto.

gime was weakening internally.[39] Although Soviet scholars expressed reservations about the apparently racist quality of Black Consciousness—a major ideological current underlying the events of the period in South Africa—the upsurge of popular unrest served the purposes of the revolution nonetheless and was perceived in highly positive terms.[40] The ANC was seen as the leading force or vanguard of South African revolution,[41] a force that, like the MPLA in Angola and FRELIMO (Front for the Liberation of Mozambique) in Mozambique, would lead a new South Africa along a path of socialist orientation.

Soviet scholars all but denied the prospect of reform in South Africa, given the perceived monolithic reactionary stance of the ruling Afrikaners. Under these conditions, Soviet observers saw violent revolution and the complete destruction of the apartheid system as necessary preconditions of liberation there.[42] This emphasis on the dismantlement of—rather than negotiation with—the regime arguably suggested a Soviet belief in the imminence of significant revolutionary change. Consequently, they apparently saw no need to broaden the ANC's organizational base through collaboration with less radical opposition groups; it would suffice for the ANC to stick to links with its close comrade-in-arms, the South African Communist Party.

Likewise, Namibia was perceived as a land to be liberated by the vanguard of the revolution—SWAPO—with gun in hand, a liberation that was expected to serve as a basis for transition to the path of socialist orientation. Other potential collaborators were largely ignored, and Soviet writers seemed convinced that the only way the South African government could be brought to accept independence for that territory was through violence.[43] Confident in the ability of SWAPO to make the revolution and in the limited capacity of South Africa to prevent it, the Soviet Union had little interest in efforts at conflict resolution.

How did the Soviets view the role of the West in the area (an important subject given the efforts of the Contact Group—the US, Canada, Great Britain, France and West Germany—from the mid-1970's seeking to achieve Namibian independence, Anglo-American initiatives on Zimbabwe, and the initiative of American diplomat Chester Crocker on Angola and Namibia)? During the late 1970's and much of the early 1980's, Soviet writers viewed the West monolithically, making few distinctions among the policies of France, Britain, the United States, and West Germany. In political terms, the objectives of the Western states were viewed as more or less identical and strongly informed by the global struggle between the socialist and capitalist world systems. In Southern Africa, Western nations were thought to be intent on slowing or reversing the revolutionary process, with a view to retaining access to raw materials, ensuring the continuing neo-colonial dependency of the independent states of the region, and protecting investments in South Africa itself. Although it was accepted that Western states occasionally competed in investment, marketing, and the quest for access to scarce resources, on the fundamental issues of holding back the process of liberation and prevent-

[39][Yusuf Dadoo], "Overseas Guests Speak," *Kommunist*, No. 8, 1976, p. 80; V. Gorodnov, "The Republic of South Africa: Deepening of the Crisis and Sharpening of the Struggle," *MEiMO*, No. 4, 1977, pp. 122–28.

[40]On Black Consciousness, see A. Makarov, " 'Black Consciousness' and the Liberation Movement in South Africa," *Narody Azii i Afriki*, No. 2, 1975, pp. 34–35, 37–38; A. B. Davidson, "Whither South Africa?" ibid., No. 2, 1978, pp. 15–17.

[41]K. Mikhaylov,"The Republic of South Africa," *MZ*, No. 6, 1978, p. 152.

[42]Dadoo, loc. cit., p. 80; V. Kremenyuk, "In the Name of National Liberation," *MEiMO*, No. 9, 1976, p. 143.

[43]"The People of Namibia Carry on the Struggle," *KVS*, No. 3, 1978, p. 85; A. Kiselev, "The Peoples of Namibia in the Struggle Against Racist Regimes," ibid., No. 23, 1979, p. 84; Tarabrin, "Africa: The Liberation Struggle and the Intrigues of Imperialism," p. 46.

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ing Soviet access to the region, they were thought to be at one.

There is little evidence in Soviet commentary on the international relations of the region that Moscow recognized differences between South Africa and the Western powers on basic political issues. The South Africans were labeled the local agent of the imperialist powers in the efforts of the latter to sustain their position. Western policies apparently directed against South Africa (e.g., the arms embargo and, later, economic sanctions) were either dismissed as subterfuges designed to mask the essential Western–South African entente, or else were viewed as reluctant and basically insubstantial cosmetic responses to overwhelming international antipathy toward apartheid.[44]

Moscow apparently saw little prospect, or need, for multilateral efforts at resolving conflicts in the region, and Soviet observers criticized Western efforts to this end.[45] In Angola, the problem seemed to be one of mopping up after the MPLA victory. In Namibia, there seemed little likelihood of South African or Western negotiations.[46] Soviet commentators were also consistently critical of efforts at a negotiated settlement during the period leading up to the Lancaster House Agreement on Rhodesia and came around to support the outcome only after the talks had been concluded.[47]

Lessons of Experience

Developments in Southern Africa proved Soviet analysis and prognosis regarding Southern African security deficient on a number of counts. First, the reappearance of UNITA after retraining by South African forces in Namibia, the movement's reasonably rapid success in establishing a secure base area in southeastern Angola under South African air cover, and the resulting deterioration of the internal security situation in southern and central Angola drew into question the previous confidence of the Angolans and their Soviet patrons concerning the durability of the MPLA victory. Repeated South African incursions into southwestern Angola—ostensibly in retaliation for SWAPO raids launched from Angola into Namibia—and the establishment by South Africa of a security zone along the Namibian frontier inside Angola reinforced this impression.

Matters were still worse in Mozambique, where the South African–supported Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) succeeded in the early 1980's in contesting FRELIMO control over increasingly large sections of the countryside and seriously damaging Mozambican infrastructure and agricultural production. There was, finally, evidence to suggest that elements of the South African security establishment were involved in efforts to destabilize Zimbabwe.[48]

These developments highlighted a more significant Soviet misjudgment—an underestimation of the continuing and growing military strength of South Africa and of Pretoria's willingness to use it. South Africa's military forces went through a period of rapid expansion during the late 1970's and early 1980's, to the point where they exceeded both qualitatively and quantitatively the combined forces of the frontline states. In 1983, for example, South Africa's total mobilizable strength (404,500) was almost four times the size of its neighbors' combined armed forces. Its military expenditures came close to exceeding that of the frontline states by a factor of two. It had 180 more combat aircraft than its neighbors together and also had a greater number of main battle tanks than the other countries of the region combined.[49]

Much of this armament came from an impressive indigenous defense industry centered on the publicly-run Armaments Corporation. The republic attained self-sufficiency in the production of small arms and small-arms ammunition. It produced its own armored cars and armored personnel carriers in considerable quantities, and helicopters and jets under license, and it benefited from substantial cooperation with Israel in the production of small missile systems. Some experts have favorably compared South African–produced systems with similar systems produced in the major arms producing countries.[50] This development not only defeated the intent of the 1977 UN-sponsored arms embargo, but greatly reduced South African vulnerability to external sanctions on arms transfers.

In the 1980's, South Africa deployed these forces in a wide array of situations in neighboring states. Opera-

[44]See Yu. Bochkarev and G. Starushenko's review of A. Urnov, *Politika YuAR v Afrike* (The Policy of the UAR in Africa), Moscow, Nauka, 1982, in *Kommunist*, No. 5, 1983, p. 128; Kiselev, loc. cit., pp. 82–83; Tarabrin, "Africa in the Global Strategy of Imperialism," *MEiMO*, No. 2, 1982, p. 30.

[45]See, for example, A. Klimov, "Changes in the Political Map and the Maneuvers of the Racists," *MZ*, No. 5, 1975, pp. 152–54; R. Vasiliyev, "The Old Fetters of the 'New Politics'," *MZ*, No. 11, 1976, pp. 127–28; A. Runov, "The Agony of a Racist Regime," ibid., No. 12, 1976, p. 76.

[46]See Solodovnikov, loc. cit., p. 135.

[47]V. Mikhin, "Rhodesia: The Struggle Against Racism Goes On," *MZ*, No. 10, 1979, p. 124.

[48]See Jennifer Whitaker, "Pretoria's Wars," *The New York Times*, Jan. 21, 1983; and Colin Legum, "The Southern African Crisis," Legum, op. cit., pp. 19–20.

[49]Data derived from *The Military Balance 1983–84*, London, IISS, 1983. This imbalance has eroded somewhat since 1983 as a result of the massive buildup of the Angolan armed forces by the Soviets.

[50]See the analysis of Bernard Trainor in *The New York Times*, Aug. 25, 1988.

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tions in Angola, already noted, grew to considerable proportions, involving direct confrontation with the bulk of the Angolan armed forces in the air and on the ground in 1985–87. There were also South African commando raids into Zambia, Mozambique, and Lesotho, and air raids into Mozambique. Meanwhile, South African counterinsurgency efforts in Namibia had succeeded by 1987 in containing SWAPO incursions to a rather narrow strip along the Angolan frontier.[51]

Moscow also underestimated the ability of the South Africans to contain, with relative ease it turned out, the internal disorders of the mid-1970's and restore a degree of stability that lasted into the early 1980's. True, the constitutional reform of 1983 that granted limited political power to the colored and Asian communities while continuing to exclude blacks from meaningful political participation brought a renewal of internal opposition centered in the United Democratic Front and—in the townships—the "comrades" (informally organized groups of radical youth seeking to destroy white-dominated structures of administration in black areas and to replace them with structures of power emanating from the people themselves). These new challenges, too, were contained, if not destroyed, by the declaration of two successive states of emergency (the second remaining in effect to this day), by the intervention of the South African Defence Force (SADF) in the townships in an urban counterinsurgency campaign that met with considerable success, and, ultimately, by the virtual banning of the United Democratic Front early in 1988.

Excessive Soviet optimism concerning prospects in Southern Africa was in turn linked to a third misjudgment, namely an underestimation of the degree to which the Western powers, particularly the United States, were willing to reassert themselves in the region. The Western intervention in southeastern Zaire has already been mentioned. This was followed eight years later by the decision of the Reagan Administration to resume direct military assistance to UNITA and by the decision of the US Congress to rescind its prohibition of such activities in Angola. The weapons—notably, advanced anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems—had a crucial impact on the balance of forces within Angola, making it impossible for the Angolans to resolve their civil dispute. In political terms, this assistance meant that the USSR could not count on the acquiescence or neutrality of the Western powers in its attempts to implement its regional agenda.

On the other hand, implementation of sanctions by the Western powers, particularly the United States, and the gradual divestiture of American and other Western holdings in South Africa suggested that to equate Western and South African interests in the region was lacking in sophistication, and that there might indeed be a degree of common ground between Soviet and American interests in the region.

These developments brought a number of significant modifications in the Soviet approach to security in Southern Africa. Optimism regarding the inexorability of "positive" trends in regional politics largely disappeared or was relegated to the very long term. Now, regional events were rarely linked to an overall positive change in the correlation of forces between socialism and imperialism. Instead, with the passage of time, Soviet scholars and spokesmen have tended to depict the conflict in the area as divorced from the overall struggle between East and West.[52]

This extends to analysis of the sources of conflict in the region: the attribution of the conflict to the machinations of imperialist powers has been replaced by a stress on the significance of local factors in stimulating and perpetuating such disputes. In the words of one Soviet source:

. . . the situation in Southern Africa is considered not in the light of a confrontation between East and West . . . . The current conflict in this area of the world is, primarily, the result of development of [the] internal socio-economic and political process in the region, the natural consequence of [the] decay of the exhausted vicious system of social relations itself.[53]

One might plausibly interpret such remarks as a Soviet desire to distance the USSR from the disputes in Southern Africa. By detaching regional issues from the global struggle between capitalism and socialism, moreover, Moscow absolves itself of responsibility to sustain its involvement and provides a means for minimizing the significance of any defeats that might occur in the region.

Enthusiasm about conflict in Southern Africa has been supplanted by expressions of concern about the possibility that regional disputes might escalate.[54]

[51]Interviews in South Africa, January 1988.

[52]See, for example S. Kozitskiy's criticism of Winrich Kuhne for having cast the Southern African conflict in "East-West" terms. Kozitskiy goes on to note that the Soviet Union opposes the transformation of Africa into an arena of confrontation with the West. *MZ*, No. 12, 1986, p. 135.

[53]Viktor Goncharov, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa: Issues of Ensuring Regional Security," *Southern Africa Record* (Braamfontein, Transvaal), Nos. 47/48, 1987, p. 78. See also Mikhail Gorbachev, as cited in D. Volsky, "Regional Conflicts and Washington's Globalism," *New Times* (Moscow), No. 1, 1986, p. 19.

[54]G. Starushenko, *Problems of Struggle Against Racism, Apartheid, and Colonialism in South Africa*, Moscow, USSR Academy of Sciences, Africa

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Since, realistically speaking, it is difficult to believe that the Soviets are seriously concerned about such escalation in current circumstances, one must look for a subtext to this argument. At least two are plausible. Expressed concern over escalation can serve as a justification for restraint and inaction. Moreover, as shall be discussed below, it serves to justify collaborative efforts to seek regional settlements that might stabilize current allies while safeguarding and legitimizing a Soviet role in regional affairs.

Soviet analysis has become more critical of Angola, in line with the more general disillusionment with the states of socialist orientation. Moreover, Moscow has been nudging Angola toward negotiated compromise with the UNITA guerrillas. Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin was recently quoted as calling explicitly for negotiations between the MPLA and UNITA (including Savimbi) to resolve the internal Angolan dispute,[55] thereby overcoming Soviet reluctance to make such efforts public.

Enthusiasm concerning the imminence of a successful revolution in South Africa itself has grown rare, largely replaced with a more level-headed awareness of the staying power of the South African regime. Advocacy of violence as a means for achieving revolutionary transformation within South Africa has become more muted. Growing Soviet interest in the process of constitutional reform within the country suggests an awareness of the necessity to deal with the incumbent regime rather than supplant it. Soviet discussions of the prospects for South African reform occasionally have gone well beyond the ANC position in willingness to address the fears of the white community.[56] Soviet commentators recently have tended to suggest postponing implementation of the more radical reforms (of the socialist-orientation type) and to insist on the necessity for the prolonged existence of a substantial private sector within a mixed South African economy.[57]

This approach suggests a desire to adopt positions that might have some attraction to dominant groups within South Africa. It also indicates growing awareness that rapid implementation of socialist reform is a recipe for disaster and might well create a new burden for the Soviets to carry at a time they were having trouble coping with their existing ones.

This growing interest in negotiated reform as a basis for political change within South Africa required some reassessment of the character of the white community because it presumed the existence of viable interlocutors among white South Africans. And, indeed, the Soviet literature of the mid-1980's displays a growing attentiveness to the plurality of perspectives in the white community,[58] and even within Afrikanerdom itself. In a recent article, Boris Asoyan, a prominent Soviet journalist and foreign ministry official who recently served in Lesotho, noted that not all the reforms implemented by the government of Pieter Botha could be dismissed as propaganda, since a number of them contained positive substance.[59] This suggests at least some willingness to entertain the possibility that the system is capable of reform.

Elsewhere, Soviet analysts have displayed considerable interest in and have endorsed the kinds of consultation such as occurred between white liberals from South Africa and the ANC in Dakar three years ago. Asoyan appeared to be using his posting to Maseru as a means of cultivating Soviet links with moderate white South Africans.[60] Unconfirmed reports persist that the USSR has complemented this broadening of its perspectives on South African domestic politics with informal diplomatic contacts with the South African government itself.[61]

This tentative exploration of the possibility of dialogue and interest in identifying viable participants in such a dialogue are related to evidence of a certain amount of disillusionment with the ANC and its sister Namibian organization, SWAPO. It is plausible that Gleb Starushenko's call for more creative thinking on

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Institute, 1986, p. 3; Goncharov, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa . . .," loc. cit., p. 77; "Soviet-Angolan Joint Communiqué," TASS in Russian for abroad, May 10, 1986, translated in *Summary of World Broadcasts* (London, BBC—hereafter, *SWB*), SWB/SU/8257/A5/1, May 13, 1986.

[55]See *The Los Angeles Times*, Aug. 12, 1988. This is the latest episode in what appears to be a Soviet effort to encourage the MPLA to solve its dispute with UNITA that dates at least to the beginning of 1988. President Dos Santos mentioned in March 1988 that the USSR had proposed to the MPLA that it negotiate with UNITA, and in the same month Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy noted in Harare that the Soviet Union backed US efforts to mediate between the MPLA and UNITA. See *The Manchester Guardian*, Mar. 25, 1988. I am indebted to Helen Kitchen for drawing my attention to this article.

[56]Starushenko (loc. cit., pp. 11–12) proposed that the rights of minority groups be protected in a new constitution as a means of reassuring whites. The ANC has never accepted the concept of group rights. Starushenko's view is not universally shared. For example, see "Soviet Policy in Southern Africa—an Interview with Viktor Goncharov," in the "progressive" South African publication, *Work in Progress*, No. 48, July 1987, p. 6.

[57]Goncharov interview, loc. cit., p. 7; Starushenko, loc. cit., pp. 7, 11.

[58]Starushenko, loc. cit., p. 11.

[59]See Asoyan's article on President Botha in *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, July 15, 1987, p. 14. For an example of other articles in the same vein appearing in 1985–87, see A. Pokrovskiy, "The Apartheid Regime and Its Imperialist Protectors," *MZ*, No. 8, 1986, p. 101.

[60]See "Glasnost from Lesotho," *Front File: Southern Africa Brief* (London), Vol. 2, No. 8, June 1988, pp. 1–2. I am grateful to Helen Kitchen for providing a copy of this article.

[61]Interviews conducted in South Africa. See also Lester Venter's report in the *Johannesburg Sunday Times*, Feb. 21, 1988, as reproduced in *FBIS-AFR*, Feb. 23, 1988, p.10. Soviet spokesmen adamantly deny contact with the South African government.

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the question of constitutional reform cited in fn. 56 was intended as an expression of impatience with the ANC's insistence on a negotiating agenda that precludes meaningful dialogue with the white mainstream. In an interview published in a South African opposition publication in the summer of 1987, Viktor Goncharov, a deputy director of Moscow's Africa Institute, was even more direct. He noted that Soviet perspectives on South Africa had grown more flexible and realistic and that while the USSR would not attempt to dictate to the ANC, it would like to see that organization develop greater flexibility and objectivity and abandon "dogmatic formulations."[62]

Recent meetings between Soviet diplomats and SWAPO leaders meanwhile indicate considerable Soviet disillusionment with SWAPO's reliance on the "intensification of armed struggle" and a desire for a degree of "new political thinking" on the part of Moscow's Namibian friends. Perhaps as a warning to SWAPO, Soviet representatives in a debate at the United Nations at the end of 1987 dropped their customary reference to SWAPO as the sole legitimate representative of the Namibian people.[63] SWAPO seems to have received the message, to judge from its cooperation in the recent US-mediated negotiations on Namibia and Angola.

Soviet commentary has been trying to play down the competitive aspect of United States policy in the region. It is now common to encounter statements to the effect that neither the USSR nor the US has significant interests in the region, and that what interests they do have sometimes overlap on significant issues such as the avoidance of escalation and confrontation, and the wish to see the apartheid system dismantled.[64] The recent Soviet recognition of common interests on the question of apartheid suggests, moreover, an awareness of the existence of significant contradictions between the interests of the United States and of South Africa in the region.

Such adjustments in perspective can serve as justification for Soviet acquiescence in, if not support of, American efforts at mediation of the regional conflicts. Indeed, the initially indifferent or hostile attitude of the Soviet Union toward diplomatic activity aimed at political settlements in the region has changed markedly since the late 1970's. Thus, the Soviet Union—unwilling to pull its allies' chestnuts out of the fire—generally abstained from criticizing the decision of Mozambique and Angola to sign the respective Nkomati and Lusaka Accords with South Africa in 1984 in the wake of a renewal and intensification of South African military activity in support of RENAMO and in Angola from 1981 on.[65] At Nkomati, South Africa agreed to cease supporting RENAMO in return for Mozambique's imposition of restrictions on the use of its soil by the ANC to mount guerrilla raids into South Africa. The Lusaka Accords contemplated a disengagement of South African and Angolan forces and withdrawal of the SADF from the salient it had occupied in Cunene province of South West Angola in 1981, in return for Angolan restriction of SWAPO activity in the affected area.

Later in 1984, the Angolans—presumably with Soviet acquiescence or approval—accepted in principle the American-proposed linkage of the removal of Cuban troops from the portion of Angola south of the Benguela Railroad to independence for Namibia.[66] This concession presumably was a vain attempt to head off resumption of direct US assistance to UNITA. It also may have reflected the perception of a need to arrive at a negotiated settlement that might permit stabilization of Angola's internal affairs. In any case, the benefits arising from implementation of United Nations Resolution 435 in Namibia, e.g., the benefits accruing from denying UNITA sanctuary and close-in support from bases in the Caprivi Strip seemed to exceed the potential costs of the derogation of Angolan sovereignty implicit in such linkage. Significantly, the Angolans did not make such a settlement conditional on any change within South African society itself.[67]

Prospects for regional settlement dimmed in late 1985 and 1986. First, in 1985, the Angolans had considerable military success in the field against UNITA in the aftermath of the South African withdrawal called for under the Lusaka Accords. After driving UNITA out of

[62]Goncharov interview, loc. cit., p. 7.

[63]Conversations with South African representatives at the United Nations.

[64]Goncharov interview, loc. cit., p. 4.

[65]In 1985, in discussing with me Soviet attitudes toward the two accords, a leading Soviet Africanist made an analogy between these agreements and the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk between Soviet Russia and Germany. It was unpleasant, but necessary, given the lack of more palatable alternatives.

[66]See "Letter from José Eduardo dos Santos to the Secretary General of the UN," Nov. 17, 1984. It was reprinted without critical comment in *New Times*, No. 51, 1984. See also *Pravda*, Nov. 17, 1984. This document went beyond previous statements, such as the 1982 Cuban-Angolan declaration, which noted that the Cuban presence in Angola was a result of a South African threat to Angolan security, that Cuban forces had begun to withdraw on two previous occasions only to have the process interrupted by South African and Western threats, and that in the event of a Namibian settlement which included South African withdrawal, the Angolans and Cubans would consider the resumption of Cuban withdrawal. For a text of the 1982 document, see *FBIS-SOV*, Feb. 8, 1982, pp. J/1–2.

[67]This "new thinking," it should be noted, predates Gorbachev's accession to power. For the text of UN Resolution 435 (1978), see *United Nations Yearbook 1978*, New York, UN, 1981, pp. 915–16.

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the Cazombo Salient in eastern Angola, the Angolan armed forces (FAPLA) turned south, apparently seeking to deliver the coup de grace to an abandoned UNITA at Mavinga and then Jamba. However, it turned out that South Africa was unwilling to accept this outcome, despite its apparent acquiescence in the Lusaka Accords. Pretoria's air and ground forces intervened on behalf of UNITA, turning the FAPLA back north of Mavinga. In the aftermath of this exchange, South African spokesmen affirmed their continuing commitment to UNITA, suggesting that—agreement or no—South Africa was unwilling to permit the Angolan government to solve the UNITA problem by force.[68] This of course drew into question the utility of negotiation with the RSA.

Second, in early 1986, the United States began to supply UNITA with military assistance, ostensibly via Zaire. This aid included Stinger missiles, which threatened to neutralize Soviet efforts to challenge South African control of southern Angolan airspace through the construction of an elaborate network of radar and air defense installations. This American action restored a degree of credibility to the view that South Africa and the United States acted in unison.[69] It also drew into question the capacity of the United States to act as an impartial mediator of conflicts between South Africa and its neighbors.

Not surprisingly, Soviet writings in 1986 and 1987 reverted to rejecting any linkage between settlement of the Namibia question and the presence of Cuban troops in Angola. Also, most commentators resurrected the view that a settlement to the region's problems could be brought about "only with the granting of independence to Namibia in accord with UN Resolution 435 *and* the definite elimination of the apartheid system."[70]

Such renewed doubts about the wisdom of negotiating with the RSA were accompanied by events raising the question of whether such negotiation would even be necessary. As noted above, 1984–86 was a period of renewed civil unrest in South Africa. The failure of the first state of emergency to contain unrest in the townships may have suggested to the Soviets and the Angolans that the South African regime was losing its grip.

However, developments in the region once again forced new shifts in Soviet analyses. The disorders in South Africa were quelled, and the internal opposition was seriously damaged by the prolonged incarceration of large numbers of its activists under emergency statutes.[71] With a few exceptions (e.g. in Pietermaritzburg), the SADF—acting in conjunction with the police—restored order in the townships and reestablished the authority of conservative older blacks there.[72] Escalation of Soviet/Cuban/Angolan efforts to defeat UNITA in 1985–87 met with little success—and growing costs—in the face of increasingly active South African support of UNITA and the spread of the insurgency into central and even northern Angola. The last episode in this sequence was the massive Soviet rearmament of FAPLA in early 1987 and subsequent attack on UNITA positions around Mavinga in mid-year. This attack met with crushing defeat and resulted in the destruction of a number of the best-equipped and best-trained FAPLA units. Advancing South African and UNITA forces in turn put under siege the major Angolan air base in the area, at Cuito Cuanavale, and rendered it unusable by the end of the year, further complicating Angolan operations in forward theaters.

The Soviets concluded from these events that the problems of Angola could not be resolved by force alone.[73] Nor would the problems be solved by a revolution in South Africa anytime soon. Moreover, the Soviets recognized that the economic and political situation in Angola had deteriorated so rapidly as to draw into question the very survival of the MPLA regime.[74] Given shortfalls in oil revenue, the costs of sustaining that regime were growing more significant by the day.

Despite the dim prospects, Moscow was unwilling to walk away from the Angolan conflict. To do so would have severely damaged Soviet prestige and would have eliminated the principal position affording the Soviet Union a role in the politics of Southern Africa. It could also have raised the prospect of a domino effect that would invite more serious challenges to other Soviet positions in the Third World, many of which (e.g., Ethiopia and Nicaragua) were already insecure. A joint Soviet-Angolan statement of May 1986 affirmed:

The Soviet Union and the People's Republic of Angola reaffirm their principled position agreed on at the tripartite Soviet/Angolan/Cuban consultations in Moscow in January 1986, that is, the readiness

[68]Marcum, loc. cit., p. 7.

[69]See the speech of Angola's President Dos Santos, reported in "In a Friendly Atmosphere," *Pravda*, May 8, 1986.

[70]Moscow television, May 6, 1986, as cited in *FBIS-SOV*, May 14, 1986, p. J/10 (emphasis added). See also the communiqué from the joint Soviet-Cuban-Angolan consultations in January of 1986, translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Jan. 31, 1986, pp. J/4–6, where the existence of apartheid is mentioned as a permanent danger for Angola, but where its elimination is not mentioned as a precondition of settlement of the Angola and Namibia questions.

[71]This assessment of the effect of the emergency on the opposition is based on interviews in South Africa with several of its members.

[72]This judgment is based in part on visits to Crossroads and Khayelitsha in January 1988.

[73]Interviews with Soviet Africanists. This new outlook is also suggested by Soviet support of the Crocker initiative throughout much of 1988.

[74]The extent of Angola's crisis was eloquently suggested in President Dos Santos' August 1987 speech on the internal economic situation. See Luanda Domestic Service, *FBIS-AFR*, Aug. 19, 1987, pp. D/1–2.

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Troops of Jonas Savimbi's Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) fire off a round against Cuban-Angolan forces during the battle for Cuito Cuanavale in autumn 1988.

—Gamma-Liaison.

to undertake concerted actions in defense of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of Angola.[75]

Thus, the Soviet Union continued to provide support, including military support, to the Angolan regime.[76]

Yet, an even more direct Soviet role in defending the Angolans would have complicated the evolving Soviet-American relationship, would have involved even greater costs, and would have been unpopular at home in the aftermath of the withdrawal from Afghanistan. Moreover, it would have restored credibility to warnings of the "Soviet threat" in Southern Africa, thereby strengthening more conservative elements within South Africa itself. And it might well have involved direct and embarrassing confrontations with the South Africans.

Consequently, Moscow reembraced with a vengeance the pursuit of a political settlement. In the summer of 1987, presumably with Soviet approval, the Angolans resurrected linkage between Cuban troop withdrawals and independence for Namibia.[77] By mid-1988, the Cuban-Angolan position on linkage had evolved to envisage Cuban withdrawal not merely from southern Angola, but from Angola altogether. The two states once again dissociated Angola-Namibia questions from internal change in South Africa itself, dropping the destruction of apartheid as a precondition for peace in the region.[78] According to press reports, Soviet diplomats pressured Angola and Cuba to be forthcoming in the timing of a Cuban withdrawal.[79] They also pushed the Angolans toward negotiation of a compromise with UNITA, in so doing assuming some risks in their relationship with Angola.[80] Presumably in an effort to allow for some permanent role for itself in the event of

[75]"Joint statement by the USSR and the PRA on the Situation in Southern Africa," TASS in Russian, May 10, 1986, as translated in *SWB*, SWB/SU/8257/A5/5, May 13, 1986. This position was explicitly reaffirmed as Soviet policy by Goncharov in June 1987 (interview, loc. cit.).

[76]For illustration of the rising quality and quantity of Soviet military assistance to Angola, see *The Military Balance* for 1985–86, pp. 91–92; for 1986–87, pp. 116–17; for 1987–88, pp. 119–20; and for 1988–89, pp. 122–23.

[77]See ANGOP on Radio Luanda in Portuguese, Aug. 10, 1987, in *SWB*, SWB/ME/8644/B/6, Aug. 12, 1987.

[78]ANGOP on Radio Luanda in Portuguese, July 13, 1987, in *FBIS-AFR*, July 14, 1987, p. D/1.

[79]See *The Washington Post*, Aug. 11, 1988.

[80]The Adamishin statement on negotiating with UNITA was rejected immediately in Luanda. See note 55.

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a settlement, Moscow strongly endorsed the role of the UN Security Council as a potential guarantor of a peace settlement in the region.[81]

Even while moving toward compromise, Soviet policy moved on a second track, aimed at forcing South Africa to offer meaningful concessions—a possibility that did not exist so long as the RSA was victorious in both Angola and Namibia.[82] The Cuban contingent in Angola was increased measurably in the first half of 1988, to some 40–50,000 troops. For the first time in years, regular units of heavily armed Cubans were deployed in proximity to South African forces in Southern Angola. Cuban involvement prevented the fall of Cuito Cuanavale to UNITA and South African forces at the end of 1987. In March 1988, they engaged the South Africans and inflicted substantial casualties. By May, they had established themselves in strength in southwestern Angola and were building airstrips and additional radar facilities in proximity to the Namibian frontier, denying effective air support for South African forces remaining in Angola.

As talks continued through the late spring and early summer, so too did military action involving the Cubans and South Africans, as in the exchanges near Calueque in June.[83] The changing military balance, the rising casualty count, and the increasing material costs of continuing its engagement in Angola fundamentally altered the RSA outlook on this adventure. And it was the consequent change in the South African diplomatic position that finally brought the parties to agreement on an Angola-Namibia settlement.

Members of a Cuban women's anti-aircraft team at a January 10, 1989, Luanda ceremony marking the departure of the first 450 Cuban troops from Angola.

—Wide World.

Conclusions

Judging from both Soviet analysis and Soviet behavior, the USSR has moved away from revolutionary activism and associated hopes of making significant new gains in influence, position, and prestige in Southern Africa. Instead, Moscow now seeks to sustain established positions and a role in regional politics at lower cost through the exploration of political settlements to regional problems. In the process, the Soviet position has evolved from actively opposing American efforts to resolve conflict in the region to collaboration in diplomatic undertakings toward that end.

Soviet implementaton of "new thinking" in Southern Africa reflects the broader patterns of recent Soviet policy toward the Third World discussed at the outset. But it also reflects the consequences of 17 years of active Soviet involvement in the politics of a specific region. Indeed, given the prominence of Southern Africa in the previous activist phase, it seems reasonable to conclude that the regional learning experience was itself an important contributor to the broader recasting of Soviet Third World policy.

The rooting of this change in experience also suggests that the recent trend is likely to endure. Although it is by no means inconceivable that the present or a subsequent Soviet leadership might be tempted into greater activism in the area at some future date, the optimism of the mid-1970's concerning the region's revolutionary potential has fallen victim to the realities of regional politics.

[81]See "Joint Statement by the USSR and the PRA on the Situation in Southern Africa," TASS in Russian, May 10, 1986, trans. in *SWB*, SWB/SU/8257/A5/6, May 13, 1986; Goncharov, "The Soviet Union and Southern Africa . . . ," loc. cit., p. 83.

[82]This point was made rather strongly to me by South African military officers in January 1988.

[83]See the *Southern Africa Record*, July 1, 1988, pp. 1–2.

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

Working to implement the December 1988 treaty on Angola and Namibia, diplomats of five countries meet in New York City in January 1989: from left to right, Vyacheslav Ustinov, the USSR; Antonio Franca Ndalu, Angola; Carlos Aldana Escalante, Cuba; Neil van Heerden, South Africa; and Chester A. Crocker, the US.

—Keystone.

The consequences for regional security of this evolution in Soviet perspectives are rather uncertain. Many factors have a stronger impact on the situation in Southern Africa than does Soviet behavior. Soviet cooperation in the peace process does not guarantee success in the US-mediated talks on Angola and Namibia—witness the recent incursions of SWAPO guerrilla forces from Angola into northern Namibia.[84] The difficulty in securing agreement on a schedule for Cuban withdrawal from Angola suggests that the Angolans and Cubans remain deeply concerned about the security of the MPLA regime despite South African withdrawal from Angolan territory. The MPLA's rejection of Soviet suggestions that they negotiate with UNITA also indicates that they are unwilling to make the concessions on power-sharing that might diminish the internal threat. In such conditions, and despite Soviet pressure, the accord may fail.

[84]The Soviet response to South African attacks on returning armed SWAPO guerrillas evolved quickly from condemnation of South African actions, to expressions of concern about the situation in Namibia and reaffirmation of support for the Brazzaville Accord, support for the compromise involving withdrawal of SWAPO forces back to Angola, and criticism of SWAPO for the mistake of sending the guerrillas home. See the commentaries of V. Korotov (*Pravda*, Apr. 12, 1989) and A. Nikanurov (*Izvestiya* [Moscow], Apr. 16, 1989).

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Moreover, given the record of past South African duplicity on the Namibian issue, one should perhaps await RSA withdrawal from Namibia to judge Pretoria's sincerity. The South African agenda may have been to avoid the growing costs of an Angolan imbroglio while assuming that there would be sufficient subsequent opportunity to sabotage the settlement process. Perhaps the most that can be said is that change in Soviet perspectives has removed or weakened one impediment to settlement.

The new Soviet perspective and posture have broader implications as well. The Botha government justifies its intransigence on both regional and domestic issues in terms of the concept of a "total Marxist onslaught" on South Africa—the notion that the republic's internal and regional troubles result from an elaborate Moscow-orchestrated conspiracy to destroy the current system in South Africa, to seize its strategic minerals, and to dominate the Cape "choke point." Soviet advocacy of violent revolution and dramatic social transformation in South Africa, close Soviet links with SWAPO and the ANC, the presence of thousands of heavily armed Cubans and hundreds of Soviet military advisers in proximity to South Africa's borders, and the provision of sanctuary and bases to SWAPO and the ANC in states closely linked to the USSR, such as Angola, all have lent a degree of credibility to this view.

A Soviet Union cooperating in Western-backed regional peace initiatives, forswearing for the foreseeable future any socialist revolutionary agenda in South Africa, pushing the national liberation movements toward negotiated compromises with the South African government, focusing on the defense of existing interests rather than the expansion of influence, and quietly pursuing contacts with South Africa's white community undermines the credibility of the South African government's chosen strategy for legitimizing its domestic and regional policies. This development may favor reform, by refocusing attention on the internal sources of the RSA's problems.

Soviet willingness to cooperate in attempting to manage and resolve conflict in Southern Africa and to foster incremental change within the RSA might seem a function of increasingly manifest weakness in the Soviet regional position. The situation in Angola has deteriorated considerably since the late 1970's, and costs to the USSR stemming from the relationship with the Angolans have grown. The relationship with Mozambique was never fully consolidated, and the FRELIMO regime has lost control of much of its own country. SWAPO has failed thus far to mount a credible counterinsurgent challenge to South African control of Namibia. The South African authorities have enjoyed considerable success in efforts to control their internal opposition, and in many respects the ANC has been marginalized abroad.

To the extent that the new Soviet diplomacy of political settlement is an effort to save what can be saved in the context of dramatic deterioration in the situation, one might be tempted to push the Soviets and Cubans a little bit harder in the anticipation that they would abandon the MPLA and forfeit a decade-long attempt to establish a place for themselves in regional affairs. Yet, in all probability, there is little chance for such a termination of Soviet involvement in Southern Africa. Although the Soviet-Cuban position might not be as rosy as it once appeared, there is little present danger that Soviet-bloc advisers will have to leave the roof of the Soviet embassy in Luanda by helicopter. The record of the past three years shows continued Soviet commitment to do what is possible short of direct intervention to prevent disastrous defeat for the MPLA and to improve prospects for a settlement that would stabilize the situation in Angola, preserve a role in government for Moscow's local ally, and maintain Soviet prestige. The southward deployment of Cubans and their engagement of South African forces in 1988 suggests that Moscow possesses the instruments to see it through.[85] This is not Afghanistan. The costs faced by the USSR are far lower. And the pain threshhold of the SADF is apparently also far lower than that of the mujahedin.

Given that a regional settlement would reduce considerably the dependence of both the MPLA and SWAPO on the Soviets, the USSR appears to be willing to risk some loss of influence in promoting this effort. But its behavior suggests an unwillingness to accept humiliation and exclusion, and readiness to go to considerable lengths to avoid both. In sum, Moscow appears amenable to cooperative ventures in regional conflict settlement but not to exclusion from the region.

See also the remarks of Anatoliy Adamishin regarding an April 11, 1989, meeting in Mount Etjo, Namibia, of a tripartite Angolan, Cuban, and South African commission (with US and Soviet observers present) that discussed the recent events. Interview on Moscow Radio in Russian, Apr. 11, 1989, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 12, 1989, p. 30.

[85]This is not to say that the southward deployment of Cubans—any more than the original Cuban decision to intervene—was by Soviet dictate. Cuban participants in recent conferences with Americans have claimed that the Soviets opposed what was a Cuban-Angolan decision. (From private communication to the author.) Cuba had reasons of its own for wanting a settlement. If there was to be a settlement, going out with a win had advantages from Castro's own perspective. However, given that the Cuban move was sustained by Soviet deliveries of matériel, and was presumably largely financed by the USSR, it seems improbable that the USSR resisted it, despite occasional Cuban hints to the contrary.

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Nascent Civil Society in the German Democratic Republic

Vladimir Tismaneanu

Until recently, the political opposition in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) did not challenge the legitimacy of the existing regime. Basically, the opposition took a "loyalist" approach in criticizing the government's policies and accepted the official claim that the GDR was a socialist state of workers and peasants. In the early 1980's, however, new groups and movements have emerged that have increasingly questioned the regime's self-image as well as condemned its repressive policies. The interest among these groups in Marxist theories and ideals is also less pronounced than it was among the regime's critics of the 1960's and 1970's. Enjoying qualified though often decisive support from the East German Evangelical Church, these groups have put forward a broad social and political agenda whose aim is to bring about the demilitarization of public life and the respect for fundamental human rights by the government. The independent peace and human rights groups have become the nerve center of an expanding coalition of groups and associations striving to democratize East German society.

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A Militaristic Ethos

Founded with Stalin's blessing in October 1949, the GDR has represented itself as being the first German state of workers and peasants whose policies mark a total break with the policies of German imperialism. The self-serving corollary to this assertion is that the East German regime is peaceful by nature.

However, because the existence of the East German communist regime owes so much to the presence of the Soviet Army in what was known for a long time simply as *die Zone*, the regime has suffered from a marked lack of legitimacy.[1] Furthermore, the GDR is the only European communist state established on the basis of a national division; this fact has also affected the dynamics of authority building in the GDR. Since Erich Honecker became its general secretary in 1971, the ruling communist party, the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*—SED), has consistently sought to implement the policy of *Abgrenzung* (demarcation) from West Germany in order to preserve and enhance the differences between the two German states;[2] party dogma asserts not merely the existence of two German states, but also the existence of two German nations—one socialist and the other one capital-

[1]See A. James McAdams, *East Germany and Detente: Building Authority after the Wall*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 9–63; J. F. Brown, *Eastern Europe and Communist Rule*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1988, pp. 230–63; Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., *The Two Germanies since 1945*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 46–53 and 99–145. For a democratic-socialist critique of the East German system, see Franz Loeser, *Die unglaubwürdige Geselischaft: Quo Vadis DDR* (The Incredible Society: Quo Vadis GDR), Köln, Bund Verlag, 1984.

[2]See Henry Krisch, "Official Nationalism," in Lyman H. Legters, Ed., *The German Democratic Republic*, Boulder, CO, Westview, 1978, pp. 103–32.

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The official rally in East Berlin honoring Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht on January 17, 1988. Thirty dissidents were arrested when they tried to hold a parallel demonstration.

—DPA.

ist.[3] The policy of demarcation has its most visible expression in the Berlin Wall, erected in August 1961.

The communist state has laid claim to the "progressive" legacy of German culture. The official ideological apparatus spells out the link between today's East German political culture and the radical strands of German socialism, especially those associated with Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht, who became the founders of the Communist Party of Germany. Speaking at a rally in East Berlin in January 1988, Egon Krenz, the SED's second-in-command and among the heirs-apparent to General Secretary Honecker, reverently evoked these two martyrs of German socialism: "We bow to their highest dedication to work, bread, and international peace. We are proud to confirm our loyalty to their revolutionary legacy. We have sworn to Karl Liebknecht and we extend our hands to Rosa Luxemburg in a spirit saying that by word and deed we will serve socialism and peace."[4] The GDR claims to have carried out a complete de-Nazification and to have eliminated all roots of militarism. Its self-image is one of unswerving commitment to peace and international cooperation. For long, the target of the regime's propaganda was the "revanchist" orientation of the Federal Republic of Germany. East German communists fulminated against West German membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while the GDR's membership in the Warsaw Treaty Organization has been presented as a commitment to peace.

Among East European communist parties, the SED takes communist ideology particularly seriously,[5] and

[3]See Martin McCauley, "The German Democratic Republic: Internal and International," in George Schöpflin, Ed., *The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe*, New York and Oxford, Facts On File Publications, 1986, pp. 337–44.

[4]For the full text of Egon Krenz's speech, see Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: East Europe* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-EEU*), Jan. 19, 1988, pp. 32–34.

[5]See Martin McCauley, *Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic*, New York, Harper and Row, 1979; David Childs, *The GDR: Moscow's German Ally*, second edition, London, Unwin Hyman, 1988.

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for good reason: for East German communists, ideological relaxation appears to bring erosion of legitimacy rather than popular acceptance. Honecker and his comrades have directed their policies toward the provision of social welfare and the ideological indoctrination of the population. East German party leaders have not forgotten the June 1953 worker uprising against Stalinist exploitation (imposition of impossible production norms and sanctions against those who did not meet them). The SED elite has adopted a technocratic-bureaucratic model of socialism, based on accelerated economic growth, but tight political control. In view of this, de-Stalinization has never been wholeheartedly implemented in the GDR.[6] At the same time, East German communists must contend with another political fact of life: the flow of uncontrolled information to GDR citizens from the Federal Republic. SED functionaries often complain about the presence of the "enemy," i.e., sources of uncensored information like West German TV broadcasting, in virtually every East German house.

In its recurrent campaigns against internal opposition, the official propaganda has played up the threat of external intervention. Party-controlled media frequently accuse dissidents of being on the payroll of foreign intelligence services. National "unity" is extolled as a necessary condition for the country's very survival and the state-controlled educational system has become the main vehicle for inculcating national cohesion. The values taught have a decidedly militaristic cast.

The role of the *Nationale Volksarmee* (NVA) has become so prominent that it is no exaggeration to describe the GDR as a militaristic society. To be sure, the SED retains political control over all sectors of the East German system, including the military. But the SED has itself internalized militaristic views and values and imposed them on the whole society. In addition, one cannot overlook the militaristic tendencies shown by the introduction of mandatory military education in schools and universities, the government's adamant opposition to conscientious objection, and the open celebration of militaristic traditions, including those associated with Prussian Junkerdom. As one analyst has noted, "if one focuses on the military as a means of political socialization and assumes that the GDR's military propaganda and premilitary education and training of youth are effective, one can easily come to the conclusion that the GDR is a militarized society."[7]

Militaristic education gathered momentum in the late 1970's. In 1978, mandatory military education was introduced in the 9th and 10th grades of technical high schools. Following the Soviet model, paramilitary organizations like the Society for Sports and Technology (*Gesellschaft für Sport und Technik*), which claims a membership of 600,000, contribute to the physical preparation of youth for military service. At universities, both male and female students participate in premilitary and civil defense activities. But the most important form of military political education takes place during the 18 months of military service required of East German males. According to the SED, the purpose of socialist military education (*sozialistische Wehrerziehung*) is to create a "socialist personality" totally committed to the existing social order. The ruling elite needs to uphold the basic myth that the GDR is a beleaguered fortress, the most exposed "western stronghold of socialism."

Under Honecker, the regime's resistance to political change and social liberalization has been combined with an emphasis on economic effectiveness. The GDR justifiably boasts that it has the most developed economy and the highest standard of living in the socialist bloc, a fact that has not passed unnoticed in neighboring Warsaw Pact countries.[8]

To foster its legitimacy, the regime has stressed a separate East German national identity. It has tried to incorporate selectively symbols and traditions associated with glorious moments in the history of the German nation. For example, in November 1983 it organized state-wide celebrations to commemorate the 500th anniversary of the birth of Martin Luther; it has reassessed favorably the historical contributions of such personalities as King Frederick the Great of Prussia, Carl von Clausewitz, and even Otto von Bismarck,[9] thereby discarding its previous judgments about the "reactionary essence of Prussianism."

In the past, the government has also tried to convince the East German population that the country's survival and the peace of the region require East Germany's complete alignment with the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. The presence of 400,000 Soviet military personnel on their territory gives many East Germans the feeling that they live in an occupied country. First, Walter Ulbricht, then, Honecker have gone out of their way

[6]It is thus worth noting that Walter Ulbricht, Honecker's predecessor and political mentor, was particularly instrumental in persuading the Soviet Politburo to adopt the decision to invade Czechoslovakia in August 1968. This fact has been confirmed by Alexander Dubček, the reformist communist leader of Czechoslovakia in 1968, in an interview with the Italian official Communist daily *L'Unità*. See *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 19, 1988, pp. 9–24.

[7]Gero Neugebauer, "The Military and Society in the GDR," in *Studies in the GDR Culture and Society 5*, Lanham, MD, University Press of America, 1985, p. 82.

[8]See Ian Jeffries and Manfried Melzer, Eds., *The East German Economy*, London, Croom Helm, and New York, Methuen, 1988. It is of course true that the relatively healthy state of the economy owes much to the assistance provided by West Germany.

[9]McAdams, op. cit., p. 189.

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to change this perception. Inculcating loyalty to the socialist bloc has been another major task of the military-educational complex.

Independent Marxist Dissent

In the 1970's, the party grappled with a strain of intellectual dissent best characterized as independent Marxism. However, as Marxists, these dissidents and critical intellectuals identified with the values espoused by the system. To be sure, the opposition also comprised elements who squarely rejected the communist regime, but they frequently found ways of leaving the GDR.[10] Basically, the intellectual dissidents did not question so much the existing social order as the "distortion" of Marxist principles by the SED. Günter Kunert, a poet who left the GDR in 1979, described the dilemma of dissident intellectuals who deplore the cultural philistinism of official politics:

I am Jewish on my mother's side and have always been on the Left, so at first I welcomed the East German regime and was delighted to live there. But gradually things began to get difficult. My poems are on very private themes, and I just could not turn out the kind of ideological "public" poetry they wanted; also, one leitmotif of mine is the dehumanizing effect of modern technology, and Marxism does not tolerate this kind of pessimism. The party harassed me and finally refused to publish me. My break with GDR-style socialism was a slow and painful process, since I'd believed in it so much—and I still think the regime has many virtues, but not for an artist. Finally we decided to move here and there was no culture shock at all.[11]

Until his death in April 1982, the physicist Robert Havemann wholeheartedly advocated change from within. His statements and essays summed up the frustrations of Marxist intellectuals critical of the absence of political and social democracy. Havemann's ideas were instrumental in the awakening and crystallization of a powerful antimilitaristic awareness in the GDR. Together with writers Stefan Heym, Jürgen Fuchs, Jurek Becker, sociologist Rudolf Bahro, poet and singer Wolf Biermann and many others, Havemann denounced the contradictions between the regime's humanistic promises and its repressive practice.

Havemann belonged to the generation of Marxist revisionists who believed that their criticism could reform the totalitarian system, a widespread illusion in Eastern Europe until it was dispelled by the communist governments' harsh reactions to their critics in the late 1960's.[12] Havemann and his supporters repudiated the bureaucratic monopoly of power and attempted to reassert the democratic potential of socialism. Havemann wrote: "There must be no privileged people, classes or groups of any description, but everybody, every person must have exactly the same opportunities, the same chances, and must be equal with regard to each other."[13]

Havemann's anti-Stalinist stance contributed to the political coming of age of a younger generation of intellectuals. Drawing on Havemann's theses, Biermann spelled out the need to elaborate a democratic-socialist alternative to the repressive regime: "My entire work has the the purpose of advancing the development of a socialist workers' democracy in those countries that call themselves socialist. I voice criticism of the monopolistic-bureaucratic system; and I speak for those forces that, rather than accept a petit bourgeois liberalization forced on them by the old bankrupt and neo-Stalinistic reactionaries to shut them up, insist on the continuation of the socialist revolution."[14] In the 1970's, critical ferment became more widespread in literary and artistic circles. It was due not to nostalgia for the pre-socialist order, nor to unqualified admiration for liberal democracy, nor to a wish to do away with Marxist ideology, but to dissatisfaction with the SED's dictatorship and the militaristic-bureaucratic course of the government.

The regime did not hesitate to strike back at the intellectual trouble-makers. In 1976, the SED Politburo ac-

[10]The poet and songwriter Sascha Anderson, who emigrated on August 15, 1986, is a case in point. Born in 1953 into an intellectual family, he is typical of a generation who refuse to consider the GDR a "motherland." Alienation from prevailing norms generates an overwhelming sense of *Heimatslosigkeit* (uprootedness). Anderson does not cherish any hopes about communism. His position is explicitly anti-systemic. He and others like him do not expect the system to humanize itself and are indifferent to its fate: "I have never taken an interest in the system. I never had an interest in undermining the system from inside. I did not even want to see myself in light of the demands of the system." See *Der Spiegel* (Hamburg), Sept. 1, 1986, quoted by B. V. Flow, "The Literary Avant-Garde Leaves the GDR," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Free Europe Research* (Munich—hereafter *RFE*), RAD Background Report/132, Sept. 18, 1986.

[11]Quoted in John Ardagh, *Germany and the Germans*, New York, Harper and Row, 1987, pp. 362–63.

[12]For the fate of Marxist revisionism and the process of de-Stalinization in the USSR and Eastern Europe, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, *The Crisis of Marxist Ideology in Eastern Europe: The Poverty of Utopia*, London and New York, Routledge, 1988.

[13]See Robert Havemann, *Ein deutscher Kommunist: Rückblicke und Perspektiven aus Isolation* (A German Communist: Retrospection and Perspective Out of Isolation), Hamburg, Rowohlt, 1978, pp. 98–103; excerpts from Havemann's book were published in Roger Woods, *Opposition in the GDR under Honecker, 1971–85: An Introduction and Documentation*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1986, pp. 165–69.

[14]See *Index on Censorship* (London), February 1973, quoted in Sharon L. Kegerreiss, "The Politics of Silence: Culture and Kulturpolitik in the GDR," *RFE*, RAD Background Report/212, Oct. 2, 1979, p. 5.

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tz, München

„Wo gibt's denn hier Ausreiseanträge in die DDR?"

A cartoon in the Munich newspaper TZ *highlights the irony of the East German ban of the Soviet publication* Sputnik. *Stalin from his grave sees a headline about the banning and asks: "Where Does One Apply for an Exit Visa to the GDR?"*

—TZ (Munich).

cused Biermann of "publicly slandering our socialist state" and deprived him of his citizenship.[15] When the writers Christa Wolf, Stefan Heym, and Stephan Hermlin protested, the authorities resorted to further repression: Wolf was expelled from the SED and Heym was charged with breaches of currency regulations. Havemann was placed under house arrest, and several other well-known writers were forced into exile.[16]

The rationale for the SED's ultradogmatic, Manichaean approach to heterodoxy was formulated by Honecker in 1979 and has remained operative ever since: "The class struggle has always involved fighting on opposing sides of the barricade—here the workers' class, there the bourgeoisie, here the socialist ideology, there the bourgeois one. There is no third alternative."[17] This neo-Stalinist outlook has been reaffirmed in recent years, in direct contrast to Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'*. For example, at the commemoration marking the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of Germany, Honecker bluntly rejected modifications in SED policies in accordance with the wind of change now blowing from Moscow: "We have no reason to copy the practice of this or that fraternal country, even apart from the fact that this would be a gross contradiction of the fundamental teachings of Marxism. Peace . . . is served by our foreign policy, it is served by our military policy, it is served by the education of the younger generation, and it is served by the all-round strengthening of our socialist fatherland."[18]

The Church and the Peace Movement

The East German Protestant Church has traditionally resisted control by the communist government. However, it has also carefully avoided open conflict. The East German relationship between state and church has been aptly described as "a marriage in which the couple is always fighting—without, however, seriously thinking of divorce."[19] The East German Protestant hierarchy has been a spokesman for peace and a voice of constructive criticism of state policy from the very beginning. For example, the Evangelical Church advocated the introduction of civilian service for conscientious objectors (1955); opposed mandatory military service in 1961; issued a statement deploring the NATO decision to deploy nuclear weapons as well as the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (January 1980). Churches have sponsored institutions engaged in peace research, endorsed peace seminars and supported independent peace groups since 1981.[20]

The basic stance of the Federation of Evangelical Churches of the GDR was summed up by Dr. Heino Falcke, a Protestant Church leader, in 1972:

We will not concede that man's political maturity depends on his liberation from Christ rather than on his being liberated by Christ. . . . We can accept in faith that

[15]Biermann seemed to anticipate this measure when he wrote: "Those who once stood before machine guns with steadfast courage now fear my guitar," ibid. For a perceptive analysis of East German dissent in the 1970's, see Werner Volkmer, "East Germany: Dissenting Views during the Last Decade," in Rudolf L. Tőkés, Ed., *Opposition in Eastern Europe,* Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979, pp. 113–41.

[16]See Karl Wilhelm Fricke, *Opposition und Widerstand in der DDR* (Opposition and Resistance in the GDR), Köln, Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1984, pp. 173–89.

[17]*Neues Deutschland* (East Berlin), June 24, 1979.

[18]Ibid., Dec. 30, 1988. For the current tensions in Soviet–East German relations, including an unprecedented ban of the Soviet periodical *Sputnik* in the GDR, see "Where Sputnik Can't Land," *The Economist* (London), Nov. 26, 1988, p. 52; Barbara Donovan, "East Germany Bans Soviet Journal," *RFE*, RAD Background Report/233, Nov. 23, 1988. In December 1988, Erich Honecker criticized Moscow for tolerating the revision of Soviet history by "bourgeois types gone wild." See Serge Schmemann, "2 Germanies' Political Divide Is Being Blurred by Glasnost," *The New York Times*, Dec. 18, 1988. For an analysis of recent GDR–USSR relations, see A. James McAdams, "The New Logic in Soviet-GDR Relations," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), September-October 1988, pp. 47–60.

[19]Peter Maser, "The Protestant Churches and the Independent Peace Movement in the GDR," in *Studies in GDR Culture and Society 5*, p. 47.

[20]Ibid.; Joyce Marie Mushaben, "Swords to Plowshares: The Church, the State, and the East German Peace Movement," *Studies in Comparative Communism* (Los Angeles, CA), Summer 1984, pp. 123–25.

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in a socialist society, too, the lordship of liberating Christ is a reality . . . . So we are set free to reject socialism's rigid view of itself, a view that would face us with the need to reject or accept it totally. We are set free from the paralyzing alternative between outright opposition and uncritically allowing ourselves to be taken over. Thus we are at liberty to offer practical and discerning cooperation.[21]

This traditional approach of Lutheranism to secular authority allows for an effective dialogue between the Church and State: the Church recognizes the existing political structures and does not intend to subvert them. As Bishop Albert Schönherr, the first president of the Federation of Evangelical Churches, put it: "We do not want to be a Church against socialism, nor a Church alongside socialism, but a Church within socialism."[22] Bishop Schönherr emphasized this outlook at his historical meeting with SED General Secretary Honecker on March 6, 1978. In turn, the Honecker regime has sought to foster cooperation with the church, particularly since the late 1970's. The Church is legally entitled to "profess and evangelize," to build churches, to publish religious literature, and to broadcast religious services on radio and television.

A new stage in this cooperation was reached on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of Martin Luther's birthday in 1983. The ceremonies were organized by a joint Church-State commission chaired by Honecker. The SED intended to portray Luther as a forerunner of the "progressive" East German state, and its involvement in the celebrations was part of the general attempt to consolidate an East German political and historical identity.[23]

Though less influential today than it was in the early 1950's, the Evangelical Church still has 8 million members. Along with the much smaller Catholic Church, the East German Evangelical Church "represents the sole institutional structure in the GDR not subject to party control."[24] The Church has offered independent pacifism more than symbolic support. It has recognized its legitimacy and has defended pacifists against official slander and harassment. Unlike in the USSR, Hungary, or Poland, where autonomous peace movements have emerged out of civil rights initiatives, in the GDR religious institutions had a vitally important role in the formation and development of East German unofficial groups. This is not to say that the East German pacifist and anti-nuclear movement remains a religious one. Yet, it maintains a basic commitment to Christian values, particularly the dignity of the individual, the sacredness of human freedom, and the ethos of nonviolence. This value system collides with the official credo.

The Church and the peace movement also share concern about intrusive state interference in private life. For young East German pacifists, encouraged by members of the Evangelical clergy, the idea of turning "Swords into Plowshares" is more than a metaphor. It is the symbol of their decision to rebel against militarism, censorship, ideological manipulation, and police repression.[25]

From Religious to Independent Pacificism

Since the early 1980's, the SED has been confronted by autonomous, grass-roots efforts to oppose its militaristic course. These groups promote an oppositional strategy different from that of their independent Marxist forerunners. They are a response to the widespread moral crisis among East German youth and acute dissatisfaction with the values propounded by the regime.[26] Because of its privileged position within the East German system, the Evangelical Church has been able to provide the independent peace groups with a powerful protective shield. Under its umbrella and with its support, these groups have become significant actors on the GDR social and political scene. The independent peace movement in East Germany was also spurred by the huge anti-nuclear demonstrations in West Germany in the early 1980's, and by the nonviolent strategy for social change followed by Solidarity in Poland before the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981.[27]

[21]Quoted in B. Welling Hall, "The Church and the Independent Peace Movement in Eastern Europe," *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo), No. 2, 1986, p. 200.

[22]See Ronald D. Asmus, "Is There a Peace Movement in the GDR?" *Orbis* (Philadelphia), Summer 1983, p. 322; Albert Schönherr, *Horizont und Mitte* (The Horizon and the Middle Distance), Munich, Christian Kaiser Verlag, 1979.

[23]See George B. von der Lippe, "Ich weiss jetzt, wer ich bin': The Figure of Martin Luther as Presented in the Literature of the GDR," in *Studies in GDR Culture and Society 5*, pp. 339–55; Robert F. Goeckel, "The Luther Anniversary in the GDR," *World Politics* (Princeton, NJ), October 1984, pp. 112–33.

[24]Asmus, loc. cit., p. 306.

[25]See "The Relevance of Pacifism: A Discussion Paper for the Communities (November 1981)," in Wolfgang Büscher, Peter Wensierski, and Klaus Wolschner, Eds., *Friedensbewegung in der DDR, Texte 1978–1982* (Peace Movement in the GDR, Documents 1978–82), Hattingen, Edition Transit, 1982, pp. 245–63.

[26]See Wolfgang Büscher and Peter Wensierski, *Null Bock auf DDR: Aussteigerjugend im anderen Deutschland* (No Idea About the GDR: Disaffected Youth in the Other Germany), Hamburg, Rowohlt Verlag, 1984, esp. pp. 133–64.

[27]See "The Poetic Principle of Sincerity: A Polish-German Discussion in the Fall of 1981," in Jürgen Fuchs, *Einmischung in eigene Angelegenheiten:*

(fn. continued on p. 96)

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The peace activists rejected from the very outset the simplistic definition of peace as the absence of war, giving it instead a much more comprehensive definition, one that encompassed the domestic policies of the government. In May 1981, lay members of the Evangelical Church in Dresden addressed a proposal to the East German Parliament advocating a two-year "social service for peace" *(Sozialer Friedensdienst)*, as an alternative to the 18-month military conscription.[28] Those undertaking such a service for peace were to be employed primarily in care for civilians—in orphanages, old people's homes, or nursing homes; as ancillary staff at hospitals; in social welfare and environmental protection. The authors of the proposal expressed their concern about the growing militarization of East German society and suggested that the government should focus instead on the serious shortcomings in social services, which the "social service for peace" could partly correct. In August 1981, Bishop Johannes Hempel of Saxony expressed the support of the Church for this initiative: "We will obviously open our arms and speak openly with those whose motives originate in Evangelical beliefs."[29]

In November 1981, the government replied to the growing campaign for an alternative peace service in the authoritative voice of the GDR State Secretary for Church Affairs, Klaus Gysi:

The demand for a "social peace service" cannot be justified either on theological or religious grounds . . . . Moreover, it is not the task of the Church to change laws and the Constitution. In addition, there are people in the West who desire to see a confrontation between us. The current regulation with the construction soldier option is one of the most progressive in the world. There is no reason to deviate from it. We need everyone and cannot afford to abolish mandatory conscription.[30]

According to Gysi, anybody who did not agree with the state's position showed a confrontational attitude. Werner Walde, a candidate member of the SED Politburo and party chief in the district of Cottbus accused the initiative for an alternative service of being directed against the "necessary military strength of socialism."[31] Instead of bowing to the SED's dictate, in September 1981 the Synod of the Evangelical Churches of the GDR adopted a resolution in support of the call for an alternative service. To counter the regime's criticism that they were playing a role in fomenting civic unrest, Church leaders emphasized that the Evangelical Church is "neither a camouflaged government party nor a camouflaged opposition party." In response, the SED resorted to "class-inspired" slogans: "Peace must be defended—peace must be armed" and "Make peace without NATO weapons." The *Freie Deutsche Jugend* (FDJ), the communist youth organization, started to propagate these "militant" slogans. The government banned the wearing of pacifist badges and took repressive measures against peace activists.

Independent peace initiatives intensified following the "Peace Week" (Friedensdekade) organized by the Protestant Church in November 1981. The theme of the campaign was "Righteousness, Disarmament, Peace," and the "Swords into Plowshares" slogan was enthusiastically accepted by thousands of young people. Since this phrase is also engraved on the base of a statue donated by the Soviet Union to the United Nations in the late 1940's, initially Soviet commentators described the "Swords into Plowshares" emblem as a "reflection of their own attitudes."[32] But soon the real meaning of the badge became clear: it highlighted the contrast between the GDR authorities' professed and practiced values, between official slogans and actual behavior.[33]

The major impetus to the development of a self-conscious, autonomous peace movement in the GDR was the publication of the "Berlin Appeal." The "Appeal," whose main author was Reiner Eppelmann, an East Berlin minister involved in youth work, was eventually signed by more than 2,000 East Germans. In many respects, it echoed Havemann's preoccupations—among them, the division of Germany.[34] Widely circulated, the "Appeal" ignited passionate discussions and struck a responsive chord among those who had long distrusted the official peace institutions and pledges.

The "Berlin Appeal" challenged the government's militaristic slogans. A motto frequently found on official East German posters reads: "The stronger socialism is, the more secure peace is." To this, the signatories of the "Appeal" replied: "We propose to hold a great debate on the questions of peace, in an atmosphere of tolerance and recognition of the right of free speech, and

Gegen Krieg und verlogenen Frieden (Interference in One's Own Affairs: Against War and a Mendacious Peace), Hamburg, Rowohlt Verlag, 1984, pp. 53–79, for a fascinating discussion between Fuchs, an East German poet and human rights activist, and two Polish intellectuals.

[28]See Buscher et al., *Friedensbewegung*, pp. 169–71.

[29]Quoted in Asmus, loc. cit., p. 308.

[30]See Fricke, op. cit., pp. 36–37.

[31]Ibid. p. 195.

[32]Asmus, loc. cit., p. 324.

[33]See Hall, loc. cit., p. 202.

[34]Before Leonid Brezhnev's visit to West Germany in autumn 1981, Havemann had addressed an "Open Letter" to the Soviet general secretary pointing to the division of Germany as a bleeding wound in the very heart of Europe: "What Germany's partition created was not security but the precondition for the deadliest of threats that has ever existed in Europe." See Asmus, loc. cit., p. 311.

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to permit and encourage every spontaneous public expression of the desire for peace."[35] The authors suggested a broad range of topics for such a dialogue:

(a) Oughtn't we to stop producing, selling, and importing so-called war toys?
(b) Oughtn't we to introduce peace studies in our schools in place of military instruction?
(c) Oughtn't we to allow social work for peace instead of the present alternative service for conscientious objectors?
(d) Oughtn't we to stop all public displays of military might and instead use our ceremonies of state to express the nation's desire for peace?
(e) Oughtn't we to stop so-called civil defense exercises? Since real civil defense is impossible in nuclear war, these exercises merely make nuclear war seem more possible. Does it not perhaps amount to a kind of psychological preparation for war?[36]

The tone of the "Berlin Appeal" was both optimistic and apocalyptic. Endorsed in the center of Europe by people deeply anxious over the threat of a nuclear holocaust, the document challenged East German officialdom in the name of a philosophy of democratic peace. The underlying premise was that all weapons are lethal, regardless of the ideological preferences of those who wield them. "Make peace without weapons," a position voiced in the "Appeal," has become the basic demand of the independent peace movement in East Germany: "Make peace without weapons—this does not just mean ensuring our own survival. It also means stopping senselessly wasting our people's labor and wealth on producing the engines of war and equipping enormous armies of young men, who are thereby taken out of productive work."[37] Regarding the division of Germany, the "Appeal" advocated in unambiguous terms the withdrawal of all occupation troops from Germany and stressed the need for guarantees against intervention in the internal affairs of both German states.

The "Berlin Appeal" was a milestone in East German independent pacifism, whose importance cannot be exaggerated. By publicizing and denouncing the preparations for war and the militarization of public education, the document exposed the regime's ideological inconsistencies. The "Appeal" proclaimed an independent struggle for peace to be a civic duty, an unmistakable allusion to the failure of the official peace institutions to articulate cogent and credible platforms. It foreshadowed the linkage between peace and human rights, including free speech, which became the hallmark of independent peace initiatives in the years to come.[38]

In the first months of 1982, the Federation of the Evangelical Churches decided not to support the "Appeal," but to continue to oppose compulsory military conscription and training. Then, in March, the regime passed a law that decreed military training for women. In response the Catholic bishops, who had long refrained from criticizing the government, declared that "it is to be feared that this kind of education will awaken the readiness to resolve conflicts by force and will thus weaken the next generation's attitude toward peace."[39]

An important meeting took place in April between the representatives of the Federation of Evangelical Churches and the government's representative Klaus Gysi, who told the churchmen that it was not the slogan "Swords into Plowshares" as such that had upset the authorities, but its impact on the readiness of the population to engage in military preparedness. He said outright that the emblem would weaken the GDR's defense capability.[40] Some bishops had meanwhile been trying to convince the radical pacifists that wearing the emblem would get them arrested and that the Church could not permanently protect them against police harassment. An incident during the Peace Forum in Dresden in February 1982 is indicative of the mounting tensions between the church hierarchy and the pacifists. When Bishop Hempel stated that the Church could resort to open opposition only in an extreme situation that did not now exist, a young participant burst out in frustration at such an "appeasing" stance: "I am 19 years old and nevertheless have nothing to lose. You talk and talk behind safe doors. Do you intend to keep putting us off until doomsday? What about the shining city on the hill?"[41]

This and similar disagreements stem from the fact that the Church has its own mission, which does not always coincide with the agenda of the independent

[35]Woods, op. cit., p. 195.
[36]Ibid., p. 196.
[37]Ibid.

[38]"The Berlin Appeal was the first independent peace manifesto in the 1980's to popularize linking calls for freedom of expression with the removal of weapons and peace activity." See *From Below: Independent Peace and Environmental Movements in Eastern Europe and the USSR. A Helsinki Watch Report,* New York, October 1987, p. 29. The theme of "democratic peace" has been extensively developed in the political thought of Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia. See Václav Havel, et al., *The Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in Central-Eastern Europe*, Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1985; Václav Havel, "An Anatomy of Reticence," *Crosscurrents: A Yearbook of Central European Culture*, Ann Arbor, MI, University of Michigan, No. 5, pp. 1–23.
[39]Hall, loc. cit., p. 203.
[40]Maser, loc. cit., p. 40.
[41]Ibid.

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peace movement. More often than not, the Church wants the unofficial peace groups to demonstrate self-restraint and moderation, as the Church's response to the "Appeal" showed: "The church leadership strongly advises against participating in the collection of signatures because this could generate misunderstandings and dangers not conducive to the necessary impartial discussion." Havemann protested against this statement adding, "I think these statements were formulated before all of the parties concerned realized that it is impossible to deal in this way with the 'Berlin Appeal' without losing all credibility in the international arena of the peace movement."[42]

Many peace activists have resented the Church's "abstentionism"—its failure to espouse all their demands. In all fairness, however, religious institutions in communist countries can hardly be expected to champion essentially political causes, for their mission is more comprehensive and enduring than simply leading a political battle. While numerous basic communities and peace seminars were organized within the Evangelical Church,[43] the church hierarchy cannot let itself be identified completely with the independent peace movement. For its part, although the peace movement has benefited from close association with the Church, it has evolved its own philosophy, methods, goals, and organization.

In recent years, the authorities have reacted very differently to peace activities taking place under the auspices of the Church and those that are independent of it. The government's aim has been to channel independent activities back into church structures, but the divide between these two forms of political activism is often blurred. The tactic of the regime is to restrict independent peace and human rights campaigns to church-sponsored activities. This policy would allow the government to delimit "tolerable" from "intolerable" actions and to force the Church hierarchy to disavow the more radical independent initiatives. Werner Fischer, one of the leaders of the independent group "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights," has described the problem of the Evangelical Church, which is caught between mounting activism from below and mounting regime pressure: "The Church cannot but give in to that pressure. The relationship between the Church and the state is a constant balancing act for the Church leadership and they have to be prepared to say that they will tolerate and support certain activities but not others."[44]

The Church has not aspired to become an actor in political confrontations or to set up a parallel power structure that would rival the government's authority. Yet, activities organized and encouraged by the Church have greatly contributed to civic mobilization. The peace education undertaken within the walls of churches has paved the way for a new critical state of mind toward official ideology, and many of the independent peace activists began as religious pacifists.

Currently, the Evangelical Church remains a center for reflection and imaginative action on fundamental issues that inevitably lead to sensitive political topics, although Church criticism of the government is offered in the language of constructive dialogue. The nature of the East German political equation is that the State has shunned direct attacks on the Church and the Church has reciprocated with what might be called critical loyalty. As Bishop Werner Krusche put it: "We have learned that it is proper for a Church not to feel to be above or beyond the social order in which it exists, that it should instead consciously accept this order as the place allotted it by God for the testing of its faith and obedient discipleship, as its mission field and opportunity for service, and as the location for new, living experiences with the living God . . . not at a critical distance, but with critical—and that always means also constructive—participation."[45] Following the crackdown on dissidents in January-February 1988, Manfred Stolpe, the president of the East Berlin Church consistory, declared that the Church does not conceive of itself as a shelter for an internal GDR opposition:

As a church we are independent and self-reliant. We are different from the social institutions in this country, the parties and mass organizations, because we have other ties. In that respect we are different in our self-reliance from the normal functioning of the GDR society. I think, however, that society has accepted the existence of independent churches and that the churches act in accordance with their mission, carrying out certain tasks in society. That is what the church does, but not in conflict with the state. The church believes in its responsibility in its entirety."[46]

Referring to the need for a gradual loosening of the East German political system, Stolpe expressed reserva-

[42]Büscher et al., *Friedensbewegung*, pp. 284–88.

[43]Pedro Ramet, *Cross and Commissar: The Politics of Religion in Eastern Europe and the USSR*, Bloomington, IN, Indiana University Press, 1987, pp. 80–96.

[44]"Hidden Opposition of the GDR," (an interview with Werner Fischer), *East European Reporter* (London), Autumn 1988, p. 66. According to Fischer, the regime reserves for itself the right to decide which activities on church premises are church-related, and thus is able to create tensions between the church hierarchy and the independent groups.

[45]Büscher, et al., *Friedensbewegung*, p. 233.

[46]See "We Need a Culture Allowing for Difference of Opinion," an interview with Manfred Stolpe, in *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 15, 1988, pp. 23–27.

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tions about the wisdom of public demonstrations to protest arrests: "Our country has been undergoing a slow and cautious change. The process is continuing. It has to continue. In that process of change, conflict of opinion—the habit of conflict of opinion—is a very important element. In my view that process of change should not be strained by elements and moments that this society is still unable to cope with."

Tensions over the peace movement have also appeared among clergymen. Younger priests tend to be more supportive of independent peace initiatives than the bishops. This does not mean that the Church hierarchy has withdrawn support from the independent peace movement, but rather that the Church leadership does not consider that current circumstances warrant their direct political involvement. It does not follow from this that the chances for the independent peace movement in the GDR are reduced or that the current compact between the the church and the state, under which nongovernmental activities are to be confined within the Church, leaves no room for independent activism. As Christoph Semsdorf, who is active, recently put it: "As a pastor I am not interested in the problems of the country. I am interested in the problems of the people. There is a big difference."[47]

As noted, the enactment in March 1982 of a military service law providing for the conscription of women brought a remonstrance from the Catholic hierarchy. It also called forth protests from independent activists. A protest letter to Honecker described the draft of women "not as an expression of their equal rights, but as inherently contrary to their nature as women." The 300 signatures of the letter protested against the obligation to serve a country whose population would be totally annihilated in a nuclear war. Therefore, they declared: "We are not willing to submit to this compulsory military service, and we demand that the possibility of refusal should be enshrined in the law. The right of refusal is necessary because our freedom of conscience is infringed by the promulgation of this law that extends the duty of military service to women."[48] A number of the signatories of this letter were harassed by the security police. The official response was made by General Heinz Hoffmann, then a Politburo member and the Defense Minister: "The members of our army, our workers, and our women and children know that peace and socialism are inseparably linked. Our soldiers bear arms for peace, and the better command they have over their weapons, the better will peace be assured. As much as we would like to scrap our weapons, we know that one day socialism and peace will need both our plowshares and our swords."[49]

An International Agenda

Links between the independent peace activists and critical intellectuals intensified after 1982. Writers Stefan Heym, Stephan Hermlin, Sarah Kirsch, Christa Wolf, Rolf Schneider, Jurek Becker and Jürgen Fuchs are among the cultural personalities whose views most influenced the young peace activists. Critical intellectuals and independent peace activists share the same anxiety about militaristic trends in East Germany and a nuclear armaggedon. Christa Wolf masterfully expressed this state of mind in her novel *Cassandra,* where she wrote: "To prevent wars, people must criticize, in their own country, the abuses that occur in their own country. The role taboos play in the preparation of war. The number of shameful secrets keeps growing incessantly, boundlessly. How meaningless all censorship taboos become, and how meaningless the consequences of overstepping them, when your life is in danger."[50] She called for unilateral disarmament by the Warsaw Pact:

I conclude that the sensible course may be the one for which there is absolutely no hope: unilateral disarmament. (I hesitate: in spite of the Reagan Administration? Yes, since I see no other way out: in spite of it!) By choosing this course, we place the other side under moral pressure from the world public; we render superfluous the USSR's extortionary policy of arming itself to death; we renounce the atomic first-strike capability, and we devote all our efforts to the most effective defense measures. Assuming that this involves some risk, how much greater is the risk of further atomic arms, which every day increase the risk of atomic annihilation, by accident if nothing else?[51]

"Armed peace" is rejected as an absurdity both by peace activists and critical intellectuals: "Twice in this century, war has arisen out of 'armed peace,' each war more cruel than its predecessor. Brecht said exactly the same thing in the 1950's. If we do not arm ourselves, we will have peace. If we arm ourselves, we will have

[47]See Thomas F. O'Boyle, "Winds of Change Coming from Moscow Stir Hopes for Liberty in East Germany," *The Wall Street Journal* (New York), Feb. 19, 1988.

[48]See "Open Letter to Erich Honecker," in Woods, op. cit., pp. 197–99.

[49]*Neues Deutschland,* Mar. 27–28, 1982.

[50]See Christa Wolf, *Cassandra: A Novel and Four Essays,* New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1984, p. 258.

[51]Ibid., pp. 229–30.

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war. I do not see how anyone could think differently on this."[52]

At an East German writers meeting in April 1983, poet Stephan Hermlin deplored the government's lack of understanding of the peace movement even as he acknowledged the validity of some criticisms of it: "We must first recognize that not everything that goes by the name of an independent peace movement in the socialist countries is concerned with peace; for the most part it is also concerned with quite different things. But there are many people, especially young people, who passionately want to make their own personal contribution to peace, but are regarded with suspicion. That is something I regret."[53]

Roland Jahn, a young peace activist who was expelled in 1983 but who continued his activities on behalf of the East German unofficial peace movement in the Federal Republic, characterized the independent peace movement as above all an association of like-minded people: "The movement is there in every person in the GDR. Among the young there are people who say, 'I can't accept things as they are anymore.' But it would only come to a mass movement of protest when things get a lot worse in a material sense."[54]

In its main aspirations and concerns, then, pacifism is not only a political but also a cultural and moral movement. It challenges the system's operational values in the name of peace. Its main aim is to promote grass-roots participation in independent initiatives and a heightened awareness about the dangers generated by the competition between the two blocs. Bärbel Bohley, a leading activist of the group "Women for Peace" summed up the psychology of independent pacifism: "I have gotten used to not being afraid any more. That is the precondition if one wants to work for peace here."[55]

In an "Open Letter to the West European Peace Movement," the poet Jürgen Fuchs, who was expelled from the GDR in 1977, wrote about the fate of East German pacifists and called for a new approach to the peace issue. In his view, as in that of most East European peace activists, peace is not an isolated issue. Peace without the guarantee of human rights is at best illusion, if not a form of capitulation. Governments that do not ensure domestic peace, can not guarantee international peace: "The matter is not to compel the peace movement 'to carry the burden of the issues dealing with human rights'! In the East, as well as in the West, the peace movement will succeed only if it will manage to dismantle the missiles, prevent the war, and open the doors of the prison cells!"[56]

The East German independent peace movement has refused to identify with the ideology of either bloc. An important document addressed by the East German independent peace movement to the July 1984 European Nuclear Disarmament Conference held in Perugia gave the rationale for this stance. The authors of the memorandum called the emerging cross-frontier independent peace movement the result of decentralized, grass-roots activities whose main objective was emancipation in the broadest sense: "It must therefore enjoy autonomy from the established political systems and must not be susceptible to being taken over by them. It must also enjoy autonomy from the two superpowers, and from those who represent their interests, and this in itself is the reason why the movement must transcend the two blocs."[57] The letter also depicted the effects of the persistent militarization of public life in the GDR and informed Western anti-nuclear campaigners about the pressures communist authorities exert on independent peace activists: "The population is to be disciplined by attempts to extend military forms of organization to every aspect of life (education of children, vocational training, civil defense exercises for working people) and by the doctrinaire, repressive behavior of the organs of state (in particular the security apparatus and the judiciary) towards all citizens who publicly espouse opinions that deviate from the dogma, not to speak of alternative projects."[58]

The SED intensified the campaign against independent peace activists at the end of 1983. In December, graphic artist Bärbel Bohley and historian Ulrike Poppe, prominent members of the "Women for Peace" group, were arrested. In January 1984—after the two women had been on a hunger-strike for 22 days and an international campaign had been launched on their behalf, they were released.[59] But on April 20, 1984, Sylvan Goethe, a less well-known activist in an unofficial peace group, was sentenced to 20 months in jail for having cir-

[52]Ibid., p. 268.

[53]For Hermlin's speech, see Woods, op. cit., pp. 200–01. More recently, Hermlin has called for the democratization of public life in the GDR, but he also criticized those who invoke Rosa Luxemburg and Mikhail Gorbachev only as a cover for their desire to emigrate to the West. See *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 6, 1989, pp. 69–80.

[54]See James M. Markham, "In Militaristic East Germany, the Pacifists Mobilize," *The New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1983.

[55]Quoted by Elizabeth Pond, "East Germany's Unique Peace Movement Faces Harder Times," *The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Jan. 5, 1984.

[56]See Jürgen Fuchs, "Open Letter to the West European Peace Movement," *L'Alternative* (Paris), March-April 1983, pp. 28–29.

[57]See "On Questions of the Autonomy and 'Ideological Independence' of the Peace Movement in East and West," in Woods, op. cit., p. 204.

[58]Ibid., pp. 205–06.

[59]See *From Below*, p. 32.

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East German dissident graphic artist Bärbel Bohley holding a banner the top of which reads: "We Hunger for Disarmament."

—DPA.

culated information abroad "harmful to the interests of the GDR."[60]

The development of an unofficial peace movement that unites people of different political and ideological views has been a major challenge to the SED's ideological and political monopoly. The party decided to step up its "educational" activities in order to prevent the spread of pacifist views. The media were instructed to pillory the independent peace movement for playing into the hands of Western intelligence agencies. In December 1984, the socialist and pacifist Rolf Schälike was sentenced to seven years imprisonment for "incitement against the state" (Article 106 of the Constitution) and "slander against the state" (Article 220). In reality, his "crime" consisted of having opposed the deployment of both NATO and Soviet missiles on German soil.

Schälike's case evinced the regime's estrangement from people who once espoused its own ideology. Schälike was born in Moscow where his German communist parents lived in exile. In the 1950's, his father was a prominent figure in the SED. In 1961, Schälike received a degree in nuclear physics from Moscow University and started a successful career at the Central Institute of Nuclear Research at Rossendorf (GDR). A "critical Marxist" in the Havemann vein, Schälike was expelled from the party for his "heretical" views and lost his job. Even after his March 1984 arrest, he continued to criticize censorship and repression in the GDR. In the Dresden courtroom before his sentencing in December, he expressed the ideological quandary of many dissenters in East Germany faced with a state apparatus that claims to represent the working class: "I am and will remain a Marxist and will not accept the label of enemy of the state."[61]

Instead of deterring the pacifists, the official campaign convinced them that they needed a broader agenda. In January 1985 they decided to address the relationship between peace and human rights issues in a systematic way. Such activists of the unofficial peace movement as Reiner Eppelmann, Ralf Hirsch, and Wolfgang Templin, wrote a letter to Honecker that was signed by more than 300 people. It called for the full implementation of the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the demilitarization of public life and the creation of an alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors. The letter also condemned travel restrictions and demanded freedom of expression and the abolition of censorship. The government chose to ignore this memorandum. Therefore, in July 1985, a new appeal was sent to the official youth organization declaring that the main objective of the independent peace movement was to revive a civil society: "Peaceful assembly and the founding of initiatives, organizations, associations, clubs, and political parties should not be dependent on official permission. The unrestricted work of independent groups would protect society from petrifying in an inflexible administrative order that inhibits creativity among its citizens."[62] This view represents the new evolutionism that has inspired the struggles of the Polish opposition and has become the shared outlook of democratic activists in East-Cen-

[60]Ibid.
[61]See *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (Frankfurt/Main), Dec. 8, 1984.

[62]See A. Winton Jackson, *Introduction* to "Appeal on the Occasion of UN Peace Year," *East European Reporter*, Spring 1986, pp. 60–61.

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tral Europe.[63] Its major goal is to restore to society its inherent rights and to bring the party-state apparatus under civic control by making it legally accountable.

In September 1985, activists released a new document critical of the travel restrictions imposed by the authorities: "It is unacceptable that we should receive our rights only as a favor granted to us, provided that we refrain from independent political activity. We demand the repeal of the prohibition against foreign travel that has been imposed on us. Only the implementation of human rights for all and a comprehensive expansion of the freedom of travel will help persuade people to remain willingly in this country, thereby reducing the number of émigrés."[64]

The progressively more radical demands of the independent peace movement led to friction in its relations with the Church. In January 1986 the leadership of the Berlin-Brandenburg Protestant church cancelled a projected human rights seminar. A number of activists thereupon decided to found a new group called the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights," which intends to function "throughout the GDR." At the same time, four prominent peace activists (Peter Grimm, Hirsch, Eppelmann, and Templin) sent an appeal to the government of the GDR on the occasion of the UN Peace Year. Arguing that "only a state at peace with itself internally can work convincingly for global peace," the authors suggested ways to foster internal peace in the GDR. They asked the government to show more trust in its subjects and end restrictions on travel. The appeal called for revisions of the various clauses in the penal code invoked against dissidents, saying that "the practice of juridical persecution for political activity is altogether questionable." The authors asked for changes in the laws restricting freedom of assembly, public meeting and association. They called for the nomination of independent candidates in municipal and parliamentary elections, because democracy necessitates public participation. The appeal also demanded that the regime recognize the validity of conscientious objection through the creation of an alternative civilian service separate from military structures.[65] These constant pressures from below have borne fruit: although the asked-for alternative service has not been established, since 1986 no conscientious objector has been imprisoned in the GDR.

Turn to Political Activism

Some of the peace movement's most articulate spokespersons have come to realize the need to transcend the self-limiting peace agenda and tackle the issue of political change. This does not mean that East German pacifists have abandoned their original goals, but that they have concluded that internal peace cannot be attained without genuine dialogue between the rulers and citizens with different opinions and some measure of popular control over the government. They demand political freedoms, particularly the rights to free expression and association, as an inherent right.

The effort to loosen political controls cannot be divorced from what might be called the *glasnost'* effect. "*Glasnost'* from below" has become a rallying cry for many independent groups in the GDR. Gorbachev's calls for openness and general restructuring have stirred independent political activism not only in the USSR, but also, and sometimes more forcefully, in East-Central Europe. Like their peers in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland, the East German human rights and peace activists see Soviet reformism as providing a chance for radical transformations in their own countries. Many East European critical intellectuals see the present moment as the right time to elaborate a strategy

based on independent associations, a "parallel polis" influencing society through its activities and growing into a nationwide movement. . . . Such a strategy conceives of the existing independent movement as the nucleus of a new society. It is not incompatible with reformism, least of all with the notion of reform from below. . . . Out of the ruins of the old unreformable bureaucratic "transmission-belts" new organizations, institutions and initiatives are born. Instead of repression and manipulation, they strive for the emancipation of society by creating the conditions necessary for the emancipation of each individual.[66]

In April 1986, a petition urging the authorities to engage in a dialogue with society was prepared by 21 members of the independent peace movement for the delegates to the 11th SED Congress.[67] In its main ori-

[63]"The new evolutionism aims at gradual and slow change. But this does not mean that the movement for change will always be peaceful—that it will not require sacrifices and casualties . . . . The democratic opposition must be constantly and incessantly visible in public life, must create political facts by organizing mass actions, must formulate alternative programs. Everything else is an illusion." See Adam Michnik, *Letters From Prison and Other Essays*, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1986, pp. 145–47.

[64]*East European Reporter*, Spring 1986, p. 61.

[65]Ibid., p. 62.

[66]See Petr Uhl, "A Czechoslovakian Perspective," *New Politics* (New York), Winter 1988, p. 109.

[67]For the quotations in this and the next two paragraphs, see "Invitation to Dialogue: GDR Citizens Petition SED Party Congress," *East European Reporter*, Summer 1986, pp. 44–47; the full text is in *GDR Peace News* (a newsletter published by the GDR Working Group of END), Summer 1986, No. 3.

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entation, the petition echoed the late Robert Havemann's philosophy of political reform and individual rights. The signatories condemned the authoritarian bureaucratic measures adopted by the party leadership to suffocate criticism from below. They dealt extensively with the failure of the regime's economic, social and cultural policies. They deplored the stultifying effects of constraints imposed on society: "Cultural needs are not determined by the people but are created and artificially manipulated by the party according to pragmatic criteria. Cultural policy shaped by the party is a channel for ideological infiltration of all areas of the arts and culture, thus hindering the release of artistic creativity." The absence of genuine political participation, wrote the authors, has been one of the main causes of widespread resignation and apathy. The regime had consistently ignored basic societal needs, single-mindedly pursuing its own interests. Premilitary training has been made a condition for securing higher education or vocational training. The militarization of the educational system has aggravated its already deplorable state: "There is an almost complete absence of education in democratic attitudes. The shortcomings in this field are alarming. Many people have difficulty in formulating their needs and demands, or even in recognizing them only partially. Instruction in the rights of the individual as well as in the means by which those rights can be enforced plays hardly any role in the education system."

On the peace issue, the authors expressed their appreciation for the numerous official initiatives to end the arms race. But they questioned their relevance as long as the party continued to militarize society and to reject dialogue with it. Moreover, the authors deplored "another peculiar process—to be found also in the Western sphere—in the relation between domestic and foreign policy: the greater the number of bilateral and multilateral contacts at the state level (which are to be welcomed), the more vigorously are politically important contacts below that level obstructed." In other words, they believed that the GDR government had monopolized contacts with the West and hindered cooperation at the grass-roots level. However, international cooperation between autonomous groups must be possible so that citizens may participate in decisions of vital importance to them.

The document suggested a strategy aimed at "the withdrawal in the medium term of the GDR from the Warsaw Pact to encourage the process of military disengagement. This applies also to the withdrawal from our territory of foreign troops together with their weapons of mass destruction. The long overdue settlement of questions relating to the legal status arising from the still existing rights of the victors of World War II would then also have to be achieved. If the complete sovereignty of the GDR is to be established, the question of the outstanding peace treaties with both German states can no longer remain a taboo subject." As a first step in this direction, the authors proposed that a forum be created to organize a national dialogue on peace issues. The government-sponsored Peace Council could not play this role: "Its dependence on the foreign information department of the Central Committee of the SED means that its sole function is to be a mouthpiece and presenter of the peace policy of the state." An independent peace council is therefore necessary so that it would have the support of the unofficial peace groups: "The peace and security policy of the GDR cannot simply be left to the party and government. Peace is a human right and thus each member of society must be able to discuss and help determine everything that affects this right." The conclusion called for a "constructive dialogue": "There are no ready-made solutions to the problems referred to so far. They are not insoluble, yet we can only overcome them in an open discussion in which many partners both have equal status and can participate creatively in the social process."

This appeal highlights the fact that the peace groups face not only the repressive apparatus of their particular dictatorships but also the reality of Soviet domination in the region and their country's subordination to the Kremlin's global strategy. Their political programs thus include suggestions for domestic democratization as well as proposals for the general reassessment of East-West relations. Independent pacifists in Eastern Europe refuse to separate these goals precisely because they understand the link between their regimes' domestic and foreign policies.

Similar concerns were expressed in October 1986, when 16 East German peace and human rights activists signed a "Joint Declaration from Eastern Europe" on the 30th anniversary of the Hungarian revolution. The document, signed by 123 peace and human rights activists from four East European countries—Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland—proclaimed the traditions and experiences of the Hungarian revolution of 1956 to be their common heritage and the inspiration for their present efforts: "We proclaim our common determination to struggle for political democracy in our countries, for their independence, for pluralism founded on the principles of self-government, for the peaceful unification of a divided Europe and for its democratic integration, as well as for the rights of the minorities."[68]

(fn. 68 appears on p. 104)

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The significance of the joint declaration—a real watershed in the development of dissident cross-frontier cooperation—was not missed by the East German authorities. The official propagandists clung to the description of the Hungarian revolution as a "fascist rebellion." An article published in the Berlin newspaper *Weissenseer Blätter* even said:"All who, knowing what had happened there, identify themselves with the revolt of the Hungarian Arrow Cross, identify themselves with something that can only be compared with the Black Shirts in Italy and the Brown Shirts in Germany." The East German signatories filed a libel suit against the author, a professor of theology at Humboldt University in East Berlin. The office of the Chief Public Procurator of the GDR refused to take action. To add insult to injury, the office based its refusal on Article 27 of the GDR Constitution—which guarantees the right to freedom of opinion. In an open letter to the Public Procurator, Gerd Poppe, one of the claimants, discredited the official version of the Hungarian revolution. At the same time, he expressed the political philosophy of the independent movements: "the use of force to achieve political aims is rejected by the majority of East and West European peace and liberation movements today."[69]

Civic Activism

For a time in 1986 and 1987, it seemed that the government would avoid direct actions against the peace and human rights movement. Following the Chernobyl disaster in April 1986, the government allowed some public discussion of nuclear energy. Independent peace activists and Church leaders called for an overall reassessment of the country's nuclear energy program. Hundreds of East German citizens petitioned the authorities to stop using nuclear energy by the year 1990.

Political developments in the Soviet Union and in other East European countries also gave new impetus to the protest movement in the GDR.[70] Moreover, increased contacts with West German peace and ecology groups, the so-called Greens, contributed to the self-confidence of East German peace and human rights activists. The West German "alternative" groups become increasingly supportive of "East Germany's protest movement, which is demanding more freedom, *glasnost'* and a voice in how the country is run."[71] The idea of a "third way," neither communist nor capitalist, seemed an appealing alternative to the frozen divisions imposed by the official rules of the game.

In June 1986, activists associated with the group "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights"—a group founded at the beginning of 1986—started to publish *Grenzfall,* a monthly bulletin on peace, ecology, and human rights issues. The title is deliberately ambiguous. It means "borderline case" but also plays on the word *Grenze* (border). It intends to indicate the precarious status of the opposition and the much too visible East-West border that has become part and parcel of East German political reality.[72] In the beginning of 1987, another independent political journal—*Umweltblätter* ("Environmental Pages")—was launched by members of the Ecology Center sponsored by the Church of Zion in East Berlin. Both publications provide coverage on the concerns and activities of the alternative social movements in the GDR.

Grenzfall has reported on current East German political, social, and cultural issues, as well as on the activities of unofficial peace and human rights activists in other countries of the Soviet bloc. The publication corrects the distorted versions of independent activities disseminated through the official media. For example, from June 6 to 8, 1987, the East German police took action against hundreds of rock fans who had gathered at the Brandenburg Gate to hear Whitsuntide concerts on the Western side of the Berlin Wall. Manhandled by plainclothes policemen, the youth started to sing the "Internationale" and chanted "The Wall Must Go!," "Rosa Luxemburg!" and "Gorbachev!" The official media essentially ascribed the youth's behavior to "Western provocation." But in an article in *Grenzfall*, peace and human rights activists Templin and Grimm gave a different interpretation of what started as a melee and then turned into a political demonstration: "It became clear how thin is the cover under which social conflicts in the GDR are concealed. The massive and brutal deployment of police and security forces produced not intimidation but rapid politicization. Naturally there were no political conceptions and programs behind the calls for Gorbachev, the singing of the 'Internationale,' the demands for freedom and democracy, and an end to

[68] *Le Monde*, (Paris), Oct. 2, 1986. East German activists and members of Czechoslovakia's Charter 77 had signed a joint declaration in November 1984 to protest the deployment of more Soviet weapons in their countries. The declaration deplored the division of Europe into hostile blocs. See *The Independent* (London), Nov. 23, 1984. For a general assessment of the concerted actions of East-Central European dissidents and critical intellectuals, see Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Dissent in the Gorbachev Era," *Orbis*, Summer 1987, pp. 234–43.

[69] See Gerd Poppe's "Open Letter to the Public Prosecutor," *East European Reporter*, Spring 1987, pp. 53–54.

[70] For the intensification of dissident activities in the *glasnost'* era, see Michael Waller, *Peace, Power, and Protest: Eastern Europe in the Gorbachev Era*, London, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, 1988.

[71] See Patricia Clough, "Germany's Divided Young Discover Unity in Dissent," *The Independent*, Feb. 16, 1988.

[72] See *From Below*, p. 36.

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the Wall. They indicate the pressure, particularly among the younger generation, for more free space and fundamental democratization." More important, Templin and Grimm pointed to the lessons the independent peace movement should draw from the June clashes: "The East German peace movement and activist circles must ask themselves to what extent their persistence in self-contained modes of work, the writing of letters and petitions, and their self-isolation, is bypassing many conflicts and hopes. The June events will come to play a considerable role in the peace movement debate over independent activity, new points of departure, and new forms of action."[73]

Not everybody in the East German dissident community has high expectations of Gorbachev's policies, however. For example, one contributor to *Grenzfall* found "somewhat inappropriate" the demonstrators' eagerness to identify themselves with Gorbachev's strategy of reforms from above. In his view, there is an enormous difference between chanting Rosa Luxemburg's name and the unfounded enthusiasm for the Soviet general secretary who remains a representative of the party bureaucracy. He went on: "The demonstrators' singing of the 'Internationale,' even if horribly out of tune, but especially the chorus of calls for Rosa Luxemburg during the Stasi [security police] attack at the Gate, seems to me more valid in this context than the name of Mikhail Gorbachev. The invocation of Rosa Luxemburg outside the false appropriation of her person and the misuse and the distortion of her politics by the usual parades and state organizations remains a wonderful gesture, an embittered statement of the real domestic politics of the regime and proof of the degeneration of its original goals. It clearly says: this state is a caricature of socialism and has nothing in common with the ideas and the struggle of revolutionary spirits like Rosa Luxemburg."[74]

Other protests occurred in the summer of 1987. On the occasion of the state celebrations of the 750th anniversary of the founding of Berlin, the Protestant Church was for the first time allowed to organize its annual Church Festival (*Kirchentag*) in East Berlin. The venue led to conflicts between peace activists and Church authorities, who wanted to keep the festival within bounds tolerable to the state authorities. The annual "Peace Workshop" was canceled and the Kirchentag agenda modified. The independent activists convened their own "*Kirchentag von Unten*" ("Church Festival from Below"—KvU). An article published in *Umweltblätter* described the tensions between the Church hierarchy and the autonomous initiatives, criticizing the Church for "its increasingly repressive policy" toward peace and environmentalist groups in its parishes, and said that the alienation of the top Church hierarchy from the independent activists "showed itself most clearly in its treatment of the 'basic' groups, who were increasingly excluded as 'freeloaders' on the Church." The article urged the Church to offer a platform to these basic groups who "belong to a genuine Christian tradition and prefigure renewal in the Church."[75] Slogans like "*Glasnost*' in the State and the Church" or "the Church from Below for more Christianity, democracy, and human rights" capture the ethos of grass-roots pacifism in the GDR. The "Church from Below" has grown—it has more than 1,000 members—and some prominent Church figures have deplored the strains in the Church's relations with these and other independent activists.

The peace movement advocates the democratization of the body politic and the transformation of society into a real partner of the government in the exercise of power. They feel that if the authorities want trust, both internally and internationally, they must accept dialogue with the independent groups who voice the critical concerns of the population. In their view, official pledges of peaceful intentions are hypocritical as long as the communist regime does not fulfill all the obligations assumed under the Helsinki Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). In November 1986, 30 East German citizens, most of them associated with the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" joined hundreds of activists from other countries in signing a memorandum addressed to the citizens and governments of all the CSCE signatories. The document insisted that, in order to become real, détente must reach beyond the governmental level to societies. The formula "détente from below" sums up this outlook: "We reject the use of military and paramilitary forces or secret service activities to suppress social changes within a country as well as any interference by such forces or threats of such interference in the internal affairs of other countries. At the same time we strongly advocate trans-frontier solidarity, mutual support and cooperation between people and groups working for peace, civil liberties, trade union rights, social justice, women's emancipation, or ecological goals. . . . Mutual trust cannot be created solely by governments. It must be built up between citizens as well."[76]

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[73]See Peter Grimm and Wolfgang Templin, "The Internationale at the Brandenburg Gate," translated in A. Winton Jackson, "The New Samizdat," *Across Frontiers* (Berkeley, CA), Winter 1988, p. 16.

[74]Ibid., pp. 16–17.

[75]Ibid., p. 17.

[76]See "Giving Real Life to the Helsinki Accords: A Memorandum to Citizens, Groups, and Governments of All CSCE Countries," published by European Network for East-West Dialogue, Berlin, November 1986; see also Vladimir Tismaneanu, "Dissent in the Gorbachev Era," loc. cit., pp. 238–40.

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Communist ideology has strongly opposed pacifism, which it blames for weakening the will to resist "imperialist aggression." Pacifist stances and attitudes may be desirable in the West, but they have no place in the behavior prescribed for the "socialist citizen." This attitude is reflected in the GDR's treatment of conscientious objectors. Service in military construction units in East Germany is not a satisfactory alternative to conscientious objectors because construction soldiers (*Bausoldaten*) must build military facilities (airfields, barracks, etc.). Moreover, former construction soldiers suffer job discrimination. The "total conscientious objectors," those who refuse to serve both in military and in construction units, used to receive prison sentences of 18 to 26 months.[77]

Both the Church and the independent peace movement have long called for the establishment of a genuine "social service for peace."[78] The status of conscientious objectors remains a fundamental concern for independent activists and may well prompt further spontaneous initiatives in Soviet-bloc countries. An announcement in January 1988 by the Polish government of its plan to introduce an alternative civilian service for conscientious objectors has prompted East German activists to exert more pressure on their own authorities.[79] Fifteen East German activists signed an appeal with other East European peace activists on behalf of conscientious objectors. The appeal, which was sent to the Vienna follow-up conference of the CSCE, welcomed the January and March 1987 resolutions of the Council of Europe and the United Nations Human Rights Commission, respectively, which defined conscientious objection as a universal human right.[80]

A New Repressive Wave

The East German regime has shown no inclination to respond to the calls of independent groups—and thus to legitimize them; instead, it has tried to silence them. In November 1987, the authorities organized a police raid on the Church of Zion in East Berlin, where they arrested two members of a peace and ecological group and confiscated printing and mimeographing supplies as well as unofficial publications considered "hostile to the state." The raid of the church of Zion was aimed at the publishers of *Grenzfall*, which was located on the church's premises and which had become the principal organ calling for political reform.[81]

Without disavowing *Grenzfall,* Evangelical Church leaders reiterated that they did not take part in political opposition. While conceding that the Church's role in the GDR consists also of serving as a "safety valve" for the oppressed, Rev. Günther Krusche, general superintendent of the Evangelical Church of East Berlin, noted: "Our critics say, 'Jesus was here for everybody, but you throw them out.' We don't, but the church should stay the church. The task of the church is not the same as that of the political opposition."[82]

In retrospect, the November 1987 crackdown appears to have been only a dress rehearsal for a wider anti-oppositional action. Disliking developments in the USSR, where thousands of independent groups, associations, and publications have sprung up due to the *glasnost'* policy, and concerned over potentially disruptive developments in the GDR, the SED leadership decided on a determined campaign against all sources of political turmoil. Thus, during the first two months of 1988, the authorities organized the largest crackdown on dissidents in at least 10 years.[83] According to information from church sources, between January and mid-March 1988, more than 500 men and women were detained. Often, an application to emigrate to West Germany was reason for detention. More than 150 persons were sentenced to prison terms of 18 to 24 months in the wake of the outbreak of protests. Some were kept in prison while awaiting trial; those who were released had to report daily to the local police.[84] The crackdown indicates that Honecker and his comrades do not intend to experiment with pluralism, even of the "socialist" variety promoted by Károly Grósz, Wojciech Jaruzelski, or Mikhail Gorbachev. They seem united in opposing internal democratization and are known to resent Soviet prodding to do so.[85]

[77] See *From Below,* pp. 38–40; Barbara Donovan, "Conscientious Objection in Eastern Europe," *RFE,* RAD Background Report/9, Jan. 26, 1988.

[78] See Edgar Lamm, "Highest, Holy, or Holiest Obligation," *Deutsche Tagespost/Katolische Zeitung für Deutschland* (Würzburg), Jan. 15, 1987.

[79] See Martin Sieff, "Growing Pacifist Movement Gains Concessions in Poland," *The Washington Times,* Mar, 30, 1988.

[80] See John Tagliabue, "In East Bloc, an Expanding Network of Dissenters," *The New York Times,* Mar. 22, 1988.

[81] *Grenzfall* appeared monthly during 1986–87 with a run of about 1,000 copies.

[82] See Henry Kamm, "In East Berlin, Dissenters Resist a Crackdown," *The New York Times,* Nov. 30, 1987.

[83] See Barbara Donovan, "Crackdown on Dissidents in the GDR," *RFE,* RAD Background Report/22, Feb. 17, 1988.

[84] *FBIS-EEU,* Apr. 1, 1988, p. 11.

[85] An unmistakable sign of the SED elite's displeasure with the current de-Stalinization campaign in the Soviet Union were the attacks on the Soviet anti-Stalinist film *Repentance* in the pages of the official party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* and the FDJ paper *Junge Welt.* See Barbara Donovan "Criticism in the GDR of the Soviet Film *Repentance,*" *RFE,* RAD Background Report/215, Nov. 9, 1987. See also E. Kautsky, "Gorbachev and the GDR," ibid., Dec. 16, 1986; and Barbara Donovan, "The GDR's Attitude Toward the Soviet 'Reform'," ibid., Feb. 20, 1987.

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Youthful participants at a church festival in East Berlin on June 28, 1987, with placards calling for "Glasnost in State and Church," and representing the "Church from Below" in asking for "More Christianity, Democracy, and Human Rights."

—DPA.

The crackdown was precipitated by the attempt of a group of human rights and peace activists to stage a demonstration parallel to the official annual January 17th rally commemorating the death in 1919 of the founders of the Communist Party of Germany, Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. Human rights activists tried to unfold banners calling for the democratization of the political system. The party newspaper *Neues Deutschland* accused the demonstrators of intending to "maliciously disturb the mourning procession." A week later, the security police expelled 54 of those arrested (as well as members of their families) who had previously applied for emigration visas. On January 25, six leading dissidents were arrested. Eleven activists were eventually sentenced to prison terms ranging from six months to one year for illegal assembly. Seven of East Germany's most prominent dissidents, including the singer Stefan Krawczyk, were investigated for "treasonable ties with the West."[86]

What followed was a forceful demonstration of solidarity with those arrested. Night after night, in East Berlin and in some 30 other cities throughout the GDR, people gathered for vigils in Protestant churches. Church personalities used these meetings to speak of the need to liberalize the political system. The Rev. Manfred Becker, head of the Berlin and Brandenburg synod, noted the widespread discontent with Honecker's reluctance to emulate the Soviet policies: "Much hope in our country is linked with the name Gorbachev .... *Glasnost'* and *perestroyka* belong on the agenda in our country too."[87] On January 30, in a statement read before more than 2,000 people gathered in an East Berlin church, the Evangelical Church leadership urged the government to release the imprisoned political ac-

[86]See Barbara Donovan, "Crackdown on Dissidents . . . ," loc. cit.
[87]See John Tagliabue, "East Germany Faces Unrest Among Youth," *The New York Times*, Feb. 4, 1988.

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tivists. On February 4, the London-based East European Cultural Foundation published the text of a petition protesting the persecution of East German peace and human rights activists, which was signed by 257 representatives of human rights groups and by private individuals from the Soviet Union and other East European countries. Such international solidarity is extremely important for activists in communist states, who believe that international public opinion—from both the East and the West—will ultimately persuade local leaders to reconsider some of their more repressive measures.

In fact, after the strong domestic and international reactions, all the dissidents were released in early February. Some of them, including Krawczyk and his wife Freya Klier, emigrated. In a statement to the West German press, Krawczyk asserted that he and his wife had not left the GDR voluntarily. According to Krawczyk, the East German officials refused to allow him and his wife to remain at liberty in the GDR but gave them the choice of emigrating or facing up to 12 years' imprisonment on charges of treason.[88] Some members of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights, as well as human rights activist Vera Wollenberger of the "Church from Below," left the GDR. They also denied the government's allegation that they left the GDR voluntarily. The government thus continues to expel the most outspoken members of the peace and human rights movement to eliminate political turmoil.

An unusual move during this clampdown on dissent was the government's decision to issue passports to two of the leading members of the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" (Bärbel Bohley and Werner Fischer) to go to Great Britain and to allow them to return to the GDR after six months. According to Fischer, the authorities sought pretexts to accuse the two activists of having engaged in anti-GDR propaganda in the West and consequently to withdraw their passports.[89] However, Fischer and Bohley were allowed to return to the GDR in August 1988.

Recently expelled East German peace activists Freya Klier and Stefan Krawczyk.

—Klaus Mehner.

The 1988 crackdown was aptly described by Krawczyk and Klier as a neo-Stalinist attempt to resist political change and safeguard the dictatorship. In economic relations, the SED leadership is increasingly Western-oriented, but domestically it seems to favor the type of rigid control of which the most extreme example today is found in Nicolae Ceauşescu's Romania.[90] According to Manfred Stolpe, a leading Evangelical Church personality, the SED Politburo is divided between those who regret the bygone era of monolithic dictatorship and those who fear the grim prospect of ending up on the disastrous Romanian course. An ominous sign of the latter possibility were the "fraternal greetings" sent to "esteemed comrade Nicolae Ceauşescu," together with the award of a Karl Marx Order,

[88]Ten years ago, the East German regime levelled similar accusations of "contacts with Western secret services" against social critic Rudolf Bahro, who was sentenced to a prison term of eight years for having written a critical analysis of "really existing socialism." Bahro was released from jail under a general amnesty and then expelled into the FRG where he has become a prominent member of the Green Party. On many occasions, Bahro has advocated a rapprochement between West and East German alternative movements based on an anti-bloc alliance that would abolish the East-West conflict: "When you look at the opposition in Hungary 1956, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and now in Poland, and compare that with what exists in the GDR, you will see that this nonantagonistic eco-pacifist movement, which is not simply seeking a confrontation with Honecker, is much more a German than an Eastern-bloc opposition. The identity of this youthful, deeply-rooted opposition in both German states demonstrates that, beyond the Federal Republic and the GDR, there is still Germany." See Rudolf Bahro, *From Red to Green: Interviews with New Left Review*, London, Verso and New Left Books, 1984, p. 194. In fact, pacifism in East Germany has taken a path increasingly like that of other East-Central European opposition movements.

[89]"Hidden Opposition in the GDR," loc. cit., p. 66.

[90]For insightful views on the new dogmatic freeze in East Germany, see the discussion with the GDR protesters Freya Klier and Stefan Krawczyk in *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 8, 1988, pp. 27–32; see also Susan Buckingham, "The Freedom to Think Differently: A Report on the Latest Crackdowns on GDR Independents," *East European Reporter*, March 1988, pp. 55–57.

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on the occasion of his 70th birthday in January 1988. Ironically, praises of the Romanian dictator were published on the front page of the same issue of the party daily *Neues Deutschland* that announced, on its second page, the arrest of Krawczyk and the other peace and civil rights activists.[91]

The explusion of Krawczyk and the other prominent activists gave the SED a temporary political victory. Not only did the authorities rid themselves of some of the most articulate spokesmen for political change, but the expulsions convinced many people that joining the peace and human rights groups and demonstrating with them could be the easiest—and fastest—way to emigrate. This situation helps the authorities to paint the independent groups as nothing more than a springboard for emigration.

The rate of emigration has also become a major concern for those peace and human rights activists who want to continue their struggle in the GDR. Heated discussions have been reported between those whose main objective is to leave the GDR and those who want to remain and promote changes from within. The regime's decision to expel Krawczyk dealt a forceful blow to the human rights and peace movement because those who remained felt betrayed on learning about the emigration of a man who symbolized the decision to stay and seek the improvement of domestic conditions. As for the Church, although it has pressed for a more tolerant emigration policy, its leaders too have been concerned over the population drain. Hirsch, one of the leaders of the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" who was expelled from the GDR, has bitterly pointed to the predicament of those who do not view their political activism as a fast track for emigration: "One has to say that the demonstrators are mainly people who want to leave the GDR. They have now learned that if one takes part in a demonstration, one quickly gets out of the country. The people who want to change the GDR from within, who want to stay in this country, will have many difficulties."[92] In other words, they will have to work hard to repair their credibility. Hirsch was not speaking only for himself when he added: "I am faced with the problem that I am here [in the FRG] and actually I wanted to stay in my country, to change something in the country where I lived. I do not feel well, at all. And, of course, I am sad. Now everything that I have been doing for years has been ruined."

Prospects

Yet, the grass-roots human rights and peace initiatives only intensified in the aftermath of the January 1988 arrests. Far from being ephemeral or marginal, such activities are the outcome of a long process of political radicalization of East German youth. The youth revolt originates in a profound disaffection with the socialist model as it exists in the GDR. For many young East Germans, participation in the new social movements afford an opportunity to gain a sense of belonging and of doing something that is both practical and noble.

An effect of complex and contradictory social, political, and cultural processes, the independent peace and human rights movement can no longer be suppressed by decree. It represents a search for innovative forms of political struggle and organization fundamentally at odds with the bureaucratic logic of the existing system. Precisely because of its broad social appeal, the movement could gradually structure itself into a democratic opposition, much as has happened in Poland and Hungary.

In East Germany, what started as a moral initiative for demilitarization of society has now turned into a rapidly growing political movement. Despite steady police harassment, there are now about 200 independent groups active in the GDR, in and out of the Church. According to Fischer, each group has between 20 and 100 members, who in turn are part of various social organizations where they can gradually disseminate their views and gain influence. Thus, these groups represent "an enormous critical potential."[93]

The Evangelical Church has helped the young activists to develop both their independent stance toward the authorities and the sense of mutual solidarity. In a letter to Honecker, Bärbel Bohley pointed out the need to bridge the abyss between "them" and "us," between the rulers and the ruled:

This state does not belong only to you or to me, but to all of us. Like me, there are many people who feel

[91]For an extensive analysis of the youth rebellion in the GDR and its implications for the political culture in that country, see *Der Spiegel*, Feb. 1, 1988, pp. 18–27. The Karl Marx Order was personally given to Ceauşescu by Erich Honecker during the Romanian leader's visit to East Berlin in November 1988. Perhaps not entirely by coincidence, the ceremony was held on the first anniversary of the popular riots in Romania's second most important city, Braşov. East German dissidents who had planned to protest Ceauşescu's repressive policy were kept under house arrest during the Romanian president's stay in East Germany.

[92]Interview with Ralf Hirsch in *Profil* (Vienna), Feb. 22, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Feb. 23, 1988, p. 20. Hirsch's life epitomizes the ordeals of independent pacifists in East Germany: "Once, I was imprisoned for two years on charges of subversion; I had distributed fliers against military service. But arrests for between 24 and 48 hours—well, there were at least 50 in the past 10 years. For years, I was taken from my apartment or arrested off the street almost every Friday morning."

[93]See "Hidden Opposition in the GDR," loc. cit., p. 65.

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homeless in this country. Like you, there are many who feel at home. But there are also people who have established themselves in their tiny corners and who mistake their niche for home; they dare not express their aspirations and views publicly. I am not writing you in the hope of having my own situation changed, but to have you contribute to change in the situation in the GDR in such a way that all persons can express their opinions without being threatened in their existence.[94]

Many activists still remain in the GDR to continue the struggle. The political agenda of the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" has become a dynamic factor in the struggle for internal change. And recent developments have shown that the authorities' attempts to compromise the movement have not succeeded. In January 1989, an open letter was addressed to Honecker by members of a group opposed to "the practice and principle of demarcation" (*Abgrenzung*) between the two German states. The authors took issue with the East German leader's statement that the Berlin Wall served the "well-understood interest of the GDR's population." It noted: "Everybody knows that the Wall is not directed against robbers from the outside but at those on the inside. Our country needs stability based on justice, not stability based on fear . . . we demand that a free, sincere, and public dialogue among all groups and forces in our society be permitted and opened up. This would be the first and most important step to removing the reasons for having the Wall that still pertain today . . . . The reasons are primarily internal not external. It is up to you to take and permit measures to overcome them. We, and our children, do not want to wait 50 more years."[95]

Also in January 1989, a group called the "Initiative for the Democratic Renewal of Our Society" distributed leaflets in Leipzig during the commemorations of the 70th anniversary of the deaths of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht. The leaflet urged East German citizens to strive to democratize their society: "It is time to courageously and openly speak our minds and put an end to paralyzing apathy and indifference. Let us advocate together the right to freedom of opinion, to freedom of association and assembly, to freedom of the press, and against the ban on the [Soviet] magazine *Sputnik* and of Soviet films."[96] The authorities arrested 11 members of church, environmental, and peace groups in Leipzig.[97]

Grenzfall also reappeared in January 1989, after a one-year pause. The new issue contained information about opposition groups in Eastern Europe, a conversation with two Estonian activists about *perestroyka*, and data about GDR citizens who had been denied exit visas to visit other socialist countries.[98] A new magazine entitled *Gegendruck*, meaning both counterpressure and counterpublishing, was launched in late 1988 as well.

Conclusion

The East German independent peace movement began as a form of unofficial activity concerned primarily with the growing militarization of public life. Due to qualified but consistent support offered by the Evangelical Church, the movement gained adherents and influence. Although on various occasions radical activists expressed dissatisfaction with the Church hierarchy's reluctance to engage in direct confrontation with the authorities, many clergymen have joined the independent movement represented by the "Church from Below" and turned their churches into havens for persecuted activists. One can expect this trend to continue. Other groups formed not only in protest over what were perceived as "accommodationist" positions by the Evangelical Church hierarchy, but because they had an agenda different from that being pursued by the Church.

The "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights," for example, was formed outside the Church because its founders had an agenda that went beyond traditional religious pacifism. As described by Werner Fischer, the group's attitude indicates the growing autonomy of the pacifist movement in the GDR:

The "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" is not particularly interested in a relationship with the Church. We use the physical space which the Church provides, but we regard ourselves as an independent group. The "Initiative" works to maintain a good working relationship with the Church because of its important function in society.[99]

[94]*Der Spiegel*, Feb. 1, 1988, p. 20.

[95]See *Frankfurter Rundschau* (Frankfurt/Main), Jan. 28, 1989.

[96]See ibid., Jan. 16, 1989. For the official commemoration, see *Neues Deutschland*, Jan. 16, 1989.

[97]The police also searched several apartments and seized books, documents, and diaries. This operation prevented a planned independent demonstration scheduled to coincide with an official ceremony commemorating Rosa Luxemburg's and Karl Liebknecht's deaths. See "Police Operations Yield Arrests," AFP in English, *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 21.

[98]See "Human Rights Publication Reappears After a Year," DPA in German, trans. in *FBIS-EEU*, Jan. 26, 1989, p. 17.

[99]See "Hidden Opposition in the GDR," loc. cit., p. 65.

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The group's purpose is to create a peaceful domestic climate through the exercise of basic rights, such as freedom of opinion and of the press, and the right of assembly. Although these rights are guaranteed by the East German constitution and laws, they can currently be exercised only at the discretion of state organs. A document prepared by the "Initiative for Peace and Human Rights" on the occasion of Human Rights Day (December 10, 1987) points out the organic connection between peace and the exercise of human rights:

Peace is for us inevitably also a process of necessary social and political change. This change within society is not a threat to, but the precondition for a stable peace. We need a broad public opinion to emerge that can exercise effective control. The emergence of such a critical public opinion depends on the guarantee of human and civil rights.[100]

Without denying the need for dialogue with the government, the movement sees democratization as a process of self-determined social emancipation:

Fundamental change in the sense of a nonviolent policy geared to the preservation, or rather, the restoration of our natural environment and respect for human dignity is not to be expected from the "all-powerful" perfect state. To achieve this, decentralization and self-organization of society, as well as self-management in all areas of life, are required. If we wish to operate in such a context, we must learn to accept the pluralism that actually exists within society.[101]

Religious pacifism is, therefore, only one current within the independent peace movement in the GDR. Other elements include ecologists, democratic socialists, neo-Marxists, etc. Yet, all these groups share a consensus about major goals and the most appropriate methods to achieve them. In the mid-1980's, the East German independent groups became increasingly critical of the existing order. Since they are all committed to a strategy of nonviolence, share the same long-term objectives, and frequently act in a coordinated way, these groups can be broadly described as a social movement.[102] But it is an informal, anti-authoritarian movement, one that rejects firm institutional structures or cooptation. It is an expression of a profound desire in East German society for democratization.

The pacifist and human rights groups have felt encouraged by Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost'* in working for societal renewal. Confronted by the mounting protest movement, Honecker's regime has reacted in the traditional repressive fashion: raids, searches, beatings, arrests, interrogations, imprisonments, and expulsions. But instead of deterring them, this tactic has further radicalized the independent groups.

To conclude, East German peace and human rights activism has profound social causes: discontent with the militaristic course of the regime, opposition to political and cultural repression, youth disaffection with officially propagated hackneyed dogmas, widespread attraction to a pluralistic order. It is indicative of the awakening of society after the long passivity imposed by a rigid bureaucratic regime. With support from the Church and the various alternative subcultures, the movement can become the backbone of a democratic opposition in East Germany.

[100]See "Thoughts of the Initiative for Peace and Human Rights on the Occasion of Human Rights Day, 10 December 1987, in the Gethsemane Church," *East European Reporter*, March 1988, p. 59.

[101]Ibid.

[102]For a discussion of the peace movement as an "integrative concept" (*Sammelbegriff*), see Eberhard Huhrt, *Wider die Militarisierung der Gesellschaft: Friedensbewegung und Kirche in der DDR* (Against the Militarization of Society: The Peace Movement and the Church in the GDR), Melle, Verlag Ernst Knoth, 1984, pp. 12–14.

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Note

Change and Continuity in Soviet Central American Policy

Jan S. Adams

WHAT impact has Mikhail Gorbachev's "new political thinking" had on Soviet involvement in Central America and the Caribbean? What are the possible implications of these changes for stability in the region?

Gorbachev's new political thought has unquestionably introduced significant changes in Soviet policy toward that part of the world. These include a new Soviet reluctance to continue providing military and economic support to clients in the region at previous levels, signs of pressure from Moscow on client states and movements to settle regional conflicts by political rather than military means, and some efforts by the USSR to play down ideology in relations with states and parties of the region.

Yet, a number of powerful past habits continue to influence Soviet behavior in the region. Concurrently with the above innovations, Moscow continues to back groups pursuing social revolution by violent means and to extend considerable amounts of military, economic, and political assistance to its major clients in the region. Also, virulent ideological attacks on the United States, disinformation campaigns, and pointedly anti-American activities remain a part of the Soviet agenda in Central America and the Caribbean. This note examines these intertwined strands of current Soviet policy and explores their future political ramifications.

Policy Change

On the change side of the ledger, there is strong evidence that Moscow has been trying to nudge the Sandinista government of Nicaragua toward a political settlement with the opposing Contra forces by exerting economic leverage, especially by withholding oil shipments. Moscow's "petro-pressure" is accompanied by advice to the Sandinistas to seek accommodation under the Guatemala accord, an agreement that appears to be in the spirit of the Gorbachev line for ending regional strife in areas where the interests of the East and the West clash.[1]

In early 1987, Moscow temporarily suspended oil deliveries to Nicaragua, indicating, in the words of one observer, the Kremlin's unwillingness to "pour money endlessly into a regional conflict that jeopardized US-

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[1]See, for example, P. Bogomolov's flat statement of Moscow's position that "the only way to normalize the [Nicaraguan] situation is through consistent implementation of the Guatemala accords . . ." and his assertion that the June 1988 cease-fire was only made possible "by the steady resolve of the revolutionary [i.e., Sandinista] government to secure peace." In "A Difficult Stage," *Pravda* (Moscow), June 5, 1988.

On the new attitude toward regional conflicts, see Mikhail Gorbachev, *Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World*, New York, Harper & Row, 1987, pp. 175–76, 188; also, A. Kislov, "New Political Thinking and Regional Conflicts," *Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya* (Moscow), August 1988, pp. 46–47.

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Soviet relations."[2] A clearer message could hardly have been sent, because Soviet oil is essential to the Sandinista war effort. Even the 100,000 tons promised in 1987 fell short of meeting Nicaragua's needs. In 1988, an official of the Nicaraguan Institute of Energy indicated that Soviet oil deliveries had dropped to 70,000 tons,[3] and in October 1988, the Sandinistas were forced to double the domestic price of fuel.[4]

Throughout 1988, Sandinista leaders repeatedly proclaimed their allegiance to the Guatemalan peace process, hoping, it seemed, to be rewarded for their good behavior. And, in fact, on November 4, 1988, the new Soviet ambassador to Managua, Valeriy Nikolayenko, announced that "contrary to Western reports alleging that Moscow would reduce its economic aid to Managua," the Soviet Union would indeed increase its economic and military aid.[5] But the Soviet-Nicaraguan economic agreement signed at the end of November did not promise greater quantities of oil. For 1989, the Soviets guaranteed delivery of only 60,000 tons, a 40 percent reduction from 1987 and a level of supply geared to keep the pressure on Nicaragua.[6]

While Moscow thus manipulated the economic levers, Soviet media were encouraging regional negotiation. Typical is a Moscow radio broadcast beamed to Latin America on August 20, 1988, in which a West German political advisor to the Nicaraguan government, interviewed by Radio Moscow's correspondent in Bonn, urged the Sandinistas to show flexibility in forthcoming talks with the Contras:

I hope that neither of the two sides puts forth unacceptable proposals, such as making the resumption of the talks contingent upon acceptance of their demands . . . . This allows us to hope that dynamic forces in the area will rise to the occasion and do everything possible for the negotiating process to advance toward the re-establishment of peace in Nicaragua.[7]

Elsewhere in the region, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) has strikingly changes its posture vis-à-vis local communist and leftist parties. Moscow has been playing down ideology in such interparty relations and has moderated its once domineering behavior. A number of Western scholars, surveying CPSU relations with fraternal parties in Latin America in 1987, noted that "the Soviets . . . have not been concerned with actively directing the Latin American communist parties." They cite, in particular, Gorbachev's explanation: "It is impossible for the Soviets to give advice on how the Argentine Communist Party should act or for the PCA to advise the CPSU; each party knows its situation better than anyone else."[8]

The CPSU's greetings to the Costa Rican Popular Vanguard (i.e., communist) Party on the occasion of its 16th Congress illustrated the new style. Instead of calling for militant revolutionary action, the Soviet party said:

We value the PVP's support for Soviet foreign policy initiatives geared to preventing a nuclear catastrophe, creating an all-embracing system of international security, and ensuring the right of peoples to free political and social choice. We hope that your congress's decisions will contribute to the cohesion of Costa Rican communists and of all who advocate the country's independent and democratic development.[9]

A similar avoidance of ideological rhetoric characterized the September 1988 greetings of the CPSU to "all Jamaican communists" gathered for the Fourth Congress of the Workers' Party of Jamaica,[10] and the dis-

[2]Carlotta Gall, "The Burden of Empire," Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty, *Radio Liberty Research* (Munich), RL 512/87, Dec. 16, 1987, p. 3.

[3]Moscow Radio to Latin America, Nov. 14, 1988, trans. in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (Washington, DC—hereafter, *FBIS-SOV*), Nov. 16, 1988, p. 43. Radio Moscow was quoting Indiana Gonzalez, who attempted to depict the reduced level of Soviet deliveries as a sign of Moscow's coming to Nicaragua's assistance when Mexico and Venezuela reduced their shipments.

[4]*The Christian Science Monitor* (Boston), Oct. 3, 1988; at the same time Nicaragua's currency was devalued by 77 percent.

[5]Belgrade TANJUG, Nov. 5, 1988, translated in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 8, 1988, p. 35. Nikolayenko may have been responding to Western assertions that Moscow had seriously trimmed its economic aid to Nicaragua in the agreement announced in January 1988, by promising only $294 million in aid for a three-year period, as compared with the $260 million in economic aid Managua reportedly received from Moscow in 1986 alone. See Daniel Abele, "The Soviet Commitment to the Sandinistas," *Radio Liberty Research*, RL 269/86, July 18, 1986, p. 3; Russell Leigh Moses, "Recent Developments in Soviet-Nicaraguan Relations," ibid., RL 137/88, Mar. 30, 1988, p. 6.

[6]Moscow Radio to Latin America, Nov. 27, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Nov. 29, 1988, p. 44.

[7]*FBIS-SOV*, Aug. 23, 1988, pp. 30–32.

[8]US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities: A Report on Active Measures and Propaganda, 1986–87*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, August 1987, p. 67. This portion of the study came from a conference sponsored by the US Department of State on May 7, 1987, which brought together nine prominent US scholars to discuss Soviet relations with Latin America.

[9]*Pravda*, Sept. 16, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 26, 1988, p. 27.

[10]*Pravda*, Sep. 8, 1988. Although Jamaica's struggle "against imperialist diktat," was mentioned, the essence of the message was expressed in the following sentence: "The CPSU and the WPJ are linked by strong bonds of comradeship and cooperation based on a community of ideals, a desire to creatively develop Marxist-Leninist teaching, and the principles of inviolable international solidarity, full equality, and independence of parties."

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cussions of CPSU delegations in Colombia and Peru in mid-1987, which "focused primarily on the process of restructuring currently under way in the USSR."[11]

Moscow is also making serious efforts to enlarge its limited diplomatic presence in Central America and the Caribbean Basin.[12] Assisting in the process is a restructured team of diplomats.[13] The Soviet Union is also employing a less formal instrument in this endeavor—exchanges of parliamentary delegations. The establishment of links between elected delegates and regional elites deemphasizes ideological differences and facilitates Soviet contacts with non-communist systems.[14]

In 1987, Guatemala sent its first-ever delegation of legislators to the USSR, and in January 1988, a Soviet legislator visited the President of Suriname "to further the development of relations and cooperation."[15] Two months later, members of the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly visited the Kremlin,[16] and the following month, Soviet parliamentarians attended the 79th Conference of the International Parliamentary Union in Guatemala.[17] In September 1988, another "first delegation," this time from Honduras, spent a week in Moscow at the invitation of the USSR Supreme Soviet and announced the establishment of regular future exchanges.[18] In the same month, legislators from Cuba and Venezuela were hosted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow.[19] And in December, a deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, P. Khabibullayev, in Mexico City for the inauguration of President Carlos Salinas de Gotari, met with the foreign ministers of Belize, Costa Rica, and the Dominican Republic to discuss Soviet ties with these countries.[20] Although exchanges of parliamentary delegations may downplay ideology—with the apparent aim of avoiding an ideological backlash, especially in countries where some local political elements may be strongly opposed to the Soviet system[21]—the broadening of such exchanges generally suggests a deemphasis of ideological advocacy and a new flexibility in promoting Soviet contacts abroad.

Change also distinguishes the new management style employed by Soviet agencies (both party and government) in their dealings with international front organizations, with the Nonaligned Movement, with trade unions, and with other international organizations and people's groups. The International Department of the CPSU Central Committee appears, in at least some cases, to be guiding the Soviet-line front organizations with a lighter touch than in the past—aided no doubt by its more broadly appealing and credible message, typified in the call by then-ID Chief Anatoliy Dobrynin for "vigorous actions of the public forces, people's diplomacy, in support of world peace and cooperation."[22] The May 1986 creation within the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a new department for Soviet relations with the Nonaligned Movement—traditionally a concern of the ID—may signal a less dogmatic approach to that movement. (The institutionalization of this function is, however, open to a different interpretation—see the discussion below.)

Finally, Soviet advice to struggling economies in Central America appears less laden with ideological rhetoric and more realistic than in the past. For example, when the United States invoked economic sanctions against Nicaragua and Panama, Moscow calmly advised these countries to seek as much independence from US markets as possible by obtaining financing from and expanded economic relations with

[11]Ibid., Jan. 6, 1988.

[12]In Central America, Moscow has embassies in Costa Rica and Nicaragua, and diplomatic relations (currently implemented through the Soviet embassies in Mexico and Costa Rica) with Guatemala. In the Caribbean Basin, there are Soviet embassies serving Cuba, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Colombia, Guyana, Mexico, Suriname, and Venezuela.

[13]All heads of missions abroad were summoned to an extraordinary meeting in May 1986 at the Soviet foreign ministry at which Gorbachev informed them of his new policy priorities and the new negotiating tactics expected of the diplomats. By that time, although Gorbachev had been in power for only 14 months, one-third of the ambassadors had already been replaced. Gorbachev's diplomatic staff reputedly has a "wider knowledge of the outside world." See Alexander Rahr, "Winds of Change Hit Foreign Ministry," *Radio Liberty Research,* RL 274/86, July 16, 1986, p. 6.

[14]As Stephen Sestanovich has observed, "the Soviets have also opened a second front in the Third World: closer relations have been actively pursued with many states once written off as American lackeys." See his "Gorbachev's Foreign Policy: A Diplomacy of Decline," *Problems of Communism* (Washington, DC), January-February 1988, pp. 12–13.

[15]Moscow Television, July 29, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* Aug. 3, 1987, p. I/3; TASS, Jan. 27, 1988, trans. in ibid., Jan. 27, 1988, p. 49.

[16]TASS, Mar. 30, 1988, trans. in ibid., Mar. 31, 1988, pp. 31–32.

[17]*Izvestiya* (Moscow), Apr. 14, 1988, trans. in ibid., Apr. 21, 1988, p. 37.

[18]Moscow Radio, Aug. 30, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 2, 1988, p. 27; *Izvestiya,* Sept. 9, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 12, 1988, p. 44.

[19]*Pravda,* Sept. 28, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 29, 1988, p. 49; TASS, Sept. 26, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 27, 1988, p. 43; Venezuela's Senator R. Carpio Castillo also discussed Soviet restructuring and international relations with Aleksandr Yakovlev during his visit.

[20]*Pravda,* Dec. 4, 1988, trans. in ibid., Dec. 8, 1988, pp. 42–43.

[21]Cultural exchanges in Guatemala were set back after a bomb exploded in front of the offices of the Soviet press agency TASS, resulting in the closing of this office and cancellation of a planned concert by a Soviet symphony orchestra. The Cuban press agency also closed its Guatemala office after its correspondent received death threats. See *The New York Times,* July 6, 1988, p. 2.

[22]Wallace Spaulding notes that "Moscow gave the appearance of loosening control over the Soviet-line peace movement" in 1988, but that the World Peace movement is "tightly controlled by the Soviets." See his "Soviet-Line Fronts in 1988," *Problems of Communism,* January-February 1989, pp. 70 and 71. For Dobrynin's comment, see TASS, May 30, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV,* June 2, 1988, p. 8.

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not only countries of the East bloc, but also states of Western Europe, the Middle East, and the Western hemisphere.[23]

Policy Continuities

Despite evidence of change, "old political thought" continues to characterize much of Soviet policy in Central America. Although the new thinking calls for Soviet cooperation with the US to seek political settlements to Central American and other regional conflicts,[24] Soviet policy practitioners continue to find in Central America irresistible opportunities to give support and encouragement to political and military groups contesting US influence and advancing Soviet interests, and a fertile field for virulent ideological attacks on the US.

Arms transfers. The most direct evidence of Soviet behavior contradicting Gorbachev's new policy directives concerning the settlement of regional conflicts by political means is the amount of military support that has continued to flow from the Soviet Union to Central America and the Caribbean throughout the 1980's. Aid to the area makes up a major share of massive Soviet arms shipments to Latin America as a whole. According to Richard Grimmett of the US Congressional Research Service, aggregate Soviet arms deliveries to all Latin American countries in 1984–87 amounted to some US$7.6, or 59.8 percent of total world arms shipments to the region. This marked an increase of $1.8 billion over the amount shipped in 1980–83 (when Soviet shipments comprised 46.8 percent of the total). (Since total shipments to the region from *all* sources grew by only $1.4 billion, it is clear that other suppliers were reducing their shipments.) According to Grimmett, Cuba received 84.5 percent of the Soviet shipments in 1980–83 and 75.3 percent in 1984–87.[25]

Arms shipments to Cuba and Nicaragua, each of which receives more than 80 percent of its arms from the Soviet Union,[26] continue at high levels. Cuban arms imports, which totaled $1.4 billion in 1984, registered $2.1 billion in 1985, $1.5 billion in 1986, and $1.8 billion in 1987.[27] Nicaraguan arms imports, which totaled $350 million in 1984, amounted to $270 million in 1985 and $575 million in 1986.[28] Various sources put the 1987 figure for Nicaraguan arms imports from the USSR alone at from $500 million to $1 billion.[29] Thus, the militarization of Cuba and Nicaragua continues.

Perhaps most striking with respect to the fueling of military conflict in Central America is the size of Soviet arms transfers to Nicaragua and Cuba relative to US arms transfers to Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, and the Contras of Nicaragua. In 1986, the Soviet Union exported over $2 billion in arms to Cuba and Nicaragua. US military aid to Central American governments and the Contras in that year was less than $185 million, with an additional $60 million going to the Contras for non-military and humanitarian aid—the total sum not exceeding one-eighth of the 1986 Soviet military investment in the Central American conflict.[30] Overall, Soviet arms transfers to Latin American countries during 1984–87 were 5.5 times greater than US arms deliveries ($7.615 billion vs. $1.367 billion), despite the proximity and strategic importance of Latin America to the United States.[31]

Ideological warfare. Ideology remains a potent Soviet weapon aimed at US interests in Central America. The USSR's international news services tirelessly expound the thesis that the US is the chief cause of all Central American problems. Thus, Yuriy Pavlov, chief of the Soviet foreign ministry's First Latin American Department, commented recently: "these internal struggles [are]

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[23]See O. D. Ushnurtseva, "Failure of the Policy of Economic Isolation of Nicaragua," *Latinskaya Amerika* (Moscow), July 1987, pp. 52–58. Both Nicaragua and Panama are in arrears to the World Bank—for $250 million and $500 million respectively. Nicaragua's debt was four years old in 1988; Panama's is of more recent vintage.

[24]See the remarks of Nikolay Shishlin on Radio Moscow, April 16, 1989: "Soviet-US links are mixed up with negative factors and the task is . . . to put these links onto a positive footing, a positive basis, and to switch our relations from those between adversaries and rivals to relations between partners . . . . This concerns regional conflicts . . . . We have no other option. . . . [t]hat means working with the partners that God has granted us and not with any ideal partners." Trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Apr. 19, 1989, p. 22.

[25]Richard F. Grimmett, *Trends in Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World by Major Supplier, 1980–87*, Washington, DC, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 9, 1988, pp. 5, 50, 54, and 64; Table 2C, p. 58; and Tables 1C and 1E, pp. 48, 50 (italics in the original).

[26]In 1982–86, the USSR supplied Cuba with 81.7 percent of its arms; and Nicaragua, with 87.5 percent. See US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1987* (hereafter, *WMEAT, 1987*), Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1988, p. 129.

[27]The figures for 1984 to 1986 are from *WMEAT, 1987*, pp. 97, 113, 129. These figures do not include arms to Cuban forces in Angola, which peaked in 1984 at $1.5 billion (followed by $775 million in 1985 and $1.2 billion in 1986). The 1987 figure is from David Gallick, Ed., *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1988*, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, forthcoming.

[28]*WMEAT, 1987*, pp. 97, 113, 129.

[29]Stephanie G. Neuman, "Arms, Aid and the Superpowers," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Summer 1988, p. 1048. Concerning militarization: the size of the armed forces increased in Sandinist Nicaragua from 6,000 in 1979 to 74,000 in 1985, and in Cuba from 120,000 in 1975 to 297,000 in 1985. The proportion of the population under arms accordingly grew in Nicaragua from 2.2 inhabitants in the armed forces per 1,000 in 1979, to 23.4 in 1985; in Cuba, from 12.9 in 1935, to 29.5 in 1985.

[30]*WMEAT, 1987*, p. 135; *Congressional Quarterly Almanac* (Washington, DC), 1986, pp. 221, 394.

[31]Grimmett, op. cit., p. 58.

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motivated by foreign interference. Without massive foreign aid [from the US], the Nicaraguan Contras would not last even one year. This is why the war continues."[32]

On events in Panama, TASS quotes a Panamanian legislator's comment that "for a year now, Panama has been the target for an aggression by the US unprecedented in scope," and repeats General Manuel Noriega's claim that "one of the aims of the US current policy with regard to Panama is to use it as a bridgehead for the implementation of aggressions against other countries of the region in case of need."[33] In August 1988, *Krasnaya Zvezda* reported on "the mounting military threat" to Panama from Washington, basing itself on allegations by a Panamanian newspaper that the US had shipped 5,000 coffins and body bags to Panama.[34] And on November 20, 1988, *Pravda* quoted the assertion of the Panamanian paper *Crítica* that "before giving up the reins of government, the Reagan administration intends to conclude a new treaty on the Panama Canal with former Panamanian President Delvalle."[35]

An extreme example of the kind of efforts that the Soviet Union is still making to discredit the United States in the eyes of its Latin American neighbors is a new wave of sensationalist reports around the world that Americans import babies from Latin America, kill them, and sell their organs for transplant.[36] *Izvestiya* of July 25, 1987, charged: "There is only one step from American arrogance, from racist contempt for the Latin American peoples, to cannibalistic total license."[37] A year later, on the eve of the Pinochet plebiscite in Chile, the same story was beamed to that country in Spanish via Moscow Radio Magallanes with embellishments about how the "baby-trafficking mafias" funnel Chilean infants to "fattening centers" in Central America "before they are used by organ-transplant centers in the developed countries."[38]

Similarly, readers of *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* are told, "At a recently convened conference of justice ministers of the Common Market, it was noted that merchants annually sell about 1 million children from Latin America, Southeast Asia, and East African countries to people who sell them to replenish all sorts of sex and porno-business establishments in Europe," adding, "Of course, the United States occupies first place in child pornography."[39]

Front work. Moscow combines ideological warfare with systematic, worldwide organizational activities intended to attack US interests and diminish US influence, activity that is adapted to the Central American scene with telling effect. International conferences whose themes place the US in a disadvantageous position in Third World eyes are used extensively. For example, on November 27, 1988, Moscow Radio broadcast to Latin America an account of an international conference in Moscow that discussed Latin American economic prospects and international affairs, quoting the following comment of a professor from Panama's School of Economics:

In our opinion, the Latin American crisis is the result of a generalized crisis in the worldwide capitalist economy. We believe the Latin American crisis is manipulated directly by US financial organizations, particularly the World Bank and the IMF, and that those organizations have a plan of structural adjustment for every country, based on the use of the foreign debt as a political instrument for aggression. In other words, the reaching or failure to reach a refinancing agreement on the foreign debt is used to exert pressure or coercion on each of our countries in their political actions in the international arena. At this time, my country is subject to a brutal aggression . . . by the US Government.[40]

Soviet courtship of the Non-Aligned Movement similarly targets the US. Shortly before the Nicosia meeting of foreign ministers of that organization in September 1988, the Soviet Union sent a note of support, which alleged:

The position of the US and other imperialist countries is different [from the Soviet position]. Applying economic, political and military pressure, Washington and its closest allies attempt to split the Non-Aligned

[32]Interview in Moscow with *El Día* of Mexico City, June 6, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 16, 1988, pp. 28–30.

[33]TASS, June 14, 1988, trans. in ibid., June 15, 1988, p. 38. TASS correspondent Eldar Abdullayev drew upon separate interviews with Panamanian legislator Alberto Aleman Boyd and General Noriega for this report.

[34]V. Vinogradov, "Military-Political Commentary: Repulsive 'Coffins Policy'," *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Moscow), July 29, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 2, 1988, p. 42.

[35]*Pravda*, Nov. 20, 1988, trans. in ibid., Nov. 28, 1988, p. 39.

[36]Linda Feldman, "Soviets Smile, but Fake Stories Continue," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Sept. 6, 1988.

[37]Cited in ibid.

[38]Moscow Radio Magallanes, Sept. 8, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1988, pp. 34–35.

[39]Unattributed article, "When They Trade in Children," *Sovetskaya Kul'tura* (Moscow), Aug. 20, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 14, 1988, p. 33.

[40]Moscow Radio to Latin America, Nov. 27, 1988, trans. in ibid., Nov. 28, 1988, p. 41. Another example is the three-week "International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development" held in New York under United Nations auspices in August 1987, which assembled

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Movement, weaken it and turn individual nations into puppets obediently fulfilling strangers' will. Emphasis is on discrediting countries pursuing an anti-imperialist course. The "black list" includes India and Cuba, Nicaragua and Ethiopia, Angola and Zambia, Kampuchea, Libya and others. The foreign ministers of nonaligned countries are going to meet . . . to try and work out effective tactics to enable these nations to counter outside pressure.[41]

The presence of Latin Americans at conferences on issues of disarmament and development is noted with special approval in Soviet commentary. For example at the "Conference of Nongovernmental Organizations on the Problem of the Interdependence of Disarmament and Development," held at Stockholm in 1987, a Soviet observer favorably noted that "for the first time, the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with the Peoples of Latin America" was in attendance at such a conference, along with "envoys of Cuba and Nicaragua, of the peace-loving nations of Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, Chili, and Uruguay.[42]

Cuba has been the site of numerous international forums where US interests are attacked by various groups assembled to address "global issues."[43] For example, the first meeting of a newly formed "Coordinating Bureau on Disarmament Problems" of the Nonaligned Movement took place in Havana on May 28–31, 1988—as Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze noted, just before the upcoming Third UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. The participants, representing over 100 nonaligned countries, national-liberation movements, and international organizations, endorsed a "plan of action" for the UN session and a resolution attacking the US. Referring specifically to Central America, the resolution expressed "serious concern over the increased American military presence in this region," and called for setting up "a zone of peace and cooperation in Central America with the withdrawal of all foreign troops, which would facilitate the solution of the regional conflict."[44]

Discussion of the foreign debt problem of Latin American countries provides a ready forum for the castigation of world capitalism and the US, positions that win Soviet support. Thus, when a May 1987 trade union conference in Brazil addressed the foreign debt problem of Latin American and Caribbean countries and resolved to carry on a steady campaign for nonpayment, this move was encouraged by a Soviet observer.[45] One should also note Daniel Ortega's enthusiastic response to Gorbachev's December 7, 1988, speech to the UN: "The Soviet Union's call to defer the repayment of foreign debts by the developing countries for a hundred years, and in individual cases to cancel them, finds a ready response in the hearts of Nicaraguans."[46]

Party-to-party relations. Meanwhile, despite Gorbachev's stated determination to curb the CPSU's overly aggressive pursuit of Third World revolutionary activities, the party, through its International Department, vigorously continues to develop networks and channels of access to power in friendly states in Central America and the Caribbean, and to maintain its links and deepen its influence with out-of-power communist parties and leftist groups.[47] Thus, high-ranking members of the Soviet party apparat periodically visit Nicaragua—ID First Deputy Chief Vadim Zagladin in 1987 and ID Deputy Chief Andrey Urnov in mid-June 1988.[48] On March 14, 1988, Nicaraguan party official Bayardo Arce met in Moscow with International Department officials Dobrynin and Karen Brutents to sign a plan of cooperation between the CPSU and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN).[49] Such exchanges of

representatives of 122 countries to discuss how savings from future disarmament agreements might stimulate economic development in the Third World. The United States, anticipating that it would be the target of anti-imperialist attacks and of discussions of its alleged obligations to Latin America and other Third World countries for "neo-colonial exploitation," refused to take part. See Paul Lewis, "US Boycotting a UN Parley on Development," *The New York Times*, Aug. 22, 1987. The US "disregard for" this international forum was promptly interpreted by a TASS reporter, Ivan Ablamov, as evidence of US arrogance and neo-colonialism. And he added, "There is a direct link between the US total military expenditures in the past five years—one trillion dollars—being equal to the foreign debt of the developing countries"; TASS, Moscow, July 17, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, July 21, 1987, p. A/4.

[41]TASS, Aug. 31, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 1, 1988, p. 7.

[42]A. P. Kireyev, "Disarmament for Development," *Latinskaya Amerika*, September 1987, p. 137.

[43]Wallace Spaulding noted that "Havana was second only to Moscow as an important site for meetings of the fronts during 1987." See "Communist Fronts in 1987," *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1988, p. 84.

[44]*Pravda*, May 28, 1988; and TASS, May 31, 1988, both trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, June 2, 1988, pp. 9–10.

[45]A. A. Sosnovskiy, "Trade Unions Against Foreign Debt," *Latinskaya Amerika*, September 1987, p. 136.

[46]TASS, Dec. 11, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Dec. 12, 1988, p. 37.

[47]For a fuller account of the ID's Third World activities see Jan S. Adams, "Incremental Activism in Soviet Third World Policy: The Role of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee," *Slavic Review* (Austin, TX), forthcoming.

[48]TASS, Sept. 8, 1987, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sept. 9, 1987, p. 32; and TASS, June 10, 1988, trans. in ibid., June 13, 1988, p. 52.

[49]TASS, Mar. 14, 1988, trans. in ibid., Mar. 15, 1988. Brutents visited Latin America for several weeks in September 1988 at the invitation of the Argentine Communist Party and the People's Party of Panama, strengthening the ties of the CPSU with these Latin American parties. See *Pravda*, Sep. 14, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 15, 1988, p. 37; *Pravda*, Sept. 20, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 21, 1988, p. 49.

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visits convey the Soviet party's strong moral support for the Sandinist cause, and provide opportunities to discuss mutual strategies, strengthen party linkages, and further coordinate the growing diplomatic, military, and cultural contacts between the two countries.

Interparty contacts take various forms. A delegation from the Soviet Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Latin America was invited by officials of a Panamanian fund to visit Panama in August 1988 to meet with the People's (i.e., communist) Party of Panama, leaders of the ruling Democratic Revolutionary Party, and other political groups.[50] In August and September, Soviet republic and regional party officials attended the 11th Congress of the Ecuador Communist Party, the 50th Conference of the People's National Party of Jamaica, and the 23rd Congress of the People's Progressive (communist) Party of Guyana.[51]

The CPSU was also an "observer" at the August 1988 "Third Meeting of South American Communist Parties" in Montevideo, where "much attention was given to questions of stepping up solidarity with the peoples of Nicaragua, Panama, El Salvador, Chile, and Paraguay."[52] Other observers included the Communist Party of Cuba, the FSLN, and the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front. The formal participants represented communist parties of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Ecuador, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

Latin American party officials also frequently visit Moscow for consultations. During one week in September 1988, ID Chief Dobrynin received two prominent visitors from the Caribbean region—Nicaraguan party and government leader Carlos Nuñez (he is chairman of Nicaragua's National Assembly) and the general secretary of Guyana's People's Progressive Party, Cheddi Jagan.[53] Earlier, in July, the general secretary of the People's Party of Panama visited Moscow and, in a radio interview, charged that a US aggression was being prepared against Panama.[54]

Impediments to Change

In keeping with the prescriptions of Gorbachev's "new thinking," Moscow's advice to fellow parties in Central America and the Caribbean is indeed somewhat more cautious, less ideological, and less incendiary than in the past. Still, the ultimate political objectives and rationale of the local political groups, as well as of their operations, continue to be characterized by a strong zero-sum orientation vis-à-vis world capitalism and by a sense of historic mission, both of which are probably essential to their continued vitality as organizations. On balance, the Soviet party's friendship and support probably continue to fuel rather than dampen the deep-seated ideological tendencies of these groups.

One reason why Soviet foreign policy runs counter to Gorbachev's prescriptions is the relatively short time that the new directives have been in effect. However, political and bureaucratic factors within the USSR also encourage the persistence of traditional objectives and perspectives in Soviet foreign policy. Positions that contest Gorbachev's policy include those that place priority on such objectives as military power and securing strategic military objectives, on violent export of social revolution, and on the vigorous pursuit of the worldwide struggle between socialism and capitalism.[55] Espoused by influential segments of the Soviet foreign policy and defense establishment, they can—and do—affect policy implementation.

The persistence of such views is explained both by bureaucratic inertia (in face of the enormous magnitude of the current change of course) and the fact that specific viewpoints are tied to functions performed by the various segments of the Soviet foreign policy and defense establishments. Thus, Soviet military strategists viewing the Central American region can be expected to focus on the advantages of still greater access to deep-water ports, airports, and electronic listening posts, and of joint naval maneuvers with regional forces, although Gorbachev's prescriptions would seem to label these activities intrusive and a potential danger to world peace. Similarly, certain units of the ID, whose expertise has been dedicated for more than 30 years to strengthening the Soviet party-state's ideological influence around the world in support of a revolutionary struggle against capitalism, can hardly be expected to desist readily from cultivating political groups in Central America that label themselves anti-imperialistic, revolutionary, and Marxist-Leninist.

Gorbachev's restructuring of the Soviet foreign policy establishment appears designed in part to achieve

[50]Moscow Radio, July 31, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 4, 1988, p. 39.

[51]*Pravda*, Aug. 1, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 3, 1988, p. 37; *Pravda*, Aug. 9, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 10, 1988, p. 37; *Pravda*, Sept. 13, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 14, 1988, pp. 32–33.

[52]Radio Moscow to Latin America, Aug. 10, 1988, trans. in ibid., Aug. 11, 1988, p. 24.

[53]TASS, Sept. 6, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 8, 1988, p. 41; and *Pravda*, Sept. 11, 1988, trans. in ibid., Sept. 13, 1988, p. 11.

[54]Moscow Radio, July 15, 1988, trans. in ibid., July 19, 1988, p. 58.

[55]The abandonment of old positions comes hard, even within the Politburo, as shown by the refusal of Yegor Ligachev to accept Gorbachev's renunciation of the concept of class struggle in the relations between nations. See Paul Quinn-Judge, "How Ligachev Lost Out in Kremlin Shuffle," *The Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 6, 1988.

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a more unified foreign policy. The streamlining of the party foreign policy apparat under Aleksandr Yakovlev's leadership and its closer integration with the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs seem to be aimed at placing the implementation of Soviet foreign policy more securely in the hands of diplomatic and governmental, rather than party, officials. The ministry now handles a number of foreign policy functions formerly assigned to the party apparat, such as relations with the international press and the Nonaligned Movement (NAM).

However, some areas of activity are not easily "de-ideologized." For example, just how non-ideological is the "multi-faceted aid" that the Soviet Union offers the Nonaligned Movement ?[56] US State Department officials argue that the USSR is exerting increasing influence on that organization, and that "a measure of its continuing success" might be gauged in the results of the special ministerial session of the NAM's Coordinating Bureau held in Georgetown, Guyana, in March 1987. A communiqué was issued containing 26 specific anti-US citations—a new record for a NAM document on a geographic region."[57] Similarly, how non-ideological is the new "people's diplomacy"?[58] How does it differ—in organizational techniques, operations, and objectives—from front activities managed so tightly by the International Department in the past?

Other factors that tend to shape Soviet Central American policy in ways that run counter to Gorbachev's new thought are regional factors in Central America and the Caribbean, especially those involving very complex aspects of the Soviet patron/client relationships with Cuba and Nicaragua. It is quite evident that Moscow would like to limit economic aid to its Marxist clients. However, to reverse commitments made by previous Soviet regimes—whatever the incentives to do so—can be achieved only at considerable political cost, as reducing the flow of oil to Nicaragua illustrated.[59] Long-term development projects already on the drawing board, like irrigation projects for Nicaragua, must go forward, and signed promises of increased aid are hard to disavow. There is no indication of any pullback from Soviet trade and aid agreements signed with Cuba in 1985 calling for project assistance to increase until 1990. Trade credits alone, according to Cuban reports in 1985, are to increase in 1986–1990 by 50 percent over the previous five years.[60]

From a purely economic point of view, Cuba would appear to be a prime target for Soviet savings, because it alone "claims far more of Moscow's aid resources than any other LDC, about $45 billion annually (half of Moscow's total)."[61] However, Cuba's failing economy (it registered a 3.5 percent decline in GNP in 1987) acutely needs aid.[62] Gorbachev's April 1989 visit to Havana, while apparently promising no financial panaceas such as writing off Cuba's estimated $10 billion debt to the USSR,[63] clearly signaled Moscow's interest in maintaining its close relationship and leverage.

Cuba's political and military services to Moscow merit special consideration. Not the least of these services is Cuba's pivotal role in the effort to erode US influence in Central America and Havana's ability to take actions on behalf of Moscow that the Soviets themselves prefer not to take openly, such as the transshipment of arms to guerrillas in El Salvador and Guatemala, the organization and training of these political groups, not to mention the large contingent of Cuban troops that has been propping up the Soviet client regime in Angola. Cuba also advances Soviet positions in Third World forums, such as meetings of the Nonaligned Movement,[64] provides a conference setting for many such international meetings, and serves as a model for future revolu-

[56]*Izvestiya*, Sept. 7, 1988, trans. in *FBIS-SOV*, Sep. 9, 1988, p. 7.

[57]US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, p. 5.

[58]An example of "people's diplomacy"—programs of citizen exchanges—is the 1988 American-Soviet "Tour for Peace," a 32-day tour of the US by 220 Soviet citizens, which is described by one of the participants A. I. Shaskol'skiy in "Prospects for People's Diplomacy," *SShA: Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya* (Moscow), February 1981, pp. 63–67.

[59]Carol Fogarty and Kevin Tritle note: "On the economic side, there is a real prospect that the protracted deterioration in the economies of Marxist client states will accelerate, making the aid program unacceptably expensive. This trend is already in motion: The 1984 agreement to supply oil on credit to Nicaragua, for example, will add up to $100 million in annual disbursements that will never be repaid . . . . This continuing high level of support to Marxist states seems to result from policies in place before Gorbachev assumed leadership, rather than policy decisions by the new government." See "Moscow's Economic Aid Programs in Less-Developed Countries: A Perspective on the 1980's," in Joint Economic Committee, Congress of the United States, *Gorbachev's Economic Plans*, Study Papers, Vol. 2, Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1987, pp. 536–37.

[60]Ibid., pp. 540–41; also see Roger E. Kanet's "Commentary," in the same work, p. 542; and US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, p. 66. Ruben Berrios notes that Cuba has signed one long-term economic cooperation treaty stretching from 1986 to 2000. See his "Soviet–Latin American Economic Relations," Kennan Institute Occasional Paper 227, Washington, DC, Wilson Center, 1988, p. 19.

[61]Fogarty and Tritle, loc. cit., p. 539; they add, "In the 1980's, the USSR has provided about $800 million a year in hard-currency support to Cuba and Vietnam by allowing Havana to resell some of the oil provided, purchasing some Cuban sugar for hard currency, and financing some imports from third countries."

[62]Clyde Farnsworth, "Deep Cut is Reported In Soviet-Cuba Trade," *The New York Times*, Jan. 16, 1989. Farnsworth notes that trade between the USSR and Cuba grew annually by 10 percent through 1987, but fell in the first quarter of 1988, with Cuba's imports from the USSR down 8 percent from the first quarter of 1987, and Cuba's exports to the USSR down 14 percent.

[63]Vera Tolz, "The USSR This Week," Radio Liberty, *Report on the USSR* (Munich), Apr. 14, 1989, p. 41.

[64]Another example is Cuba's strong support for campaigns against repayment by Latin American debtors of loans owed to Western financial institutions. See US Department of State, *Soviet Influence Activities*, p. 2.

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tionary states in Central America.[65] At the turn of 1988–89, Castro's unprecedented visits to Ecuador, Mexico, and Venezuela were a first step toward broadening of Cuba's access to the Latin American diplomatic world.[66]

Meanwhile, Moscow's clients in the Central American region, strengthened by Soviet economic and military aid, display a willful proclivity to pursue their own ideological and foreign policy objectives. Such factors may constrain and embarrass the Soviet Union, but may also offer great advantages, since even sometimes obstreperous client/proxies can be of inestimable value in advancing Soviet interests in ways that violate "new thinking" without directly incriminating the USSR.

To a certain extent, Moscow's Central American policy is simply a response to openings provided by a changing Central American context, a region destablized by social crises and war, where instability threatens the US far more than it does Moscow, and where US influence appears to have suffered a "secular slump."[67] In these conditions, the countries to the south of the US, seeking greater leverage in dealing with the "colossus of the north," are tempted to fall back upon the underlying conflict of interests of the two superpowers and, when it is advantageous, to side with the USSR for economic, diplomatic, and military support. In this way, chronic regional instabilities continue to offer the Soviet Union irresistible opportunities to whittle away at US interests.

Conclusion

Given such complex crosscurrents of policy, bureaucratic inertia, and national interests, it is not surprising that current Soviet policies in Central America today are contradictory—partly new and partly old, reflecting freedom from some ideological motivations and the unrelenting grip of others.

This situation is not likely to change soon. However, in the short run the logic of Gorbachev's ideas about the interdependency of nations and the global threat inherent in regional crises motivates Moscow to use what leverage it has to bring its regional clients to the negotiating table. To the degree that these clients—whether willingly or reluctantly—profess their readiness to make compromises in the search for regional stability, this may reflect the changes of style and rhetoric emanating from Moscow.

In light of Moscow's current outlook and its possible reflection in the policies of Soviet clients in Central America, a window of opportunity may have opened momentarily to allow the region's states some measure of disengagement from the East-West conflict in their joint deliberations on settling regional problems. Although many factors will affect this dialogue in the years ahead, including US actions, continued Soviet encouragement of negotiations greatly improves the prospects for regional settlements in Central America.

Meanwhile, Moscow's underlying, long-term objectives remain unchanged: to avoid at all costs direct US-Soviet confrontation but to persist in the patient, deliberate expansion of Soviet influence in a region of vital security interest to the United States. In the future, pursuit of these objectives can be expected to increase the slow but steady growth of ties of the USSR and East-bloc countries with Central America and the Caribbean Basin, and to produce a greatly enhanced Soviet diplomatic, economic, and military presence in the region.

[65]Grenada's ambassador to the USSR recorded his hope in 1983 that Grenada might, by becoming "the sponsor of revolutionary activities and progressive developments" among the English-speaking states of the Caribbean, emulate Cuba's relations "to the revolutionary left in the Dominican Republic, Puerto Rica, and Central America." See Mark Falcoff, "Bishop's Cuba, Castro's Grenada," in Jiri Valenta and Herbert J. Ellison, Eds., *Grenada and Soviet Cuban Policy*, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986, p. 72.

[66]One Soviet observer commented: "Even a very short analysis of the results of the trip of F. Castro to Ecuador shows that the course of Cuba's foreign policy in the region has acquired a new orientation, characterized by the effort to actively participate in the process of the political integration of Latin America. See E. S. Dabagyan, "Integration Processes—The Call of the Times," *Latinskaya Amerika*, December 1988, p. 15.

[67]Jan F. Triska, Ed., *Dominant Powers and Subordinate States: The United States in Latin America and the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe*, Durham, NC, Duke University Press, 1986, p. 463.

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Books

The Future of Eastern Europe

John A. Armstrong

IVAN BEREND. *The Crisis Zone of Europe: An Interpretation of East Central European History in the First Half of the Twentieth Century.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

ROMAN SZPORLUK. *Communism and Nationalism: Karl Marx versus Friedrich List.* New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI. *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century.* New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989.

DESPITE great differences in their approaches, these three books suggest that a turning point may have been reached in the appraisal of developments in the Soviet bloc.

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As befits his extraordinary experience, Zbigniew Brzezinski's most recent book ranges broadly over East Asia, Latin America, and Western Europe. Nevertheless, its core concerns are geographically and culturally identical to those of Berend and Szporluk: East Central Europe, where all three authors were born. As their subtitles indicate, Berend and Brzezinski focus explicitly on the 20th century, whereas Szporluk emphasizes the 19th-century ideological origins of the current political system in East Central Europe. All authors, however, are bent on demonstrating the significance of historical factors for contemporary politics.

For older American Sovietologists who studied under Merle Fainsod, Geroid T. Robinson, or Philip Mosely, such emphasis may seem familiar. Indeed, one criticism of the present authors that I shall make is that they do not reach back far enough to explain history's influence on present policy. In this connection, George F. Kennan's geohistorical admonition remains apt, namely, one must keep in mind that Lenin's "precepts are fortified by the lessons of Russian history: of centuries of obscure battles between nomadic forces over the stretches of a vast unfortified plain."[1]

The books under review here abound in multidimensional interpretations derived from historical analysis, which is a contrast to the shallow temporal range of much current Sovietology that too often resorts to economic reductionism (albeit usually derived from Adam Smith rather than Karl Marx). Even the series of recent works on the tsarist centuries, though gratifying as monographs based on archival documentation, frequently lack the comparative perspective that all three authors reviewed here reveal.

IVAN BEREND'S principal aim is to interpret the reasons for the "long-lasting crisis which brought the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe into such speedy and restless motion" beginning with World War I (p. 5). He cogently points out that this crisis was a precursor of the crisis, far larger geographically, that transfigured the Third World after World War II. Berend recognizes the importance of economic factors like the Industrial Revolution, but he devotes more attention to cultural and social developments. Particu-

[1]George Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" (1947), in *American Diplomacy, 1900–1950,* Chicago, IL, University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 118.

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larly significant, in his interpretation, were "ideas of English liberalism and French rationalism," which "fascinated the small intellectual circles of these backward countries [farther east in Europe], and also presented an example for the ruling elite to follow in order to secure their power" (p. 6). Berend is especially concerned, in Chapter 2, to show how the search for "ethnic purity" distorted populist movements throughout Central and Eastern Europe. Eventually—he relates in Chapter 3—such national revolutions confronted class revolutions following Lenin's example. Both revolts led not only to intensified social and political upheaval, but to drastic cultural transformation.

Berend's discussion of trends in the arts before the communists came to power, providing novel examples and appraisals for most readers, is especially welcome. By reference to the creations of musicians like Béla Bartók, painters like Kasimir Malevich, and writers like Karel Čapek, Berend interprets "different modes of social revolt" as a prelude to showing how these were stifled by totalitarian regimes that were, to a considerable extent, also the products of the same societal changes that had fostered aesthetic innovation.

THE book by Szporluk is the most solidly based in research. Many writers have noted the significance of Friedrich List (1789–1846) as a forerunner and implicit antagonist of Marx, but none has explored the subject so thoroughly. His exploration leads Szporluk to confront head-on an issue at the heart of the revived concern for historical interpretation: will economics dominate the future of East Central and Eastern Europe? Szporluk's major hypothesis is that nationalism, instead of being an epiphenomenon of capitalism, as Marxists contend, was "a third party on the battlefield where Marxism met capitalism" (p. 14). Marxism and nationalism acted as rival revolutionary movements in the "long" 19th century (to borrow Fernand Braudel's terminology) from 1789 to 1918.

Friedrich List's key role in this rivalry is the central theme of Szporluk's book. His extended discussion of earlier German nationalists (notably, Johann Gottfried Herder and Johann Gottlieb Fichte) is intended to demonstrate that none had reacted, in a penetrating manner, to the Industrial Revolution. Hence it remained for List to provide the synthesis between a nation's economic life and its culture and politics, which enabled nationalists to compete successfully with emerging Marxism. But List was no apologist for the existing order. After his political activities compelled him to leave the Kingdom of Württemberg, List acquired (1825–30) prominent friends—but also severe critics—in the United States, where he embraced Alexander Hamilton's "national school" of economic policy. Back in Europe, List rejected a German editorial post—a job that eventually went to Marx! Although his book, *The National System of Political Economy* (1845) ultimately had a remarkable impact, List did not live to see that success.

In contrast to Marx's belief in an international working class that would finally produce a socialist world order, List contended that each nation had legitimate interests that other nations should copy (using protective tariffs, for example) rather than criticize. Such fundamental differences in the two thinkers' action programs reflected their basic disagreement on forces behind the 19th-century transformations.

AT first sight it appears paradoxical that List, an economist promoting industrial development, should provide a refutation of the Marxist thesis that the cultural superstructure is determined by the base of economic production relationships. The paradox is deepened by the attachment of both List and Marx to "planning rationality" versus "market rationality," that is, to state intervention versus private enterprise. Both theorists also focused on the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution as turning points in societal development—but Marx saw them as the triumph of capitalism, while List saw them as the unleashing of national forces.

Indeed, List's adherence to economic intervention by the state presents a series of difficulties for his non-Marxist critics. A brief look at these difficulties suggests, however, that the real problem may be that many non-Marxists tend to accept tacitly *other* Marxist postulates that List had already rejected before Marx even made them.

Both Szporluk and Brzezinski identify as the major Marxist error, one greatly aggravated by Lenin, the conviction that limitless benefits accrue from political action. This conviction was acted upon in a "misguided effort to impose total rationality on social affairs" (Brzezinski, p. 231). In the early 1920's, Soviet leaders seemed to subscribe to List's counsels on planning and expert management—Szporluk recalls that Edward H. Carr had termed List the "father of the theory of planning" in the Soviet Union (p. 220). However, the Soviet regime soon went far beyond rational economic direction (scarcely possible under early Soviet conditions) to engage in a ghastly manipulation of human conditions through "social engineering."

List, by contrast, began by postulating the nation-state as the normal framework for industrial development. Hence, he insisted that each developmental pattern of industrial-

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ization contained its own irreducible element of cultural distinctiveness. To be sure, his limited historical perspective as well as his German bias led List to belittle the future prospects of small nations (Szporluk, p. 125). It is remarkable how this view finds perverse echoes in Russia today. Brzezinski, for example, quotes the Italian Communist newspaper *L'Unità* report on an anti-*perestroyka* manuscript circulating in the Soviet Union that contained the following sentence: "The greatest danger . . . is constituted by the scandalous nationalism of insignificant nations such as the Tatars of the Crimea and Zionist-type Jews" (p. 99). (This sentence was deleted from the text eventually published in March 1988 in *Sovetskaya Rossiya,* the organ of the Russian republic.) Neither Marx nor List (nor, it appears, Szporluk) fully appreciated the fundamental significance of mythic elements in the long history of national development. Nevertheless, a crucial distinction remains between List's appreciation of the nation as an independent variable among many and Marx's rationalist insistence that the "dream history of nations" is merely a dependent variable masking capitalist interests.

UNFORTUNATELY, in their search for presumably more fundamental social factors, many Western analysts tacitly follow Marx and liberal philosophers like Jeremy Bentham in treating national identity as epiphenomenal. This implicit assumption has left them unprepared for the recent reappearance of deep cleavages among the ethnic components of the Soviet Union, which, as Brzezinski rightly emphasizes in his book, are unanticipated consequences of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost'* as well potentially fatal obstacles to his *perestroyka*. Just a few years ago some American social scientists were predicting that universal pressures for economic development would soon lead to a large-scale incorporation of Moslem labor from Central Asia in the urban centers of the European parts of the Soviet Union. Instead, the Moslem demographic explosion has been accompanied by the increasing attachment on the part of Soviet Moslems to the ersatz *Dar ul-Islam* represented by those Soviet republics whose populations are predominantly Moslem. In these homelands, xenophobic outbursts against Europeans—especially but not exclusively against Armenians—portend a threat to continued Soviet rule. At the western end of the "southern tier" of Soviet power, East Central European nationalism has never been quiescent. Today, it seems to threaten the Soviet imperial system more than ever. Just within the USSR's border, nationalist expression among the huge Ukrainian population constitutes, according to Brzezinski, "the potentially gravest threat to the very survival of the Soviet Union" (p. 246).

Brzezinski's assessment of specific nationalist problems in the USSR gains authority from the breadth of his comparisons. His first three chapters concentrate on the development of the Soviet system, beginning with Lenin's brief but seminal leadership and concluding with Brezhnev's 18 years, which Brzezinski calls "stagnant Stalinism." The next four chapters analyze prospects for Gorbachev's reforms. Here Brzezinski discounts fundamental cleavages among Politburo members, while recognizing notable differences on tactics. Then he identifies 10 "dynamics of disunion." These include virtually the entire range of Soviet policy, but appear to be especially significant in fields where internal Soviet problems (intellectual, religious, and national) transcend the formal frontiers of the USSR by relating to unrest in Soviet-dominated countries of East Central Europe (Chapters 8–12), to China (Chapters 12–16), to international communism (Chapter 17), and to the Third World (Chapters 18–19). Chapters 21–24, with an appendix of graphic comparisons, provide an overall assessment of what Brzezinski terms the "general crisis" of communism.

BOTH Szporluk and Berend would concur with Brzezinski's conclusion that a one-dimensional ideological emphasis on centrally directed economic development has produced a spiritual emptiness that saps Soviet domestic vitality. The close historical relationship between religion and national identity—amounting in this reviewer's view to typological continuity—means that a heightening of national awareness will also have religious implications that *could* go a long way to fill the spiritual void. But one cannot overlook the specifics of the current situation, in which ethno-religious revival can also produce catastrophic flights from reason rivalling the excesses of Marxism-Leninism. Surely, irrationality is one aspect of the shocking Armenian-Azeri clashes. More sinister, because of its broader implications, is the effort by elements in *Pamyat'* to amalgamate crude Russian nationalism and anti-Semitism with traditional Orthodox themes.

A critical ingredient of many ethno-religious amalgams is exaggeration of the Romantic folkloric and linguistic aspects of national identity at the expense of institutional components. Here, as Szporluk demonstrates, List's lessons are most valuable. A contemporary of the Romantic movement, List recognized the importance of emotional (mythic) components of the authentic national community. But,

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like Edmund Burke a few decades earlier, List refused to capitulate unconditionally to the Romantic components. Instead, both men ascribed equal weight to major institutional structures—legal ones for Burke, economic ones for List. Their position was prescient. Those national movements that turned their backs on stability ensured by a legal and constitutional order, or on economic development to satisfy human needs, have produced new catastrophes. Some, like Italian predecessors of Mussolini's Fascism or the Khmer Rouge, did this by directly imposing massive sacrifices on their populations. Other nationalist movements (e.g. the "White" anti-Bolsheviks) effectively abandoned the field of popular support to ostensibly rational movements that promised security and welfare.

In my view, one must penetrate deeper into the roots of East Central European nationalism to understand how ethno-religious identity can find the delicate balance between Romantic adherence to "modern" symbols like language and the practical requirements of national reconstruction. Not only have scholars of Eastern Europe often minimized the enduring implications of the Moslem-Christian rift across Europe from the Adriatic to the Caspian Seas; they have often oversimplified relations among ethnic communities in the historically Christian sphere. Most critical have been misconceptions about the evolution of the East Central European city as an ethnically mixed entity.

The Central European myth of a superior rural gentry lifestyle confronting alien urban "islands" spread east during the 18th century to adjoining regions, especially to the European portions of the Russian Empire. As the 19th century drew on, "populist" versions (in *völkisch* or *narodnik* ideologies) of this myth, stressing peasant virtues, appealed to rising nationalist elites. One result was the xenophobia of the "Black Hundreds" and their current Russian epigones. But chauvinist attacks on urban ethnic minorities were also frequent among non-Russian nations of the tsarist empire, depriving them of much needed urban skills.

Even more lastingly injurious to stable national evolution, if not so obviously repugnant, has been the populist rejection of the city itself as the center of national life. In this, Eastern and East Central European national cultures have differed sharply from most Mediterranean cultures (Castile being an extreme exception to this rule), which celebrated urban lifestyles. Hence, Szporluk's perception of parallels between early 20th-century trends in Italy and lands farther to the east seems to me somewhat superficial. Possibly, this deep-rooted negative attitude toward the city is a more serious barrier to regarding Iberia after Francisco Franco and Antonio Salazar as a model for Eastern Europe at the present time than Brzezinski's point that the persistence of autonomous institutions under the two Iberian dictators preserved a basis for pluralism that the totalitarians in the East have swept away.

MY principal point is that assessment of the future of Communist systems requires not only historical examination ranging far back in time and comparisons going far afield, but careful adaptation of analytic frameworks from diverse disciplines. Resort to fashionable comparative models may be as ephemeral as infatuation with "structural functionalism" in the early 1960's or "interest group pluralism" in the 1970's, although both cults did produce some permanent contributions to the area studies field. Conversely, Rankean historicism, for long the paradigm for the area studies approach, will not suffice, no matter how much it leads to the production of technically sound research.[2]

In the search for an adequate synthetic framework, the area student will need to turn partially to models that utilize, often fruitfully, certain Marxist theses.[3] Although, as Brzezinski notes, Marxism as a coherent system is obsolete, its components will continue to permeate areas of intellectual discourse. Through prior acquaintance with Leninist systems, the area student should be extraordinarily well-prepared to extract the gold from Marxist interpretations and leave behind the dross.

From the practical standpoint, a systematic investigation of the societal manifestations permitted by Gorbachev's innovations cannot await the thorough conceptual retooling just suggested. But our three authors' stress on historical depth and comparative breadth at least point in the direction such investigations must take.

Further, Szporluk and Brzezinski note the great deterioration, since the 1970's, of the Soviet regime's position in the world, and hence the relative strengthening of the United States' position. In this appraisal, they agree with writers in the January 1989 survey issue of *Foreign Affairs,* most of whom are specialists

[2]In this connection one should not overlook the very important *comparative* contributions recently made by East-Central European symposia, for example, *L'Europe aux IXe–XIe siècles: Aux origines des états nationaux* (Europe in the 9th–11th Centuries: On the Origins of Nation-States), Warsaw, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1968; Vera Zimanyi, Ed., *La Pologne et la Hongrie aux XVIe–XVIIIe siècles*, (Poland and Hungary in the 16th–18th Centuries), Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1981.

[3]See, for example, many contributions in Theda Skocpol, Ed., *Vision and Method in Historical Sociology*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984.

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on American foreign policy. It is instructive to see such scholars as Robert W. Tucker and Paul Johnson conclude that the Reagan years, despite repeated confusion on side-issues, produced a great improvement in the American global position.[4] From a slightly longer perspective, one might recognize Zbigniew Brzezinski's comparable contribution when he was national security adviser for the preceding administration. Amidst the cacophony of 1977–80, he maintained, I am convinced, a measure of consistency in policy toward Moscow that prepared the ground for the Reagan Administration's more apparent gains. Most academics like to write about the unity of theory and practice; Brzezinski realized it.

CONFRONTED by such pervasive optimism among diverse observers, one hesitates to interject a note of pessimism. Surely, the ideological appeal of Marxism-Leninism is essentially finished. Here and there—notably in Latin America—grossly simplified versions of Leninism still attract activists. But intellectual enthusiasts for Third World rejection of the "world center of exploitation," although drawing on some of Lenin's theses, treat the Soviet system itself not as a model but as a make-weight in the complicated global struggle. Immanuel Wallerstein, for example, wrote in 1975 that the existence of the USSR "objectively . . . held first Nazi Germany and later the USA at bay," legitimizing the "revolutionary struggle" and creating "world social space for opposition forces" against the capitalist center.[5]

In fact, the erosion of Marxism-Leninism's ideological appeal has been proceeding relentlessly for many years. The hidden decay of Stalin's years was sealed by Nikita Khrushchev's admissions in the late 1950's. Yet, as Brzezinski points out, for a brief period following the launching of Sputnik, Soviet *power* appeared to be on the ascendant. The present reviewer merely summed up widespread opinion when he wrote: "In crucial areas where Soviet threats have real meaning, however, a new group of *recruits* replaces the dedicated revolutionaries of the interwar period. Those who are attracted by the prospect of power unchecked by moral scruples, and those cunning opportunists who wish merely to ride the 'wave of history' align themselves with the Soviet presence."[6] The long period (1964–82) of oligarchic bureaucratic stagnation under Leonid Brezhnev and Mikhail Suslov revealed the incapacity (which many had suspected earlier) of the obsolescent Soviet economy to sustain a multifaceted "presence" on the global stage.

The principal *military* instruments of Soviet world power, however, remain intact, indeed they have been immensely strengthened both relatively and absolutely since Khrushchev's day. Recent admissions that not 15, but 25 percent of the Soviet gross national product has regularly gone for military end-items reinforces rather than weakens the image of the USSR as the longest-lived modern garrison state. Regrettably, history provides several examples of other garrison polities armed with weapons slightly cruder than today's that in their vast numbers were able to overwhelm more sophisticated civilizations.

Few observers think that the present Soviet leadership, or its probable rivals, would contemplate a resort to mass destruction. Nevertheless, as Brzezinski underscores, surprisingly influential manifestations of Russian nationalism make it evident that the end of Soviet imperial power would be unacceptable to a large core element of the population. Brzezinski also believes (correctly, I think) that the Pandora's box of non-Russian national passion can never again be tightly closed. Consequently, an explosive anti-Moscow outburst, whether originating within or outside the Soviet border, is possible. Such a nationalist rebellion might be countered by an irrationally extreme Russian response, instead of by the grimly cautious preventive measures that characterized the Leninist formulas for centralized coercion. The front-line of coercion—that is, those most immediately threatened by an anti-Moscow outburst—still consists of police and military professionals. Among the various apparatuses of Soviet power, these are now the most Russian in recruitment and in bureaucratic tradition. Some evidence suggests that elements among the police and military were involved in the extreme chauvinism of *Pamyat'* and its predecessors during Brezhnev's final years. Both professional interests and ethnic affiliations suggest, therefore, that the police and the military might respond drastically to a centrifugal upheaval. Ominously, these apparatuses exert immediate control over the means of mass destruction, as the use of poison gas to control a demonstration in Georgia, ostensibly without Politburo approval, reminds us.

In a general way, therefore, Brzezinski's analysis, despite its optimism, suggests that considerable Western caution is in order. Obviously, to make sweeping Western

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[4]See Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," and Paul Johnson, "Europe and the Reagan Years," *Foreign Affairs* (New York), Vol. 69, No. 1, 1989, pp. 1–27 and 28–38, respectively.

[5]"Old Problems and New Syntheses," reprinted in Immanuel Wallerstein, *The Capitalist World Economy: Essays*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 242.

[6]John A. Armstrong, *The Politics of Totalitarianism*, New York, Random House, 1961, p. 347.

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concessions affecting the fundamental military balance would be a dubious decision. More worthy of debate is whether the installation of defensive systems with significant capacity for countering a desperate Soviet strike (possibly weakened by incoherence at the top command level) would be desirable, should such systems be technically feasible. However, in the final analysis, no defensive measures are likely to avert mass destruction unless they have been preceded—during an interval of productive negotiations with Soviet leaders concerned to restore rationality in policy-making—by mutual limitation on the numbers and capacity of offensive weapons. To this observer, therefore, the basic optimism about the end of an expansive Soviet system, tempered by a dose of pessimism, calls for intensive, flexible arms negotiations with Gorbachev or any reasonable successors, unhindered by excessive concern with personalities and the accompanying "atmospherics."

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Moscow and the Military Buildup in Northern Europe

Robert W. Janes

JOHN H. M. HAGARD. *Nordic Security*. New York, Institute for East-West Security Studies, 1987.

CLIVE ARCHER, ED. *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters*. New York, Routledge, Chapman, and Hall, 1988.

ROY ALLISON. *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944–1984*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1985.

ORJAN BERNER. *Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries*. Cambridge, MA, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1986.

SVERRE JERVELL and KARE NYBLOM, EDS. *The Military Buildup in the High North. American and Nordic Perspectives*. Cambridge, MA, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1986.

JOHN C. AUSLAND. *Nordic Security and the Great Powers*. Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1986.

HELGE OLE BERGESEN, ARILD MOE, WILLY ØSTRENG. *Soviet Oil and Security Interests in the Barents Sea*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1987.

INGEMAR LINDAHL. *The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal*. New York, St. Martin's Press, 1988.

WITH considerable justification the Nordic countries have often been referred to as the quiet corner of Europe. Despite Scandinavia's strategic location, a modus vivendi of regional and superpower interaction has been worked out that has kept tension in the region fairly low. However, over the course of the 1980's, regional stability has become increasingly threatened, a trend that started in the 1970's with the buildup of the Soviet Northern Fleet. As American analyst Steven Miller has stated: "Indeed, from an American perspective there is virtually no region in the world that has witnessed more dramatic changes in the politico-military environment than has Northern Europe" (Archer, Ed., p. 225).

Previously a topic mainly of concern to Nordic scholars, the viability of the Nordic region's equilibrium recently has come under scrutiny from other quarters as well. Many analysts on both sides of the Atlantic now attempt to assess the influence of Soviet policies in Scandinavia and question whether stability in the region can be maintained in the face of its recently increased strategic importance.

The quiescence in the Nordic region masks its considerable complexity. The books under review present a number of regional and strategic perspectives on different but intersecting topics, and capture the mix of domestic and international politics specific to the region. Taken together, the key theme that emerges in these books is the role of traditional Nordic stability in the increasingly militarized Northern environment. This review will focus on the varying assessments of the role of the Nordic system in maintaining regional stability. Three issues are particularly salient: competing military alliances; Nordic domestic attitudes, particularly as reflected in the proposal for a Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone

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(NNWFZ). Before examining these topics, however, it is necessary to review the authors' perceptions of Nordic stability and patterns of Soviet policy toward the region.

AS THE Danish scholar, Erling Bjol, notes: "viewed from the outside, the Nordic countries have the character of geostrategic unity. From the inside, from within each of the Nordic countries, the perspective is rather different. Instead of unity you see diversity" (Jervell and Nyblom, Eds., p. 91). Swedish Defense Minister Anders Thunborg made a related point when he argued that the Nordic region "constitutes an area which is neither completely neutral nor completely aligned."[1] Bjol and Thunborg draw attention to an interesting feature of the region: the Nordic countries each have individual security policies, yet, these policies also interact to give a unique character to Nordic security. Norway, Denmark, and Iceland are founding members of NATO, although their membership in this alliance is qualified by self-imposed restraints regarding basing of troops and nuclear weapons. Sweden practices an armed neutrality, but is generally viewed as leaning toward NATO. Finland is also neutral but maintains a special relationship with the Soviet Union codified in their Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) Treaty signed in 1948. The unique character of Nordic regional security derives from the fact that, despite their differences, "the policy of each Nordic government is carried out with due regard to the interests of all the other Nordic countries" (Archer, Ed., p. 165). The themes of mutual consideration and close interaction run through practically all discussions of Nordic security; they also function extra-regionally in the security relations of the Nordic countries with outside powers, especially the United States and the Soviet Union (Lindahl, p. 23).

Differences among the authors reviewed here arise over the extent to which such interaction and sensitivity can continue in a changed security environment. The strongest view of Nordic interaction is contained in the Nordic balance theory.[2] The theory posits, in essence, that moves by one superpower or its alliance in the region will lead to a response from the opposing superpower or its alliance. For example, were the Soviet Union to enhance its ties with Finland, this action would precipitate the greater integration of Norway and Denmark into NATO. The Nordic balance theory can thus explain Soviet restraint toward Finland, as well as the restraints on Norway's involvement in NATO (which, according to the balance theory, would lead to increased Soviet ties with Helsinki). The Nordic balance theory has gained widespread favor among Norwegian scholars (Allison, p. 55).

John H. M. Hagard's *Nordic Security* argues that the balancing process among the Nordic countries is characterized by high degrees of sensitivity and interaction both among the countries of the region and between the region and the superpowers. However, like most authors reviewed here, he argues that something less than an automatic balance regulates their relations. Thus, he ascribes considerable value to the balancing mechanism as a means to regulate superpower tension by the regional powers. Hagard likens the mechanism to unilateral confidence-building measures (CBM's) taken out of "consideration for the situation and options of one or several of the other Nordic countries." As he notes: "This aspect of the Nordic security policy pattern is intended to dissuade the superpowers from increasing their involvement in the region" (Hagard, p. 5). Thus, Norway, for example, aside from its basing pledges, limits military exercises in Finnmark—its northern province on the Soviet border—and keeps its pre-positioned NATO equipment in central Norway where it poses a less dangerous threat to the USSR.

Although Clive Archer generally subscribes to the balance theory, he ascribes more importance to regional sensitivity to neighbors' security. However, in focusing mainly on the NATO Nordic countries, he uses deterrence and reassurance to analyze this sensitivity, rather than a balancing mechanism. Archer argues that while these countries need participation in NATO to deter Soviet aggressive intentions, they cannot allow their territories to pose a threat to Soviet security.

In contrast to the support the balance theory finds among the Norwegians, the Finns reject the notion of a balancing mechanism. As Roy Allison notes in *Finland's Relations with the Soviet Union, 1944–1984,* "the most that Finnish officials have conceded is that a balance exists in the North as a static regional condition between spheres of interest of the superpowers" (Allison, p. 55). Allison further points out that the Nordic balance concept is fundamentally at odds with the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line, as the postwar Finnish foreign and security policy is called. Accordingly, Finnish-Soviet relations operate primarily in a bilat-

[1]Anders Thunborg, "Neutral States and World Peace," Address to International Seminar for Diplomats, Klessheim, Austria, August 25, 1984, quoted in Hagard, p. 4. See also Thunborg's comments on states' alignments in "The Need to Maintain Sweden' s Defense Efforts," in Jervell and Nyblom, Eds., pp. 67–73.

[2]This theory is associated most strongly with the Norwegian scholar A. O. Brundtland. See A. O. Brundtland, "The Nordic Balance," *Cooperation and Conflict* (Stockholm), 1966 II, pp. 30–63.

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eral context, and Finland ensures its independence through its own efforts at neutrality. In turn, the success of Finland's neutral policies gives the Soviet Union no reason to interfere. Moreover, the Finns view Norway's and Denmark's limited participation in NATO as deriving from domestic political constraints within those countries, and not as a result of their concern for Finland (Allison, pp. 52–54). Quite naturally, as Allison points out, the Finns would not be interested in a theory that suggested the need for closer ties to the Soviet Union, should Norway pursue greater integration with the Atlantic Alliance.

ALTHOUGH the Soviet Union denies the validity of the Nordic balance theory, at times it too has acted with restraint. Certainly, Soviet policy toward these countries has at times reflected, if not satisfaction, then at least tolerance of the status quo. A comment by a former Norwegian correspondent to Moscow reflects the intermittently anodyne perceptions Moscow has of the Nordic situation:

At the public level, one hears that Finland has a policy of positive neutrality, that Sweden's neutrality is also commendable, although it could be improved in some respects, and that Norway and Denmark are basically decent nations, who have regrettably fallen into dubious company because they did not understand what was best for them.[3]

By contrast, Orjan Berner, in *Soviet Policies Toward the Nordic Countries,* points to periods of considerable tension between the Nordic countries and the USSR. Berner reviews the broad historical patterns of alternating tension, restraint, and accommodation that characterize Soviet policy toward the Nordic region. Berner is less interested in theoretical explanations—such as Nordic balance—than in assessing a few basic principles that seem to have guided Soviet policy. This work clearly demonstrates the value of historical perspective on the Nordic region, a quality it shares with Allison's book on Finland.

The predominant Soviet concern in the postwar period has been to minimize the Nordic countries' involvement with the Western alliance. The pattern that emerged in the postwar period was not predestined, as is shown by Berner's discussion of plans for a neutral Scandinavian Defense Union (SDU) in 1948–49. Soviet reaction to the SDU was entirely negative because Joseph Stalin believed that the organization would gravitate toward the Atlantic alliance. Although the Soviet Union was not responsible for the failure of the SDU, the episode points to a strong Soviet suspicion of Nordic neutrality. This suspicion is, however, tinged with ambivalence—after NATO had been established, the Soviet Union attempted to resurrect the idea of the SDU. The Nordic NATO countries quite naturally rejected Moscow's proposal.

Norway's and Denmark's integration into NATO in the early 1950's strained their relations with the USSR. A period of relaxation followed in 1955 with Moscow's efforts to foster détente with the Nordic countries. In the late 1950's, however, Danish and West German military cooperation in the Baltic became another source of considerable strain. A particularly sore point was the formation of the Combined Baltic Command in 1961, which created a joint military command between Denmark and West Germany for the Baltic.

Throughout the 1960's and 1970's, the Soviet Union had reason for general satisfaction with Sweden's neutral course, and indeed relations seemed to have achieved a reasonable degree of amity. Berner reviews Soviet commentary lauding Sweden for its international peace efforts, as well as analyses chiding it for the growth of its armed forces. As Berner explains, however, Moscow did not fear the size of the Swedish military per se, but rather its technological level, which created the potential for Stockolm's dependence on the American arms industry (Berner, p. 143). In this generally warm atmosphere, the Soviet submarine incursions and the renewed period of tension that ensued in the 1980's appear quite perplexing. Nevertheless, no permanent chill in relations has occurred between Sweden and the Soviet Union.

Denmark, despite its NATO membership, has developed fairly smooth relations with the Soviet Union since the 1960's. Copenhagen's policies have not proven to be major irritants to Moscow. Denmark maintains a low level of military spending within the alliance, and many Danes exhibit strong antinuclear sentiments (Berner, pp. 155–60). However, discordant notes arose in the early 1980's because of Danish participation in NATO exercises.

Although Iceland is the only Nordic country that allows permanent basing of American troops, its relations with Moscow generally have remained free of strain. More often, it has been the recipient of Soviet blandishments, such as a 1946 agreement to buy fish from Iceland, Soviet credits for purchasing fishing boats, and guarantees to respect Iceland's neutrality, should it leave NATO (Berner, pp. 70–71). At

[3]Per Egil Hegge, "The Soviet View of the Nordic Balance," *The Washington Quarterly* (Washington, DC), Summer 1979, p. 63, quoted in Lindahl, p. 28.

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times, the Soviet Union has taken a hostile tack and tried to exploit Icelandic anti-nuclear sentiments by charging that the United States stores nuclear weapons at Keflavik. The Icelandic government has repeatedly rejected the Soviet charges, although it is American policy to neither confirm nor deny the presence of such weapons.

It has fallen on Norway to receive the brunt of Soviet criticisms. Their underlying theme has been that cooperation with the United States is slowly but surely eroding Norway's pledge not to allow nuclear weapons on its territory. Norway occupies the pivotal strategic position for NATO in Northern Europe. Thus, of the three Nordic participants in NATO, Norway is the most integrated into the alliance. Moreover, in 1980, Norway agreed to pre-positioning of matériel for the US Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB), which involves the deployment of both aircraft and artillery capable of delivering conventional and nuclear weapons. Thus, so the Soviets claim, in a crisis situation, the United States would force Norway to abandon its non-nuclear pledge. Norway also maintains electronic intelligence-gathering and navigation stations that contribute to NATO command, control, and communications. In the Soviet view, this cooperation amounts to Norway's assimilation into NATO's nuclear command structure, despite the refusal to extend navigation assistance to US strategic nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN's) by the Norwegian government (Berner, pp. 170–77).

Media campaigns and diplomatic notes have been the main instruments through which the Soviet Union has addressed the Nordic countries. Berner argues that neither Moscow's carrots nor its sticks have achieved great success. The hard-line tactics have produced marginal accommodation at best. The blandishments may create an atmosphere of détente, but they have failed to sway the Nordic countries from their security policies (Berner, p. 84).

In Berner's view, the Soviet Union has consistently sought a *droit de regard* in the Nordic countries, at least over issues of basing policies and ties to the Western alliance. However, because both Norway and Denmark have limited their participation in NATO as a matter of self-imposed policy, the Soviet Union has no grounds to interfere. Although it has stopped short of direct interference, the Soviet Union has tried to prevent these countries' increased integration into NATO. Berner does not believe that the prevailing pattern is in immediate danger: "Whatever has preserved peace during the last decades—deterrence, parity, support for the status quo, or the absence of demands for dramatic change—might very well continue to work for the foreseeable future" (Berner, p. 184). Furthermore, despite Soviet attempts to test the Nordic countries' resolve to maintain their chosen security arrangements, Berner believes Soviet policies are also anchored in a tradition of restraint (Berner, p. 184).

A SECURE and non-hostile Finland constitutes the linchpin of Soviet policy in Northern Europe. Allison's book gives the most thorough examination to date of the Soviet-Finnish relationship. Allison's is a valuable analysis not least because of the often superficial treatment the relationship has received in the past. His account stresses the importance of historical circumstance and the Finnish character as major influences on Finnish policy.

In the immediate postwar period, the Finns adjusted to coexistence with the Soviet Union by means of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line: an active policy of giving careful consideration to Soviet security concerns. After the two wars Finland had fought with the USSR between 1939 and 1945, the Soviet leadership sought to ensure that Finland would never again attack the Soviet Union. In the reconstruction of relations after the war, the decisive point came in February 1948 when Stalin sent President J. K. Paasikivi of Finland a note calling for a treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual assistance between the two countries modeled on similar treaties just signed with Romania and Hungary. This action reverberated throughout the Nordic region and accelerated the Scandinavians' search for security arrangements, a point also discussed by Berner. In the end, Stalin accepted almost without change a very different version of the FCMA treaty proposed by Paasikivi. This outcome resulted from Stalin's preoccupation with the emerging cold war. In Allison's view, this preoccupation, coupled with demonstrated Finnish toughness, probably led Stalin to settle for a treaty that satisfied basic Soviet security needs relative to Finland. This explanation is shared by Berner and Lindahl.

Articles I and II are the most significant parts of the treaty. Article I states that if Germany or its allies attack the Soviet Union through Finland, Finland would fight to repel this attack, and Moscow would extend assistance as a result of mutual consultations. Article II states that the Helsinki and Moscow partners are to confer if the existence of such a threat is established.

The "note crisis" of 1961 provided further clarification of the FCMA treaty's mutual security provisions. During the tension surrounding the Berlin crisis, the Soviet Union sent a note to Finland claiming that the international situation warranted mili-

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tary consultations with Helsinki on the basis of Article II of the FCMA treaty. The crisis passed fairly quickly after Finnish President Urho Kekkonen visited Khrushchev and persuaded him that invoking the treaty would add to the "war psychosis" in the North (Allison, Ch. 2).

The "note crisis" became, in Allison's view, the main point of departure for Finnish security policy. As the central objective of his foreign policy, Kekkonen sought to persuade Moscow that Finland could reliably safeguard Soviet security interests. The Finns believed that once they had gained Soviet trust, Moscow would never again feel compelled to invoke Article II of the FCMA treaty. According to Allison, "it followed that both during the Note Crisis and in subsequent years Finnish leaders had to avoid creating the impression that Finland would be disinclined to activate Articles I and II of the treaty as such" (Allison, p. 58). In this sense, Finland's own interest lies in preventing threats to the Soviet Union from the Nordic quarter. Thus, the Finns have had to prove their reliability in protecting Soviet interests and, more importantly, to undertake concrete efforts aimed at precluding the emergence of such threatening situations.

Thus, Finland took on what has been pejoratively termed its watchdog role. Its promotion of the NNFZ proposal is the best example of this effort. Other examples of the "active neutrality" in which Kekkonen engaged to reduce tension included his playing host to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the SALT I talks. For a very small country with essentially little leverage in international politics, Finland managed to become an effective actor on the international stage.

Finland's active neutrality also highlighted divergent security interests in the region. Finland's security is best assured by keeping both superpowers at the greatest possible distance. The security of Norway and Denmark, by contrast, would weaken if the United States was kept too far away from the region (Lindahl, p. 105).

The stable and extremely friendly relations that have developed between the USSR and Finland are often taken as vindication of the Paasikivi-Kekkonen line. This policy has generally been identified with the term "Finlandization." Allison, however, finds little evidence to support the traditional understanding of Finlandization, which denotes the gradual loss of control over foreign and even domestic policies to the Soviet Union. Although the Soviet Union has interfered in Finland's domestic affairs, as Allison points out, such instances have been fairly limited in number. He also mentions Finnish self-censorship of subject matter offensive to Moscow, but the number of such cases is also small, and the standards for self-censorship recently have been relaxed (Allison, p. 164).

Regional security issues, however, eventually intruded into the very stable Finnish-Soviet relationship. In the late 1970's, the changing security environment revived Soviet concerns regarding Finland's fulfillment of its obligations under the FCMA treaty. Authoritative Soviet commentary began to suggest the reevaluation of the scope of the FCMA treaty and limitations on Finnish neutrality.

A specific Soviet concern was Finland's ability to defend its airspace (an issue that also troubled Sweden). As a neutral, and under the FCMA treaty, Finland is obliged to defend itself against weapons that may use its airspace and territory on their way to targets in the USSR. This problem became particularly acute in the late 1970's with the introduction of cruise-missile technology.

Throughout this period, the Finnish government refuted charges that its neutrality was being compromised and took steps to bolster its defense capabilities. This affair demonstrates that Soviet policy toward Finland will remain sensitive to the international environment. Allison aptly describes the episode's significance: "For Finns this underlined that the destiny and security of the nation were still inextricably bound to the constellation of forces in the Nordic region as a whole" (Allison, p. 70).

THE MILITARY situation in the Nordic region has changed greatly since the late 1930's, when the Soviet Union felt itself threatened by the proximity of Leningrad to the Finnish border. In the postwar period, the Soviet Union has clearly been the dominant power in the Baltic with control of most of its southern coastline. The shift of the headquarters of the Baltic fleet from Kronstadt to Kaliningrad, along with changes in military technology, obviated the need for Soviet control of access to the Gulf of Finland, thereby allowing the return of the leased base at Porkkala to Finland. Nevertheless, the Baltic, which represents, in effect, the northern flank of the central front in Europe, retains an extremely important place in Warsaw Pact and NATO planning. The Kola Peninsula, located east of Finland, however, has become the focus of military concern as the home base of the Soviet Northern Fleet and the most important locus of the Soviet Union's strategic reserve force.

In order to assess the kind of threat that the militarization of the Kola poses to Nordic stability, it is necessary to understand Soviet objectives in the region because they have been the driving factor in the

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military buildup. Tomas Ries's contribution to Clive Archer's *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters* is very useful in this regard because he clearly and thoroughly delineates Soviet strategic objectives and their effect on the regional military situation.

Some 60 percent of the Soviet SSBN fleet is based on the Kola, and although the missiles on these submarines are not directed at the Nordic countries, the presence of these submarines necessarily has an impact on regional security. The Kola is the best basing area for the SSBN fleet because the "the adjacent waters constitute the optimal operational concealment and launch stations for these forces" (Archer, Ed., p..91). Since the late 1970's, the SSBN base at Petropavlovsk on the Kamchatka Peninsula has increased in importance, but Kola will certainly remain preeminent because the most modern SSBN's are based there. Ries further notes that the Soviet Union clearly adopted a bastion strategy with these boats; that is, it has kept them in the northern waters and not on patrol off the US coast.

Furthermore, the Kola Peninsula is home for crucial air defense forces because it lies beneath the shortest route that can be taken by strategic bombers attempting to reach the western Soviet Union. The Arkhangel'sk Defense Sector has an essential role in defending the greatest concentrations of population, industry, and military forces in the Soviet Union. In addition, the Kola itself is a major strategic asset and requires sizable air defense.

What effect do these factors have on regional security? The defense of the Kola will focus on the Norwegian Sea because that sea is the main route to the Kola that NATO forces will use. Ries points to the fact that air defense forces stationed at Arkhangel'sk can cover the Norwegian Sea only with great difficulty. However, by seizing the airbases of northern Norway, Soviet airpower could be projected much farther south. A successful attack would require rapid force projection into northern Norway and the occupation of Norwegian airbases. In this regard, Ries notes a definite improvement in the conventional forces at Kola. Yet, the battle for the Norwegian Sea will be of crucial importance for NATO as well: control of the sea would give the Soviet Union easy access to NATO's sea lanes of communication (SLOC's), which are essential for resupply of the central front. The importance of the Kola Peninsula to Soviet strategic forces blurs the distinction between NATO's strategic requirements and the security requirements of the Nordic countries (particularly Norway). In other words, the militarization of the Kola Peninsula links the strategic security of NATO to the security of the Nordic countries.

Among the different works under review, a rather consistent picture emerges of the purpose of Soviet forces and the direction of Soviet strategy in the high north. Much more controversial is the American response to the Soviet military buildup. The interplay of strategic and regional considerations in the area makes it inevitable that superpower actions and reactions would be viewed as a threat to the Nordic equilibrium. Both Jervell and Nyblom's *The Military Buildup in the High North* and Archer's *The Soviet Union and Northern Waters* contain excellent discussions of the opposing points of view on this issue. The advantage of the former lies in the mix of differing perspectives offered by defense analysts and Nordic government officials. The relevant chapters in the Archer volume tend to present more focused analyses of the same issues in somewhat greater depth.

The debate centers around the US "maritime strategy"—introduced during the Reagan Administration—of aggressively confronting the Soviet Navy on a global scale. In the event of a war in Europe, the US Navy would adopt a forward strategy by attempting to contain the Soviet Navy in its home ports at Kola and in the Pacific in Petropavlovsk. Under the strategy, the US intends to "defeat Soviet maritime strength in all its dimensions, including base support."[4] Additionally, the US Navy will seek to degrade the Soviet SSBN fleet as much as possible. Although the maritime strategy is global in its orientation, it has clear implications for the Nordic region because of the importance of the Northern Fleet.

Assessments of potential dangers posed by the maritime strategy to Nordic stability depend, of course, on perceptions of the military interaction in the region. Hagard, for example, who has a fairly robust view of intra-regional dynamics, views with foreboding the evident arms race taking place in northern waters. He succinctly reviews the arms spiral in the region and finds that because neither superpower has yet adopted a permanent naval presence or patrolling activity in the northern waters (unlike in the Mediterranean), the curtailment of the escalation—given doctrinal changes—is possible. Along this line, Ries argues that because Kola regional forces have not been built up beyond defensive strength, perhaps in order not to overly alarm the Scandinavian countries, the preservation of stability on the regional level is possible. Steven Miller, by contrast, argues

[4]Special Supplement, "The Maritime Strategy," *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings* (Annapolis, MD), January 1986, p. 11, quoted in Archer, Ed., p. 30.

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that "it is time to set aside the comforting and persistent myth that Scandinavia is a region of stability and low tension" (Archer, Ed., p. 226). In other words, once the northern waters became vital to the Soviet Union's strategic force, then the nature of the Nordic countries' security problems had to change.

What is the balance on the regional level? John Ausland's *Nordic Security and the Great Powers* deals largely with regional interaction. Ausland understands, of course, the importance of the Norwegian Sea in the strategic competition. However, he pays considerably less attention to distinctions between regional and strategic objectives. Although Ausland regards control of the Norwegian Sea as the primary regional issue, he spends much of the book comparing the Nordic countries, both individually and as part of NATO, to the Warsaw Pact. Ausland's chief purpose is to highlight the weaknesses of NATO's Nordic members and Sweden, and he is not optimistic about the odds NATO faces. Ausland underscores NATO's failure to keep pace with Moscow's conventional buildup.

Ausland's book contains appropriate prescriptions for redressing weaknesses on the regional level. However, because Ausland does not provide a clear analysis of Soviet strategy, it is difficult to assess the value of the Scandinavian peninsula as a Soviet military objective, and therefore, the requirements for deterrence. Carl Bildt, in "The Defense Efforts of Nordic Countries," in the Jervell and Nyblom volume, is much more sanguine about deterring a Soviet invasion of the Scandinavian peninsula. He points out how the geography heavily favors defenders in the Troms area (a narrow coast of mountains and fjords) of northern Norway, should a conventional attack come from the Kola through Finnmark. Given NATO reinforcement with the MAB and F–16's flown into the airbases in northern Norway, Bildt argues that a credible defense of the area is possible.

The Soviet military also has the option of crossing Finnish Lapland and Sweden to attack Norway. Bildt acknowledges that the Swedish army has shrunk in recent years and that the Finnish army has limitations as well. However, both armies have units and tactics well-suited to the terrain, with which they are naturally very familiar. This terrain, moreover, has a poor road network, and therefore it is not conducive to mechanized attack forces.

Furthermore, the Soviets, in initiating conventional warfare in Scandinavia, would have to weigh very carefully the possibility of bringing Sweden and its formidable air force into a war on the side of NATO. As a number of analysts note, the defense of the Kola is a strategic priority whose security might be endangered rather than enhanced by attacking Norway (Berger, p. 167). In the southern Baltic, a Soviet amphibious attack on Denmark and southern Norway—and possibly southern Sweden as well—has been suggested as a possible scenario. Robert Weinland's "The Soviet Naval Buildup in the North: A Reassessment" in the Jervell and Nyblom volume discusses this option. The USSR would gain apparent advantages by seizing control of Denmark and using it for the forward basing of aircraft. Soviet occupation of Denmark would effectively outflank NATO air defense on the central front and pose an extremely serious threat to the SLOC's even without Soviet control of the Norwegian Sea. Weinland presents this scenario as a potential Soviet option and does not discuss its likelihood of success. Bildt sees considerable deterrent capability in the recent modernization of West German, Danish and Swedish forces that would defend these areas. Ultimately, the likelihood of a Soviet conventional attack depends on Moscow's assessments of the value of forward air bases, which clearly have increased in importance. Yet, at the same time, NATO airpower has also improved.

Berner and Weinland discuss the Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish waters in the context of a possible Soviet attack on Sweden. Since the Soviet Whiskey class submarine ran aground off the Karlskrona military installation in 1981, submarine incursions have become the most visible aspect of Soviet policy in the region. A number of reported incursions have taken place since 1981. In the wake of the 1981 incident, the Swedish government mustered support for an increase in its defense budget together with the reinforcement of its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. Additionally, the incursions certainly drew the public's attention to the salience of the Soviet threat. The increased military importance of Scandinavia has meant that the Soviet Union has had to include the Baltic as well as the Norwegian Sea in its military planning. Both Weinland and Berner view the submarine incursions as examples of contingency planning for an attack on Sweden. A similar purpose might also underlie Soviet incursions into the Norwegian fjords.

An interpretation of the Soviet incursions that places more weight on political considerations merits attention. Steve Lindberg, for example, has argued that once Stockholm discovered the incursions, their military utility would have declined thanks to the adoption of Swedish countermeasures.[5] Although the incursions might have begun as a purely military exercise, once discovered, their political value might well have risen. In the in-

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creasing tension of the early 1980's, the incursions provided a means to remind Sweden of its neutrality and the importance the Soviet Union attaches to its security interests in the Baltic. Lindberg further argues that the costs of continuing the incursions are low relative to the message they send. In his view, the incursions are the equivalent of the subtle signals sent to Finland in the late 1970's—clear reminders that within a framework of essentially stable relations, Moscow is still very sensitive to perceived adverse security conditions in the North.

ONE OF the more distinctive features of the Nordic countries is the degree to which domestic politics and security policies intersect. As Ausland comments, "nuclear weapons and arms control have become a part of the fabric of domestic politics" (Ausland, p. 55). The publics in all the Nordic countries consistently support their governments' security policies. However, as Clive Archer points out, this support is not uncritical. Although the Danish public supports the country's defense policies, it is very reluctant to fund them. Norwegians and Danes received NATO's decision to deploy intermediate-range nuclear forces with considerable criticism. In general, the Nordic peoples maintain a strong dislike of nuclear weapons (Archer, Ed., p. 174).

The Nordic nuclear-weapons-free-zone proposal provides a particularly apt illustration of domestic influence on Nordic security policies. First brought up in the 1950's, the NNWFZ might be considered the hardy perennial of arms control proposals. It was formally launched by Kekkonen in 1963 as part of his efforts at active neutrality in the aftermath of the "note crisis." The immediate rejection of the NNWFZ proposal in the region was understandable, given its incompatibility with Norway's and Denmark's NATO membership. In addition, the Soviet Union—the only state in the region with nuclear weapons—spurned the proposal. Moscow also held firmly against an extension of the NNWFZ to the Baltic because this coverage would have prohibited the use of that sea by Soviet warships carrying nuclear arms. The states affected by the proposal had no nuclear weapons and no plans to acquire them. The NNWFZ proposal would simply have "de-nuclearized" a region devoid of nuclear weapons.

The revival of the cold war between the US and the Soviet Union and the consequent increased tension in Europe, which culminated in NATO's decision to deploy cruise missiles and Pershing II missiles, made the NNWFZ more appealing to the publics and political leaderships of the Nordic countries. For example, the Norwegian Social Democratic Party gradually adopted the NNWFZ as part of its platform, although it made the implementation of the proposal contingent on broader European disarmament. As Ingemar Lindahl points out in *The Soviet Union and the Nordic Nuclear-Weapons-Free-Zone Proposal,* the Social Democratic Party's policy has created the perception that the Norwegian government is severely constrained in exercising the option to acquire nuclear weapons, even in war.

According to Lindahl, the dynamic at work in the NNWFZ proposal and its warm support from the Soviet Union pits two political cultures against one other. He identifies a democratic and rational Nordic culture that abhors nuclear weapons and the possibility of nuclear war. Nordic traditions of neutrality and aloofness from the rest of Europe reinforce this attitude. The Nordic countries' neighbor to the east, however, is a distinctly different international actor, one that is not bound by public opinion and hence can use arms control cynically to manipulate public opinion in other countries. Lindahl, indeed, considers the Nordic populations to be particularly susceptible to such manipulation.

For Lindahl, like Berner, the basic objective of Soviet policy in the 1970's and 1980's has been the attempt to gain a *droit de regard* in Nordic affairs. In contrast to Berner, however, Lindahl views the Soviet Union as much less willing to accept the status quo. The intrusiveness of the NNWFZ measures would preclude Copenhagen's and Oslo's membership in NATO. Accordingly, Lindahl argues that Moscow seeks to use the NNWFZ proposal to force Norway and Denmark into de facto neutrality.

Lindahl uses the Soviet promotion of the NNFZ proposal as a prism for interpreting Soviet foreign policy toward the Nordic region. He argues that Marxism and Great Russian nationalism motivate Soviet foreign policy, leading Moscow to claim great-power prerogatives in relation to the interests of small states (Lindahl, pp. 186, 188; Ch. 3, passim). In this sense, Lindahl's portrayal of Soviet policy resembles the Stalinist "two-camp doctrine": the view that the international system is characterized by the unremitting struggle of capitalism against socialism. Consequently, he contends that Moscow does not fully accept the legitimacy of neutral status. Thus, were Norway and Denmark to adopt neutrality, the Soviet Union would continue to pressure them to to accomodate Soviet security interests.

[5]Steve Lindberg, "Submarine Incursions for Political Consumption," *Nordic Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (Uppsala), Vol. 4, No. 1, 1987, pp. 61–77.

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Perceptions of the NNWFZ tend to reflect the assumptions of these authors' about regional politics and Soviet foreign policy. Ausland for example, with his emphasis on deterrence rather than reassurance, regards the proposal as "a residue of the myth of Nordic unity" (Ausland, p. 193). Hagard, by contrast, views the proposal as the logical extension of the confidence-building measures inherent in the Nordic security pattern. Judging from Lindahl's analysis of Soviet policy, however, stability has never truly been a feature of the Nordic region. Therefore, in Lindahl's view, the Nordic public attitude that associates the NNWFZ with Nordic stability and Hagard's understanding of the NNWFZ as an enhanced confidence-building measure are, for the most part, delusory (Lindahl, pp. 190–94).

IN THE past decade, natural-resource exploitation in the Barents Sea has become yet another issue that bears upon Soviet foreign policy concerns. The growing Soviet perception of economic benefits from these resources is shared by other states in the region. The potential economic importance of the Barents puts a premium on reinforcing patterns of cooperation and stable relations. At the same time, it increases the possibility for conflict. The problem of resource exploitation in the Barents mainly concerns petroleum exploration, although it also pertains to fisheries.

Both David Scrivener's "Soviet Fisheries and Offshore Oil Exploration in the Barents Sea," in the Archer collection, and Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng's *Soviet Oil and Security Interests in the Barents Sea* discuss Soviet efforts to explore off-shore oil reserves. These efforts entail substantial purchases of Western drilling equipment, extensive seismic tests in the Barents, and the spudding of a limited number of wells.

The Soviet Union faces several difficult dilemmas should it pursue oil exploration in the Barents. The chief problem centers on the fact that the Barents is quite shallow, and therefore a little less than 70 percent of its area is capable of stationing the large Delta and Typhoon SSBN's. Given the fact that the SSBN's must share the sea with attack submarines fulfilling an ASW role, the result is a "strategic traffic jam."[6]

The Soviet Navy's use of the Barents as a permanent area of deployment is unlikely. The Arctic Ocean and Norwegian Sea are much more effective SSBN bastions. However, because a large percentage of Soviet SSBN's remain in port at any given time, they must be rapidly dispersed during crises. Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng conclude that "the Barents Sea is thus primarily to be considered a crisis and reserve stationing area for the port-based part of the SSBN fleet" (Bergesen, et al., p. 77). Problems arise because the areas between Norway and the Bear Islands and between Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land are the only two points of egress from the Barents into the other regions. Soviet SSBN's would be forced to escape their bastions through these narrow points of egress, thus giving rise to a channeling effect that creates significant advantages for NATO ASW efforts (Bergesen, et al., p. 82).

Oil exploration and economic activity would further complicate operation of strategic vessels in the Barents and could increase the channeling effect. Furthermore, the presence of oil drilling platforms introduces an element of uncertainty into security calculations. Yet, oil platforms could offer increased intelligence opportunities and generate a considerable amount of noise, thereby complicating NATO ASW.

Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng's analysis suggests that if the Soviet leadership decides to proceed with oil exploration in the Barents, it will face two problems that affect the Nordic area. First, the USSR will have to accord priority to either the military or the economic exploitation of the Barents. Choice of the latter may entail opposition from the military leadership. Second, the Soviet Union will likely need assistance from the Nordic countries—particularly Norway—to explore for oil in the Barents. Therefore, decreasing political tension in the region and reinforcing patterns of cooperation will assume new importance. Soviet diplomatic démarches highly critical of one or more of the Nordic countries—such as occurred in the past—could now have economic costs.

Since the 1970's, Norway and the Soviet Union have been involved in a jurisdictional dispute over 45,000 square nautical miles of the Barents Sea shelf. This area has proven economic value for the Norwegian fishing industry, which takes a large portion of its annual catch from the Barents. It may also hold significant oil reserves. In January 1978, both countries signed the so-called Grey Zone agreement regulating use of this region. The agreement's annual renewal demonstrates the success Norway and the USSR have had thus far at limited cooperation and at keeping the dispute low-key (Archer, Ed., p. 47). Effective future management of resources, however, will require that current cooperation lead to long-term resolution of this issue.

THE Soviet Union will probably continue to take an active interest in

[6]Harriet Critchley, "Canadian Security Policy in the Arctic. The Context for the Future," (mimeograph), quoted in Bergesen, Moe, and Østreng, p. 76.

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Nordic politics, especially the NNWFZ. The region's interdependence and dislike of nuclear weapons seem tailor-made for Mikhail Gorbachev's public diplomacy and regional security proposals. On October 1, 1987, Gorbachev gave a speech in Murmansk promoting the NNWFZ and stating that the Soviet Union would act as its guarantor, regardless of the stance of the other powers. If this zone is established, Moscow promises to withdraw its ballistic missile submarines from the Baltic (six submarines with a total of 18 missiles). Given the constraints imposed by NATO, however, it is unlikely that Oslo and Copenhagen will quickly take up Gorbachev's proposals.

Gorbachev also promised Soviet flexibility toward CBM's in the Baltic and in the northern waters.[7] Several of the works—especially Ausland's *Nordic Security* and Geoffrey Till's chapter in the Archer volume—believe that CBM's are particularly appropriate for the Nordic area. Till regards CBM's as especially valuable for a region that has such an important role in the US maritime strategy. Thus, one conclusion that emerges from a number of these works is that the increased use of CBM's could maintain some form of traditional Nordic stability as well as lessen tension. The Nordic countries appear to be evolving toward a greater use of confidence-building measures to undergird this stability, an approach probably influenced by the successful conclusion of the Stockholm Conference in 1986. This conference—a follow-on to the CSCE—established CBM's regarding notification and observation of military exercises in Europe.

Another interpretation presented in the books under review is also plausible. The evidence points to a high degree of regional interaction, and the different states of the region remain very sensitive to shifts in each other's security policies. But as Soviet policy toward Finland in the 1970's and Soviet submarine incursions into Swedish and Norwegian waters in the 1980's showed, not all interaction restores a balance or enhances stability. Interaction may indeed reflect a spiral of increasing tension.

A third interpretation—that of Berner—argues that past restraints, even those felt by Moscow, will remain the pattern in the future. Yet even if Berner is correct, regional dynamics will nonetheless continue to make the Nordic region an area of fruitful scholarly research.

[7] See Yuri Deryabin, "The Echo of Murmansk," *International Affairs* (Moscow), June 1988, pp. 36–47; and Andrei Anatolyev and Yevgeni Nadezhdin, "Northern Europe—An Invitation to a Dialogue," ibid., December 1987, pp. 82–86.

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